CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
14191 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-G26H-2QW9-QC67
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:42 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:42Directory traversal vulnerability in body.php in phpSpamManager (phpSM) 0.53 beta allows remote attackers to read arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the filename parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-1645"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-04-02T17:44:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in body.php in phpSpamManager (phpSM) 0.53 beta allows remote attackers to read arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the filename parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-g26h-2qw9-qc67",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:42:07Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:42:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-1645"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/41575"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/5328"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/28529"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2008/1055/references"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-G26Q-578C-PC62
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-17 15:31 – Updated: 2026-05-17 15:31A vulnerability has been found in fishaudio Bert-VITS2 up to 8f7fbd8c4770965225d258db548da27dc8dd934c. The impacted element is the function generate_config of the file webui_preprocess.py of the component Gradio Interface. Such manipulation of the argument data_dir leads to path traversal. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. This product does not use versioning. This is why information about affected and unaffected releases are unavailable. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-8756"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-17T13:16:46Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been found in fishaudio Bert-VITS2 up to 8f7fbd8c4770965225d258db548da27dc8dd934c. The impacted element is the function generate_config of the file webui_preprocess.py of the component Gradio Interface. Such manipulation of the argument data_dir leads to path traversal. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. This product does not use versioning. This is why information about affected and unaffected releases are unavailable. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-g26q-578c-pc62",
"modified": "2026-05-17T15:31:42Z",
"published": "2026-05-17T15:31:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-8756"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/YLChen-007/550cb92f3489c317ff049fc7d7ea6b99"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/811175"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/364383"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/364383/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-G277-4M9P-49HV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-04 15:30 – Updated: 2023-04-10 21:30Directory Traversal vulnerability found in B3log Wide allows a an attacker to escalate privileges via symbolic links.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-19279"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-04T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Directory Traversal vulnerability found in B3log Wide allows a an attacker to escalate privileges via symbolic links.",
"id": "GHSA-g277-4m9p-49hv",
"modified": "2023-04-10T21:30:24Z",
"published": "2023-04-04T15:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-19279"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/b3log/wide/issues/355"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g277-4m9p-49hv"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G279-3GH8-W39F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-28 18:30 – Updated: 2023-03-08 00:30An unauthenticated path traversal vulnerability affects the "STAGIL Navigation for Jira - Menu & Themes" plugin before 2.0.52 for Jira. By modifying the fileName parameter to the snjFooterNavigationConfig endpoint, it is possible to traverse and read the file system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-26256"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-28T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An unauthenticated path traversal vulnerability affects the \"STAGIL Navigation for Jira - Menu \u0026 Themes\" plugin before 2.0.52 for Jira. By modifying the fileName parameter to the snjFooterNavigationConfig endpoint, it is possible to traverse and read the file system.",
"id": "GHSA-g279-3gh8-w39f",
"modified": "2023-03-08T00:30:32Z",
"published": "2023-02-28T18:30:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-26256"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/1nters3ct/CVEs/blob/main/CVE-2023-26256.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://marketplace.atlassian.com/apps/1216090/stagil-navigation-for-jira-menus-themes?tab=overview\u0026hosting=cloud"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G29C-RGQ6-GXGJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-09 12:32 – Updated: 2026-07-31 16:39A path traversal vulnerability was found in awxkit, the CLI tool for AWX. The YAML !include directive does not sanitize file paths, allowing an attacker to craft a malicious YAML file that reads arbitrary YAML-formatted files from the local filesystem when a user imports it using "awx --conf.format yaml import". This is a client-side vulnerability requiring user interaction.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "awxkit"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "24.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-52902"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-31T16:39:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-09T10:16:44Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A path traversal vulnerability was found in awxkit, the CLI tool for AWX. The YAML !include directive does not sanitize file paths, allowing an attacker to craft a malicious YAML file that reads arbitrary YAML-formatted files from the local filesystem when a user imports it using \"awx --conf.format yaml import\". This is a client-side vulnerability requiring user interaction.",
"id": "GHSA-g29c-rgq6-gxgj",
"modified": "2026-07-31T16:39:05Z",
"published": "2026-06-09T12:32:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52902"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-52902"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2486729"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ansible/awx"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "awxkit has a path traversal vulnerability"
}
GHSA-G29J-RWFV-H99W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 22:12 – Updated: 2026-09-02 22:12Summary
com.github.jknack.handlebars.springmvc.SpringTemplateLoader resolves Spring MVC view names into URLs via Spring's ResourceLoader without applying the path-containment check that protects every other URL-based loader in the project (ClassPathTemplateLoader, FileTemplateLoader, ServletContextTemplateLoader - all hardened by commit d177cdee).
The only remaining defense for file: / classpath: view names is the unconditional .hbs suffix appended by AbstractTemplateLoader.resolve(...). This suffix is the load-bearing security boundary that prevents a request like view=file:/etc/passwd from reading /etc/passwd instead of /etc/passwd.hbs.
This boundary is bypassed by a single character: # (the URL fragment delimiter).
When the view name ends with #, the appended .hbs lands inside the URL fragment. Both Spring's FileUrlResource.exists() (via URI.getSchemeSpecificPart()) and the JDK's URL.openStream() (via URL.getFile()) silently discard the fragment, so the file actually opened is the bare path the attacker specified - for example /etc/passwd rather than /etc/passwd.hbs. The compiled "template" is then parsed and rendered into the HTTP response body.
Result: unauthenticated, network-reachable, arbitrary file read of any file readable by the JVM process on any Spring MVC application that uses a default-configured HandlebarsViewResolver and exposes a controller that returns a (fully or partly) user-influenced view name.
Vulnerable Code
SpringTemplateLoader.resolve - preserves file: / classpath: and applies suffix to the path portion
// handlebars-springmvc/.../SpringTemplateLoader.java:66-77
@Override
public String resolve(final String location) {
String protocol = null;
if (location.startsWith(ResourceUtils.CLASSPATH_URL_PREFIX)) {
protocol = ResourceUtils.CLASSPATH_URL_PREFIX;
} else if (location.startsWith(ResourceUtils.FILE_URL_PREFIX)) {
protocol = ResourceUtils.FILE_URL_PREFIX; // matches "file:"
}
if (protocol == null) {
return super.resolve(location);
}
return protocol + super.resolve(location.substring(protocol.length()));
}
SpringTemplateLoader.getResource - no containment check
// handlebars-springmvc/.../SpringTemplateLoader.java:57-63
@Override
protected URL getResource(final String location) throws IOException {
Resource resource = loader.getResource(location); // trust Spring blindly
if (!resource.exists()) {
return null;
}
return resource.getURL();
}
Contrast with the hardened sibling ClassPathTemplateLoader.getResource, which delegates to URLTemplateLoader.classpathResource(...) - the containment helper added by commit d177cdee:
// handlebars/.../io/URLTemplateLoader.java:75-93 (the d177cdee hardening)
protected final String classpathResource(String location) {
String resolvedPath =
Paths.get(location).normalize().toString().replace(java.io.File.separatorChar, '/');
if (location.startsWith("/") && !resolvedPath.startsWith("/")) {
resolvedPath = "/" + resolvedPath;
}
String prefix = getPrefix();
if (!prefix.equals("/") && !resolvedPath.startsWith(prefix)) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException(
"Path traversal attempt detected. Resolved path escapes base prefix: " + location);
}
return resolvedPath;
}
SpringTemplateLoader.getResource never calls this helper.
HandlebarsViewResolver - strips the outer prefix/suffix and forwards to compile, no validation
// handlebars-springmvc/.../HandlebarsViewResolver.java:112-117
public HandlebarsViewResolver(final Class<? extends HandlebarsView> viewClass) {
setViewClass(viewClass);
setContentType(DEFAULT_CONTENT_TYPE);
setPrefix(TemplateLoader.DEFAULT_PREFIX); // "/"
setSuffix(TemplateLoader.DEFAULT_SUFFIX); // ".hbs"
}
// handlebars-springmvc/.../HandlebarsViewResolver.java:163-178
protected AbstractUrlBasedView configure(final HandlebarsView view) throws IOException {
String url = view.getUrl();
url = url.substring(getPrefix().length(), url.length() - getSuffix().length());
try {
view.setTemplate(handlebars.compile(url)); // ← attacker-controlled url
view.setValueResolver(valueResolvers.toArray(new ValueResolver[0]));
} catch (IOException ex) {
if (failOnMissingFile) throw ex;
logger.debug("File not found: " + url);
}
return view;
}
AbstractTemplateLoader.resolve - the load-bearing .hbs gate
// handlebars/.../io/AbstractTemplateLoader.java:47-50
@Override
public String resolve(final String uri) {
return prefix + normalize(uri) + suffix; // "/" + path + ".hbs"
}
The suffix string is concatenated as a string. Whether that string lands in the path component, query component, or fragment component of the resulting URL is decided by Spring's URL parsing - not by Handlebars.
Impact
Direct primitive
Unauthenticated arbitrary file read of any file readable by the JVM process UID.
Real-world attack chains (downstream impact)
- Read
application.yml-> extractjwt.secret/spring.datasource.password-> forge admin JWT or directly connect to the database. Common Spring Boot deployment pattern; one request to game-over. - Read AWS / GCP credentials -> assume role -> exfiltrate buckets, modify infrastructure.
- Read K8s service-account token -> API-server access scoped to the pod's role -> namespace lateral movement, secret exfiltration.
- Read
/proc/self/environ-> harvest CI/CD-injected secrets that never appear on disk. - Read private keys (
id_rsa, TLS keys) -> impersonate host / decrypt MITM'd traffic / sign commits. - Read the application's source-code-on-disk to discover further server-side endpoints, hardcoded credentials, or chains.
Indirect
- Confirmed reachable from any controller that returns user-influenced view names - a documented Spring anti-pattern that nevertheless appears in production (CMS preview endpoints, theme switchers, multi-tenant view routing,
@RequestMapping("/{view}")patterns,DefaultRequestToViewNameTranslator-driven URL->view mappings). - No authentication, no privilege, no clicks - a single Internet HTTP GET.
Remediation
Any of the following independently closes the bypass. We recommend implementing #1 and #2 for defense in depth.
Apply the containment helper to SpringTemplateLoader.getResource (parity with d177cdee)
// handlebars-springmvc/.../SpringTemplateLoader.java
@Override
protected URL getResource(final String location) throws IOException {
// For classpath: locations, delegate to the hardened helper as ClassPathTemplateLoader does.
// For file: locations, perform an explicit canonical-path containment check.
Resource resource = loader.getResource(location);
if (!resource.exists()) {
return null;
}
URL url = resource.getURL();
validateNoUnsafeUrlComponents(url); // see 9.3
return url;
}
Validate the resolved URL components
private static void validateNoUnsafeUrlComponents(URL url) {
if (url.getRef() != null) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException(
"Template URL must not contain a fragment: " + url);
}
if (url.getQuery() != null) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException(
"Template URL must not contain a query: " + url);
}
}
This is the structural fix - it ensures the textual .hbs check matches the resolved-file behavior regardless of input shape.
Remove the protocol short-circuit entirely
If the supported deployment model is "templates live in one well-known prefix", SpringTemplateLoader.resolve should not preserve file: / classpath: prefixes from user input at all. Either remove that branch, or require an explicit allow-list in the constructor:
public SpringTemplateLoader(ResourceLoader loader, boolean allowProtocolPrefixes) { ... }
with the default being false.
Validate the stripped view name in HandlebarsViewResolver.configure
// handlebars-springmvc/.../HandlebarsViewResolver.java:163-178
protected AbstractUrlBasedView configure(final HandlebarsView view) throws IOException {
String url = view.getUrl();
url = url.substring(getPrefix().length(), url.length() - getSuffix().length());
if (url.contains(":") || url.contains("#") || url.contains("..")) {
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Unsafe view name: " + url);
}
// ...
}
This is a defense-in-depth check that rejects view names containing protocols, fragments, or traversal sequences. It does not by itself remove the SpringTemplateLoader weakness (developers calling handlebars.compile(...) directly still bypass it), but it eliminates the most common reach pattern.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.github.jknack:handlebars-springmvc"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63490"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-23",
"CWE-552"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T22:12:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-20T15:18:04Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`com.github.jknack.handlebars.springmvc.SpringTemplateLoader` resolves Spring MVC view names into URLs via Spring\u0027s `ResourceLoader` **without applying the path-containment check** that protects every other URL-based loader in the project (`ClassPathTemplateLoader`, `FileTemplateLoader`, `ServletContextTemplateLoader` - all hardened by commit `d177cdee`).\n\nThe only remaining defense for `file:` / `classpath:` view names is the unconditional `.hbs` suffix appended by `AbstractTemplateLoader.resolve(...)`. This suffix is the load-bearing security boundary that prevents a request like `view=file:/etc/passwd` from reading `/etc/passwd` instead of `/etc/passwd.hbs`.\n\n**This boundary is bypassed by a single character: `#` (the URL fragment delimiter).**\n\nWhen the view name ends with `#`, the appended `.hbs` lands inside the URL fragment. Both Spring\u0027s `FileUrlResource.exists()` (via `URI.getSchemeSpecificPart()`) and the JDK\u0027s `URL.openStream()` (via `URL.getFile()`) **silently discard the fragment**, so the file actually opened is the bare path the attacker specified - for example `/etc/passwd` rather than `/etc/passwd.hbs`. The compiled \"template\" is then parsed and rendered into the HTTP response body.\n\nResult: **unauthenticated, network-reachable, arbitrary file read** of any file readable by the JVM process on any Spring MVC application that uses a default-configured `HandlebarsViewResolver` and exposes a controller that returns a (fully or partly) user-influenced view name.\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n\n#### `SpringTemplateLoader.resolve` - preserves `file:` / `classpath:` and applies suffix to the path portion\n\n```java\n// handlebars-springmvc/.../SpringTemplateLoader.java:66-77\n@Override\npublic String resolve(final String location) {\n String protocol = null;\n if (location.startsWith(ResourceUtils.CLASSPATH_URL_PREFIX)) {\n protocol = ResourceUtils.CLASSPATH_URL_PREFIX;\n } else if (location.startsWith(ResourceUtils.FILE_URL_PREFIX)) {\n protocol = ResourceUtils.FILE_URL_PREFIX; // matches \"file:\"\n }\n if (protocol == null) {\n return super.resolve(location);\n }\n return protocol + super.resolve(location.substring(protocol.length()));\n}\n```\n\n#### `SpringTemplateLoader.getResource` - **no containment check**\n\n```java\n// handlebars-springmvc/.../SpringTemplateLoader.java:57-63\n@Override\nprotected URL getResource(final String location) throws IOException {\n Resource resource = loader.getResource(location); // trust Spring blindly\n if (!resource.exists()) {\n return null;\n }\n return resource.getURL();\n}\n```\n\nContrast with the hardened sibling `ClassPathTemplateLoader.getResource`, which delegates to `URLTemplateLoader.classpathResource(...)` - the containment helper added by commit `d177cdee`:\n\n```java\n// handlebars/.../io/URLTemplateLoader.java:75-93 (the d177cdee hardening)\nprotected final String classpathResource(String location) {\n String resolvedPath =\n Paths.get(location).normalize().toString().replace(java.io.File.separatorChar, \u0027/\u0027);\n if (location.startsWith(\"/\") \u0026\u0026 !resolvedPath.startsWith(\"/\")) {\n resolvedPath = \"/\" + resolvedPath;\n }\n String prefix = getPrefix();\n if (!prefix.equals(\"/\") \u0026\u0026 !resolvedPath.startsWith(prefix)) {\n throw new IllegalArgumentException(\n \"Path traversal attempt detected. Resolved path escapes base prefix: \" + location);\n }\n return resolvedPath;\n}\n```\n\n`SpringTemplateLoader.getResource` never calls this helper.\n\n#### `HandlebarsViewResolver` - strips the outer prefix/suffix and forwards to compile, no validation\n\n```java\n// handlebars-springmvc/.../HandlebarsViewResolver.java:112-117\npublic HandlebarsViewResolver(final Class\u003c? extends HandlebarsView\u003e viewClass) {\n setViewClass(viewClass);\n setContentType(DEFAULT_CONTENT_TYPE);\n setPrefix(TemplateLoader.DEFAULT_PREFIX); // \"/\"\n setSuffix(TemplateLoader.DEFAULT_SUFFIX); // \".hbs\"\n}\n\n// handlebars-springmvc/.../HandlebarsViewResolver.java:163-178\nprotected AbstractUrlBasedView configure(final HandlebarsView view) throws IOException {\n String url = view.getUrl();\n url = url.substring(getPrefix().length(), url.length() - getSuffix().length());\n try {\n view.setTemplate(handlebars.compile(url)); // \u2190 attacker-controlled url\n view.setValueResolver(valueResolvers.toArray(new ValueResolver[0]));\n } catch (IOException ex) {\n if (failOnMissingFile) throw ex;\n logger.debug(\"File not found: \" + url);\n }\n return view;\n}\n```\n\n#### `AbstractTemplateLoader.resolve` - the load-bearing `.hbs` gate\n\n```java\n// handlebars/.../io/AbstractTemplateLoader.java:47-50\n@Override\npublic String resolve(final String uri) {\n return prefix + normalize(uri) + suffix; // \"/\" + path + \".hbs\"\n}\n```\n\nThe suffix string is concatenated as a string. Whether that string lands in the path component, query component, or fragment component of the resulting URL is decided by Spring\u0027s URL parsing - not by Handlebars.\n\n### Impact\n\n#### Direct primitive\n\nUnauthenticated arbitrary file read of any file readable by the JVM process UID.\n\n#### Real-world attack chains (downstream impact)\n\n1. **Read `application.yml` -\u003e extract `jwt.secret` / `spring.datasource.password` -\u003e forge admin JWT or directly connect to the database.** Common Spring Boot deployment pattern; one request to game-over.\n2. **Read AWS / GCP credentials -\u003e assume role -\u003e exfiltrate buckets, modify infrastructure.**\n3. **Read K8s service-account token -\u003e API-server access scoped to the pod\u0027s role -\u003e namespace lateral movement, secret exfiltration.**\n4. **Read `/proc/self/environ` -\u003e harvest CI/CD-injected secrets that never appear on disk.**\n5. **Read private keys (`id_rsa`, TLS keys) -\u003e impersonate host / decrypt MITM\u0027d traffic / sign commits.**\n6. **Read the application\u0027s source-code-on-disk** to discover further server-side endpoints, hardcoded credentials, or chains.\n\n#### Indirect\n\n* Confirmed reachable from any controller that returns user-influenced view names - a documented Spring anti-pattern that nevertheless appears in production (CMS preview endpoints, theme switchers, multi-tenant view routing, `@RequestMapping(\"/{view}\")` patterns, `DefaultRequestToViewNameTranslator`-driven URL-\u003eview mappings).\n* No authentication, no privilege, no clicks - a single Internet HTTP GET.\n\n### Remediation\n\nAny of the following independently closes the bypass. We recommend implementing **#1 and #2** for defense in depth.\n\n#### Apply the containment helper to `SpringTemplateLoader.getResource` (parity with d177cdee)\n\n```java\n// handlebars-springmvc/.../SpringTemplateLoader.java\n@Override\nprotected URL getResource(final String location) throws IOException {\n // For classpath: locations, delegate to the hardened helper as ClassPathTemplateLoader does.\n // For file: locations, perform an explicit canonical-path containment check.\n Resource resource = loader.getResource(location);\n if (!resource.exists()) {\n return null;\n }\n URL url = resource.getURL();\n validateNoUnsafeUrlComponents(url); // see 9.3\n return url;\n}\n```\n\n#### Validate the resolved URL components\n\n```java\nprivate static void validateNoUnsafeUrlComponents(URL url) {\n if (url.getRef() != null) {\n throw new IllegalArgumentException(\n \"Template URL must not contain a fragment: \" + url);\n }\n if (url.getQuery() != null) {\n throw new IllegalArgumentException(\n \"Template URL must not contain a query: \" + url);\n }\n}\n```\n\nThis is the **structural** fix - it ensures the textual `.hbs` check matches the resolved-file behavior regardless of input shape.\n\n#### Remove the protocol short-circuit entirely\n\nIf the supported deployment model is \"templates live in one well-known prefix\", `SpringTemplateLoader.resolve` should not preserve `file:` / `classpath:` prefixes from user input at all. Either remove that branch, or require an explicit allow-list in the constructor:\n\n```java\npublic SpringTemplateLoader(ResourceLoader loader, boolean allowProtocolPrefixes) { ... }\n```\n\nwith the default being `false`.\n\n#### Validate the stripped view name in `HandlebarsViewResolver.configure`\n\n```java\n// handlebars-springmvc/.../HandlebarsViewResolver.java:163-178\nprotected AbstractUrlBasedView configure(final HandlebarsView view) throws IOException {\n String url = view.getUrl();\n url = url.substring(getPrefix().length(), url.length() - getSuffix().length());\n if (url.contains(\":\") || url.contains(\"#\") || url.contains(\"..\")) {\n throw new IllegalArgumentException(\"Unsafe view name: \" + url);\n }\n // ...\n}\n```\n\nThis is a defense-in-depth check that rejects view names containing protocols, fragments, or traversal sequences. It does not by itself remove the SpringTemplateLoader weakness (developers calling `handlebars.compile(...)` directly still bypass it), but it eliminates the most common reach pattern.",
"id": "GHSA-g29j-rwfv-h99w",
"modified": "2026-09-02T22:12:03Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T22:12:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jknack/handlebars.java/security/advisories/GHSA-g29j-rwfv-h99w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63490"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jknack/handlebars.java/commit/61f43423a337b87db5fec1fe59f0725aaaa38df5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jknack/handlebars.java"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jknack/handlebars.java/releases/tag/v4.5.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Handlebars.java: Arbitrary file read in `SpringTemplateLoader` via URL-fragment suffix bypass"
}
GHSA-G2F7-GQV7-HRRH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 05:51 – Updated: 2022-05-17 05:51Directory traversal vulnerability in the ZiMB Core (aka ZiMBCore or com_zimbcore) component 0.1 in the ZiMB Manager collection for Joomla! allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files and possibly have unspecified other impact via a .. (dot dot) in the controller parameter to index.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-1603"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-04-29T17:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the ZiMB Core (aka ZiMBCore or com_zimbcore) component 0.1 in the ZiMB Manager collection for Joomla! allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files and possibly have unspecified other impact via a .. (dot dot) in the controller parameter to index.php.",
"id": "GHSA-g2f7-gqv7-hrrh",
"modified": "2022-05-17T05:51:34Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T05:51:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-1603"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.org/1004-exploits/joomlazimbmanager-lfi.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/12284"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/39546"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2010/0931"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-G2FH-W56X-24QX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 18:44 – Updated: 2025-04-09 03:49Directory traversal vulnerability in printview.php in PNphpBB2 1.2i and earlier allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the phpEx parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2007-6624"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-01-04T00:46:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in printview.php in PNphpBB2 1.2i and earlier allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the phpEx parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-g2fh-w56x-24qx",
"modified": "2025-04-09T03:49:51Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T18:44:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2007-6624"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/39243"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/4796"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://irk4z.wordpress.com/2007/12/27/pnphpbb2-12i-printviewphp-phpex-local-file-inclusion-vuln"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/39879"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27039"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-G2G7-QJ44-MR6J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:29 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:29Directory traversal vulnerability in arias/help/effect.php in aria 0.99-6 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via directory traversal sequences in the page parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-0332"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-01-17T22:00:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in arias/help/effect.php in aria 0.99-6 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via directory traversal sequences in the page parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-g2g7-qj44-mr6j",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:29:12Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:29:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0332"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/39712"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/4920"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/486406/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27311"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-G2HG-PF39-5Q37
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-25 12:31 – Updated: 2024-10-25 18:30In sm_mem_compat_get_vmm_obj of lib/sm/shared_mem.c, there is a possible arbitrary physical memory access due to improper input validation. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-47027"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-25T11:15:17Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In sm_mem_compat_get_vmm_obj of lib/sm/shared_mem.c, there is a possible arbitrary physical memory access due to improper input validation. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.",
"id": "GHSA-g2hg-pf39-5q37",
"modified": "2024-10-25T18:30:48Z",
"published": "2024-10-25T12:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47027"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/pixel/2024-10-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.