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Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-23

Allowed

Relative Path Traversal

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize sequences such as ".." that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory.

843 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-FWX2-7CX7-P6J5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:55 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:50
VLAI
Details

A relative path traversal vulnerability found in Advan VD-1 firmware versions up to 230. It allows attackers to download arbitrary files via url cgibin/ExportSettings.cgi?Download=filepath, without any authentication.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-13408"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-23"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-08-29T01:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A relative path traversal vulnerability found in Advan VD-1 firmware versions up to 230. It allows attackers to download arbitrary files via url cgibin/ExportSettings.cgi?Download=filepath, without any authentication.",
  "id": "GHSA-fwx2-7cx7-p6j5",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T01:50:36Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:55:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-13408"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gist.github.com/keniver/f5155b42eb278ec0273b83565b64235b#file-androvideo-advan-vd-1-multiple-vulnerabilities-md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tvn.twcert.org.tw/taiwanvn/TVN-201906009"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://surl.twcert.org.tw/2bvXq"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-FWX6-6883-XR45

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-17 21:31 – Updated: 2026-07-11 00:31
VLAI
Details

Anviz CX7 Firmware is vulnerable to an authenticated CSV upload which allows path traversal to overwrite arbitrary files (e.g., /etc/shadow), enabling unauthorized SSH access when combined with debug‑setting changes

Severity
4.9 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-31927"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-23"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-17T20:16:33Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Anviz CX7 Firmware\u00a0is vulnerable to an authenticated CSV upload which allows path traversal \nto overwrite arbitrary files (e.g., /etc/shadow), enabling unauthorized \nSSH access when combined with debug\u2011setting changes",
  "id": "GHSA-fwx6-6883-xr45",
  "modified": "2026-07-11T00:31:45Z",
  "published": "2026-04-17T21:31:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31927"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-106-03.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.anviz.com/contact-us.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-106-03"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-G29J-RWFV-H99W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 22:12 – Updated: 2026-09-02 22:12
VLAI
Summary
Handlebars.java: Arbitrary file read in `SpringTemplateLoader` via URL-fragment suffix bypass
Details

Summary

com.github.jknack.handlebars.springmvc.SpringTemplateLoader resolves Spring MVC view names into URLs via Spring's ResourceLoader without applying the path-containment check that protects every other URL-based loader in the project (ClassPathTemplateLoader, FileTemplateLoader, ServletContextTemplateLoader - all hardened by commit d177cdee).

The only remaining defense for file: / classpath: view names is the unconditional .hbs suffix appended by AbstractTemplateLoader.resolve(...). This suffix is the load-bearing security boundary that prevents a request like view=file:/etc/passwd from reading /etc/passwd instead of /etc/passwd.hbs.

This boundary is bypassed by a single character: # (the URL fragment delimiter).

When the view name ends with #, the appended .hbs lands inside the URL fragment. Both Spring's FileUrlResource.exists() (via URI.getSchemeSpecificPart()) and the JDK's URL.openStream() (via URL.getFile()) silently discard the fragment, so the file actually opened is the bare path the attacker specified - for example /etc/passwd rather than /etc/passwd.hbs. The compiled "template" is then parsed and rendered into the HTTP response body.

Result: unauthenticated, network-reachable, arbitrary file read of any file readable by the JVM process on any Spring MVC application that uses a default-configured HandlebarsViewResolver and exposes a controller that returns a (fully or partly) user-influenced view name.

Vulnerable Code

SpringTemplateLoader.resolve - preserves file: / classpath: and applies suffix to the path portion

// handlebars-springmvc/.../SpringTemplateLoader.java:66-77
@Override
public String resolve(final String location) {
  String protocol = null;
  if (location.startsWith(ResourceUtils.CLASSPATH_URL_PREFIX)) {
    protocol = ResourceUtils.CLASSPATH_URL_PREFIX;
  } else if (location.startsWith(ResourceUtils.FILE_URL_PREFIX)) {
    protocol = ResourceUtils.FILE_URL_PREFIX;          // matches "file:"
  }
  if (protocol == null) {
    return super.resolve(location);
  }
  return protocol + super.resolve(location.substring(protocol.length()));
}

SpringTemplateLoader.getResource - no containment check

// handlebars-springmvc/.../SpringTemplateLoader.java:57-63
@Override
protected URL getResource(final String location) throws IOException {
  Resource resource = loader.getResource(location);   // trust Spring blindly
  if (!resource.exists()) {
    return null;
  }
  return resource.getURL();
}

Contrast with the hardened sibling ClassPathTemplateLoader.getResource, which delegates to URLTemplateLoader.classpathResource(...) - the containment helper added by commit d177cdee:

// handlebars/.../io/URLTemplateLoader.java:75-93   (the d177cdee hardening)
protected final String classpathResource(String location) {
  String resolvedPath =
      Paths.get(location).normalize().toString().replace(java.io.File.separatorChar, '/');
  if (location.startsWith("/") && !resolvedPath.startsWith("/")) {
    resolvedPath = "/" + resolvedPath;
  }
  String prefix = getPrefix();
  if (!prefix.equals("/") && !resolvedPath.startsWith(prefix)) {
    throw new IllegalArgumentException(
        "Path traversal attempt detected. Resolved path escapes base prefix: " + location);
  }
  return resolvedPath;
}

SpringTemplateLoader.getResource never calls this helper.

HandlebarsViewResolver - strips the outer prefix/suffix and forwards to compile, no validation

// handlebars-springmvc/.../HandlebarsViewResolver.java:112-117
public HandlebarsViewResolver(final Class<? extends HandlebarsView> viewClass) {
  setViewClass(viewClass);
  setContentType(DEFAULT_CONTENT_TYPE);
  setPrefix(TemplateLoader.DEFAULT_PREFIX);   // "/"
  setSuffix(TemplateLoader.DEFAULT_SUFFIX);   // ".hbs"
}

// handlebars-springmvc/.../HandlebarsViewResolver.java:163-178
protected AbstractUrlBasedView configure(final HandlebarsView view) throws IOException {
  String url = view.getUrl();
  url = url.substring(getPrefix().length(), url.length() - getSuffix().length());
  try {
    view.setTemplate(handlebars.compile(url));      // ← attacker-controlled url
    view.setValueResolver(valueResolvers.toArray(new ValueResolver[0]));
  } catch (IOException ex) {
    if (failOnMissingFile) throw ex;
    logger.debug("File not found: " + url);
  }
  return view;
}

AbstractTemplateLoader.resolve - the load-bearing .hbs gate

// handlebars/.../io/AbstractTemplateLoader.java:47-50
@Override
public String resolve(final String uri) {
  return prefix + normalize(uri) + suffix;   // "/" + path + ".hbs"
}

The suffix string is concatenated as a string. Whether that string lands in the path component, query component, or fragment component of the resulting URL is decided by Spring's URL parsing - not by Handlebars.

Impact

Direct primitive

Unauthenticated arbitrary file read of any file readable by the JVM process UID.

Real-world attack chains (downstream impact)

  1. Read application.yml -> extract jwt.secret / spring.datasource.password -> forge admin JWT or directly connect to the database. Common Spring Boot deployment pattern; one request to game-over.
  2. Read AWS / GCP credentials -> assume role -> exfiltrate buckets, modify infrastructure.
  3. Read K8s service-account token -> API-server access scoped to the pod's role -> namespace lateral movement, secret exfiltration.
  4. Read /proc/self/environ -> harvest CI/CD-injected secrets that never appear on disk.
  5. Read private keys (id_rsa, TLS keys) -> impersonate host / decrypt MITM'd traffic / sign commits.
  6. Read the application's source-code-on-disk to discover further server-side endpoints, hardcoded credentials, or chains.

Indirect

  • Confirmed reachable from any controller that returns user-influenced view names - a documented Spring anti-pattern that nevertheless appears in production (CMS preview endpoints, theme switchers, multi-tenant view routing, @RequestMapping("/{view}") patterns, DefaultRequestToViewNameTranslator-driven URL->view mappings).
  • No authentication, no privilege, no clicks - a single Internet HTTP GET.

Remediation

Any of the following independently closes the bypass. We recommend implementing #1 and #2 for defense in depth.

Apply the containment helper to SpringTemplateLoader.getResource (parity with d177cdee)

// handlebars-springmvc/.../SpringTemplateLoader.java
@Override
protected URL getResource(final String location) throws IOException {
  // For classpath: locations, delegate to the hardened helper as ClassPathTemplateLoader does.
  // For file: locations, perform an explicit canonical-path containment check.
  Resource resource = loader.getResource(location);
  if (!resource.exists()) {
    return null;
  }
  URL url = resource.getURL();
  validateNoUnsafeUrlComponents(url);   // see 9.3
  return url;
}

Validate the resolved URL components

private static void validateNoUnsafeUrlComponents(URL url) {
  if (url.getRef() != null) {
    throw new IllegalArgumentException(
        "Template URL must not contain a fragment: " + url);
  }
  if (url.getQuery() != null) {
    throw new IllegalArgumentException(
        "Template URL must not contain a query: " + url);
  }
}

This is the structural fix - it ensures the textual .hbs check matches the resolved-file behavior regardless of input shape.

Remove the protocol short-circuit entirely

If the supported deployment model is "templates live in one well-known prefix", SpringTemplateLoader.resolve should not preserve file: / classpath: prefixes from user input at all. Either remove that branch, or require an explicit allow-list in the constructor:

public SpringTemplateLoader(ResourceLoader loader, boolean allowProtocolPrefixes) { ... }

with the default being false.

Validate the stripped view name in HandlebarsViewResolver.configure

// handlebars-springmvc/.../HandlebarsViewResolver.java:163-178
protected AbstractUrlBasedView configure(final HandlebarsView view) throws IOException {
  String url = view.getUrl();
  url = url.substring(getPrefix().length(), url.length() - getSuffix().length());
  if (url.contains(":") || url.contains("#") || url.contains("..")) {
    throw new IllegalArgumentException("Unsafe view name: " + url);
  }
  // ...
}

This is a defense-in-depth check that rejects view names containing protocols, fragments, or traversal sequences. It does not by itself remove the SpringTemplateLoader weakness (developers calling handlebars.compile(...) directly still bypass it), but it eliminates the most common reach pattern.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.github.jknack:handlebars-springmvc"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-63490"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-23",
      "CWE-552"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T22:12:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-20T15:18:04Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`com.github.jknack.handlebars.springmvc.SpringTemplateLoader` resolves Spring MVC view names into URLs via Spring\u0027s `ResourceLoader` **without applying the path-containment check** that protects every other URL-based loader in the project (`ClassPathTemplateLoader`, `FileTemplateLoader`, `ServletContextTemplateLoader` - all hardened by commit `d177cdee`).\n\nThe only remaining defense for `file:` / `classpath:` view names is the unconditional `.hbs` suffix appended by `AbstractTemplateLoader.resolve(...)`. This suffix is the load-bearing security boundary that prevents a request like `view=file:/etc/passwd` from reading `/etc/passwd` instead of `/etc/passwd.hbs`.\n\n**This boundary is bypassed by a single character: `#` (the URL fragment delimiter).**\n\nWhen the view name ends with `#`, the appended `.hbs` lands inside the URL fragment. Both Spring\u0027s `FileUrlResource.exists()` (via `URI.getSchemeSpecificPart()`) and the JDK\u0027s `URL.openStream()` (via `URL.getFile()`) **silently discard the fragment**, so the file actually opened is the bare path the attacker specified - for example `/etc/passwd` rather than `/etc/passwd.hbs`. The compiled \"template\" is then parsed and rendered into the HTTP response body.\n\nResult: **unauthenticated, network-reachable, arbitrary file read** of any file readable by the JVM process on any Spring MVC application that uses a default-configured `HandlebarsViewResolver` and exposes a controller that returns a (fully or partly) user-influenced view name.\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n\n#### `SpringTemplateLoader.resolve` - preserves `file:` / `classpath:` and applies suffix to the path portion\n\n```java\n// handlebars-springmvc/.../SpringTemplateLoader.java:66-77\n@Override\npublic String resolve(final String location) {\n  String protocol = null;\n  if (location.startsWith(ResourceUtils.CLASSPATH_URL_PREFIX)) {\n    protocol = ResourceUtils.CLASSPATH_URL_PREFIX;\n  } else if (location.startsWith(ResourceUtils.FILE_URL_PREFIX)) {\n    protocol = ResourceUtils.FILE_URL_PREFIX;          // matches \"file:\"\n  }\n  if (protocol == null) {\n    return super.resolve(location);\n  }\n  return protocol + super.resolve(location.substring(protocol.length()));\n}\n```\n\n#### `SpringTemplateLoader.getResource` - **no containment check**\n\n```java\n// handlebars-springmvc/.../SpringTemplateLoader.java:57-63\n@Override\nprotected URL getResource(final String location) throws IOException {\n  Resource resource = loader.getResource(location);   // trust Spring blindly\n  if (!resource.exists()) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  return resource.getURL();\n}\n```\n\nContrast with the hardened sibling `ClassPathTemplateLoader.getResource`, which delegates to `URLTemplateLoader.classpathResource(...)` - the containment helper added by commit `d177cdee`:\n\n```java\n// handlebars/.../io/URLTemplateLoader.java:75-93   (the d177cdee hardening)\nprotected final String classpathResource(String location) {\n  String resolvedPath =\n      Paths.get(location).normalize().toString().replace(java.io.File.separatorChar, \u0027/\u0027);\n  if (location.startsWith(\"/\") \u0026\u0026 !resolvedPath.startsWith(\"/\")) {\n    resolvedPath = \"/\" + resolvedPath;\n  }\n  String prefix = getPrefix();\n  if (!prefix.equals(\"/\") \u0026\u0026 !resolvedPath.startsWith(prefix)) {\n    throw new IllegalArgumentException(\n        \"Path traversal attempt detected. Resolved path escapes base prefix: \" + location);\n  }\n  return resolvedPath;\n}\n```\n\n`SpringTemplateLoader.getResource` never calls this helper.\n\n#### `HandlebarsViewResolver` - strips the outer prefix/suffix and forwards to compile, no validation\n\n```java\n// handlebars-springmvc/.../HandlebarsViewResolver.java:112-117\npublic HandlebarsViewResolver(final Class\u003c? extends HandlebarsView\u003e viewClass) {\n  setViewClass(viewClass);\n  setContentType(DEFAULT_CONTENT_TYPE);\n  setPrefix(TemplateLoader.DEFAULT_PREFIX);   // \"/\"\n  setSuffix(TemplateLoader.DEFAULT_SUFFIX);   // \".hbs\"\n}\n\n// handlebars-springmvc/.../HandlebarsViewResolver.java:163-178\nprotected AbstractUrlBasedView configure(final HandlebarsView view) throws IOException {\n  String url = view.getUrl();\n  url = url.substring(getPrefix().length(), url.length() - getSuffix().length());\n  try {\n    view.setTemplate(handlebars.compile(url));      // \u2190 attacker-controlled url\n    view.setValueResolver(valueResolvers.toArray(new ValueResolver[0]));\n  } catch (IOException ex) {\n    if (failOnMissingFile) throw ex;\n    logger.debug(\"File not found: \" + url);\n  }\n  return view;\n}\n```\n\n#### `AbstractTemplateLoader.resolve` - the load-bearing `.hbs` gate\n\n```java\n// handlebars/.../io/AbstractTemplateLoader.java:47-50\n@Override\npublic String resolve(final String uri) {\n  return prefix + normalize(uri) + suffix;   // \"/\" + path + \".hbs\"\n}\n```\n\nThe suffix string is concatenated as a string. Whether that string lands in the path component, query component, or fragment component of the resulting URL is decided by Spring\u0027s URL parsing - not by Handlebars.\n\n### Impact\n\n#### Direct primitive\n\nUnauthenticated arbitrary file read of any file readable by the JVM process UID.\n\n#### Real-world attack chains (downstream impact)\n\n1. **Read `application.yml` -\u003e extract `jwt.secret` / `spring.datasource.password` -\u003e forge admin JWT or directly connect to the database.** Common Spring Boot deployment pattern; one request to game-over.\n2. **Read AWS / GCP credentials -\u003e assume role -\u003e exfiltrate buckets, modify infrastructure.**\n3. **Read K8s service-account token -\u003e API-server access scoped to the pod\u0027s role -\u003e namespace lateral movement, secret exfiltration.**\n4. **Read `/proc/self/environ` -\u003e harvest CI/CD-injected secrets that never appear on disk.**\n5. **Read private keys (`id_rsa`, TLS keys) -\u003e impersonate host / decrypt MITM\u0027d traffic / sign commits.**\n6. **Read the application\u0027s source-code-on-disk** to discover further server-side endpoints, hardcoded credentials, or chains.\n\n#### Indirect\n\n* Confirmed reachable from any controller that returns user-influenced view names - a documented Spring anti-pattern that nevertheless appears in production (CMS preview endpoints, theme switchers, multi-tenant view routing, `@RequestMapping(\"/{view}\")` patterns, `DefaultRequestToViewNameTranslator`-driven URL-\u003eview mappings).\n* No authentication, no privilege, no clicks - a single Internet HTTP GET.\n\n### Remediation\n\nAny of the following independently closes the bypass. We recommend implementing **#1 and #2** for defense in depth.\n\n#### Apply the containment helper to `SpringTemplateLoader.getResource` (parity with d177cdee)\n\n```java\n// handlebars-springmvc/.../SpringTemplateLoader.java\n@Override\nprotected URL getResource(final String location) throws IOException {\n  // For classpath: locations, delegate to the hardened helper as ClassPathTemplateLoader does.\n  // For file: locations, perform an explicit canonical-path containment check.\n  Resource resource = loader.getResource(location);\n  if (!resource.exists()) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  URL url = resource.getURL();\n  validateNoUnsafeUrlComponents(url);   // see 9.3\n  return url;\n}\n```\n\n#### Validate the resolved URL components\n\n```java\nprivate static void validateNoUnsafeUrlComponents(URL url) {\n  if (url.getRef() != null) {\n    throw new IllegalArgumentException(\n        \"Template URL must not contain a fragment: \" + url);\n  }\n  if (url.getQuery() != null) {\n    throw new IllegalArgumentException(\n        \"Template URL must not contain a query: \" + url);\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThis is the **structural** fix - it ensures the textual `.hbs` check matches the resolved-file behavior regardless of input shape.\n\n#### Remove the protocol short-circuit entirely\n\nIf the supported deployment model is \"templates live in one well-known prefix\", `SpringTemplateLoader.resolve` should not preserve `file:` / `classpath:` prefixes from user input at all. Either remove that branch, or require an explicit allow-list in the constructor:\n\n```java\npublic SpringTemplateLoader(ResourceLoader loader, boolean allowProtocolPrefixes) { ... }\n```\n\nwith the default being `false`.\n\n#### Validate the stripped view name in `HandlebarsViewResolver.configure`\n\n```java\n// handlebars-springmvc/.../HandlebarsViewResolver.java:163-178\nprotected AbstractUrlBasedView configure(final HandlebarsView view) throws IOException {\n  String url = view.getUrl();\n  url = url.substring(getPrefix().length(), url.length() - getSuffix().length());\n  if (url.contains(\":\") || url.contains(\"#\") || url.contains(\"..\")) {\n    throw new IllegalArgumentException(\"Unsafe view name: \" + url);\n  }\n  // ...\n}\n```\n\nThis is a defense-in-depth check that rejects view names containing protocols, fragments, or traversal sequences. It does not by itself remove the SpringTemplateLoader weakness (developers calling `handlebars.compile(...)` directly still bypass it), but it eliminates the most common reach pattern.",
  "id": "GHSA-g29j-rwfv-h99w",
  "modified": "2026-09-02T22:12:03Z",
  "published": "2026-09-02T22:12:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jknack/handlebars.java/security/advisories/GHSA-g29j-rwfv-h99w"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63490"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jknack/handlebars.java/commit/61f43423a337b87db5fec1fe59f0725aaaa38df5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jknack/handlebars.java"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jknack/handlebars.java/releases/tag/v4.5.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Handlebars.java: Arbitrary file read in `SpringTemplateLoader` via URL-fragment suffix bypass"
}

GHSA-G2J9-G8R5-RG82

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-14 20:33 – Updated: 2025-11-14 20:33
VLAI
Summary
PrivateBin's template-switching feature allows arbitrary local file inclusion through path traversal
Details

Summary

An unauthenticated Local File Inclusion exists in the template-switching feature: if templateselection is enabled in the configuration, the server trusts the template cookie and includes the referenced PHP file. An attacker can read sensitive data or, if they manage to drop a PHP file elsewhere, gain RCE.

Affected versions

PrivateBin versions since 1.7.7.

Conditions

  • templateselection got enabled in cfg/conf.php
  • Visitor sets a cookie template pointing to an existing PHP file without it's suffix, using a path relative to the tpl folder. Absolute paths do not work.

Impact

The constructed path of the template file is checked for existence, then included. For PrivateBin project files this does not leak any secrets due to data files being created with PHP code that prevents execution, but if a configuration file without that line got created or the visitor figures out the relative path to a PHP script that directly performs an action without appropriate privilege checking, those might execute or leak information.

Impact analysis

In detail, we have analyzed different ways of exploiting this vulnerability and found no way to cause a full remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability or denial of service (DoS) as recursive includes, e.g., are not possible.

Generally, it is again notably to remember only PHP files of the local filesystem can be included. That's why potentially at risk PrivateBin PHP files have been analyzed.

  • the PrivateBin config file is by default protected as it prevents access itself resulting in a 403 HTTP status code. This is called the “(PHP) protection line”.
  • Likewise, the paste data cannot be accessed due to that “protection line”. Each created file contains the same line protecting it against PHP execution/inclusion.
  • As for the salt, purge_ and traffic_limiter files, they get included, but no data is displayed (variables or comments only), and a webserver specific error message is returned.
  • When one tries to include index.php, you get a PHP error (possibly visible, depending on the webserver setup), due to define being called twice.
  • With any of the files in lib and likely those in vendor (we have not verified each dependency), code is only declared and not executed and the result is again a webserver specific error message.
  • With the scripts in bin, the result is an error message, but code is executed to some extent, but you cannot pass arguments to any administrative scripts as they are read via $_SERVER['argc'].

That said, the vulnerability could be used to chain more attacks or execute other non-PrivateBin related PHP files on the host system, if such other files exist and the (relative) path to them can be guessed. Also, should for some reason the PHP “protection line” be missing on your deployment the impact could be much worse and e.g. data like the URL shortener token or the database configuration from the configuration file could possibly be exfiltrated.

Real-life impact

PrivateBin has checked all instances versioned 1.7.7 and above listed in the PrivateBin directory and did find 11 instances that had the template switcher enabled. The following script was used to detect this:

for URL in $(
    curl --silent --header 'Accept: application/json' 'https://privatebin.info/directory/api?top=100&version=1.7.7' | jq --raw-output '.[].url'
) $(
    curl --silent --header 'Accept: application/json' 'https://privatebin.info/directory/api?top=100&version=1.7.8' | jq --raw-output '.[].url'
) $(
    curl --silent --header 'Accept: application/json' 'https://privatebin.info/directory/api?top=100&version=2'     | jq --raw-output '.[].url'
)
do
    curl --silent "$URL" | grep -q 'id="template"' && echo "$URL uses template switcher"
done

None of these instances had an unprotected PrivateBin configuration file in use. The following script was used and may be adapted to check any single instance:

curl --silent --cookie  'template=../cfg/conf' https://privatebin.net

Technical Description

Users can select their preferred template via the template cookie, as seen in TemplateSwitcher::getSelectedByUserTemplate:

    private static function getSelectedByUserTemplate(): ?string
    {
        $selectedTemplate    = null;
        $templateCookieValue = $_COOKIE['template'] ?? '';

        if (self::isTemplateAvailable($templateCookieValue)) {
            $selectedTemplate = $templateCookieValue;
        }

        return $selectedTemplate;
    }

In this commit, introduced in 1.7.7, the TemplateSwitcher::isTemplateAvailable method went from this:

    public static function isTemplateAvailable(string $template): bool
    {
        return in_array($template, self::getAvailableTemplates());
    }

to this:

    public static function isTemplateAvailable(string $template): bool
    {
        $available = in_array($template, self::getAvailableTemplates());

        if (!$available && !View::isBootstrapTemplate($template)) {
            $path      = View::getTemplateFilePath($template);
            $available = file_exists($path);
        }

        return $available;
    }

The new code will now blindly trust $template, unless it starts with the string bootstrap-.

View::getTemplateFilePath will return PATH . 'tpl' . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $file . '.php', allowing directory traversal, but preventing non-PHP files to be included.

View::draw will then include the user-submitted template:

    public function draw($template)
    {
        $path = self::getTemplateFilePath($template);
        if (!file_exists($path)) {
            throw new Exception('Template ' . $template . ' not found!', 80);
        }
        extract($this->_variables);
        include $path;
    }

Note: this is only possible if templateselection configuration is enabled, or if no template has been set. The template will be rewritten if this condition isn't met:

    private function _setDefaultTemplate()
    {
        $templates = $this->_conf->getKey('availabletemplates');
        $template  = $this->_conf->getKey('template');
        TemplateSwitcher::setAvailableTemplates($templates);
        TemplateSwitcher::setTemplateFallback($template);

        // force default template, if template selection is disabled and a default is set
        if (!$this->_conf->getKey('templateselection') && !empty($template)) {
            $_COOKIE['template'] = $template;
            setcookie('template', $template, array('SameSite' => 'Lax', 'Secure' => true));
        }
    }

Reproduction Steps

  1. Configure PrivateBin with templateselection = true (default template list is fine).
  2. Send a request with a malicious template cookie like template=../cfg/conf, where the relative path points to a PHP file without its file suffix
  3. The script now includes the select PHP file (leading to a 500 in that specific case).

Mitigation

Patches

The issue has been patched in version 2.0.3.

Workarounds

Set templateselection = false in cfg/conf.php or remove it, it's default is false.

Credits

PrivateBin would like to thank Benoit Esnard, who reported this vulnerability.

In general, PrivateBin would like to thank everyone reporting issues and potential vulnerabilities to us.

If a user suspects they have found a vulnerability or potential security risk, PrivateBin kindly asks them to follow the security policy and report it to PrivateBin. After submssion the report is assessed and necessary actions will be taken to address it.

Timeline

  • 2025-11-09 Received report via GitHub Security Advisory
  • 2025-11-10 Discussed and reproduced issue, wrote a unit test case based on this, started work on a patch
  • 2025-11-11 Further work on patch, refactored related code
  • 2025-11-12 Released patch with PrivateBin 2.0.3
Severity
5.8 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "privatebin/privatebin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.7.7"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-64714"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-23",
      "CWE-73",
      "CWE-98"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-14T20:33:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-13T16:15:56Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated Local File Inclusion exists in the template-switching feature: if `templateselection` is enabled in the configuration, the server trusts the `template` cookie and includes the referenced PHP file. An attacker can read sensitive data or, if they manage to drop a PHP file elsewhere, gain RCE.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nPrivateBin versions since 1.7.7.\n\n## Conditions\n\n- `templateselection` got enabled in `cfg/conf.php`\n- Visitor sets a cookie `template` pointing to an existing PHP file without it\u0027s suffix, using a path relative to the `tpl` folder. Absolute paths do not work.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe constructed path of the template file is checked for existence, then included. For PrivateBin project files this does not leak any secrets due to data files being created with PHP code that prevents execution, but if a configuration file without that line got created or the visitor figures out the relative path to a PHP script that directly performs an action without appropriate privilege checking, those might execute or leak information.\n\n### Impact analysis\nIn detail, we have analyzed different ways of exploiting this vulnerability and found no way to cause a full remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability or denial of service (DoS) as recursive includes, e.g., are not possible.\n\nGenerally, it is again notably to remember only PHP files of the local filesystem can be included. That\u0027s why potentially at risk PrivateBin PHP files have been analyzed.\n\n* the PrivateBin config file is by default [protected as it prevents access itself](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/blob/591d2d40e16a196aa628e3962a1c21bdf9793db2/cfg/conf.sample.php#L1) resulting in a 403 HTTP status code. This is called the \u201c(PHP) protection line\u201d.\n* Likewise, the paste data cannot be accessed due to that \u201cprotection line\u201d. [Each created file contains the same line protecting it against](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/blob/591d2d40e16a196aa628e3962a1c21bdf9793db2/lib/Data/Filesystem.php#L46) PHP execution/inclusion.\n* As for the `salt`, `purge_` and `traffic_limiter` files, they get included, but no data is displayed (variables or comments only), and a webserver specific error message is returned.\n* When one tries to include `index.php`, you get a PHP error (possibly visible, depending on the webserver setup), due to define being called twice.\n* With any of the files in lib and likely those in vendor (we have not verified each dependency), code is only declared and not executed and the result is again a webserver specific error message.\n* With the scripts in bin, the result is an error message, but code is executed to some extent, but you cannot pass arguments to any administrative scripts [as they are read via `$_SERVER[\u0027argc\u0027]`](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/blob/d32ac29925066c668241a165264c76de051398e3/bin/administration#L357C37-L357C54).\n\nThat said, the vulnerability could be used to chain more attacks or execute other non-PrivateBin related PHP files on the host system, if such other files exist and the (relative) path to them can be guessed.\nAlso, should for some reason the PHP \u201cprotection line\u201d be missing on your deployment the impact could be much worse and e.g. data like the URL shortener token or the database configuration from the configuration file could possibly be exfiltrated.\n\n### Real-life impact\n\nPrivateBin has checked all instances versioned 1.7.7 and above listed in the [PrivateBin directory](https://privatebin.info/directory/) and did find 11 instances that had the template switcher enabled. The following script was used to detect this:\n\n```shell\nfor URL in $(\n    curl --silent --header \u0027Accept: application/json\u0027 \u0027https://privatebin.info/directory/api?top=100\u0026version=1.7.7\u0027 | jq --raw-output \u0027.[].url\u0027\n) $(\n    curl --silent --header \u0027Accept: application/json\u0027 \u0027https://privatebin.info/directory/api?top=100\u0026version=1.7.8\u0027 | jq --raw-output \u0027.[].url\u0027\n) $(\n    curl --silent --header \u0027Accept: application/json\u0027 \u0027https://privatebin.info/directory/api?top=100\u0026version=2\u0027     | jq --raw-output \u0027.[].url\u0027\n)\ndo\n    curl --silent \"$URL\" | grep -q \u0027id=\"template\"\u0027 \u0026\u0026 echo \"$URL uses template switcher\"\ndone\n```\n\nNone of these instances had an unprotected PrivateBin configuration file in use. The following script was used and may be adapted to check any single instance:\n\n```shell\ncurl --silent --cookie  \u0027template=../cfg/conf\u0027 https://privatebin.net\n```\n\n## Technical Description\n\nUsers can select their preferred template via the `template` cookie, as seen in `TemplateSwitcher::getSelectedByUserTemplate`:\n\n```php\n    private static function getSelectedByUserTemplate(): ?string\n    {\n        $selectedTemplate    = null;\n        $templateCookieValue = $_COOKIE[\u0027template\u0027] ?? \u0027\u0027;\n\n        if (self::isTemplateAvailable($templateCookieValue)) {\n            $selectedTemplate = $templateCookieValue;\n        }\n\n        return $selectedTemplate;\n    }\n```\n\nIn [this commit](44f8cfbfb8df4b4bec1cbf79aa8ce51abdb18be3), introduced in 1.7.7, the `TemplateSwitcher::isTemplateAvailable` method went from this:\n\n```php\n    public static function isTemplateAvailable(string $template): bool\n    {\n        return in_array($template, self::getAvailableTemplates());\n    }\n```\n\nto this:\n\n```php\n    public static function isTemplateAvailable(string $template): bool\n    {\n        $available = in_array($template, self::getAvailableTemplates());\n\n        if (!$available \u0026\u0026 !View::isBootstrapTemplate($template)) {\n            $path      = View::getTemplateFilePath($template);\n            $available = file_exists($path);\n        }\n\n        return $available;\n    }\n```\n\nThe new code will now blindly trust `$template`, unless it starts with the string `bootstrap-`.\n\n`View::getTemplateFilePath` will return `PATH . \u0027tpl\u0027 . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $file . \u0027.php\u0027`, allowing directory traversal, but preventing non-PHP files to be included.\n\n`View::draw` will then include the user-submitted template:\n\n```php\n    public function draw($template)\n    {\n        $path = self::getTemplateFilePath($template);\n        if (!file_exists($path)) {\n            throw new Exception(\u0027Template \u0027 . $template . \u0027 not found!\u0027, 80);\n        }\n        extract($this-\u003e_variables);\n        include $path;\n    }\n```\n\n**Note:** this is only possible if `templateselection` configuration is enabled, or if no template has been set. The `template` will be rewritten if this condition isn\u0027t met:\n\n```php\n    private function _setDefaultTemplate()\n    {\n        $templates = $this-\u003e_conf-\u003egetKey(\u0027availabletemplates\u0027);\n        $template  = $this-\u003e_conf-\u003egetKey(\u0027template\u0027);\n        TemplateSwitcher::setAvailableTemplates($templates);\n        TemplateSwitcher::setTemplateFallback($template);\n\n        // force default template, if template selection is disabled and a default is set\n        if (!$this-\u003e_conf-\u003egetKey(\u0027templateselection\u0027) \u0026\u0026 !empty($template)) {\n            $_COOKIE[\u0027template\u0027] = $template;\n            setcookie(\u0027template\u0027, $template, array(\u0027SameSite\u0027 =\u003e \u0027Lax\u0027, \u0027Secure\u0027 =\u003e true));\n        }\n    }\n```\n\n### Reproduction Steps\n\n1. Configure PrivateBin with templateselection = true (default template list is fine).\n2. Send a request with a malicious template cookie like `template=../cfg/conf`, where the relative path points to a PHP file without its file suffix\n3. The script now includes the select PHP file (leading to a 500 in that specific case).\n\n## Mitigation\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue has been patched in version 2.0.3.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nSet `templateselection = false` in `cfg/conf.php` or remove it, it\u0027s default is `false`.\n\n## Credits\n\nPrivateBin would like to thank [Benoit Esnard](https://github.com/esnard), who reported this vulnerability.\n\nIn general, PrivateBin would like to thank everyone reporting issues and potential vulnerabilities to us.\n\nIf a user suspects they have found a vulnerability or potential security risk, [PrivateBin kindly asks them to follow the security policy](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/blob/master/SECURITY.md) and report it to PrivateBin. After submssion the report is assessed and necessary actions will be taken to address it.\n\n## Timeline\n\n- 2025-11-09 Received report via GitHub Security Advisory\n- 2025-11-10 Discussed and reproduced issue, wrote a unit test case based on this, started work on a patch\n- 2025-11-11 Further work on patch, refactored related code\n- 2025-11-12 Released patch with PrivateBin 2.0.3",
  "id": "GHSA-g2j9-g8r5-rg82",
  "modified": "2025-11-14T20:33:36Z",
  "published": "2025-11-14T20:33:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/security/advisories/GHSA-g2j9-g8r5-rg82"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64714"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/commit/4434dbf73ac53217fda0f90d8cf9b6110f8acc4f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PrivateBin\u0027s template-switching feature allows arbitrary local file inclusion through path traversal"
}

GHSA-G3PM-PXCJ-98PH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-01 12:30 – Updated: 2023-03-09 15:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was found in Drag and Drop Multiple File Upload Contact Form 7 5.0.6.1. It has been classified as critical. Affected is an unknown function of the file admin-ajax.php. The manipulation of the argument upload_name leads to relative path traversal. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-222072.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-1112"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-23"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-01T10:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was found in Drag and Drop Multiple File Upload Contact Form 7 5.0.6.1. It has been classified as critical. Affected is an unknown function of the file admin-ajax.php. The manipulation of the argument upload_name leads to relative path traversal. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-222072.",
  "id": "GHSA-g3pm-pxcj-98ph",
  "modified": "2023-03-09T15:30:50Z",
  "published": "2023-03-01T12:30:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1112"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Nickguitar/Drag-and-Drop-Multiple-File-Uploader-PRO-Path-Traversal"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.222072"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.222072"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-G447-V446-74C4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-27 18:31 – Updated: 2024-06-27 18:31
VLAI
Details

Relative Path Traversal in GitHub repository stitionai/devika prior to -.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-5547"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-23"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-27T18:15:20Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Relative Path Traversal in GitHub repository stitionai/devika prior to -.",
  "id": "GHSA-g447-v446-74c4",
  "modified": "2024-06-27T18:31:32Z",
  "published": "2024-06-27T18:31:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5547"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/stitionai/devika/commit/6acce21fb08c3d1123ef05df6a33912bf0ee77c2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/7ea0eb5f-7643-4452-bc93-a225e2090283"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-G53Q-F99J-JC9R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-12 00:01 – Updated: 2022-05-20 00:00
VLAI
Details

A zip slip vulnerability in XINJE XD/E Series PLC Program Tool up to version v3.5.1 can provide an attacker with arbitrary file write privilege when opening a specially-crafted project file. This vulnerability can be triggered by manually opening an infected project file, or by initiating an upload program request from an infected Xinje PLC. This can result in remote code execution, information disclosure and denial of service of the system running the XINJE XD/E Series PLC Program Tool.

Severity
7.3 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-34605"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-23"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-05-11T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A zip slip vulnerability in XINJE XD/E Series PLC Program Tool up to version v3.5.1 can provide an attacker with arbitrary file write privilege when opening a specially-crafted project file. This vulnerability can be triggered by manually opening an infected project file, or by initiating an upload program request from an infected Xinje PLC. This can result in remote code execution, information disclosure and denial of service of the system running the XINJE XD/E Series PLC Program Tool.",
  "id": "GHSA-g53q-f99j-jc9r",
  "modified": "2022-05-20T00:00:36Z",
  "published": "2022-05-12T00:01:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34605"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://claroty.com/2022/05/11/blog-research-from-project-file-to-code-execution-exploiting-vulnerabilities-in-xinje-plc-program-tool"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-G6MH-6454-QM24

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-25 00:31 – Updated: 2025-11-25 15:31
VLAI
Details

In RSA Authentication Agent before 7.4.7, service paths and shortcut paths may be vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks. An adversary can place an executable in a higher-level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-47856"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-23"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-24T22:15:46Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In RSA Authentication Agent before 7.4.7, service paths and shortcut paths may be vulnerable to path interception if the path has one or more spaces and is not surrounded by quotation marks. An adversary can place an executable in a higher-level directory of the path, and Windows will resolve that executable instead of the intended executable.",
  "id": "GHSA-g6mh-6454-qm24",
  "modified": "2025-11-25T15:31:33Z",
  "published": "2025-11-25T00:31:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47856"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://community.rsa.com/s/article/RSA-2024-13-RSA-Authentication-Agent-for-Microsoft-Windows-Security-Update"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://community.rsa.com/s/product-download/a9G4u000000mCOYEAU/rsa-authentication-agent-747-for-microsoft-windows"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-G7HP-974G-6WG8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-21 12:30 – Updated: 2024-05-21 12:30
VLAI
Details

Relative Path Traversal vulnerability in ZkTeco-based OEM devices allows an attacker to access any file on the system.

This issue affects ZkTeco-based OEM devices (ZkTeco ProFace X, Smartec ST-FR043, Smartec ST-FR041ME and possibly others) with the ZAM170-NF-1.8.25-7354-Ver1.0.0 and possibly others.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-3940"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-23"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-21T11:15:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Relative Path Traversal vulnerability in ZkTeco-based OEM devices allows an attacker \nto access any file on the system.\n\n\nThis issue affects \nZkTeco-based OEM devices (ZkTeco ProFace X, Smartec ST-FR043, Smartec \nST-FR041ME and possibly others) with the ZAM170-NF-1.8.25-7354-Ver1.0.0 \nand possibly others.",
  "id": "GHSA-g7hp-974g-6wg8",
  "modified": "2024-05-21T12:30:52Z",
  "published": "2024-05-21T12:30:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-3940"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/klsecservices/Advisories/blob/master/K-ZkTeco-2023-003.md"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-G7RF-G4J7-7FC4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-03 00:01 – Updated: 2022-06-10 00:00
VLAI
Details

The affected products are vulnerable to directory traversal, which may allow an attacker to obtain arbitrary operating system files.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-1661"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-23"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-06-02T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The affected products are vulnerable to directory traversal, which may allow an attacker to obtain arbitrary operating system files.",
  "id": "GHSA-g7rf-g4j7-7fc4",
  "modified": "2022-06-10T00:00:49Z",
  "published": "2022-06-03T00:01:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1661"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-146-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
  • Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
  • Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
  • realpath() in C
  • getCanonicalPath() in Java
  • GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
  • realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
  • realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-29
Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

CAPEC-139: Relative Path Traversal

An attacker exploits a weakness in input validation on the target by supplying a specially constructed path utilizing dot and slash characters for the purpose of obtaining access to arbitrary files or resources. An attacker modifies a known path on the target in order to reach material that is not available through intended channels. These attacks normally involve adding additional path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.), or encodings thereof, in various combinations in order to reach parent directories or entirely separate trees of the target's directory structure.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

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