Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-327

Allowed-with-Review

Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.

960 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-X32Q-36FR-233C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-10 09:31 – Updated: 2024-09-10 09:31
VLAI
Details

Dell PowerScale InsightIQ, versions 5.0 through 5.1, contains a Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Elevation of privileges.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-39583"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-09-10T09:15:03Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Dell PowerScale InsightIQ, versions 5.0 through 5.1, contains a Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Elevation of privileges.",
  "id": "GHSA-x32q-36fr-233c",
  "modified": "2024-09-10T09:31:12Z",
  "published": "2024-09-10T09:31:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39583"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000228412/dsa-2024-360-security-update-for-dell-powerscale-insightiq-for-multiple-security-vulnerabilities"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X3W8-63XM-CWMM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-05 00:29 – Updated: 2024-04-03 23:58
VLAI
Details

The KRandom::random function in KDE Paste Applet after 4.10.5 in kdeplasma-addons uses the GNU C Library rand function's linear congruential generator, which makes it easier for context-dependent attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by predicting the generator output.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2013-2213"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-02-11T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The KRandom::random function in KDE Paste Applet after 4.10.5 in kdeplasma-addons uses the GNU C Library rand function\u0027s linear congruential generator, which makes it easier for context-dependent attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by predicting the generator output.",
  "id": "GHSA-x3w8-63xm-cwmm",
  "modified": "2024-04-03T23:58:03Z",
  "published": "2022-05-05T00:29:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-2213"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=978243"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2013/06/13/1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2013/06/26/2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X44P-GVRJ-PJ2R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-18 15:47 – Updated: 2025-12-18 15:47
VLAI
Summary
Amazon S3 Encryption Client for Java has a Key Commitment Issue
Details

Summary

S3 Encryption Client for Java is an open-source client-side encryption library used to facilitate writing and reading encrypted records to S3.

When the encrypted data key (EDK) is stored in an "Instruction File" instead of S3's metadata record, the EDK is exposed to an "Invisible Salamanders" attack (https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/016), which could allow the EDK to be replaced with a new key.

Impact

Background - Key Commitment

There is a cryptographic property whereby under certain conditions, a single ciphertext could be decrypted into 2 different plaintexts by using different encryption keys. To address this issue, strong encryption schemes use what is known as "key commitment", a process by which an encrypted message can only be decrypted by one key; the key used to originally encrypt the message.

In older versions of S3EC, when customers are also using a feature called "Instruction File" to store EDKs, key commitment is not implemented because multiple EDKs could be associated to an underlying encrypted message object. For such customers an attack that leverages the lack of key commitment is possible. A bad actor would need two things to leverage this issue: (i) the ability to create a separate, rogue, EDK that will also decrypt the underlying object to produce desired plaintext, and (ii) permission to upload a new instruction file to the S3 bucket to replace the existing instruction file placed there by the user using the S3C. Any future attempt to decrypt the underlying encrypted message with the S3EC will unwittingly use the rogue EDK to produce a valid plaintext message.

Impacted versions: <= v3.5

Patches

S3 Encryption Client is introducing the concept of "key commitment" to S3EC where the EDK is cryptographically bound to the ciphertext in order to address this issue. In order to maintain compatibility for in-flight messages we are releasing the fix in two versions. A code-compatible minor version that can read messages with key-commitment but not write them, and a new major version that can both read and write messages with key-commitment. For maximum safety customers are asked to upgrade to the latest major version: 4.0.0 or later

Workarounds

There are no workarounds, please upgrade to the suggested version of S3EC.

References

If users have any questions or comments about this advisory, S3 Encryption Client asks that they contact AWS Security via our issue reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "software.amazon.encryption.s3:amazon-s3-encryption-client-java"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-14763"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-18T15:47:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-17T21:15:53Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nS3 Encryption Client for Java is an open-source client-side encryption library used to facilitate writing and reading encrypted records to S3.  \n\nWhen the encrypted data key (EDK) is stored in an \"Instruction File\" instead of S3\u0027s metadata record, the EDK is exposed to an \"Invisible Salamanders\" attack  (https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/016), which could allow the EDK to be replaced with a new key. \n\n\n## Impact\n\n### Background - Key Commitment\n\nThere is a cryptographic property whereby under certain conditions, a single ciphertext could be decrypted into 2 different plaintexts by using different encryption keys. To address this issue, strong encryption schemes use what is known as \"key commitment\", a process by which an encrypted message can only be decrypted by one key; the key used to originally encrypt the message. \n\nIn older versions of S3EC, when customers are also using a feature called \"Instruction File\" to store EDKs, key commitment is not implemented because multiple EDKs could be associated to an underlying encrypted message object. For such customers an attack that leverages the lack of key commitment is possible. A bad actor would need two things to leverage this issue: (i) the ability to create a separate, rogue, EDK that will also decrypt the underlying object to produce desired plaintext, and (ii) permission to upload a new instruction file to the S3 bucket to replace the existing instruction file placed there by the user using the S3C.  Any future attempt to decrypt the underlying encrypted message with the S3EC will unwittingly use the rogue EDK to produce a valid plaintext message.\n\nImpacted versions: \u003c= v3.5\n\n## Patches\n\nS3 Encryption Client is introducing the concept of \"key commitment\" to S3EC where the EDK is cryptographically bound to the ciphertext in order to address this issue. In order to maintain compatibility for in-flight messages we are releasing the fix in two versions.  A code-compatible minor version that can read messages with key-commitment but not write them, and a new major version that can both read and write messages with key-commitment. For maximum safety customers are asked to upgrade to the latest major version: 4.0.0 or later\n\n## Workarounds\n\nThere are no workarounds, please upgrade to the suggested version of S3EC.\n\n## References\n\nIf users have any questions or comments about this advisory, S3 Encryption Client asks that they contact AWS Security via our issue reporting page or directly via email to [aws-security@amazon.com](mailto:aws-security@amazon.com). Please do not create a public GitHub issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-x44p-gvrj-pj2r",
  "modified": "2025-12-18T15:47:07Z",
  "published": "2025-12-18T15:47:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/amazon-s3-encryption-client-java/security/advisories/GHSA-x44p-gvrj-pj2r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14763"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/amazon-s3-encryption-client-java/commit/9d4523edbbc249781b3b3b3f8868fad39c5673d5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/AWS-2025-032"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/amazon-s3-encryption-client-java"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/amazon-s3-encryption-client-java/releases/tag/v4.0.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Amazon S3 Encryption Client for Java has a Key Commitment Issue"
}

GHSA-X4WX-5CQV-7FWC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:40 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:38
VLAI
Details

Seagate Business NAS devices with firmware before 2015.00322 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code with root privileges by leveraging use of a static encryption key to create session tokens.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2014-8687"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-06-08T16:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Seagate Business NAS devices with firmware before 2015.00322 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code with root privileges by leveraging use of a static encryption key to create session tokens.",
  "id": "GHSA-x4wx-5cqv-7fwc",
  "modified": "2025-04-20T03:38:40Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T02:40:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-8687"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://beyondbinary.io/articles/seagate-nas-rce"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/36202"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/36264"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/130585/Seagate-Business-NAS-2014.00319-Remote-Code-Execution.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/130609/Seagate-Business-NAS-Unauthenticated-Remote-Command-Execution.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/72831"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X6VP-HP42-CR9P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-13 18:30 – Updated: 2022-12-15 18:30
VLAI
Details

Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm in SICK RFU61x firmware version <v2.25 allows a low-privileged remote attacker to decrypt the encrypted data if the user requested weak cipher suites to be used for encryption via the SSH interface. The patch and installation procedure for the firmware update is available from the responsible SICK customer contact person.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-27581"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-12-13T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm in SICK RFU61x firmware version \u003cv2.25 allows a low-privileged remote attacker to decrypt the encrypted data if the user requested weak cipher suites to be used for encryption via the SSH interface. The patch and installation procedure for the firmware update is available from the responsible SICK customer contact person.",
  "id": "GHSA-x6vp-hp42-cr9p",
  "modified": "2022-12-15T18:30:18Z",
  "published": "2022-12-13T18:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-27581"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://sick.com/psirt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X7FC-G3MG-7H5H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-17 21:31 – Updated: 2026-02-17 21:31
VLAI
Details

IBM Concert 1.0.0 through 2.1.0 uses weaker than expected cryptographic algorithms that could allow an attacker to decrypt highly sensitive information.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-43178"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-17T19:21:53Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Concert 1.0.0 through 2.1.0 uses weaker than expected cryptographic algorithms that could allow an attacker to decrypt highly sensitive information.",
  "id": "GHSA-x7fc-g3mg-7h5h",
  "modified": "2026-02-17T21:31:13Z",
  "published": "2026-02-17T21:31:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43178"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7260162"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-X7G2-WRRP-R6H3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-09-01 18:41 – Updated: 2024-02-05 15:50
VLAI
Summary
Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
Details

✍️ Description

The function mt_rand is used to generate session tokens, this function is cryptographically flawed due to its nature being one pseudorandomness, an attacker can take advantage of the cryptographically insecure nature of this function to enumerate session tokens for accounts that are not under his/her control

🕵️‍♂️ Proof of Concept

Numerous examples and attack implementations can be found in this paper . If you're looking for a practical tool that can crack your mt_rand implementation's seed value, see this project and run the following commands in a console with php5 and OpenWall's tool installed:

root$ php -r 'mt_srand(13333337); echo mt_rand( ), "\n";' After that, copy the output (1863134308) and execute the following commands:

root$ gcc php_mt_seed.c -o php_mt_seedroot$ ./php_mt_seed 1863134308 After waiting ~1 minute you should have a few possible seeds corresponding to their PHP versions, next to your installed PHP version you should see something akin to:

seed = 0x00cb7359 = 13333337 (PHP 7.1.0+) Hey, that's your seed!

💥 Impact

An attacker could takeover accounts at random by enumerating and using access tokens.

📝 References

  • https://openwall.com/php_mt_seedhttps://crypto.di.uoa.gr/CRYPTO.SEC/Randomness_Attacks_files/paper.pdf
  • https://github.com/mautic/mautic/blob/5213e320b4ef4d0c51bb84c1d46a1071e8e4f7fc/app/bundles/PointBundle/Controller/TriggerController.php#L187
  • https://github.com/mautic/mautic/releases/tag/3.3.4
  • https://github.com/mautic/mautic/releases/tag/4.0.0
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "mautic/core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.3.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "mautic/core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0-alpha1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-27913"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-30T18:02:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-08-30T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## \u270d\ufe0f Description\nThe function mt_rand is used to generate session tokens, this function is cryptographically flawed due to its nature being one pseudorandomness, an attacker can take advantage of the cryptographically insecure nature of this function to enumerate session tokens for accounts that are not under his/her control\n\n## \ud83d\udd75\ufe0f\u200d\u2642\ufe0f Proof of Concept\nNumerous examples and attack implementations can be found in this paper . If you\u0027re looking for a practical tool that can crack your mt_rand implementation\u0027s seed value, see this project and run the following commands in a console with php5 and OpenWall\u0027s tool installed:\n\n`root$ php -r \u0027mt_srand(13333337); echo mt_rand( ), \"\\n\";\u0027`\nAfter that, copy the output (1863134308) and execute the following commands:\n\n`root$ gcc php_mt_seed.c -o php_mt_seedroot$ ./php_mt_seed 1863134308`\nAfter waiting ~1 minute you should have a few possible seeds corresponding to their PHP versions, next to your installed PHP version you should see something akin to:\n\nseed = 0x00cb7359 = 13333337 (PHP 7.1.0+)\nHey, that\u0027s your seed!\n\n## \ud83d\udca5 Impact\nAn attacker could takeover accounts at random by enumerating and using access tokens.\n\n## \ud83d\udcdd References\n\n- https://openwall.com/php_mt_seedhttps://crypto.di.uoa.gr/CRYPTO.SEC/Randomness_Attacks_files/paper.pdf\n- https://github.com/mautic/mautic/blob/5213e320b4ef4d0c51bb84c1d46a1071e8e4f7fc/app/bundles/PointBundle/Controller/TriggerController.php#L187\n- https://github.com/mautic/mautic/releases/tag/3.3.4\n- https://github.com/mautic/mautic/releases/tag/4.0.0",
  "id": "GHSA-x7g2-wrrp-r6h3",
  "modified": "2024-02-05T15:50:17Z",
  "published": "2021-09-01T18:41:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mautic/mautic/security/advisories/GHSA-x7g2-wrrp-r6h3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27913"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mautic/mautic/commit/d1cad766a2de74e6c6b89d6d78c2a5f2e36ba91c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/mautic/core/CVE-2021-27913.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mautic/mautic"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm"
}

GHSA-X8CP-JF6F-R4XH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-18 18:52 – Updated: 2025-12-20 05:31
VLAI
Summary
AWS SDK for PHP's S3 Encryption Client has a Key Commitment Issue
Details

Summary

S3 Encryption Client for PHP is an open-source client-side encryption library used to facilitate writing and reading encrypted records to S3.

When the encrypted data key (EDK) is stored in an "Instruction File" instead of S3's metadata record, the EDK is exposed to an "Invisible Salamanders" attack (https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/016), which could allow the EDK to be replaced with a new key.

Impact

Background - Key Commitment

There is a cryptographic property whereby under certain conditions, a single ciphertext can be decrypted into 2 different plaintexts by using different encryption keys. To address this issue, strong encryption schemes use what is known as "key commitment", a process by which an encrypted message can only be decrypted by one key; the key used to originally encrypt the message.

In older versions of S3EC, when customers are also using a feature called "Instruction File" to store EDKs, key commitment is not implemented because multiple EDKs could be associated to an underlying encrypted message object. For such customers an attack that leverages the lack of key commitment is possible. A bad actor would need two things to leverage this issue: (i) the ability to create a separate, rogue, EDK that will also decrypt the underlying object to produce desired plaintext, and (ii) permission to upload a new instruction file to the S3 bucket to replace the existing instruction file placed there by the user using the S3C. Any future attempt to decrypt the underlying encrypted message with the S3EC will unwittingly use the rogue EDK to produce a valid plaintext message.

Impacted versions: <= 3.367.0

Patches

We are introducing the concept of "key commitment" to S3EC where the EDK is cryptographically bound to the ciphertext in order to address this issue. In order to maintain compatibility for in-flight messages we are releasing the fix in two versions. A code-compatible minor version that can read messages with key-commitment but not write them, and a new major version that can both read and write messages with key-commitment. For maximum safety customers are asked to upgrade to the latest major version: 3.368.0 or later.

Workarounds

There are no workarounds, please upgrade to the suggested version of S3EC.

References

If customeres have any questions or comments about this advisory, AWS SDK for PHP asks that they contact AWS Security via the issue reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "aws/aws-sdk-php"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.368.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-14761"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-18T18:52:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-17T21:15:53Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nS3 Encryption Client for PHP is an open-source client-side encryption library used to facilitate writing and reading encrypted records to S3.  \n\nWhen the encrypted data key (EDK) is stored in an \"Instruction File\" instead of S3\u0027s metadata record, the EDK is exposed to an \"Invisible Salamanders\" attack  (https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/016), which could allow the EDK to be replaced with a new key. \n\n\n\n## Impact\n\n### Background - Key Commitment\n\nThere is a cryptographic property whereby under certain conditions, a single ciphertext can be decrypted into 2 different plaintexts by using different encryption keys. To address this issue, strong encryption schemes use what is known as \"key commitment\", a process by which an encrypted message can only be decrypted by one key; the key used to originally encrypt the message. \n\nIn older versions of S3EC, when customers are also using a feature called \"Instruction File\" to store EDKs, key commitment is not implemented because multiple EDKs could be associated to an underlying encrypted message object.  For such customers an attack that leverages the lack of key commitment is possible. A bad actor would need two things to leverage this issue: (i) the ability to create a separate, rogue, EDK that will also decrypt the underlying object to produce desired plaintext, and (ii) permission to upload a new instruction file to the S3 bucket to replace the existing instruction file placed there by the user using the S3C. Any future attempt to decrypt the underlying encrypted message with the S3EC will unwittingly use the rogue EDK to produce a valid plaintext message.\n\nImpacted versions: \u003c= 3.367.0\n\n\n\n## Patches\n\nWe are introducing the concept of \"key commitment\" to S3EC where the EDK is cryptographically bound to the ciphertext in order to address this issue.  In order to maintain compatibility for in-flight messages we are releasing the fix in two versions.  A code-compatible minor version that can read messages with key-commitment but not write them, and a new major version that can both read and write messages with key-commitment.  For maximum safety customers are asked to upgrade to the latest major version: 3.368.0 or later.\n\n\n\n## Workarounds\n\nThere are no workarounds, please upgrade to the suggested version of S3EC.\n\n## References\n\nIf customeres have any questions or comments about this advisory, AWS SDK for PHP asks that they contact AWS Security via the issue reporting page or directly via email to [aws-security@amazon.com](mailto:aws-security@amazon.com). Please do not create a public GitHub issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-x8cp-jf6f-r4xh",
  "modified": "2025-12-20T05:31:02Z",
  "published": "2025-12-18T18:52:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-php/security/advisories/GHSA-x8cp-jf6f-r4xh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14761"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-php/commit/6827cac70397dca07e6e86f7cf630954ec2bc6bf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/AWS-2025-032"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/aws/aws-sdk-php/CVE-2025-14761.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-php/releases/tag/3.368.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AWS SDK for PHP\u0027s S3 Encryption Client has a Key Commitment Issue"
}

GHSA-X8GX-R9P5-6XP8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-20 18:30 – Updated: 2025-01-20 18:30
VLAI
Details

IBM DevOps Velocity 5.0.0 and IBM UrbanCode Velocity 4.0.0 through 4.0. 25 uses weaker than expected cryptographic algorithms that could allow an attacker to decrypt highly sensitive information.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-22347"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-20T18:15:13Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM DevOps Velocity 5.0.0 and IBM UrbanCode Velocity 4.0.0 through 4.0. 25 uses weaker than expected cryptographic algorithms that could allow an attacker to decrypt highly sensitive information.",
  "id": "GHSA-x8gx-r9p5-6xp8",
  "modified": "2025-01-20T18:30:49Z",
  "published": "2025-01-20T18:30:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-22347"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7172750"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-XC37-3R4W-XFWC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:12 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:12
VLAI
Details

openITCOCKPIT before 3.7.3 uses the 1fea123e07f730f76e661bced33a94152378611e API key rather than generating a random API Key for WebSocket connections.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-10788"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-03-25T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "openITCOCKPIT before 3.7.3 uses the 1fea123e07f730f76e661bced33a94152378611e API key rather than generating a random API Key for WebSocket connections.",
  "id": "GHSA-xc37-3r4w-xfwc",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:12:38Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:12:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10788"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/it-novum/openITCOCKPIT/commit/581cc9007bbfba84a2575729d5d903ab3a8f25ee"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://openitcockpit.io/2020/2020/03/23/openitcockpit-3-7-3-released"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

Mitigation MIT-24
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and use well-tested implementations. As with all cryptographic mechanisms, the source code should be available for analysis.
  • For example, US government systems require FIPS 140-2 certification [REF-1192].
  • Do not develop custom or private cryptographic algorithms. They will likely be exposed to attacks that are well-understood by cryptographers. Reverse engineering techniques are mature. If the algorithm can be compromised if attackers find out how it works, then it is especially weak.
  • Periodically ensure that the cryptography has not become obsolete. Some older algorithms, once thought to require a billion years of computing time, can now be broken in days or hours. This includes MD4, MD5, SHA1, DES, and other algorithms that were once regarded as strong. [REF-267]
Mitigation MIT-52
Architecture and Design

Ensure that the design allows one cryptographic algorithm to be replaced with another in the next generation or version. Where possible, use wrappers to make the interfaces uniform. This will make it easier to upgrade to stronger algorithms. With hardware, design the product at the Intellectual Property (IP) level so that one cryptographic algorithm can be replaced with another in the next generation of the hardware product.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Carefully manage and protect cryptographic keys (see CWE-320). If the keys can be guessed or stolen, then the strength of the cryptography itself is irrelevant.

Mitigation MIT-4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
  • Industry-standard implementations will save development time and may be more likely to avoid errors that can occur during implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Consider the ESAPI Encryption feature.
Mitigation MIT-25
Implementation Architecture and Design

When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks.

CAPEC-20: Encryption Brute Forcing

An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.

CAPEC-459: Creating a Rogue Certification Authority Certificate

An adversary exploits a weakness resulting from using a hashing algorithm with weak collision resistance to generate certificate signing requests (CSR) that contain collision blocks in their "to be signed" parts. The adversary submits one CSR to be signed by a trusted certificate authority then uses the signed blob to make a second certificate appear signed by said certificate authority. Due to the hash collision, both certificates, though different, hash to the same value and so the signed blob works just as well in the second certificate. The net effect is that the adversary's second X.509 certificate, which the Certification Authority has never seen, is now signed and validated by that Certification Authority.

CAPEC-473: Signature Spoof

An attacker generates a message or datablock that causes the recipient to believe that the message or datablock was generated and cryptographically signed by an authoritative or reputable source, misleading a victim or victim operating system into performing malicious actions.

CAPEC-475: Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation

An adversary exploits a cryptographic weakness in the signature verification algorithm implementation to generate a valid signature without knowing the key.

CAPEC-608: Cryptanalysis of Cellular Encryption

The use of cryptanalytic techniques to derive cryptographic keys or otherwise effectively defeat cellular encryption to reveal traffic content. Some cellular encryption algorithms such as A5/1 and A5/2 (specified for GSM use) are known to be vulnerable to such attacks and commercial tools are available to execute these attacks and decrypt mobile phone conversations in real-time. Newer encryption algorithms in use by UMTS and LTE are stronger and currently believed to be less vulnerable to these types of attacks. Note, however, that an attacker with a Cellular Rogue Base Station can force the use of weak cellular encryption even by newer mobile devices.

CAPEC-614: Rooting SIM Cards

SIM cards are the de facto trust anchor of mobile devices worldwide. The cards protect the mobile identity of subscribers, associate devices with phone numbers, and increasingly store payment credentials, for example in NFC-enabled phones with mobile wallets. This attack leverages over-the-air (OTA) updates deployed via cryptographically-secured SMS messages to deliver executable code to the SIM. By cracking the DES key, an attacker can send properly signed binary SMS messages to a device, which are treated as Java applets and are executed on the SIM. These applets are allowed to send SMS, change voicemail numbers, and query the phone location, among many other predefined functions. These capabilities alone provide plenty of potential for abuse.

CAPEC-97: Cryptanalysis

Cryptanalysis is a process of finding weaknesses in cryptographic algorithms and using these weaknesses to decipher the ciphertext without knowing the secret key (instance deduction). Sometimes the weakness is not in the cryptographic algorithm itself, but rather in how it is applied that makes cryptanalysis successful. An attacker may have other goals as well, such as: Total Break (finding the secret key), Global Deduction (finding a functionally equivalent algorithm for encryption and decryption that does not require knowledge of the secret key), Information Deduction (gaining some information about plaintexts or ciphertexts that was not previously known) and Distinguishing Algorithm (the attacker has the ability to distinguish the output of the encryption (ciphertext) from a random permutation of bits).