CWE-352
AllowedCross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Abstraction: Compound · Status: Stable
The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.
14157 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-X2F7-HH2H-82C7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-19 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:32Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Creative Motion Disable Admin Notices individually allows Cross Site Request Forgery.This issue affects Disable Admin Notices individually: from n/a through 1.3.5.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-52420"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-19T17:15:55Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Creative Motion Disable Admin Notices individually allows Cross Site Request Forgery.This issue affects Disable Admin Notices individually: from n/a through 1.3.5.",
"id": "GHSA-x2f7-hh2h-82c7",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:32:34Z",
"published": "2024-11-19T18:31:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-52420"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/disable-admin-notices/vulnerability/wordpress-disable-admin-notices-individually-plugin-1-3-5-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/disable-admin-notices/wordpress-disable-admin-notices-individually-plugin-1-3-5-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X2FW-RVP7-JWXC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-20 12:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:32Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Edush Maxim GoogleDrive folder list allows Stored XSS.This issue affects GoogleDrive folder list: from n/a through 2.2.2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-49335"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-20T10:15:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Edush Maxim GoogleDrive folder list allows Stored XSS.This issue affects GoogleDrive folder list: from n/a through 2.2.2.",
"id": "GHSA-x2fw-rvp7-jwxc",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:32:07Z",
"published": "2024-10-20T12:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49335"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/googledrive-folder-list/vulnerability/wordpress-googledrive-folder-list-plugin-2-2-2-csrf-to-stored-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/googledrive-folder-list/wordpress-googledrive-folder-list-plugin-2-2-2-csrf-to-stored-cross-site-scripting-xss-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X2GQ-6C9P-44P8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-13 03:32 – Updated: 2026-01-13 03:32Due to a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in SAP Fiori App Intercompany Balance Reconciliation an attacker could execute state?changing actions using an inappropriate request type, this deviation from expected request semantics may allow an attacker to trigger unintended actions on behalf of an authenticated user causing low impact on integrity of the system. This has no impact on confidentiality and availability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-0493"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-13T02:15:51Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Due to a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in SAP Fiori App Intercompany Balance Reconciliation an attacker could execute state?changing actions using an inappropriate request type, this deviation from expected request semantics may allow an attacker to trigger unintended actions on behalf of an authenticated user causing low impact on integrity of the system. This has no impact on confidentiality and availability.",
"id": "GHSA-x2gq-6c9p-44p8",
"modified": "2026-01-13T03:32:08Z",
"published": "2026-01-13T03:32:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0493"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://me.sap.com/notes/3655229"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://url.sap/sapsecuritypatchday"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X2M8-4X5H-2R66
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-27 15:30 – Updated: 2023-03-31 03:30Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Pankaj Jha WordPress Ping Optimizer plugin <= 2.35.1.2.3 versions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-30705"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-03-27T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Pankaj Jha WordPress Ping Optimizer plugin \u003c= 2.35.1.2.3 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-x2m8-4x5h-2r66",
"modified": "2023-03-31T03:30:31Z",
"published": "2023-03-27T15:30:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-30705"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/wordpress-ping-optimizer/wordpress-ping-optimizer-plugin-2-35-1-2-3-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X2P9-GM8G-4XVP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-15 21:30 – Updated: 2023-02-24 18:30Media CP Media Control Panel latest version. CSRF possible through unspecified endpoint.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-23465"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-15T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Media CP Media Control Panel latest version. CSRF possible through unspecified endpoint.",
"id": "GHSA-x2p9-gm8g-4xvp",
"modified": "2023-02-24T18:30:27Z",
"published": "2023-02-15T21:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23465"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/faq/cve_advisories"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X2PF-FGMW-JW47
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:47 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:47Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in blogs/admin.php in b2evolution before 4.1.7 allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators for requests that conduct SQL injection attacks via the show_statuses[] parameter, related to CVE-2013-2945.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2013-7352"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-04-02T18:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in blogs/admin.php in b2evolution before 4.1.7 allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication of administrators for requests that conduct SQL injection attacks via the show_statuses[] parameter, related to CVE-2013-2945.",
"id": "GHSA-x2pf-fgmw-jw47",
"modified": "2022-05-17T04:47:54Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:47:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7352"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.htbridge.com/advisory/HTB23152"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2013-05/0004.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://b2evolution.net/news/2013/04/29/b2evolution-4-1-7-and-5-0-3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/show/osvdb/92906"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/121481/b2evolution-4.1.6-SQL-Injection.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-X2PV-FPH3-PHFX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-29 15:31 – Updated: 2025-11-05 20:53Jenkins Nexus Task Runner Plugin 0.9.2 and earlier does not perform a permission check in an HTTP endpoint.
This allows attackers with Overall/Read permission to connect to an attacker-specified URL using attacker-specified username and password.
Additionally, this endpoint does not require POST requests, resulting in a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability.
As of publication of this advisory, there is no fix.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:nexus-task-runner"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.9.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-64141"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-29T22:05:30Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-29T14:15:58Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Jenkins Nexus Task Runner Plugin 0.9.2 and earlier does not perform a permission check in an HTTP endpoint.\n\nThis allows attackers with Overall/Read permission to connect to an attacker-specified URL using attacker-specified username and password.\n\nAdditionally, this endpoint does not require POST requests, resulting in a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability.\n\nAs of publication of this advisory, there is no fix.",
"id": "GHSA-x2pv-fph3-phfx",
"modified": "2025-11-05T20:53:16Z",
"published": "2025-10-29T15:31:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64141"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2025-10-29/#SECURITY-3550"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/10/29/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Jenkins Nexus Task Runner Plugin vulnerable to cross-site request forgery"
}
GHSA-X2PW-9C38-CP2J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 23:12 – Updated: 2026-04-24 20:32Summary
Multiple AVideo JSON endpoints under objects/ accept state-changing requests via $_REQUEST/$_GET and persist changes tied to the caller's session user, without any anti-CSRF token, origin check, or referer check. A malicious page visited by a logged-in victim can silently:
- Cast/flip the victim's like/dislike on any comment (
objects/comments_like.json.php). - Post a comment authored by the victim on any video, with attacker-chosen text (
objects/commentAddNew.json.php). - Delete assets from any category (
objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php) when the victim has category management rights.
Each endpoint is reachable from a browser via a simple <img src="…"> tag or form submission, so exploitation only requires the victim to load an attacker-controlled HTML resource.
Details
AVideo exposes a helper, forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest() (objects/functionsSecurity.php:138), that rejects cross-origin requests when the Referer/Origin does not match webSiteRootURL. It is only invoked in one file in the tree — objects/userUpdate.json.php:18 — and is not applied to the endpoints below. There is also an isGlobalTokenValid() helper (objects/functions.php:2313) intended for CSRF-style token checks; none of the affected endpoints call it. allowOrigin() only sets CORS response headers and does not prevent cookie-bearing top-level or image requests from reaching the server.
1. objects/comments_like.json.php — CSRF → forced like/dislike
// objects/comments_like.json.php
15: if (empty($_POST['comments_id']) && !empty($_GET['comments_id'])) {
16: $_POST['comments_id'] = $_GET['comments_id'];
17: }
18:
19: $like = new CommentsLike($_GET['like'], $_POST['comments_id']);
20: echo json_encode(CommentsLike::getLikes($_POST['comments_id']));
The endpoint deliberately promotes $_GET['comments_id'] to $_POST['comments_id'] so the call works for either verb. CommentsLike::__construct (objects/comments_like.php:18) reads User::getId(), calls load() to fetch any prior vote, then setLike() + save() — issuing an INSERT/UPDATE on comments_likes keyed to the session user (objects/comments_like.php:70-89). There is no token check and no origin check.
2. objects/commentAddNew.json.php — CSRF → forced comment posting
// objects/commentAddNew.json.php
34: if (!User::canComment()) {
35: $obj->msg = __("Permission denied");
36: die(json_encode($obj));
37: }
...
117: $objC = new Comment($_REQUEST['comment'], $_REQUEST['video']);
118: $objC->setComments_id_pai($_REQUEST['comments_id']);
...
124: $obj->comments_id = $objC->save();
All inputs come from $_REQUEST, so GET is fully supported. The only gate is User::canComment(), which is true for ordinary logged-in users. isCommentASpam() (lines 39–97) is a per-session rate limiter, not a CSRF defense — it accounts the victim's own session bucket, so it does not block a single forged write. The comment is persisted under the victim's users_id via $objC->save().
3. objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php — CSRF → forced deletion of category assets
// objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php
14: $obj->id = intval(@$_REQUEST['id']);
15:
16: if (!Category::canCreateCategory()) {
17: $obj->msg = __("Permission denied");
18: die(json_encode($obj));
19: }
20:
21: if (!Category::deleteAssets($obj->id)) {
22: $obj->error = false;
23: ...
State-destroying operation reachable by GET with no CSRF defense. The attacker can enumerate category ids with a loop of <img> tags — every one fires a credentialed request.
Root cause (shared)
All three endpoints follow the same pattern: objects/*.json.php handler that (a) reads mutating parameters from $_REQUEST/$_GET, (b) performs authorization against the victim's session, and (c) writes to the database — without calling forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(), without validating a CSRF token, and without any SameSite mitigation in the session cookie set by AVideo's auth layer. Any logged-in victim loading an attacker-controlled HTML resource is sufficient.
PoC
Preconditions: attacker controls a page the victim loads while logged into the target AVideo instance. Cookies are sent by default on cross-site <img>/top-level GETs.
Variant A — comments_like.json.php (force a downvote on comment id 10)
Attacker page:
<img src="https://victim.example.com/objects/comments_like.json.php?like=-1&comments_id=10" style="display:none">
Manual verification:
curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<victim-session>' \
'https://victim.example.com/objects/comments_like.json.php?like=-1&comments_id=10'
# → {"comments_id":10,"likes":...,"dislikes":...,"myVote":-1}
# Row inserted/updated in `comments_likes` with users_id = victim.
Variant B — commentAddNew.json.php (force victim to post a phishing comment on video 123)
Attacker page:
<img src="https://victim.example.com/objects/commentAddNew.json.php?comment=Check+out+my+free+giveaway+https%3A%2F%2Fattacker.example%2Fscam&video=123" style="display:none">
Manual verification:
curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<victim-session>' \
'https://victim.example.com/objects/commentAddNew.json.php?comment=phish&video=123'
# → {"error":false,"comments_id":<id>,"msg":"Your comment has been saved!",...}
Variant C — categoryDeleteAssets.json.php (force a category admin to delete assets on category 1)
Attacker page (enumerate several ids):
<img src="https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php?id=1">
<img src="https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php?id=2">
<img src="https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php?id=3">
Manual verification:
curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<category-admin-session>' \
'https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php?id=1'
# → {"error":false,"msg":"","id":1}
# Assets for category 1 are removed.
Impact
- Integrity of social signals: Attackers can flip any logged-in user's likes/dislikes to upvote attacker comments or downvote legitimate comments at scale (driven by whichever users visit the attacker page). Because the endpoint accepts
like=-1|0|1, arbitrary vote states can be forced. - Identity abuse via forced comments: An attacker can cause any logged-in user with comment permission to "post" attacker-controlled text on any video. This enables impersonation, phishing link injection under a trusted account, harassment of third parties in a victim's name, and (if the victim is a moderator/admin) endorsement-shaped content in a privileged voice.
- Data loss: Any user with
canCreateCategory()who visits an attacker page can be made to silently delete assets belonging to arbitrary categories. Since category ids are small integers, a loop of<img>tags can cover the full category space in one page load.
No special configuration is required; AVideo's default session cookie lacks a SameSite=Lax/Strict protection that would independently blunt the attack, and none of the affected endpoints verifies origin or token.
Recommended Fix
- Call the existing
forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()helper at the top of every mutatingobjects/*.json.phphandler (the same pattern already used inobjects/userUpdate.json.php):
// objects/comments_like.json.php (add near line 9)
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/functionsSecurity.php';
forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();
// objects/commentAddNew.json.php (add after configuration.php include)
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/functionsSecurity.php';
forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();
// objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php (add after configuration.php include)
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'objects/functionsSecurity.php';
forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();
-
Require
$_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'POST'(orDELETE) for state-changing operations and stop promoting$_GET['comments_id']→$_POST['comments_id']incomments_like.json.php:15-17. -
Validate a per-session CSRF token on all mutating endpoints using the existing
isGlobalTokenValid()/getToken()helpers (objects/functions.php:2313), rejecting requests whoseglobalTokenis missing or invalid. -
As defense in depth, set the session cookie with
SameSite=Lax(orStrict) in the AVideo session initialization, so cross-site navigational GETs do not carry the session cookie even if a handler regresses.
Applying (1) alone closes all three reported variants; (2)–(4) harden the surface against variants of the same pattern in other objects/*.json.php handlers.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "29.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40928"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T23:12:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T23:16:20Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nMultiple AVideo JSON endpoints under `objects/` accept state-changing requests via `$_REQUEST`/`$_GET` and persist changes tied to the caller\u0027s session user, without any anti-CSRF token, origin check, or referer check. A malicious page visited by a logged-in victim can silently:\n\n1. Cast/flip the victim\u0027s like/dislike on any comment (`objects/comments_like.json.php`).\n2. Post a comment authored by the victim on any video, with attacker-chosen text (`objects/commentAddNew.json.php`).\n3. Delete assets from any category (`objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php`) when the victim has category management rights.\n\nEach endpoint is reachable from a browser via a simple `\u003cimg src=\"\u2026\"\u003e` tag or form submission, so exploitation only requires the victim to load an attacker-controlled HTML resource.\n\n## Details\n\nAVideo exposes a helper, `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()` (`objects/functionsSecurity.php:138`), that rejects cross-origin requests when the `Referer`/`Origin` does not match `webSiteRootURL`. It is only invoked in one file in the tree \u2014 `objects/userUpdate.json.php:18` \u2014 and is *not* applied to the endpoints below. There is also an `isGlobalTokenValid()` helper (`objects/functions.php:2313`) intended for CSRF-style token checks; none of the affected endpoints call it. `allowOrigin()` only sets CORS response headers and does not prevent cookie-bearing top-level or image requests from reaching the server.\n\n### 1. `objects/comments_like.json.php` \u2014 CSRF \u2192 forced like/dislike\n\n```php\n// objects/comments_like.json.php\n15: if (empty($_POST[\u0027comments_id\u0027]) \u0026\u0026 !empty($_GET[\u0027comments_id\u0027])) {\n16: $_POST[\u0027comments_id\u0027] = $_GET[\u0027comments_id\u0027];\n17: }\n18:\n19: $like = new CommentsLike($_GET[\u0027like\u0027], $_POST[\u0027comments_id\u0027]);\n20: echo json_encode(CommentsLike::getLikes($_POST[\u0027comments_id\u0027]));\n```\n\nThe endpoint deliberately promotes `$_GET[\u0027comments_id\u0027]` to `$_POST[\u0027comments_id\u0027]` so the call works for either verb. `CommentsLike::__construct` (`objects/comments_like.php:18`) reads `User::getId()`, calls `load()` to fetch any prior vote, then `setLike()` + `save()` \u2014 issuing an `INSERT`/`UPDATE` on `comments_likes` keyed to the session user (`objects/comments_like.php:70-89`). There is no token check and no origin check.\n\n### 2. `objects/commentAddNew.json.php` \u2014 CSRF \u2192 forced comment posting\n\n```php\n// objects/commentAddNew.json.php\n34: if (!User::canComment()) {\n35: $obj-\u003emsg = __(\"Permission denied\");\n36: die(json_encode($obj));\n37: }\n...\n117: $objC = new Comment($_REQUEST[\u0027comment\u0027], $_REQUEST[\u0027video\u0027]);\n118: $objC-\u003esetComments_id_pai($_REQUEST[\u0027comments_id\u0027]);\n...\n124: $obj-\u003ecomments_id = $objC-\u003esave();\n```\n\nAll inputs come from `$_REQUEST`, so GET is fully supported. The only gate is `User::canComment()`, which is true for ordinary logged-in users. `isCommentASpam()` (lines 39\u201397) is a per-session rate limiter, not a CSRF defense \u2014 it accounts the victim\u0027s own session bucket, so it does not block a single forged write. The comment is persisted under the victim\u0027s `users_id` via `$objC-\u003esave()`.\n\n### 3. `objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php` \u2014 CSRF \u2192 forced deletion of category assets\n\n```php\n// objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php\n14: $obj-\u003eid = intval(@$_REQUEST[\u0027id\u0027]);\n15:\n16: if (!Category::canCreateCategory()) {\n17: $obj-\u003emsg = __(\"Permission denied\");\n18: die(json_encode($obj));\n19: }\n20:\n21: if (!Category::deleteAssets($obj-\u003eid)) {\n22: $obj-\u003eerror = false;\n23: ...\n```\n\nState-destroying operation reachable by GET with no CSRF defense. The attacker can enumerate category ids with a loop of `\u003cimg\u003e` tags \u2014 every one fires a credentialed request.\n\n### Root cause (shared)\n\nAll three endpoints follow the same pattern: `objects/*.json.php` handler that (a) reads mutating parameters from `$_REQUEST`/`$_GET`, (b) performs authorization against the victim\u0027s session, and (c) writes to the database \u2014 without calling `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`, without validating a CSRF token, and without any `SameSite` mitigation in the session cookie set by AVideo\u0027s auth layer. Any logged-in victim loading an attacker-controlled HTML resource is sufficient.\n\n## PoC\n\nPreconditions: attacker controls a page the victim loads while logged into the target AVideo instance. Cookies are sent by default on cross-site `\u003cimg\u003e`/top-level GETs.\n\n### Variant A \u2014 comments_like.json.php (force a downvote on comment id 10)\n\nAttacker page:\n```html\n\u003cimg src=\"https://victim.example.com/objects/comments_like.json.php?like=-1\u0026comments_id=10\" style=\"display:none\"\u003e\n```\n\nManual verification:\n```bash\ncurl -b \u0027PHPSESSID=\u003cvictim-session\u003e\u0027 \\\n \u0027https://victim.example.com/objects/comments_like.json.php?like=-1\u0026comments_id=10\u0027\n# \u2192 {\"comments_id\":10,\"likes\":...,\"dislikes\":...,\"myVote\":-1}\n# Row inserted/updated in `comments_likes` with users_id = victim.\n```\n\n### Variant B \u2014 commentAddNew.json.php (force victim to post a phishing comment on video 123)\n\nAttacker page:\n```html\n\u003cimg src=\"https://victim.example.com/objects/commentAddNew.json.php?comment=Check+out+my+free+giveaway+https%3A%2F%2Fattacker.example%2Fscam\u0026video=123\" style=\"display:none\"\u003e\n```\n\nManual verification:\n```bash\ncurl -b \u0027PHPSESSID=\u003cvictim-session\u003e\u0027 \\\n \u0027https://victim.example.com/objects/commentAddNew.json.php?comment=phish\u0026video=123\u0027\n# \u2192 {\"error\":false,\"comments_id\":\u003cid\u003e,\"msg\":\"Your comment has been saved!\",...}\n```\n\n### Variant C \u2014 categoryDeleteAssets.json.php (force a category admin to delete assets on category 1)\n\nAttacker page (enumerate several ids):\n```html\n\u003cimg src=\"https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php?id=1\"\u003e\n\u003cimg src=\"https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php?id=2\"\u003e\n\u003cimg src=\"https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php?id=3\"\u003e\n```\n\nManual verification:\n```bash\ncurl -b \u0027PHPSESSID=\u003ccategory-admin-session\u003e\u0027 \\\n \u0027https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php?id=1\u0027\n# \u2192 {\"error\":false,\"msg\":\"\",\"id\":1}\n# Assets for category 1 are removed.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Integrity of social signals:** Attackers can flip any logged-in user\u0027s likes/dislikes to upvote attacker comments or downvote legitimate comments at scale (driven by whichever users visit the attacker page). Because the endpoint accepts `like=-1|0|1`, arbitrary vote states can be forced.\n- **Identity abuse via forced comments:** An attacker can cause any logged-in user with comment permission to \"post\" attacker-controlled text on any video. This enables impersonation, phishing link injection under a trusted account, harassment of third parties in a victim\u0027s name, and (if the victim is a moderator/admin) endorsement-shaped content in a privileged voice.\n- **Data loss:** Any user with `canCreateCategory()` who visits an attacker page can be made to silently delete assets belonging to arbitrary categories. Since category ids are small integers, a loop of `\u003cimg\u003e` tags can cover the full category space in one page load.\n\nNo special configuration is required; AVideo\u0027s default session cookie lacks a `SameSite=Lax/Strict` protection that would independently blunt the attack, and none of the affected endpoints verifies origin or token.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n1. Call the existing `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()` helper at the top of every mutating `objects/*.json.php` handler (the same pattern already used in `objects/userUpdate.json.php`):\n\n```php\n// objects/comments_like.json.php (add near line 9)\nrequire_once $global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . \u0027objects/functionsSecurity.php\u0027;\nforbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();\n\n// objects/commentAddNew.json.php (add after configuration.php include)\nrequire_once $global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . \u0027objects/functionsSecurity.php\u0027;\nforbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();\n\n// objects/categoryDeleteAssets.json.php (add after configuration.php include)\nrequire_once $global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . \u0027objects/functionsSecurity.php\u0027;\nforbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();\n```\n\n2. Require `$_SERVER[\u0027REQUEST_METHOD\u0027] === \u0027POST\u0027` (or `DELETE`) for state-changing operations and stop promoting `$_GET[\u0027comments_id\u0027]` \u2192 `$_POST[\u0027comments_id\u0027]` in `comments_like.json.php:15-17`.\n\n3. Validate a per-session CSRF token on all mutating endpoints using the existing `isGlobalTokenValid()` / `getToken()` helpers (`objects/functions.php:2313`), rejecting requests whose `globalToken` is missing or invalid.\n\n4. As defense in depth, set the session cookie with `SameSite=Lax` (or `Strict`) in the AVideo session initialization, so cross-site navigational GETs do not carry the session cookie even if a handler regresses.\n\nApplying (1) alone closes all three reported variants; (2)\u2013(4) harden the surface against variants of the same pattern in other `objects/*.json.php` handlers.",
"id": "GHSA-x2pw-9c38-cp2j",
"modified": "2026-04-24T20:32:32Z",
"published": "2026-04-14T23:12:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-x2pw-9c38-cp2j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40928"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/7aaad601bd9cd7b993ba0ee1b1bea6c32ee7b77c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "WWBN AVideo: Missing CSRF Protection on State-Changing JSON Endpoints Enables Forced Comment Creation, Vote Manipulation, and Category Asset Deletion"
}
GHSA-X2QM-79P9-JG87
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-02 18:30 – Updated: 2024-05-02 18:30The SVS Pricing Tables plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.4. This is due to missing or incorrect nonce validation on the savePricingTable() function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to create and edit pricing tables via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-2959"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-02T17:15:20Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The SVS Pricing Tables plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.4. This is due to missing or incorrect nonce validation on the savePricingTable() function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to create and edit pricing tables via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link.",
"id": "GHSA-x2qm-79p9-jg87",
"modified": "2024-05-02T18:30:53Z",
"published": "2024-05-02T18:30:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-2959"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/svs-pricing-tables/trunk/app/model/svs_pt_model_main.php#L61"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/78af081a-807b-48c8-82cd-f87fbef0fbe6?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X2W2-FRFV-4F2J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-20 12:32FlatPress CMS version latest is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks that allow an attacker to enable or disable plugins on behalf of a victim user. The attacker can craft a malicious link or script that, when clicked by an authenticated user, will send a request to the FlatPress CMS server to perform the desired action on behalf of the victim user. Since the request is authenticated, the server will process it as if it were initiated by the legitimate user, effectively allowing the attacker to perform unauthorized actions. This vulnerability is fixed in version 1.4.dev.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-9847"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:50Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "FlatPress CMS version latest is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks that allow an attacker to enable or disable plugins on behalf of a victim user. The attacker can craft a malicious link or script that, when clicked by an authenticated user, will send a request to the FlatPress CMS server to perform the desired action on behalf of the victim user. Since the request is authenticated, the server will process it as if it were initiated by the legitimate user, effectively allowing the attacker to perform unauthorized actions. This vulnerability is fixed in version 1.4.dev.",
"id": "GHSA-x2w2-frfv-4f2j",
"modified": "2025-03-20T12:32:52Z",
"published": "2025-03-20T12:32:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9847"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flatpressblog/flatpress/commit/a81c968f51f134b5e5f9bbe208aa12f4fbc329df"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/b30ef7b0-74ea-4cac-adc4-1cc8a5cb559e"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]
- Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
Mitigation
Ensure that the application is free of cross-site scripting issues (CWE-79), because most CSRF defenses can be bypassed using attacker-controlled script.
Mitigation
Generate a unique nonce for each form, place the nonce into the form, and verify the nonce upon receipt of the form. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330). [REF-332]
Mitigation
Identify especially dangerous operations. When the user performs a dangerous operation, send a separate confirmation request to ensure that the user intended to perform that operation.
Mitigation
- Use the "double-submitted cookie" method as described by Felten and Zeller:
- When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.
- Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.
- This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
Mitigation
Do not use the GET method for any request that triggers a state change.
Mitigation
Check the HTTP Referer header to see if the request originated from an expected page. This could break legitimate functionality, because users or proxies may have disabled sending the Referer for privacy reasons.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-462: Cross-Domain Search Timing
An attacker initiates cross domain HTTP / GET requests and times the server responses. The timing of these responses may leak important information on what is happening on the server. Browser's same origin policy prevents the attacker from directly reading the server responses (in the absence of any other weaknesses), but does not prevent the attacker from timing the responses to requests that the attacker issued cross domain.
CAPEC-467: Cross Site Identification
An attacker harvests identifying information about a victim via an active session that the victim's browser has with a social networking site. A victim may have the social networking site open in one tab or perhaps is simply using the "remember me" feature to keep their session with the social networking site active. An attacker induces a payload to execute in the victim's browser that transparently to the victim initiates a request to the social networking site (e.g., via available social network site APIs) to retrieve identifying information about a victim. While some of this information may be public, the attacker is able to harvest this information in context and may use it for further attacks on the user (e.g., spear phishing).
CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery
An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.