CWE-328
AllowedUse of Weak Hash
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product uses an algorithm that produces a digest (output value) that does not meet security expectations for a hash function that allows an adversary to reasonably determine the original input (preimage attack), find another input that can produce the same hash (2nd preimage attack), or find multiple inputs that evaluate to the same hash (birthday attack).
149 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-VFV6-92FF-J949
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-11 15:56 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:38Impact
React Server Component responses can be vulnerable to cache poisoning in deployments that rely on shared caches with insufficient response partitioning. In affected conditions, collisions in the _rsc cache-busting value can allow an attacker to poison cache entries so users receive the wrong response variant for a given URL.
Fix
We strengthened the _rsc cache-busting mechanism to make practical collisions significantly harder and to better separate response variants that should not share cache entries.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately, ensure intermediary caches correctly honor Vary for RSC-related request headers, or disable shared caching for affected RSC responses until you can deploy a patched release.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "next"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "13.4.6"
},
{
"fixed": "15.5.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "next"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "16.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "16.2.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44582"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-328"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-11T15:56:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T18:16:19Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nReact Server Component responses can be vulnerable to cache poisoning in deployments that rely on shared caches with insufficient response partitioning. In affected conditions, collisions in the `_rsc` cache-busting value can allow an attacker to poison cache entries so users receive the wrong response variant for a given URL.\n\n### Fix\n\nWe strengthened the `_rsc` cache-busting mechanism to make practical collisions significantly harder and to better separate response variants that should not share cache entries.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, ensure intermediary caches correctly honor `Vary` for RSC-related request headers, or disable shared caching for affected RSC responses until you can deploy a patched release.",
"id": "GHSA-vfv6-92ff-j949",
"modified": "2026-05-14T20:38:32Z",
"published": "2026-05-11T15:56:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vercel/next.js/security/advisories/GHSA-vfv6-92ff-j949"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44582"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vercel/next.js"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases/tag/v15.5.16"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vercel/next.js/releases/tag/v16.2.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Next.js vulnerable to cache poisoning via collisions in React Server Component cache-busting"
}
GHSA-W2XG-49X3-6W59
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-30 21:31 – Updated: 2025-07-31 21:31A weak hashing algorithm and small sizes of seeds/secrets in Google's gVisor allowed for a remote attacker to calculate a local IP address and a per-boot identifier that could aid in tracking of a device in certain circumstances.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-10026"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-326",
"CWE-328"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-30T20:15:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A weak hashing algorithm and small sizes of seeds/secrets in Google\u0027s gVisor allowed for a remote attacker to calculate a local IP address and a per-boot identifier that could aid in tracking of a device in certain circumstances.",
"id": "GHSA-w2xg-49x3-6w59",
"modified": "2025-07-31T21:31:32Z",
"published": "2025-01-30T21:31:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10026"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/google/gvisor/commit/83f75082e5b03fafca9201d9d9939028f712b0b2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/google/gvisor/commit/e54bfde79278cafadedbf73c68ee10cb5982f2af"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/google/gvisor/commit/f956b5ac17ae1f60a4d21999b59ba18c55f86d56"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/2025-122-paper.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-W7QR-Q9FH-FJ35
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-09 21:46 – Updated: 2024-10-09 21:46Summary
The app uses sha-256 as the hash for passwords. The app should switch to bcrypt.
Details
SHA-256 is a message digest hash, and not classified as secure for password hashing. Message digest hashes are designed to be fast, while password hashing mechanisms are designed with certain cryptographic properties (e.g. slow) to protect against vulnerabilities. Refer to the links below for more information: - https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/195563/why-is-sha-256-not-good-for-passwords - https://stackoverflow.com/questions/11624372/best-practice-for-hashing-passwords-sha256-or-sha512 - https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html#pre-hashing-passwords-with-bcrypt
PoC
N/A
Impact
It leaves users susceptible to rainbow table attacks
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/amir20/dozzle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.5.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-47182"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-326",
"CWE-328"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-09T21:46:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-27T14:15:04Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe app uses sha-256 as the hash for passwords. The app should switch to bcrypt.\n\n### Details\nSHA-256 is a message digest hash, and not classified as secure for password hashing. Message digest hashes are designed to be fast, while password hashing mechanisms are designed with certain cryptographic properties (e.g. slow) to protect against vulnerabilities. Refer to the links below for more information:\n- https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/195563/why-is-sha-256-not-good-for-passwords\n- https://stackoverflow.com/questions/11624372/best-practice-for-hashing-passwords-sha256-or-sha512\n- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html#pre-hashing-passwords-with-bcrypt\n\n### PoC\nN/A\n\n### Impact\nIt leaves users susceptible to rainbow table attacks\n",
"id": "GHSA-w7qr-q9fh-fj35",
"modified": "2024-10-09T21:46:22Z",
"published": "2024-10-09T21:46:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/amir20/dozzle/security/advisories/GHSA-w7qr-q9fh-fj35"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47182"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/amir20/dozzle/commit/de79f03aa3dbe5bb1e154a7e8d3dccbd229f3ea3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/amir20/dozzle"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2024-3163"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Dozzle uses unsafe hash for passwords"
}
GHSA-WMHW-FVG9-87FC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:52 – Updated: 2024-11-21 21:57The image signature algorithm in OpenStack Glance 11.0.0 allows remote attackers to bypass the signature verification process via a crafted image, which triggers an MD5 collision.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "glance"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "11.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-8234"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-328"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-08-03T22:14:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2017-03-29T14:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The image signature algorithm in OpenStack Glance 11.0.0 allows remote attackers to bypass the signature verification process via a crafted image, which triggers an MD5 collision.",
"id": "GHSA-wmhw-fvg9-87fc",
"modified": "2024-11-21T21:57:17Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:52:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-8234"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugs.launchpad.net/glance/+bug/1516031"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/glance/PYSEC-2017-143.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2015/q4/303"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wiki.openstack.org/wiki/OSSN/OSSN-0061"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2015/q4/303"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenStack Glance Signature Verification Bypass"
}
GHSA-WR3P-R5FJ-WF97
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-31 21:32 – Updated: 2024-08-01 13:24An issue in beego v.2.2.0 and before allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges via the getCacheFileName function in the file.go file.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/beego/beego/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-40465"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327",
"CWE-328"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-08-01T13:24:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-31T21:15:17Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue in beego v.2.2.0 and before allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges via the `getCacheFileName` function in the `file.go` file.",
"id": "GHSA-wr3p-r5fj-wf97",
"modified": "2024-08-01T13:24:06Z",
"published": "2024-07-31T21:32:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/beego/beego/security/advisories/GHSA-6g9p-wv47-4fxq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40465"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/beego/beego/commit/5a366cd62b555354a917a2d153e6563fe4d6eb88"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/beego/beego/commit/8f89e12e6cafb106d5c201dbc3b2a338bfde74e2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/nyxfqq/a5a2fc5147a1b34538e1ac05a3e56910"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/beego/beego"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Beego privilege escalation vulnerability"
}
GHSA-WWXW-WHWC-CFVX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-25 21:30 – Updated: 2023-05-25 21:30A vulnerability was found in NFine Rapid Development Platform 20230511. It has been classified as problematic. Affected is an unknown function of the file /Login/CheckLogin. The manipulation leads to use of weak hash. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitability is told to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. VDB-229974 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-2900"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327",
"CWE-328"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-25T21:15:09Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in NFine Rapid Development Platform 20230511. It has been classified as problematic. Affected is an unknown function of the file /Login/CheckLogin. The manipulation leads to use of weak hash. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The complexity of an attack is rather high. The exploitability is told to be difficult. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. VDB-229974 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-wwxw-whwc-cfvx",
"modified": "2023-05-25T21:30:31Z",
"published": "2023-05-25T21:30:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-2900"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Peanut886/Vulnerability/blob/main/webray.com.cn/NFine-Rapid-development-platform-has-weak-password-vulnerability.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.229974"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.229974"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X27G-4QRQ-H538
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-27 21:31 – Updated: 2026-02-27 21:31SODOLA SL902-SWTGW124AS firmware versions through 200.1.20 use the cryptographically broken MD5 hash function for session cookie generation, weakening session security. Attackers can exploit predictable session tokens combined with MD5's collision vulnerabilities to forge valid session cookies and gain unauthorized access to the device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27754"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-328"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-27T19:16:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "SODOLA SL902-SWTGW124AS firmware versions through 200.1.20 use the cryptographically broken MD5 hash function for session cookie generation, weakening session security. Attackers can exploit predictable session tokens combined with MD5\u0027s collision vulnerabilities to forge valid session cookies and gain unauthorized access to the device.",
"id": "GHSA-x27g-4qrq-h538",
"modified": "2026-02-27T21:31:21Z",
"published": "2026-02-27T21:31:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27754"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sodola-network.com/products/sodola-6-port-2-5g-easy-web-managed-switch-4-x-2-5g-base-t-ports-2-x-10g-sfp-static-aggregation-qos-vlan-igmp-2-5gb-network-home-lab-switch"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/sodola-sl902-swtgw124as-md5-session-token-generation"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-X2G5-FVC2-GQVP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 21:54 – Updated: 2026-06-24 13:06Description
The default bcrypt salt rounds is set to 5, which is below the recommended minimum for security.
Affected Code
export function getHash(value: string) {
const salt = bcrypt.genSaltSync(parseInt(process.env.PASSWORD_SALT_HASH_ROUNDS || '5'))
return bcrypt.hashSync(value, salt)
}
Evidence
Using 5 salt rounds provides 2^5 = 32 iterations, which is far below the OWASP recommendation of 10 (2^10 = 1024 iterations) for bcrypt. This makes password hashes vulnerable to brute-force attacks with modern hardware.
Impact
Faster password cracking - in the event of database compromise, attackers can crack password hashes significantly faster than with proper salt rounds, potentially compromising all user accounts.
Recommendation
Increase default PASSWORD_SALT_HASH_ROUNDS to at least 10 (recommended by OWASP). Consider using 12 for better security-performance balance. Document that higher values increase login time but improve security.
Notes
The default bcrypt salt rounds is 5 (line 6), which provides only 2^5=32 iterations. OWASP recommends minimum 10 rounds (1024 iterations) for bcrypt. While configurable via PASSWORD_SALT_HASH_ROUNDS env var, the default matters because: (1) most deployments use defaults, (2) existing password hashes at 5 rounds remain vulnerable even if later increased. With modern GPUs, 5 rounds allows ~300,000 hashes/second vs ~10,000/second at 10 rounds - a 30x difference in cracking speed. In a database breach scenario, all user passwords could be cracked significantly faster. The same weak default is used in resetPassword (account.service.ts:568). This is a cryptographic weakness with real-world impact on password security.
Detection Method: Kolega.dev Deep Code Scan
| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
| Severity | Medium |
| CWE | CWE-916 (Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort) |
| Location | packages/server/src/enterprise/utils/encryption.util.ts:5-7 |
| Practical Exploitability | Medium |
| Developer Approver | faizan@kolega.ai |
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.0.12"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "flowise"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.0.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-56272"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-328",
"CWE-916"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T21:54:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Description\nThe default bcrypt salt rounds is set to 5, which is below the recommended minimum for security.\n\n### Affected Code\n```\nexport function getHash(value: string) {\n const salt = bcrypt.genSaltSync(parseInt(process.env.PASSWORD_SALT_HASH_ROUNDS || \u00275\u0027))\n return bcrypt.hashSync(value, salt)\n}\n```\n\n### Evidence\nUsing 5 salt rounds provides 2^5 = 32 iterations, which is far below the OWASP recommendation of 10 (2^10 = 1024 iterations) for bcrypt. This makes password hashes vulnerable to brute-force attacks with modern hardware.\n\n### Impact\nFaster password cracking - in the event of database compromise, attackers can crack password hashes significantly faster than with proper salt rounds, potentially compromising all user accounts.\n\n### Recommendation\nIncrease default PASSWORD_SALT_HASH_ROUNDS to at least 10 (recommended by OWASP). Consider using 12 for better security-performance balance. Document that higher values increase login time but improve security.\n\n### Notes\nThe default bcrypt salt rounds is 5 (line 6), which provides only 2^5=32 iterations. OWASP recommends minimum 10 rounds (1024 iterations) for bcrypt. While configurable via PASSWORD_SALT_HASH_ROUNDS env var, the default matters because: (1) most deployments use defaults, (2) existing password hashes at 5 rounds remain vulnerable even if later increased. With modern GPUs, 5 rounds allows ~300,000 hashes/second vs ~10,000/second at 10 rounds - a 30x difference in cracking speed. In a database breach scenario, all user passwords could be cracked significantly faster. The same weak default is used in resetPassword (account.service.ts:568). This is a cryptographic weakness with real-world impact on password security.\n\n**Detection Method:** Kolega.dev Deep Code Scan\n\n| Attribute | Value |\n|---|---|\n| Severity | Medium |\n| CWE | CWE-916 (Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort) |\n| Location | packages/server/src/enterprise/utils/encryption.util.ts:5-7 |\n| Practical Exploitability | Medium |\n| Developer Approver | faizan@kolega.ai |",
"id": "GHSA-x2g5-fvc2-gqvp",
"modified": "2026-06-24T13:06:50Z",
"published": "2026-03-05T21:54:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-x2g5-fvc2-gqvp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/5665"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Flowise has Insufficient Password Salt Rounds"
}
GHSA-XWCQ-PM8M-C4VF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-25 21:15 – Updated: 2024-02-01 16:30Impact
Summary
Crypto-js PBKDF2 is 1,000 times weaker than originally specified in 1993, and at least 1,300,000 times weaker than current industry standard. This is because it both (1) defaults to SHA1, a cryptographic hash algorithm considered insecure since at least 2005 and (2) defaults to one single iteration, a 'strength' or 'difficulty' value specified at 1,000 when specified in 1993. PBKDF2 relies on iteration count as a countermeasure to preimage and collision attacks.
Potential Impact:
- If used to protect passwords, the impact is high.
- If used to generate signatures, the impact is high.
Probability / risk analysis / attack enumeration:
- [For at most $45,000][SHA1 is a Shambles], an attacker, given control of only the beginning of a crypto-js PBKDF2 input, can create a value which has identical cryptographic signature to any chosen known value.
- Due to the length extension attack on SHA1, we can create a value that has identical signature to any unknown value, provided it is prefixed by a known value. It does not matter if PBKDF2 applies 'salt' or 'pepper' or any other secret unknown to the attacker. It will still create an identical signature.
Update: PBKDF2 requires a pseudo-random function that takes two inputs, so HMAC-SHA1 is used rather than plain SHA1. HMAC is not affected by length extension attacks. However, by defaulting to a single PBKDF2 iteration, the hashes do not benefit from the extra computational complexity that PBKDF2 is supposed to provide. The resulting hashes therefore have little protection against an offline brute-force attack.
[SHA1 is a Shambles]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf "SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust, Gaëtan Leurent and Thomas Peyrin"
crypto-js has 10,642 public users as displayed on NPM, today October 11th 2023. The number of transient dependents is likely several orders of magnitude higher.
A very rough GitHub search shows 432 files cross GitHub using PBKDF2 in crypto-js in Typescript or JavaScript, but not specifying any number of iterations.
Affected versions
All versions are impacted. This code has been the same since crypto-js was first created.
Further Cryptanalysis
The issue here is especially egregious because the length extension attack makes useless any secret that might be appended to the plaintext before calculating its signature.
Consider a scheme in which a secret is created for a user's username, and that secret is used to protect e.g. their passwords. Let's say that password is 'fake-password', and their username is 'example-username'.
To encrypt the user password via symmetric encryption we might do encrypt(plaintext: 'fake-password', encryption_key: cryptojs.pbkdf2(value: 'example username' + salt_or_pepper)). By this means, we would, in theory, create an encryption_key that can be determined from the public username, but which requires the secret salt_or_pepper to generate. This is a common scheme for protecting passwords, as exemplified in bcrypt & scrypt. Because the encryption key is symmetric, we can use this derived key to also decrypt the ciphertext.
Because of the length extension issue, if the attacker obtains (via attack 1), a collision with 'example username', the attacker does not need to know salt_or_pepper to decrypt their account data, only their public username.
Description
PBKDF2 is a key-derivation is a key-derivation function that is used for two main purposes: (1) to stretch or squash a variable length password's entropy into a fixed size for consumption by another cryptographic operation and (2) to reduce the chance of downstream operations recovering the password input (for example, for password storage).
Unlike the modern webcrypto standard, crypto-js does not throw an error when a number of iterations is not specified, and defaults to one single iteration. In the year 2000, when PBKDF2 was originally specified, the minimum number of iterations suggested was set at 1,000. Today, OWASP recommends 1,300,000:
https://github.com/brix/crypto-js/blob/4dcaa7afd08f48cd285463b8f9499cdb242605fa/src/pbkdf2.js#L22-L26
Patches
No available patch. The package is not maintained.
Workarounds
Consult the OWASP PBKDF2 Cheatsheet. Configure to use SHA256 with at least 250,000 iterations.
Coordinated disclosure
This issue was simultaneously submitted to crypto-js and crypto-es on the 23rd of October 2023.
Caveats
This issue was found in a security review that was not scoped to crypto-js. This report is not an indication that crypto-js has undergone a formal security assessment by the author.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "crypto-js"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-46233"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327",
"CWE-328",
"CWE-916"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-10-25T21:15:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-25T21:15:10Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n#### Summary\nCrypto-js PBKDF2 is 1,000 times weaker than originally specified in 1993, and [at least 1,300,000 times weaker than current industry standard][OWASP PBKDF2 Cheatsheet]. This is because it both (1) defaults to [SHA1][SHA1 wiki], a cryptographic hash algorithm considered insecure [since at least 2005][Cryptanalysis of SHA-1] and (2) defaults to [one single iteration][one iteration src], a \u0027strength\u0027 or \u0027difficulty\u0027 value specified at 1,000 when specified in 1993. PBKDF2 relies on iteration count as a countermeasure to [preimage][preimage attack] and [collision][collision attack] attacks.\n\nPotential Impact:\n\n1. If used to protect passwords, the impact is high.\n2. If used to generate signatures, the impact is high.\n\nProbability / risk analysis / attack enumeration:\n\n1. [For at most $45,000][SHA1 is a Shambles], an attacker, given control of only the beginning of a crypto-js PBKDF2 input, can create a value which has _identical cryptographic signature_ to any chosen known value.\n4. Due to the [length extension attack] on SHA1, we can create a value that has identical signature to any _unknown_ value, provided it is prefixed by a known value. It does not matter if PBKDF2 applies \u0027[salt][cryptographic salt]\u0027 or \u0027[pepper][cryptographic pepper]\u0027 or any other secret unknown to the attacker. It will still create an identical signature.\n\nUpdate: PBKDF2 requires a pseudo-random function that takes two inputs, so HMAC-SHA1 is used rather than plain SHA1. HMAC is not affected by [length extension attacks][Length Extension attack]. However, by defaulting to a single PBKDF2 iteration, the hashes do not benefit from the extra computational complexity that PBKDF2 is supposed to provide. The resulting hashes therefore have little protection against an offline brute-force attack.\n \n[cryptographic salt]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salt_(cryptography) \"Salt (cryptography), Wikipedia\"\n[cryptographic pepper]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pepper_(cryptography) \"Pepper (cryptography), Wikipedia\"\n[SHA1 wiki]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-1 \"SHA-1, Wikipedia\"\n[Cryptanalysis of SHA-1]: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/cryptanalysis_o.html \"Cryptanalysis of SHA-1\"\n[one iteration src]: https://github.com/brix/crypto-js/blob/1da3dabf93f0a0435c47627d6f171ad25f452012/src/pbkdf2.js#L22-L26 \"crypto-js/src/pbkdf2.js lines 22-26\"\n[collision attack]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hash_collision \"Collision Attack, Wikipedia\"\n[preimage attack]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preimage_attack \"Preimage Attack, Wikipedia\"\n[SHA1 is a Shambles]: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf \"SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1\nand Application to the PGP Web of Trust, Ga\u00ebtan Leurent and Thomas Peyrin\"\n[Length Extension attack]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Length_extension_attack \"Length extension attack, Wikipedia\"\n\ncrypto-js has 10,642 public users [as displayed on NPM][crypto-js, NPM], today October 11th 2023. The number of transient dependents is likely several orders of magnitude higher.\n\nA very rough GitHub search[ shows 432 files][GitHub search: affected files] cross GitHub using PBKDF2 in crypto-js in Typescript or JavaScript, but not specifying any number of iterations.\n\n[OWASP PBKDF2 Cheatsheet]: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html#pbkdf2 \"OWASP PBKDF2 Cheatsheet\"\n[crypto-js, NPM]: https://www.npmjs.com/package/crypto-js \"crypto-js on NPM\"\n[GitHub search: affected files]: https://github.com/search?q=%22crypto-js%22+AND+pbkdf2+AND+%28lang%3AJavaScript+OR+lang%3ATypeScript%29++NOT+%22iterations%22\u0026type=code\u0026p=2 \"GitHub search: crypto-js AND pbkdf2 AND (lang:JavaScript OR lang:TypeScript) NOT iterations\"\n\n#### Affected versions\nAll versions are impacted. This code has been the same since crypto-js was first created.\n\n#### Further Cryptanalysis\n\nThe issue here is especially egregious because the length extension attack makes useless any secret that might be appended to the plaintext before calculating its signature.\n\nConsider a scheme in which a secret is created for a user\u0027s username, and that secret is used to protect e.g. their passwords. Let\u0027s say that password is \u0027fake-password\u0027, and their username is \u0027example-username\u0027.\n\nTo encrypt the user password via symmetric encryption we might do `encrypt(plaintext: \u0027fake-password\u0027, encryption_key: cryptojs.pbkdf2(value: \u0027example username\u0027 + salt_or_pepper))`. By this means, we would, in theory, create an `encryption_key` that can be determined from the public username, but which requires the secret `salt_or_pepper` to generate. This is a common scheme for protecting passwords, as exemplified in bcrypt \u0026 scrypt. Because the encryption key is symmetric, we can use this derived key to also decrypt the ciphertext.\n\nBecause of the length extension issue, if the attacker obtains (via attack 1), a collision with \u0027example username\u0027, the attacker _does not need to know_ `salt_or_pepper` to decrypt their account data, only their public username.\n\n### Description\n\nPBKDF2 is a key-derivation is a key-derivation function that is used for two main purposes: (1) to stretch or squash a variable length password\u0027s entropy into a fixed size for consumption by another cryptographic operation and (2) to reduce the chance of downstream operations recovering the password input (for example, for password storage).\n\nUnlike the modern [webcrypto](https://w3c.github.io/webcrypto/#pbkdf2-operations) standard, crypto-js does not throw an error when a number of iterations is not specified, and defaults to one single iteration. In the year 2000, when PBKDF2 was originally specified, the minimum number of iterations suggested was set at 1,000. Today, [OWASP recommends 1,300,000][OWASP PBKDF2 Cheatsheet]:\n\nhttps://github.com/brix/crypto-js/blob/4dcaa7afd08f48cd285463b8f9499cdb242605fa/src/pbkdf2.js#L22-L26\n\n### Patches\nNo available patch. The package is not maintained.\n\n### Workarounds\nConsult the [OWASP PBKDF2 Cheatsheet]. Configure to use SHA256 with at least 250,000 iterations.\n\n### Coordinated disclosure\nThis issue was simultaneously submitted to [crypto-js](https://github.com/brix/crypto-js) and [crypto-es](https://github.com/entronad/crypto-es) on the 23rd of October 2023.\n\n### Caveats\n\nThis issue was found in a security review that was _not_ scoped to crypto-js. This report is not an indication that crypto-js has undergone a formal security assessment by the author.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-xwcq-pm8m-c4vf",
"modified": "2024-02-01T16:30:29Z",
"published": "2023-10-25T21:15:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/brix/crypto-js/security/advisories/GHSA-xwcq-pm8m-c4vf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46233"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/brix/crypto-js/commit/421dd538b2d34e7c24a5b72cc64dc2b9167db40a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/brix/crypto-js"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/11/msg00025.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "crypto-js PBKDF2 1,000 times weaker than specified in 1993 and 1.3M times weaker than current standard"
}
Mitigation MIT-51
- Use an adaptive hash function that can be configured to change the amount of computational effort needed to compute the hash, such as the number of iterations ("stretching") or the amount of memory required. Some hash functions perform salting automatically. These functions can significantly increase the overhead for a brute force attack compared to intentionally-fast functions such as MD5. For example, rainbow table attacks can become infeasible due to the high computing overhead. Finally, since computing power gets faster and cheaper over time, the technique can be reconfigured to increase the workload without forcing an entire replacement of the algorithm in use.
- Some hash functions that have one or more of these desired properties include bcrypt [REF-291], scrypt [REF-292], and PBKDF2 [REF-293]. While there is active debate about which of these is the most effective, they are all stronger than using salts with hash functions with very little computing overhead.
- Note that using these functions can have an impact on performance, so they require special consideration to avoid denial-of-service attacks. However, their configurability provides finer control over how much CPU and memory is used, so it could be adjusted to suit the environment's needs.
CAPEC-461: Web Services API Signature Forgery Leveraging Hash Function Extension Weakness
An adversary utilizes a hash function extension/padding weakness, to modify the parameters passed to the web service requesting authentication by generating their own call in order to generate a legitimate signature hash (as described in the notes), without knowledge of the secret token sometimes provided by the web service.
CAPEC-68: Subvert Code-signing Facilities
Many languages use code signing facilities to vouch for code's identity and to thus tie code to its assigned privileges within an environment. Subverting this mechanism can be instrumental in an attacker escalating privilege. Any means of subverting the way that a virtual machine enforces code signing classifies for this style of attack.