CWE-319
AllowedCleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors.
1213 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-4683-XJ3V-WQVF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-06 19:24 – Updated: 2024-04-04 05:36Mattermost fails to redact from audit logs the user password during user creation and the user password hash in other operations if the experimental audit logging configuration was enabled (ExperimentalAuditSettings section in config).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-1831"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-319"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-17T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Mattermost fails to redact from audit logs\u00a0the user password during user creation and the user password hash in other operations if the experimental audit logging configuration was enabled (ExperimentalAuditSettings section in config).\n",
"id": "GHSA-4683-xj3v-wqvf",
"modified": "2024-04-04T05:36:36Z",
"published": "2023-07-06T19:24:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1831"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-46C5-PPQR-V898
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-14 18:31Cleartext transmission of sensitive information in Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34346"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-319"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T17:16:46Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cleartext transmission of sensitive information in Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally.",
"id": "GHSA-46c5-ppqr-v898",
"modified": "2026-07-14T18:31:57Z",
"published": "2026-07-14T18:31:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34346"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-34346"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-46G7-VHP2-8MJ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-04 12:00 – Updated: 2022-11-04 19:01"IBM Security Guardium 10.5, 10.6, 11.0, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, and 11.4 stores user credentials in plain clear text which can be read by a local privileged user. IBM X-Force ID: 215587."
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-39077"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-312",
"CWE-319"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-11-03T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "\"IBM Security Guardium 10.5, 10.6, 11.0, 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, and 11.4 stores user credentials in plain clear text which can be read by a local privileged user. IBM X-Force ID: 215587.\"",
"id": "GHSA-46g7-vhp2-8mj6",
"modified": "2022-11-04T19:01:16Z",
"published": "2022-11-04T12:00:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-39077"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/215587"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6831647"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-46X2-RXF4-75X5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-08 18:30 – Updated: 2022-12-13 15:30In certain Secustation products the administrator account password can be read. This affects V2.5.5.3116-S50-SMA-B20171107A, V2.3.4.1301-M20-TSA-B20150617A, V2.5.5.3116-S50-RXA-B20180502A, V2.5.5.3116-S50-SMA-B20190723A, V2.5.5.3116-S50-SMB-B20161012A, V2.3.4.2103-S50-NTD-B20170508B, V2.5.5.3116-S50-SMB-B20160601A, V2.5.5.2601-S50-TSA-B20151229A, and V2.5.5.3116-S50-SMA-B20170217.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-40939"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-319"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-08T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In certain Secustation products the administrator account password can be read. This affects V2.5.5.3116-S50-SMA-B20171107A, V2.3.4.1301-M20-TSA-B20150617A, V2.5.5.3116-S50-RXA-B20180502A, V2.5.5.3116-S50-SMA-B20190723A, V2.5.5.3116-S50-SMB-B20161012A, V2.3.4.2103-S50-NTD-B20170508B, V2.5.5.3116-S50-SMB-B20160601A, V2.5.5.2601-S50-TSA-B20151229A, and V2.5.5.3116-S50-SMA-B20170217.",
"id": "GHSA-46x2-rxf4-75x5",
"modified": "2022-12-13T15:30:27Z",
"published": "2022-12-08T18:30:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-40939"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cdsbz.gitbook.io/untitled/secustion-camera-vulnerability-recurrence"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://220.161.30.125.dy.iij4u.or.jp:50001/web/index.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-47JC-2CQH-WC8G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-31 00:00 – Updated: 2022-01-12 00:02Netgear Nighthawk R6700 version 1.0.4.120 does not utilize secure communication methods to the SOAP interface. By default, all communication to/from the device's SOAP Interface (port 5000) is sent via HTTP, which causes potentially sensitive information (such as usernames and passwords) to be transmitted in cleartext
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-20175"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-319"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-12-30T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Netgear Nighthawk R6700 version 1.0.4.120 does not utilize secure communication methods to the SOAP interface. By default, all communication to/from the device\u0027s SOAP Interface (port 5000) is sent via HTTP, which causes potentially sensitive information (such as usernames and passwords) to be transmitted in cleartext",
"id": "GHSA-47jc-2cqh-wc8g",
"modified": "2022-01-12T00:02:06Z",
"published": "2021-12-31T00:00:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20175"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2021-57"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-4852-997V-4274
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 03:31 – Updated: 2026-06-23 03:31Overview: A vulnerability has been found in FAST/TOOLS and CI Server. The web server may return a response containing the CI Server setting information. This information could be exploited by an attacker for other attacks.
The affected products and versions are as follows:
FAST/TOOLS (Packages: RVSVRN, UNSVRN, HMIWEB, FTEES, HMIMOB) R9.01 to R10.04
CI Server (All packages) R1.01 to R1.04
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-11833"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-319"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T02:16:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Overview: \nA vulnerability has been found in FAST/TOOLS and CI Server. The web server may return a response containing the CI Server setting information. This information could \nbe exploited by an attacker for other attacks. \n\nThe affected products and versions are as follows:\n\nFAST/TOOLS (Packages: RVSVRN, UNSVRN, HMIWEB, FTEES, HMIMOB) R9.01 to R10.04\n\nCI Server\u00a0(All packages)\u00a0R1.01 to R1.04",
"id": "GHSA-4852-997v-4274",
"modified": "2026-06-23T03:31:43Z",
"published": "2026-06-23T03:31:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11833"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web-material3.yokogawa.com/1/39777/files/YSAR-26-0004-E.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-486V-Q2WF-FP2R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-10 23:02 – Updated: 2026-09-10 23:02Vulnerability Details
File: backend/http/http.go
Lines: 285 (client construction — no CheckRedirect), 505-510 (addHeaders, writes configured secret headers onto every request), 533-534 / 700-701 / 782-785 (f.httpClient.Do(req) used by List/stat/download)
Root Cause
The http backend lets a user attach arbitrary secret headers to every request via --http-headers/headers= (documented for authentication: '"Cookie","name=value","Authorization","xxx"'). The backend's HTTP client is built with fshttp.NewClient(ctx), which never sets http.Client.CheckRedirect, so it falls back to Go's stdlib default redirect policy.
Go's default policy only strips four header names (Authorization, Www-Authenticate, Cookie, Cookie2), and only when the redirect target's host differs from the original — every other configured header is copied to the redirect target unconditionally, regardless of host or scheme. Even the four protected names survive a same-host https:// → http:// downgrade, since Go only checks host equality, not scheme.
Any redirect response from the configured remote — whether from server compromise, an open redirect, a CDN/mirror failover to a different domain, or a malicious server from the start — causes rclone to resend every configured secret header (and, for a scheme downgrade, Authorization/Cookie in cleartext) to the new destination.
This is the exact vulnerability class already fixed for the s3 backend (9328763/7543a7a, GHSA-8mxv-9xhp-86h4 and the webdav backend (59b513b, GHSA-h4mf-4v27-hggj, wiring rest.RefuseHTTPSDowngradeRedirectFn). backend/http was not touched by either fix.
Vulnerable Code
// backend/http/http.go:285
client := fshttp.NewClient(ctx) // no CheckRedirect set
...
f.httpClient = client // used by readDir / NewObject / Object.Open
// backend/http/http.go:505-510
func addHeaders(req *http.Request, opt *Options) {
for i := 0; i < len(opt.Headers); i += 2 {
key := opt.Headers[i]
value := opt.Headers[i+1]
req.Header.Add(key, value)
}
}
Attack Scenario
- User configures an
httpremote:url=https://good.example.com/files/,headers=X-Api-Key,SECRET-TOKEN. - At some point
good.example.comreturns a redirect whoseLocationpoints at a different host (compromise, open redirect, CDN change, or malice from the start). - User runs any operation (
ls,cat,copy,mount,serve) against the remote. - rclone follows the redirect with the default client and resends
X-Api-Key: SECRET-TOKENto the new, untrusted destination. - The attacker's server captures the secret from the incoming request.
Impact
Exfiltration of API keys / bearer tokens / session cookies configured for one host, to any host the (trusted-at-configuration-time) remote later redirects to. All operations on the http backend (list, stat, download, mount, serve) are affected. No special rclone privileges or unusual user interaction are needed beyond a normal sync/list/copy once the redirect exists.
Dynamic Confirmation
Built rclone from source at cfdc9d0 (current master, v1.76.0-DEV) and configured:
[testhttp]
type = http
url = http://127.0.0.1:9090/
headers = X-Api-Key,SUPER-SECRET-TOKEN-abc123
Server A (port 9090, the "configured" host) 302-redirects every request to Server B (port 9091, a different host). Running rclone cat testhttp:file.txt caused Server B — which was never configured with any credential — to receive:
Header: X-Api-Key: SUPER-SECRET-TOKEN-abc123
Header: Referer: http://127.0.0.1:9090/file.txt
rclone printed Server B's response body as if it were the real file, confirming the full stat→redirect→download round trip leaks the header and trusts the redirect target.
Vulnerable Code / Fix
A minimal fix (implemented, tested, and verified to close the leak while preserving redirect functionality) wires the client to rest.RefuseHTTPSDowngradeRedirectFn (already used by webdav) and strips the configured opt.Headers on any cross-host redirect:
client := fshttp.NewClient(ctx)
client.CheckRedirect = redirectCheckFn(opt)
...
func redirectCheckFn(opt *Options) func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
return func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if err := rest.RefuseHTTPSDowngradeRedirectFn(req, via); err != nil {
return err
}
if len(via) > 0 && req.URL.Host != via[0].URL.Host {
for i := 0; i < len(opt.Headers); i += 2 {
req.Header.Del(opt.Headers[i])
}
}
return nil
}
}
A regression test (TestRedirectStripsHeadersOnHostChange) was added to backend/http/http_internal_test.go, confirmed to fail without the fix and pass with it. Full backend/http and lib/rest test suites pass with the fix applied. I have a fix branch ready to push to a private fork once this report is acknowledged.
Verification
Dynamically confirmed on rclone master @ cfdc9d0 (post v1.75.0) in a local test harness — see "Dynamic Confirmation" above. Fix verified to eliminate the leak via the same harness (secret header absent from Server B after the fix; functionality — file download via redirect — unaffected).
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.75.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/rclone/rclone"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.49.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.75.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-88013"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-319",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-10T23:02:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-10T16:18:08Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "## Vulnerability Details\n\n**File**: `backend/http/http.go`\n**Lines**: 285 (client construction \u2014 no `CheckRedirect`), 505-510 (`addHeaders`, writes configured secret headers onto every request), 533-534 / 700-701 / 782-785 (`f.httpClient.Do(req)` used by List/stat/download)\n\n### Root Cause\nThe `http` backend lets a user attach arbitrary secret headers to every request via `--http-headers`/`headers=` (documented for authentication: `\u0027\"Cookie\",\"name=value\",\"Authorization\",\"xxx\"\u0027`). The backend\u0027s HTTP client is built with `fshttp.NewClient(ctx)`, which never sets `http.Client.CheckRedirect`, so it falls back to Go\u0027s stdlib default redirect policy.\n\nGo\u0027s default policy only strips four header names (`Authorization`, `Www-Authenticate`, `Cookie`, `Cookie2`), and only when the redirect target\u0027s *host* differs from the original \u2014 every other configured header is copied to the redirect target unconditionally, regardless of host or scheme. Even the four protected names survive a same-host `https://` \u2192 `http://` downgrade, since Go only checks host equality, not scheme.\n\nAny redirect response from the configured remote \u2014 whether from server compromise, an open redirect, a CDN/mirror failover to a different domain, or a malicious server from the start \u2014 causes rclone to resend every configured secret header (and, for a scheme downgrade, `Authorization`/`Cookie` in cleartext) to the new destination.\n\nThis is the exact vulnerability class already fixed for the `s3` backend (`9328763`/`7543a7a`, GHSA-8mxv-9xhp-86h4 and the `webdav` backend (`59b513b`, GHSA-h4mf-4v27-hggj, wiring `rest.RefuseHTTPSDowngradeRedirectFn`). `backend/http` was not touched by either fix.\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n```go\n// backend/http/http.go:285\nclient := fshttp.NewClient(ctx) // no CheckRedirect set\n...\nf.httpClient = client // used by readDir / NewObject / Object.Open\n```\n```go\n// backend/http/http.go:505-510\nfunc addHeaders(req *http.Request, opt *Options) {\n\tfor i := 0; i \u003c len(opt.Headers); i += 2 {\n\t\tkey := opt.Headers[i]\n\t\tvalue := opt.Headers[i+1]\n\t\treq.Header.Add(key, value)\n\t}\n}\n```\n\n### Attack Scenario\n1. User configures an `http` remote: `url=https://good.example.com/files/`, `headers=X-Api-Key,SECRET-TOKEN`.\n2. At some point `good.example.com` returns a redirect whose `Location` points at a different host (compromise, open redirect, CDN change, or malice from the start).\n3. User runs any operation (`ls`, `cat`, `copy`, `mount`, `serve`) against the remote.\n4. rclone follows the redirect with the default client and resends `X-Api-Key: SECRET-TOKEN` to the new, untrusted destination.\n5. The attacker\u0027s server captures the secret from the incoming request.\n\n### Impact\nExfiltration of API keys / bearer tokens / session cookies configured for one host, to any host the (trusted-at-configuration-time) remote later redirects to. All operations on the `http` backend (list, stat, download, mount, serve) are affected. No special rclone privileges or unusual user interaction are needed beyond a normal sync/list/copy once the redirect exists.\n\n### Dynamic Confirmation\nBuilt rclone from source at `cfdc9d0` (current master, `v1.76.0-DEV`) and configured:\n```ini\n[testhttp]\ntype = http\nurl = http://127.0.0.1:9090/\nheaders = X-Api-Key,SUPER-SECRET-TOKEN-abc123\n```\nServer A (port 9090, the \"configured\" host) 302-redirects every request to Server B (port 9091, a different host). Running `rclone cat testhttp:file.txt` caused Server B \u2014 which was never configured with any credential \u2014 to receive:\n```\nHeader: X-Api-Key: SUPER-SECRET-TOKEN-abc123\nHeader: Referer: http://127.0.0.1:9090/file.txt\n```\nrclone printed Server B\u0027s response body as if it were the real file, confirming the full stat\u2192redirect\u2192download round trip leaks the header and trusts the redirect target.\n\n### Vulnerable Code / Fix\nA minimal fix (implemented, tested, and verified to close the leak while preserving redirect functionality) wires the client to `rest.RefuseHTTPSDowngradeRedirectFn` (already used by `webdav`) and strips the configured `opt.Headers` on any cross-host redirect:\n\n```go\nclient := fshttp.NewClient(ctx)\nclient.CheckRedirect = redirectCheckFn(opt)\n...\nfunc redirectCheckFn(opt *Options) func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {\n\treturn func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {\n\t\tif err := rest.RefuseHTTPSDowngradeRedirectFn(req, via); err != nil {\n\t\t\treturn err\n\t\t}\n\t\tif len(via) \u003e 0 \u0026\u0026 req.URL.Host != via[0].URL.Host {\n\t\t\tfor i := 0; i \u003c len(opt.Headers); i += 2 {\n\t\t\t\treq.Header.Del(opt.Headers[i])\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn nil\n\t}\n}\n```\n\nA regression test (`TestRedirectStripsHeadersOnHostChange`) was added to `backend/http/http_internal_test.go`, confirmed to fail without the fix and pass with it. Full `backend/http` and `lib/rest` test suites pass with the fix applied. I have a fix branch ready to push to a private fork once this report is acknowledged.\n\n### Verification\nDynamically confirmed on rclone master @ `cfdc9d0` (post `v1.75.0`) in a local test harness \u2014 see \"Dynamic Confirmation\" above. Fix verified to eliminate the leak via the same harness (secret header absent from Server B after the fix; functionality \u2014 file download via redirect \u2014 unaffected).",
"id": "GHSA-486v-q2wf-fp2r",
"modified": "2026-09-10T23:02:53Z",
"published": "2026-09-10T23:02:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/security/advisories/GHSA-486v-q2wf-fp2r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88013"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/commit/22859b7e696cea3c563c6ba04c6b7f91f74456b4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/commit/79fbc0842f74e02cb84f0e3e7261d169983c8831"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/commit/925fb4fb21eb25e75cd1b64fdd17ded857784bfc"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/releases/tag/v1.75.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "rclone: http backend forwards custom/auth headers to a different host on redirect"
}
GHSA-49HC-75C3-5637
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:20 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:20A vulnerability has been identified in Climatix POL909 (AWM module) (All versions < V11.34). The web server of affected devices transmits data without TLS encryption. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker in a man-in-the-middle position to read sensitive data, such as administrator credentials, or modify data in transit.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-40366"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-311",
"CWE-319"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-11-09T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been identified in Climatix POL909 (AWM module) (All versions \u003c V11.34). The web server of affected devices transmits data without TLS encryption. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker in a man-in-the-middle position to read sensitive data, such as administrator credentials, or modify data in transit.",
"id": "GHSA-49hc-75c3-5637",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:20:09Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:20:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40366"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-703715.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-49V9-J5FF-RJ5W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-24 00:31 – Updated: 2026-04-24 00:31A vulnerability exists in SenseLive X3050’s web management interface due to its reliance on unencrypted HTTP for all administrative communication. Because management traffic, including authentication attempts and configuration data, is transmitted in cleartext, an attacker with access to the same network segment could intercept or observe sensitive operational information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40431"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-319"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T00:16:28Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability exists in\u00a0SenseLive\u00a0X3050\u2019s web management interface due to its reliance on unencrypted HTTP for all administrative communication. Because management traffic, including authentication attempts and configuration data, is transmitted in cleartext, an attacker with access to the same network segment could intercept or observe sensitive operational information.",
"id": "GHSA-49v9-j5ff-rj5w",
"modified": "2026-04-24T00:31:52Z",
"published": "2026-04-24T00:31:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40431"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-111-12.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://senselive.io/contact"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-111-12"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-49WH-VW4X-P83M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:59 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:31The Customer's Tomedo Server in Version 1.7.3 communicates to the Vendor Tomedo Server via HTTP (in cleartext) that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors. Basic authentication is used for the authentication, making it possible to base64 decode the sniffed credentials and discover the username and password.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-17393"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-319",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-10-18T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The Customer\u0027s Tomedo Server in Version 1.7.3 communicates to the Vendor Tomedo Server via HTTP (in cleartext) that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors. Basic authentication is used for the authentication, making it possible to base64 decode the sniffed credentials and discover the username and password.",
"id": "GHSA-49wh-vw4x-p83m",
"modified": "2024-04-04T02:31:27Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:59:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-17393"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/154873/Tomedo-Server-1.7.3-Information-Disclosure-Weak-Cryptography.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2019/Oct/33"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Before transmitting, encrypt the data using reliable, confidentiality-protecting cryptographic protocols.
Mitigation
When using web applications with SSL, use SSL for the entire session from login to logout, not just for the initial login page.
Mitigation
When designing hardware platforms, ensure that approved encryption algorithms (such as those recommended by NIST) protect paths from security critical data to trusted user applications.
Mitigation
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
Mitigation
Configure servers to use encrypted channels for communication, which may include SSL or other secure protocols.
CAPEC-102: Session Sidejacking
Session sidejacking takes advantage of an unencrypted communication channel between a victim and target system. The attacker sniffs traffic on a network looking for session tokens in unencrypted traffic. Once a session token is captured, the attacker performs malicious actions by using the stolen token with the targeted application to impersonate the victim. This attack is a specific method of session hijacking, which is exploiting a valid session token to gain unauthorized access to a target system or information. Other methods to perform a session hijacking are session fixation, cross-site scripting, or compromising a user or server machine and stealing the session token.
CAPEC-117: Interception
An adversary monitors data streams to or from the target for information gathering purposes. This attack may be undertaken to solely gather sensitive information or to support a further attack against the target. This attack pattern can involve sniffing network traffic as well as other types of data streams (e.g. radio). The adversary can attempt to initiate the establishment of a data stream or passively observe the communications as they unfold. In all variants of this attack, the adversary is not the intended recipient of the data stream. In contrast to other means of gathering information (e.g., targeting data leaks), the adversary must actively position themself so as to observe explicit data channels (e.g. network traffic) and read the content. However, this attack differs from a Adversary-In-the-Middle (CAPEC-94) attack, as the adversary does not alter the content of the communications nor forward data to the intended recipient.
CAPEC-383: Harvesting Information via API Event Monitoring
An adversary hosts an event within an application framework and then monitors the data exchanged during the course of the event for the purpose of harvesting any important data leaked during the transactions. One example could be harvesting lists of usernames or userIDs for the purpose of sending spam messages to those users. One example of this type of attack involves the adversary creating an event within the sub-application. Assume the adversary hosts a "virtual sale" of rare items. As other users enter the event, the attacker records via AiTM (CAPEC-94) proxy the user_ids and usernames of everyone who attends. The adversary would then be able to spam those users within the application using an automated script.
CAPEC-477: Signature Spoofing by Mixing Signed and Unsigned Content
An attacker exploits the underlying complexity of a data structure that allows for both signed and unsigned content, to cause unsigned data to be processed as though it were signed data.
CAPEC-65: Sniff Application Code
An adversary passively sniffs network communications and captures application code bound for an authorized client. Once obtained, they can use it as-is, or through reverse-engineering glean sensitive information or exploit the trust relationship between the client and server. Such code may belong to a dynamic update to the client, a patch being applied to a client component or any such interaction where the client is authorized to communicate with the server.