CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13651 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-9QPX-HW6Q-QW9H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-21 00:00 – Updated: 2022-03-18 00:01PJL directory traversal vulnerability in Lexmark devices through 2021-12-07 that can be leveraged to overwrite internal configuration files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-44737"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-01-20T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "PJL directory traversal vulnerability in Lexmark devices through 2021-12-07 that can be leveraged to overwrite internal configuration files.",
"id": "GHSA-9qpx-hw6q-qw9h",
"modified": "2022-03-18T00:01:39Z",
"published": "2022-01-21T00:00:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44737"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.lexmark.com/alerts"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-22-333"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9QRJ-W7FW-96WJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:42 – Updated: 2022-05-17 00:42Directory traversal vulnerability in rss.php in WebSVN 2.0 and earlier, when magic_quotes_gpc is disabled, allows remote attackers to overwrite arbitrary files via directory traversal sequences in the rev parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-5919"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2009-01-21T02:30:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in rss.php in WebSVN 2.0 and earlier, when magic_quotes_gpc is disabled, allows remote attackers to overwrite arbitrary files via directory traversal sequences in the rev parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-9qrj-w7fw-96wj",
"modified": "2022-05-17T00:42:26Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:42:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-5919"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/46050"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/6822"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/32338"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/34191"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/4928"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://websvn.tigris.org/issues/show_bug.cgi?id=179"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://websvn.tigris.org/servlets/NewsItemView?newsItemID=2218"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.gentoo.org/security/en/glsa/glsa-200903-20.xml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.gulftech.org/?node=research\u0026article_id=00132-10202008"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/31891"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-9QRP-H7FW-42HG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-01 19:56 – Updated: 2022-06-01 19:56Impact
One can ask for any file located in the classloader using the template API and a path with ".." in it. For example
{{template name="../xwiki.hbm.xml"/}}
To our knownledge none of the available files of the classloader in XWiki Standard contain any strong confidential data, hence the low confidentiality value of this advisory.
Patches
The issue is patched in versions 14.0 and 13.10.3.
Workarounds
There's no easy workaround for this issue, administrators should upgrade their wiki.
References
- https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-19349
- https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/4917c8f355717bb636d763844528b1fe0f95e8e2
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in Jira XWiki * Email us at security mailing list
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-oldcore"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.3-rc-1"
},
{
"fixed": "13.10.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-29253"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-24"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-06-01T19:56:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-25T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nOne can ask for any file located in the classloader using the template API and a path with \"..\" in it. For example \n\n```\n{{template name=\"../xwiki.hbm.xml\"/}}\n```\n\nTo our knownledge none of the available files of the classloader in XWiki Standard contain any strong confidential data, hence the low confidentiality value of this advisory.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue is patched in versions 14.0 and 13.10.3.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere\u0027s no easy workaround for this issue, administrators should upgrade their wiki.\n\n### References\n\n * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-19349\n * https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/4917c8f355717bb636d763844528b1fe0f95e8e2\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [Jira XWiki](https://jira.xwiki.org)\n* Email us at [security mailing list](mailto:security@xwiki.org)",
"id": "GHSA-9qrp-h7fw-42hg",
"modified": "2022-06-01T19:56:34Z",
"published": "2022-06-01T19:56:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-9qrp-h7fw-42hg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-29253"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/4917c8f355717bb636d763844528b1fe0f95e8e2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-19349"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Path Traversal in XWiki Platform"
}
GHSA-9QW4-VHJ6-M3PQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-26 12:31 – Updated: 2026-04-26 12:31A vulnerability was identified in Tenda i9 1.0.0.5(2204). This vulnerability affects the function R7WebsSecurityHandlerfunction of the component HTTP Handler. The manipulation leads to path traversal. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit is publicly available and might be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-7036"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-26T12:16:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was identified in Tenda i9 1.0.0.5(2204). This vulnerability affects the function R7WebsSecurityHandlerfunction of the component HTTP Handler. The manipulation leads to path traversal. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit is publicly available and might be used.",
"id": "GHSA-9qw4-vhj6-m3pq",
"modified": "2026-04-26T12:31:37Z",
"published": "2026-04-26T12:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7036"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Litengzheng/vuldb_new/blob/main/M3/vul_80/README.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/798479"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/359616"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/359616/cti"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tenda.com.cn"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-9QX3-MPQF-XHQ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:50 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:50Directory traversal vulnerability in the ReportViewServlet servlet in the server in NetIQ Sentinel 7.4.x before 7.4.2 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a PREVIEW value for the fileType field.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-1605"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2016-08-01T02:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the ReportViewServlet servlet in the server in NetIQ Sentinel 7.4.x before 7.4.2 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a PREVIEW value for the fileType field.",
"id": "GHSA-9qx3-mpqf-xhq8",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:50:59Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:50:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-1605"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.netiq.com/support/kb/doc.php?id=7017803"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-16-406"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9QXH-6993-386R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 06:13 – Updated: 2022-05-02 06:13Directory traversal vulnerability in AFP Server in Apple Mac OS X before 10.6.3 allows remote attackers to list a share root's parent directory, and read and modify files in that directory, via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-0533"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-03-30T17:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in AFP Server in Apple Mac OS X before 10.6.3 allows remote attackers to list a share root\u0027s parent directory, and read and modify files in that directory, via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-9qxh-6993-386r",
"modified": "2022-05-02T06:13:30Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T06:13:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-0533"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.apple.com/archives/security-announce/2010//Mar/msg00001.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4077"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-9R2V-HQ4W-8PC6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-25 09:32 – Updated: 2025-03-25 09:32A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in zhijiantianya ruoyi-vue-pro 2.4.1. Affected is an unknown function of the file /admin-api/mp/material/upload-news-image of the component Material Upload Interface. The manipulation of the argument File leads to path traversal. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-2744"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-25T07:15:39Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in zhijiantianya ruoyi-vue-pro 2.4.1. Affected is an unknown function of the file /admin-api/mp/material/upload-news-image of the component Material Upload Interface. The manipulation of the argument File leads to path traversal. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-9r2v-hq4w-8pc6",
"modified": "2025-03-25T09:32:06Z",
"published": "2025-03-25T09:32:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-2744"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/uglory-gll/javasec/blob/main/ruoyi-vue-pro.md#7arbitrary-file-deletion-vulnerability---uploadnewsimage"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.300846"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.300846"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.519694"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-9R2W-394V-53QC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-08-31 16:05 – Updated: 2021-08-31 16:01Impact
Arbitrary File Creation, Arbitrary File Overwrite, Arbitrary Code Execution
node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with the same name as the directory, where the symlink and directory names in the archive entry used backslashes as a path separator on posix systems. The cache checking logic used both \ and / characters as path separators, however \ is a valid filename character on posix systems.
By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it was thus possible to bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite.
Additionally, a similar confusion could arise on case-insensitive filesystems. If a tar archive contained a directory at FOO, followed by a symbolic link named foo, then on case-insensitive file systems, the creation of the symbolic link would remove the directory from the filesystem, but not from the internal directory cache, as it would not be treated as a cache hit. A subsequent file entry within the FOO directory would then be placed in the target of the symbolic link, thinking that the directory had already been created.
These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.16, 5.0.8 and 6.1.7.
The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar. If this is not possible, a workaround is available below.
Patches
4.4.16 || 5.0.8 || 6.1.7
Workarounds
Users may work around this vulnerability without upgrading by creating a custom filter method which prevents the extraction of symbolic links.
const tar = require('tar')
tar.x({
file: 'archive.tgz',
filter: (file, entry) => {
if (entry.type === 'SymbolicLink') {
return false
} else {
return true
}
}
})
Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched versions, rather than attempt to sanitize tar input themselves.
Fix
The problem is addressed in the following ways:
- All paths are normalized to use
/as a path separator, replacing\with/on Windows systems, and leaving\intact in the path on posix systems. This is performed in depth, at every level of the program where paths are consumed. - Directory cache pruning is performed case-insensitively. This may result in undue cache misses on case-sensitive file systems, but the performance impact is negligible.
Caveat
Note that this means that the entry objects exposed in various parts of tar's API will now always use / as a path separator, even on Windows systems. This is not expected to cause problems, as / is a valid path separator on Windows systems, but may result in issues if entry.path is compared against a path string coming from some other API such as fs.realpath() or path.resolve().
Users are encouraged to always normalize paths using a well-tested method such as path.resolve() before comparing paths to one another.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "tar"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.4.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "tar"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "tar"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.1.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-37701"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-31T16:01:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-31T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nArbitrary File Creation, Arbitrary File Overwrite, Arbitrary Code Execution\n\n`node-tar` aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.\n\nThis logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with the same name as the directory, where the symlink and directory names in the archive entry used backslashes as a path separator on posix systems. The cache checking logic used both `\\` and `/` characters as path separators, however `\\` is a valid filename character on posix systems.\n\nBy first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it was thus possible to bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary file creation and overwrite.\n\nAdditionally, a similar confusion could arise on case-insensitive filesystems. If a tar archive contained a directory at `FOO`, followed by a symbolic link named `foo`, then on case-insensitive file systems, the creation of the symbolic link would remove the directory from the filesystem, but _not_ from the internal directory cache, as it would not be treated as a cache hit. A subsequent file entry within the `FOO` directory would then be placed in the target of the symbolic link, thinking that the directory had already been created. \n\nThese issues were addressed in releases 4.4.16, 5.0.8 and 6.1.7.\n\nThe v3 branch of `node-tar` has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of `node-tar`. If this is not possible, a workaround is available below.\n\n### Patches\n\n4.4.16 || 5.0.8 || 6.1.7\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUsers may work around this vulnerability without upgrading by creating a custom filter method which prevents the extraction of symbolic links.\n\n```js\nconst tar = require(\u0027tar\u0027)\n\ntar.x({\n file: \u0027archive.tgz\u0027,\n filter: (file, entry) =\u003e {\n if (entry.type === \u0027SymbolicLink\u0027) {\n return false\n } else {\n return true\n }\n }\n})\n```\n\nUsers are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched versions, rather than attempt to sanitize tar input themselves.\n\n### Fix\n\nThe problem is addressed in the following ways:\n\n1. All paths are normalized to use `/` as a path separator, replacing `\\` with `/` on Windows systems, and leaving `\\` intact in the path on posix systems. This is performed in depth, at every level of the program where paths are consumed.\n2. Directory cache pruning is performed case-insensitively. This _may_ result in undue cache misses on case-sensitive file systems, but the performance impact is negligible.\n\n#### Caveat\n\nNote that this means that the `entry` objects exposed in various parts of tar\u0027s API will now always use `/` as a path separator, even on Windows systems. This is not expected to cause problems, as `/` is a valid path separator on Windows systems, but _may_ result in issues if `entry.path` is compared against a path string coming from some other API such as `fs.realpath()` or `path.resolve()`.\n\nUsers are encouraged to always normalize paths using a well-tested method such as `path.resolve()` before comparing paths to one another.",
"id": "GHSA-9r2w-394v-53qc",
"modified": "2021-08-31T16:01:50Z",
"published": "2021-08-31T16:05:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/npm/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-9r2w-394v-53qc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-37701"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-389290.pdf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/npm/node-tar"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2022/12/msg00023.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2021/dsa-5008"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/tar"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuoct2021.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Arbitrary File Creation/Overwrite via insufficient symlink protection due to directory cache poisoning using symbolic links"
}
GHSA-9R4C-JWX3-3J76
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-06 19:58 – Updated: 2025-02-07 17:35Summary
While the application only displays Sqlite3 databases present in the directory /db, there is no path traversal prevention in place. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to open any Sqlite3 database present on the host machine that the application is running on.
Details
WhoDB allows users to connect to Sqlite3 databases. By default, the databases must be present in /db/ (or alternatively ./tmp/ if development mode is enabled). Source: https://github.com/clidey/whodb/blob/ba6eb81d0ca40baead74bca58b2567166999d6a6/core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go#L14-L20
If no databases are present in the default directory, the UI indicates that the user is unable to open any databases:
The database file is an user-controlled value. This value is used in .Join() with the default directory, in order to get the full path of the database file to open. Source: https://github.com/clidey/whodb/blob/ba6eb81d0ca40baead74bca58b2567166999d6a6/core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go#L26
No checks are performed whether the database file that is eventually opened actually resides in the default directory /db.
This allows an attacker to use path traversal (../../) in order to open any Sqlite3 database present on the system.
PoC
Before running the container, an example Sqlite3 database with dummy "secret" data was created:
DB_FILE=$(mktemp)
echo "CREATE TABLE secret_table (data TEXT); INSERT INTO secret_table VALUES ('secret data')" | sqlite3 "$DB_FILE"
The container was then created with nothing mounted into /db, and the dummy database mounted into /etc/secret.db:
podman run -d -p 8080:8080 -v "$DB_FILE":/etc/secret.db docker.io/clidey/whodb
The attacker sends a HTTP request to determine whether the secret.db is accessible by setting the Database value to ../etc/secret.db:
POST /api/query HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8080
content-type: application/json
...
{"operationName":"Login","variables":{"credentials":{"Type":"Sqlite3","Hostname":"","Database":"../etc/secret.db","Username":"","Password":"","Advanced":[]}},"query":"mutation Login($credentials: LoginCredentials!) {\n Login(credentials: $credentials) {\n Status\n __typename\n }\n}"}
The server response indicates that the database was successfully opened:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Set-Cookie: Token=eyJUeXBlIjoiU3FsaXRlMyIsIkhvc3RuYW1lIjoiIiwiVXNlcm5hbWUiOiIiLCJQYXNzd29yZCI6IiIsIkRhdGFiYXNlIjoiLi4vZXRjL3NlY3JldC5kYiJ9; Path=/; Expires=Thu, 23 Jan 2025 10:35:43 GMT; HttpOnly
...
{"data":{"Login":{"Status":true,"__typename":"StatusResponse"}}}
The Set-Cookie Token value is simply a Base64-encoded string with a JSON payload containing the connection details:
{
"Type": "Sqlite3",
"Hostname": "",
"Username": "",
"Password": "",
"Database": "../etc/secret.db"
}
The attacker may set this cookie in the browser manually (alongside corresponding profiles in Local Storage) in order to open this database in the WhoDB application graphically. An easy way to perform this is by using a HTTP proxy such as Burp Suite, intercepting the login request and swapping the Database value to ../etc/secret.db.
Doing so, the attacker can then browse the database, its tables and the data within:
The attacker may also insert or modify data using either the buttons presented in the UI or the Scratchpad functionality. In this proof-of-concept, the attacker inserts a new row using the Add Row button:
Impact
Allows an unauthenticated attacker to open and read any Sqlite3 databases present on the system WhoDB is running on. If WhoDB has write permissions for the database file, the attacker is also able to modify the opened database.
The attacker is unable to create new databases; however, files which already exist but have no content (0-length files) may be opened and modified as fresh databases.
Recommendations
Before attempting to open the database, resolve and normalize the path to the database and check whether it is in the default directory. If not, present the user with an error.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/clidey/whodb/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20250127172032-547336ac73c8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-24786"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-06T19:58:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-06T19:15:20Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nWhile the application only displays Sqlite3 databases present in the directory `/db`, there is no path traversal prevention in place. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to open any Sqlite3 database present on the host machine that the application is running on.\n\n### Details\n\nWhoDB allows users to connect to Sqlite3 databases. By default, the databases must be present in `/db/` (or alternatively `./tmp/` if development mode is enabled). Source: https://github.com/clidey/whodb/blob/ba6eb81d0ca40baead74bca58b2567166999d6a6/core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go#L14-L20\n\nIf no databases are present in the default directory, the UI indicates that the user is unable to open any databases:\n\n\n\nThe database file is an user-controlled value. This value is used in `.Join()` with the default directory, in order to get the full path of the database file to open. Source: https://github.com/clidey/whodb/blob/ba6eb81d0ca40baead74bca58b2567166999d6a6/core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go#L26\n\nNo checks are performed whether the database file that is eventually opened actually resides in the default directory `/db`.\n\nThis allows an attacker to use path traversal (`../../`) in order to open any Sqlite3 database present on the system. \n\n### PoC\n\nBefore running the container, an example Sqlite3 database with dummy \"secret\" data was created:\n```sh\nDB_FILE=$(mktemp)\necho \"CREATE TABLE secret_table (data TEXT); INSERT INTO secret_table VALUES (\u0027secret data\u0027)\" | sqlite3 \"$DB_FILE\"\n```\n\nThe container was then created with nothing mounted into `/db`, and the dummy database mounted into `/etc/secret.db`:\n```sh\npodman run -d -p 8080:8080 -v \"$DB_FILE\":/etc/secret.db docker.io/clidey/whodb\n```\n\nThe attacker sends a HTTP request to determine whether the `secret.db` is accessible by setting the `Database` value to `../etc/secret.db`:\n```http\nPOST /api/query HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:8080\ncontent-type: application/json\n...\n\n{\"operationName\":\"Login\",\"variables\":{\"credentials\":{\"Type\":\"Sqlite3\",\"Hostname\":\"\",\"Database\":\"../etc/secret.db\",\"Username\":\"\",\"Password\":\"\",\"Advanced\":[]}},\"query\":\"mutation Login($credentials: LoginCredentials!) {\\n Login(credentials: $credentials) {\\n Status\\n __typename\\n }\\n}\"}\n```\n\nThe server response indicates that the database was successfully opened:\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: application/json\nSet-Cookie: Token=eyJUeXBlIjoiU3FsaXRlMyIsIkhvc3RuYW1lIjoiIiwiVXNlcm5hbWUiOiIiLCJQYXNzd29yZCI6IiIsIkRhdGFiYXNlIjoiLi4vZXRjL3NlY3JldC5kYiJ9; Path=/; Expires=Thu, 23 Jan 2025 10:35:43 GMT; HttpOnly\n...\n\n{\"data\":{\"Login\":{\"Status\":true,\"__typename\":\"StatusResponse\"}}}\n```\n\nThe `Set-Cookie` `Token` value is simply a Base64-encoded string with a JSON payload containing the connection details:\n```json\n{\n \"Type\": \"Sqlite3\",\n \"Hostname\": \"\",\n \"Username\": \"\",\n \"Password\": \"\",\n \"Database\": \"../etc/secret.db\"\n}\n``` \n\nThe attacker may set this cookie in the browser manually (alongside corresponding profiles in Local Storage) in order to open this database in the WhoDB application graphically. An easy way to perform this is by using a HTTP proxy such as Burp Suite, intercepting the login request and swapping the `Database` value to `../etc/secret.db`.\n\nDoing so, the attacker can then browse the database, its tables and the data within:\n\n\n\nThe attacker may also insert or modify data using either the buttons presented in the UI or the _Scratchpad_ functionality. In this proof-of-concept, the attacker inserts a new row using the _Add Row_ button:\n\n\n\n### Impact\n\nAllows an unauthenticated attacker to open and read any Sqlite3 databases present on the system WhoDB is running on. If WhoDB has write permissions for the database file, the attacker is also able to modify the opened database.\n\nThe attacker is unable to create new databases; however, files which already exist but have no content (0-length files) may be opened and modified as fresh databases.\n\n### Recommendations\n\nBefore attempting to open the database, resolve and normalize the path to the database and check whether it is in the default directory. If not, present the user with an error.",
"id": "GHSA-9r4c-jwx3-3j76",
"modified": "2025-02-07T17:35:11Z",
"published": "2025-02-06T19:58:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/clidey/whodb/security/advisories/GHSA-9r4c-jwx3-3j76"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24786"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/clidey/whodb/commit/547336ac73c8d17929c18c3941c0d5b0099753cc"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/clidey/whodb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/clidey/whodb/blob/ba6eb81d0ca40baead74bca58b2567166999d6a6/core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go#L14-L20"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/clidey/whodb/blob/ba6eb81d0ca40baead74bca58b2567166999d6a6/core/src/plugins/sqlite3/db.go#L26"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "WhoDB has a path traversal opening Sqlite3 database"
}
GHSA-9R56-R7R5-55VJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-07 03:32 – Updated: 2025-02-12 00:32A vulnerability has been identified in GoldPanKit eva-server v4.1.0. It affects the path parameter of the /api/resource/local/download endpoint, where manipulation of this parameter can lead to arbitrary file download.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-54909"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-06T22:15:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been identified in GoldPanKit eva-server v4.1.0. It affects the path parameter of the /api/resource/local/download endpoint, where manipulation of this parameter can lead to arbitrary file download.",
"id": "GHSA-9r56-r7r5-55vj",
"modified": "2025-02-12T00:32:15Z",
"published": "2025-02-07T03:32:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-54909"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/goldpankit/eva-springboot2/issues/2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.