CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13462 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-88H5-6W7M-5W56
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-07 16:18 – Updated: 2024-11-07 16:18Impact
Specially crafted Git repositories can cause jj to write files outside the clone.
Patches
Fixed in 0.23.0.
Workarounds
Not much other than to not clone repositories from untrusted sources.
References
Here's the original report from @joernchen:
When cloning a crafted Git repository it is possible to let
jjwrite into arbitrary directories. This can be achieved by having file objects which contain path traversals.Reproduction steps:
Apply the following patch to Git version v.2.47.0:
```diff diff --git a/path.c b/path.c index 93491bab14..2f47e69fd1 100644 --- a/path.c +++ b/path.c @@ -44,11 +44,11 @@ struct strbuf *get_pathname(void)
static const char cleanup_path(const char path) { - / Clean it up / + / Clean it up if (skip_prefix(path, "./", &path)) { while (path == '/') path++; - } + }*/ return path; }
@@ -1101,7 +1101,9 @@ int normalize_path_copy_len(char dst, const char src, int *prefix_len)
int normalize_path_copy(char dst, const char src) { - return normalize_path_copy_len(dst, src, NULL); +// return normalize_path_copy_len(dst, src, NULL); + memcpy(dst, src, strlen(dst)); + return 0; }
int strbuf_normalize_path(struct strbuf src) diff --git a/read-cache.c b/read-cache.c index 3c078afadb..2eb44cb26f 100644 --- a/read-cache.c +++ b/read-cache.c @@ -977,6 +977,7 @@ static enum verify_path_result verify_path_internal(const char path, unsigned mode) { char c = 0; + return PATH_OK;
if (has_dos_drive_prefix(path)) return PATH_INVALID;```
With this patched
gitbinary we can now apply a crafted patch containing a path traversal to a repository.The patch would look like:
```patch From ecea96264bd3f9785e5ebec8640be4847ba28e22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: joernchen <joernchen@phenoelit.de> Date: Sun, 13 Oct 2024 18:09:50 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] z123
z | 0 1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) create mode 100644 z
diff --git a/../joernchen_was_here b/../joernchen_was_here new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e69de29 -- 2.46.1 ```
Note the traversal
../joernchen_was_herein the patch. This now can be committed to a repository using the modifiedgitbinary:
bash mkdir demo cd demo git init ./path/to/modified/git/git --exec-path=./path/to/modified/git am the_traversal.patch rm ../joernchen_was_here # remove the file the modified git wroteNow, when cloning that repository with
jj git clonethe path traversal will write above the worktree directory, allowing arbitrary file writes.I've attached a tar.gz with the demo repo so you don't have to mess with the patched Git at all. For reproduction it should be sufficient to do
jj git clone demo.gitafter unpacking the tarball.The demo repository after being cloned with
jjwill create an empty filejoernchen_was_hereright next to thedemodirectory to demonstrate the traversal.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "jj-lib"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-51990"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-11-07T16:18:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-07T01:15:03Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nSpecially crafted Git repositories can cause `jj` to write files outside the clone.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in 0.23.0.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNot much other than to not clone repositories from untrusted sources.\n\n### References\n\nHere\u0027s the original report from @joernchen:\n\n\u003e When cloning a crafted Git repository it is possible to let `jj` write\n\u003e into arbitrary directories. This can be achieved by having file objects\n\u003e which contain path traversals.\n\u003e \n\u003e Reproduction steps:\n\u003e \n\u003e Apply the following patch to Git version v.2.47.0:\n\u003e \n\u003e ```diff\n\u003e diff --git a/path.c b/path.c\n\u003e index 93491bab14..2f47e69fd1 100644\n\u003e --- a/path.c\n\u003e +++ b/path.c\n\u003e @@ -44,11 +44,11 @@ struct strbuf *get_pathname(void)\n\u003e \n\u003e static const char *cleanup_path(const char *path)\n\u003e {\n\u003e - /* Clean it up */\n\u003e + /* Clean it up\n\u003e if (skip_prefix(path, \"./\", \u0026path)) {\n\u003e while (*path == \u0027/\u0027)\n\u003e path++;\n\u003e - }\n\u003e + }*/\n\u003e return path;\n\u003e }\n\u003e \n\u003e @@ -1101,7 +1101,9 @@ int normalize_path_copy_len(char *dst, const char *src, int *prefix_len)\n\u003e \n\u003e int normalize_path_copy(char *dst, const char *src)\n\u003e {\n\u003e - return normalize_path_copy_len(dst, src, NULL);\n\u003e +// return normalize_path_copy_len(dst, src, NULL);\n\u003e + memcpy(dst, src, strlen(dst));\n\u003e + return 0;\n\u003e }\n\u003e \n\u003e int strbuf_normalize_path(struct strbuf *src)\n\u003e diff --git a/read-cache.c b/read-cache.c\n\u003e index 3c078afadb..2eb44cb26f 100644\n\u003e --- a/read-cache.c\n\u003e +++ b/read-cache.c\n\u003e @@ -977,6 +977,7 @@ static enum verify_path_result verify_path_internal(const char *path,\n\u003e unsigned mode)\n\u003e {\n\u003e char c = 0;\n\u003e + return PATH_OK;\n\u003e \n\u003e if (has_dos_drive_prefix(path))\n\u003e return PATH_INVALID;\n\u003e ```\n\u003e \n\u003e With this patched `git` binary we can now apply a crafted\n\u003e patch containing a path traversal to a repository.\n\u003e \n\u003e The patch would look like:\n\u003e \n\u003e ```patch\n\u003e From ecea96264bd3f9785e5ebec8640be4847ba28e22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001\n\u003e From: joernchen \u003c[joernchen@phenoelit.de](mailto:joernchen@phenoelit.de)\u003e\n\u003e Date: Sun, 13 Oct 2024 18:09:50 +0200\n\u003e Subject: [PATCH] z123\n\u003e \n\u003e ---\n\u003e z | 0\n\u003e 1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)\n\u003e create mode 100644 z\n\u003e \n\u003e diff --git a/../joernchen_was_here b/../joernchen_was_here\n\u003e new file mode 100644\n\u003e index 0000000..e69de29\n\u003e --\n\u003e 2.46.1\n\u003e ```\n\u003e \n\u003e Note the traversal `../joernchen_was_here` in the patch. This now can be committed to a repository\n\u003e using the modified `git` binary:\n\u003e \n\u003e ```bash\n\u003e mkdir demo\n\u003e cd demo\n\u003e git init\n\u003e ./path/to/modified/git/git --exec-path=./path/to/modified/git am the_traversal.patch\n\u003e rm ../joernchen_was_here # remove the file the modified git wrote\n\u003e ```\n\u003e \n\u003e Now, when cloning that repository with `jj git clone` the path traversal will write above the worktree\n\u003e directory, allowing arbitrary file writes.\n\u003e \n\u003e I\u0027ve attached a tar.gz with the demo repo so you don\u0027t have to mess with the patched Git at all. For\n\u003e reproduction it should be sufficient to do `jj git clone demo.git` after unpacking the tarball.\n\u003e \n\u003e The demo repository after being cloned with `jj` will create an empty file `joernchen_was_here` right next\n\u003e to the `demo` directory to demonstrate the traversal.",
"id": "GHSA-88h5-6w7m-5w56",
"modified": "2024-11-07T16:18:44Z",
"published": "2024-11-07T16:18:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/martinvonz/jj/security/advisories/GHSA-88h5-6w7m-5w56"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51990"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/martinvonz/jj"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "jj vulnerable to path traversal via crafted Git repositories"
}
GHSA-88JF-7RCH-32QC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-18 20:31 – Updated: 2023-08-30 11:23The ExtractTo function doesn't securely escape file paths in zip archives which include leading or non-leading "..". This allows an attacker to add or replace files system-wide.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/unknwon/cae"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7668"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-12T20:32:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-06-23T19:38:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The ExtractTo function doesn\u0027t securely escape file paths in zip archives which include leading or non-leading \"..\". This allows an attacker to add or replace files system-wide.",
"id": "GHSA-88jf-7rch-32qc",
"modified": "2023-08-30T11:23:31Z",
"published": "2021-05-18T20:31:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7668"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/unknwon/cae/commit/07971c00a1bfd9dc171c3ad0bfab5b67c2287e11"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/unknwon/cae"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2020-0041"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/research/zip-slip-vulnerability"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-GOLANG-GITHUBCOMUNKNWONCAETZ-570384"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "github.com/unknwon/cae Path Traversal vulnerability"
}
GHSA-88JQ-FMHX-7GR3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:03 – Updated: 2025-01-14 21:31Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('Path Traversal') in cgi component in Synology DiskStation Manager (DSM) before 6.2.4-25553 allows local users to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-29088"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-06-01T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) in cgi component in Synology DiskStation Manager (DSM) before 6.2.4-25553 allows local users to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-88jq-fmhx-7gr3",
"modified": "2025-01-14T21:31:41Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:03:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-29088"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.synology.com/security/advisory/Synology_SA_21_03"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-88M7-MXF9-V644
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-23 00:31 – Updated: 2026-04-23 00:31IBM Guardium Data Protection 12.1 could allow an administrative user to traverse directories on the system. An attacker could send a specially crafted URL request containing "dot dot" sequences (/../) to write arbitrary files on the system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-4917"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-23T00:16:46Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM Guardium Data Protection 12.1 could allow an administrative user to traverse directories on the system. An attacker could send a specially crafted URL request containing \"dot dot\" sequences (/../) to write arbitrary files on the system.",
"id": "GHSA-88m7-mxf9-v644",
"modified": "2026-04-23T00:31:19Z",
"published": "2026-04-23T00:31:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-4917"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7270422"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-88PR-878C-24WF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-04 17:43 – Updated: 2026-08-04 17:43Summary
Flowise on current main allows an authenticated user with
documentStores:preview-process permission to trigger the S3 Directory
document loader with attacker-controlled S3 object keys. The loader joins
each returned S3 key with a temporary directory using path.join(tempDir, key)
and writes the object bytes to disk without validating traversal sequences
such as ../. Cleanup later removes only the original temporary directory,
so files written outside that directory persist on the host filesystem.
This yields arbitrary file write with the privileges of the Flowise
server process.
A related variant exists in the S3File loader when
fileProcessingMethod = unstructured (same root cause; its cleanup behavior
turns it into a mixed arbitrary write/delete/DoS primitive).
## Affected component
packages/components/nodes/documentloaders/S3Directory/S3Directory.ts- line 191:
filePath = path.join(tempDir, key)(unsanitized) - line 213: recursive
mkdirSynccreates parent path - line 216:
writeFileSyncwrites attacker-controlled bytes - line 289: cleanup only removes the original
tempDir, so escaped
files remain on disk
- line 191:
- Related (variant):
packages/components/nodes/documentloaders/S3File/S3File.ts
(lines 756, 780, 782, 817 — arbitrary write + recursive dirname delete)
## Reachability
- Routes exposed:
packages/server/src/routes/documentstore/index.ts:41,45
(/api/v1/document-store/loader/preview,
/api/v1/document-store/loader/process/:loaderId) - Both require
documentStores:preview-process packages/server/src/services/documentstore/index.ts:588passes
data.loaderConfigstraight to the loader node with no path
sanitizationS3Directoryaccepts a customserverUrl, so the attacker does not need access to an existing trusted AWS bucket — they can point Flowise
at a local MinIO or any S3-compatible endpoint they control
## Impact
- Authenticated arbitrary file write to any path writable by the Flowise
process - Destructive overwrite of application data, secrets, or configuration
- Deployment-dependent lift to RCE if the service account can modify
executable, startup, or interpreter-loaded files
(e.g..bashrc, systemd units, cron files,require.resolvetargets,
package.jsonpostinstall scripts). This is not guaranteed
product-wide.
## Preconditions
- Flowise instance running (HTTP server mode)
- Attacker has a workspace account with the
documentStores:preview-processrole - No additional infrastructure required —
serverUrlcan point to
attacker-controlled S3-compatible endpoint
## Proof of Concept
- Authenticate as a user with
documentStores:preview-process - Run an S3-compatible server the attacker controls (e.g. MinIO)
- Create an object with a traversal key such as:
../../../../tmp/flowise-poc.txt - Trigger:
POST /api/v1/document-store/loader/preview
(or /api/v1/document-store/loader/process/:loaderId)
body: {
"loaderId": "s3Directory",
"loaderConfig": {
"serverUrl": "http://attacker-minio:9000",
"bucketName": "attacker-bucket",
"prefix": "",
"credential": ""
}
} - Observe that Flowise writes the object bytes to the escaped path
- Observe that cleanup removes only the original temp directory; the escaped file persists
Local reproduction confirmed: writing a key containing
../../escape-target/poc.txt from a nested temp root created the file
outside the temp directory, and the cleanup removed only tempDir.
## Root Cause
The loader trusts S3 object keys as safe local relative paths. It should
canonicalize the destination with path.resolve(...), verify the resolved
path remains within the intended temp directory, and reject traversal or
absolute-path patterns before any directory creation or file write.
## Suggested Remediation
The repository already has shared path validators that are not used here:
packages/components/src/validator.ts:35defines traversal checkspackages/components/src/validator.ts:295definessanitizeFileName
Recommended fix:
- Replace
path.join(tempDir, key)with a resolve-and-verify flow - Reject any resolved path outside
tempDir - Prefer a sanitized basename if directory structure is not required
- Apply the same fix to the
S3Fileloader (fileProcessingMethod = unstructuredbranch)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "flowise-components"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "flowise"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-04T17:43:45Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary \n \n Flowise on current `main` allows an authenticated user with\n `documentStores:preview-process` permission to trigger the `S3 Directory` \n document loader with attacker-controlled S3 object keys. The loader joins\n each returned S3 key with a temporary directory using `path.join(tempDir, key)` \n and writes the object bytes to disk **without validating traversal sequences\n such as `../`**. Cleanup later removes only the original temporary directory,\n so files written outside that directory persist on the host filesystem. \n \n This yields **arbitrary file write** with the privileges of the Flowise \n server process. \n \n A related variant exists in the `S3File` loader when \n `fileProcessingMethod = unstructured` (same root cause; its cleanup behavior \n turns it into a mixed arbitrary write/delete/DoS primitive). \n \n ## Affected component \n \n - `packages/components/nodes/documentloaders/S3Directory/S3Directory.ts`\n - line **191**: `filePath = path.join(tempDir, key)` (unsanitized) \n - line **213**: recursive `mkdirSync` creates parent path \n - line **216**: `writeFileSync` writes attacker-controlled bytes \n - line **289**: cleanup only removes the original `tempDir`, so escaped \n files remain on disk \n - Related (variant): \n `packages/components/nodes/documentloaders/S3File/S3File.ts` \n (lines 756, 780, 782, 817 \u2014 arbitrary write + recursive dirname delete)\n \n ## Reachability \n \n - Routes exposed: \n `packages/server/src/routes/documentstore/index.ts:41,45` \n (`/api/v1/document-store/loader/preview`, \n `/api/v1/document-store/loader/process/:loaderId`) \n - Both require `documentStores:preview-process` \n - `packages/server/src/services/documentstore/index.ts:588` passes \n `data.loaderConfig` straight to the loader node **with no path \n sanitization** \n - `S3Directory` accepts a custom `serverUrl`, so the attacker does **not\n need access to an existing trusted AWS bucket** \u2014 they can point Flowise \n at a local MinIO or any S3-compatible endpoint they control \n \n ## Impact \n \n - Authenticated arbitrary file write to any path writable by the Flowise \n process \n - Destructive overwrite of application data, secrets, or configuration \n - Deployment-dependent lift to RCE if the service account can modify \n executable, startup, or interpreter-loaded files \n (e.g. `.bashrc`, systemd units, cron files, `require.resolve` targets, \n `package.json` postinstall scripts). This is not guaranteed \n product-wide. \n \n ## Preconditions \n \n - Flowise instance running (HTTP server mode) \n - Attacker has a workspace account with the \n `documentStores:preview-process` role \n - No additional infrastructure required \u2014 `serverUrl` can point to \n attacker-controlled S3-compatible endpoint \n \n ## Proof of Concept \n \n 1. Authenticate as a user with `documentStores:preview-process`\n 2. Run an S3-compatible server the attacker controls (e.g. MinIO) \n 3. Create an object with a traversal key such as: \n `../../../../tmp/flowise-poc.txt` \n 4. Trigger: \n POST /api/v1/document-store/loader/preview \n (or /api/v1/document-store/loader/process/:loaderId) \n body: { \n \"loaderId\": \"s3Directory\", \n \"loaderConfig\": { \n \"serverUrl\": \"http://attacker-minio:9000\", \n \"bucketName\": \"attacker-bucket\", \n \"prefix\": \"\", \n \"credential\": \"\" \n } \n } \n 5. Observe that Flowise writes the object bytes to the escaped path \n 6. Observe that cleanup removes only the original temp directory; the\n escaped file persists \n \n Local reproduction confirmed: writing a key containing \n `../../escape-target/poc.txt` from a nested temp root created the file \n outside the temp directory, and the cleanup removed only `tempDir`. \n \n ## Root Cause \n \n The loader trusts S3 object keys as safe local relative paths. It should \n canonicalize the destination with `path.resolve(...)`, verify the resolved \n path remains within the intended temp directory, and reject traversal or \n absolute-path patterns before any directory creation or file write. \n \n ## Suggested Remediation \n \n The repository already has shared path validators that are not used here: \n \n - `packages/components/src/validator.ts:35` defines traversal checks\n - `packages/components/src/validator.ts:295` defines `sanitizeFileName` \n \n Recommended fix: \n \n 1. Replace `path.join(tempDir, key)` with a resolve-and-verify flow \n 2. Reject any resolved path outside `tempDir` \n 3. Prefer a sanitized basename if directory structure is not required\n 4. Apply the same fix to the `S3File` loader (`fileProcessingMethod = unstructured` branch)",
"id": "GHSA-88pr-878c-24wf",
"modified": "2026-08-04T17:43:45Z",
"published": "2026-08-04T17:43:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-88pr-878c-24wf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6549"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/commit/571b5d6218b1c129588ac625c8f20e30905a67cb"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise@3.1.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Flowise: Authenticated arbitrary file write in the `S3 Directory` document loader via unsanitized S3 object keys "
}
GHSA-88QH-CPHV-996C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-05 00:37 – Updated: 2026-02-10 02:57Summary
Description A path traversal vulnerability in FUXA allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to write arbitrary files to arbitrary locations on the server filesystem. This affects FUXA through version 1.2.9. This issue has been patched in FUXA version 1.2.10.
Impact
This affects all deployments, including those with runtime.settings.secureEnabled set to true.
Exploitation allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to overwrite application and system files. If the attacker can overwrite application code, startup scripts, or configuration files that are later executed/loaded, RCE is likely. Depending on deployment configuration and permissions, this may lead to full system compromise and could further expose connected ICS/SCADA environments to follow-on actions.
Patches
This issue has been patched in FUXA version 1.2.10. Users are strongly encouraged to update to the latest available release.
Notes
GitHub stated this vulnerability is identical to CVE-2025-69981, which was published against the repository out of band before coordinated disclosure concluded. CVE-2025-69981 describes a "CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type" vulnerability. While a CWE-434 is present, it was an unsafe, intended feature of the application that has been locked behind authentication. This report describes a "CWE-35: Path Traversal" that enables an arbitrary file write.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.2.9"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "fuxa-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25895"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-05T00:37:30Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-09T23:16:05Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n**Description**\nA path traversal vulnerability in FUXA allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to write arbitrary files to arbitrary locations on the server filesystem. This affects FUXA through version 1.2.9. This issue has been patched in FUXA version 1.2.10.\n\n### Impact\nThis affects all deployments, including those with\u00a0`runtime.settings.secureEnabled`\u00a0set to\u00a0`true`.\n\nExploitation allows an unauthenticated, remote attacker to overwrite application and system files. If the attacker can overwrite application code, startup scripts, or configuration files that are later executed/loaded, RCE is likely. Depending on deployment configuration and permissions, this may lead to full system compromise and could further expose connected ICS/SCADA environments to follow-on actions.\n\n### Patches\nThis issue has been patched in FUXA version 1.2.10. Users are strongly encouraged to update to the latest available release.\n\n### Notes\nGitHub stated this vulnerability is identical to CVE-2025-69981, which was published against the repository out of band before coordinated disclosure concluded. CVE-2025-69981 describes a \"CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type\" vulnerability. While a CWE-434 is present, it was an unsafe, intended feature of the application that has been locked behind authentication. This report describes a \"CWE-35: Path Traversal\" that enables an arbitrary file write.",
"id": "GHSA-88qh-cphv-996c",
"modified": "2026-02-10T02:57:44Z",
"published": "2026-02-05T00:37:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA/security/advisories/GHSA-88qh-cphv-996c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25895"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA/commit/22c2192f5d9beef8a787c45eff3a14c24dbb5f96"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA/releases/tag/v1.2.10"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "FUXA Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Arbitrary File Write in Upload API"
}
GHSA-88V8-3G84-5X8Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-02 06:31 – Updated: 2025-10-02 06:31Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'), Download of Code Without Integrity Check vulnerability in GTONE ChangeFlow allows Path Traversal.This issue affects ChangeFlow: All versions to v9.0.1.1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-11182"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-02T06:15:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027), Download of Code Without Integrity Check vulnerability in GTONE ChangeFlow allows Path Traversal.This issue affects ChangeFlow: All versions to v9.0.1.1.",
"id": "GHSA-88v8-3g84-5x8q",
"modified": "2025-10-02T06:31:07Z",
"published": "2025-10-02T06:31:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11182"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.gtone.co.kr/kr/application-lifecycle-management.php"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-88V8-V46G-6C9W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-30 06:30 – Updated: 2025-09-25 22:02Versions of the package servst before 2.0.3 are vulnerable to Directory Traversal due to improper sanitization of its filePath variable.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "servst"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-25936"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-02-01T01:38:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-30T05:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Versions of the package servst before 2.0.3 are vulnerable to Directory Traversal due to improper sanitization of its filePath variable.",
"id": "GHSA-88v8-v46g-6c9w",
"modified": "2025-09-25T22:02:01Z",
"published": "2023-01-30T06:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25936"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/andrepolischuk/servst/commit/f7cae5d2d7c64c86bc512e1e50614240396ef114"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/lirantal/691d02d607753d54856f9335f9a1692f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/andrepolischuk/servst"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-SERVST-3244896"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Servst vulnerable to Path Traversal"
}
GHSA-88VW-6QC7-7W62
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:45 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:45Directory Traversal in File Explorer in ASUSTOR ADM version 3.1.1 allows attackers to view arbitrary files by modifying the "file1" URL parameter, a similar issue to CVE-2018-11344.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-12306"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-12-04T17:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory Traversal in File Explorer in ASUSTOR ADM version 3.1.1 allows attackers to view arbitrary files by modifying the \"file1\" URL parameter, a similar issue to CVE-2018-11344.",
"id": "GHSA-88vw-6qc7-7w62",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:45:25Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:45:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-12306"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.securityevaluators.com/over-a-dozen-vulnerabilities-discovered-in-asustor-as-602t-8dd5832a82cc"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-88W5-8C88-9JHR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 00:32 – Updated: 2026-07-24 00:32Microweber CMS through 2.0.20 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the static file controller that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to read arbitrary files by supplying directory traversal sequences in the path query parameter. Attackers can send a single unauthenticated HTTP GET request exploiting the failure of normalize_path() to strip traversal sequences, disclosing sensitive files such as environment configuration files containing credentials and system files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-65694"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-23T22:16:53Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Microweber CMS through 2.0.20 contains a path traversal vulnerability in the static file controller that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to read arbitrary files by supplying directory traversal sequences in the path query parameter. Attackers can send a single unauthenticated HTTP GET request exploiting the failure of normalize_path() to strip traversal sequences, disclosing sensitive files such as environment configuration files containing credentials and system files.",
"id": "GHSA-88w5-8c88-9jhr",
"modified": "2026-07-24T00:32:34Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T00:32:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65694"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microweber/microweber/pull/1181"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/microweber-cms-path-traversal-via-servestaticfilecontroller"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.