CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13216 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-62GX-5Q78-WRVX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-15 21:56 – Updated: 2026-07-15 21:56Summary
The Local REST API's /vault/{path} endpoints (GET/PUT/PATCH/POST/DELETE) percent-decode the request path inside the handler — after Express has already routed and normalized it, then hand it to the Obsidian vault adapter with no confinement check. A literal ../ is resolved/rejected at the routing layer (→ 404), but %2F is not a separator there, so ..%2F..%2F survives routing and is only turned into a real / by the handler's decodeURIComponent, reconstituting a ../ traversal that walks out of the vault. An authenticated client can read, write, or delete arbitrary files on the host with the Obsidian process's privileges.
Details
Framework: Express (import express from "express"; routes registered via this.api.route("/vault/*")…).
The vulnerable line — in src/requestHandler.ts, every vault handler (vaultGet, vaultPut, vaultPatch, vaultPost, vaultDelete) derives the path like this:
ts
const rawPath = decodeURIComponent(
req.path.slice(req.path.indexOf("/", 1) + 1),
);
The path is decodeURIComponent'd after Express routing. A literal ../ is collapsed/rejected at the routing layer, but %2F isn't a separator there — so ..%2F..%2F reaches the handler intact and this decodeURIComponent turns it into a real ../../. The string routing saw (…%2F…) is not the string the handler uses (…/…), and %2e%2e behaves the same way.
No confinement on the decoded path. The handlers pass rawPath straight to the vault adapter — e.g. this.app.vault.adapter.readBinary(filePath) / this.app.vault.getAbstractFileByPath(filePath) — with no path.resolve + vault-root prefix check, so the reconstituted ../../ escapes.
The fix already exists in your code — for MOVE only. vaultMove confines correctly:
ts
const syntheticRoot = "/vault";
const resolved = posix.resolve(syntheticRoot, normalized);
if (resolved !== syntheticRoot && !resolved.startsWith(syntheticRoot + "/")) {
this.returnCannedResponse(res, { errorCode: ErrorCode.PathTraversalNotAllowed });
return;
}
GET/PUT/PATCH/POST/DELETE lack this guard. Apply the same posix.resolve(syntheticRoot, …) + startsWith check to the decoded path in every vault handler, and reject any segment that decodes to ...
PoC
Prereq: a running Obsidian with the Local REST API plugin enabled and its configured API key ($API_KEY). Targets below are Unix; adjust per OS (e.g. ..%2F..%2FWindows%2Fwin.ini on Windows).
```bash # READ outside the vault (returns 200 + the target file's real bytes): curl --path-as-is -k -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" \ "https://127.0.0.1:27124/vault/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd"
# WRITE outside the vault (creates a file on disk outside the vault root): curl --path-as-is -k -X PUT -H "Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY" --data "pwned" \ "https://127.0.0.1:27124/vault/..%2F..%2F..%2Ftmp%2Fcanary.txt" ```
--path-as-is stops curl from collapsing .. client-side. A plain ../ (unencoded) request returns 404 — only the %2F/%2e%2e encoded form bypasses, confirming the decode-after-routing gap.
Impact
Authenticated arbitrary file read / write / delete outside the Obsidian vault, with the OS privileges of the Obsidian process — typically the user's home directory (SSH keys, browser profiles, dotfiles, credentials). Amplified in MCP/LLM-agent deployments: this API is widely used as an MCP server, so a prompt-injection in vault content (or a malicious MCP client) can make an agent emit a %2F path — turning "the agent can edit my notes" into "the agent can read/write any file on the host," with no user intent to grant filesystem access beyond the vault.
This vulnerability was reported by Caleb Brisbin through responsible disclosure.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 4.1.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "obsidian-local-rest-api"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-15T21:56:45Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe Local REST API\u0027s `/vault/{path}` endpoints (GET/PUT/PATCH/POST/DELETE) percent-decode the request path *inside the handler \u2014 after* Express has already routed and normalized it, then hand it to the Obsidian vault adapter with no confinement check. A literal `../` is resolved/rejected at the routing layer (\u2192 404), but `%2F` is not a separator there, so `..%2F..%2F` survives routing and is only turned into a real `/` by the handler\u0027s `decodeURIComponent`, reconstituting a `../` traversal that walks out of the vault. An **authenticated** client can read, write, or delete **arbitrary files on the host** with the Obsidian process\u0027s privileges.\n\n### Details\n**Framework:** Express (`import express from \"express\"`; routes registered via `this.api.route(\"/vault/*\")\u2026`).\n\n**The vulnerable line** \u2014 in `src/requestHandler.ts`, every vault handler (`vaultGet`, `vaultPut`, `vaultPatch`, `vaultPost`, `vaultDelete`) derives the path like this:\n ```ts\n const rawPath = decodeURIComponent(\n req.path.slice(req.path.indexOf(\"/\", 1) + 1),\n );\n ```\nThe path is `decodeURIComponent`\u0027d **after** Express routing. A literal `../` is collapsed/rejected at the routing layer, but `%2F` isn\u0027t a separator there \u2014 so `..%2F..%2F` reaches the handler intact and this `decodeURIComponent` turns it into a real `../../`. **The string routing saw (`\u2026%2F\u2026`) is not the string the handler uses (`\u2026/\u2026`)**, and `%2e%2e` behaves the same way.\n\n**No confinement on the decoded path.** The handlers pass `rawPath` straight to the vault adapter \u2014 e.g. `this.app.vault.adapter.readBinary(filePath)` / `this.app.vault.getAbstractFileByPath(filePath)` \u2014 with no `path.resolve` + vault-root prefix check, so the reconstituted `../../` escapes.\n\n**The fix already exists in your code \u2014 for MOVE only.** `vaultMove` confines correctly:\n ```ts\n const syntheticRoot = \"/vault\";\n const resolved = posix.resolve(syntheticRoot, normalized);\n if (resolved !== syntheticRoot \u0026\u0026 !resolved.startsWith(syntheticRoot + \"/\")) {\n this.returnCannedResponse(res, { errorCode: ErrorCode.PathTraversalNotAllowed });\n return;\n }\n ```\nGET/PUT/PATCH/POST/DELETE lack this guard. **Apply the same `posix.resolve(syntheticRoot, \u2026)` + `startsWith` check to the decoded path in every vault handler**, and reject any segment that decodes to `..`.\n\n### PoC\nPrereq: a running Obsidian with the Local REST API plugin enabled and its configured API key (`$API_KEY`). Targets below are Unix; adjust per OS (e.g. `..%2F..%2FWindows%2Fwin.ini` on Windows).\n\n ```bash\n # READ outside the vault (returns 200 + the target file\u0027s real bytes):\n curl --path-as-is -k -H \"Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY\" \\\n \"https://127.0.0.1:27124/vault/..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd\"\n\n # WRITE outside the vault (creates a file on disk outside the vault root):\n curl --path-as-is -k -X PUT -H \"Authorization: Bearer $API_KEY\" --data \"pwned\" \\\n \"https://127.0.0.1:27124/vault/..%2F..%2F..%2Ftmp%2Fcanary.txt\"\n ```\n\n`--path-as-is` stops curl from collapsing `..` client-side. A plain `../` (unencoded) request returns 404 \u2014 only the `%2F`/`%2e%2e` encoded form bypasses, confirming the decode-after-routing gap.\n\n### Impact\nAuthenticated arbitrary file **read / write / delete** outside the Obsidian vault, with the OS privileges of the Obsidian process \u2014 typically the user\u0027s home directory (SSH keys, browser profiles, dotfiles, credentials). Amplified in MCP/LLM-agent deployments: this API is widely used as an MCP server, so a prompt-injection in vault content (or a malicious MCP client) can make an agent emit a `%2F` path \u2014 turning \"the agent can edit my notes\" into \"the agent can read/write any file on the host,\" with no user intent to grant filesystem access beyond the vault.\n\nThis vulnerability was reported by Caleb Brisbin through responsible disclosure.",
"id": "GHSA-62gx-5q78-wrvx",
"modified": "2026-07-15T21:56:45Z",
"published": "2026-07-15T21:56:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/coddingtonbear/obsidian-local-rest-api/security/advisories/GHSA-62gx-5q78-wrvx"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/coddingtonbear/obsidian-local-rest-api"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/coddingtonbear/obsidian-local-rest-api/releases/tag/4.1.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "obsidian-local-rest-api: Authenticated path traversal via URL-encoded %2F in /vault/{path} \u2014 arbitrary host file read/write/delete"
}
GHSA-62H5-PX63-5PR8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-30 15:30 – Updated: 2024-07-03 18:37An issue was discovered in Quest KACE Agent for Windows 12.0.38 and 13.1.23.0. An unquoted Windows search path vulnerability exists in the KSchedulerSvc.exe and AMPTools.exe components. This allows local attackers to execute code of their choice with NT Authority\SYSTEM privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-23774"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-30T14:15:15Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Quest KACE Agent for Windows 12.0.38 and 13.1.23.0. An unquoted Windows search path vulnerability exists in the KSchedulerSvc.exe and AMPTools.exe components. This allows local attackers to execute code of their choice with NT Authority\\SYSTEM privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-62h5-px63-5pr8",
"modified": "2024-07-03T18:37:40Z",
"published": "2024-04-30T15:30:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23774"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.quest.com/kb/4375402/quest-response-to-kace-sma-agent-vulnerabilities-cve-2024-23772-cve-2024-23773-cve-2024-23774"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.quest.com/kace"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-62HC-F8QJ-5XC3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-30 00:00 – Updated: 2023-10-27 17:08Jenkins Pipeline: Phoenix AutoTest Plugin 1.3 and earlier allows attackers with Item/Configure permission to upload arbitrary files from the Jenkins controller via FTP to an attacker-specified FTP server.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.surenpi.jenkins:phoenix-autotest"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-28157"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-04-05T19:49:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-03-29T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Jenkins Pipeline: Phoenix AutoTest Plugin 1.3 and earlier allows attackers with Item/Configure permission to upload arbitrary files from the Jenkins controller via FTP to an attacker-specified FTP server.",
"id": "GHSA-62hc-f8qj-5xc3",
"modified": "2023-10-27T17:08:14Z",
"published": "2022-03-30T00:00:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-28157"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/phoenix-autotest-plugin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2022-03-29/#SECURITY-2684"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/03/29/1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Path traversal in Jenkins Pipeline Phoenix AutoTest Plugin"
}
GHSA-62J2-RQPV-Q83G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:06 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:06A vulnerability has been identified in TIA Portal V14 (All versions), TIA Portal V15 (All versions < V15.1 Upd 4), TIA Portal V16 (All versions). Changing the contents of a configuration file could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. The security vulnerability could be exploited by an attacker with a valid account and limited access rights on the system. No user interaction is required. At the time of advisory publication no public exploitation of this security vulnerability was known.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-10934"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-01-16T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been identified in TIA Portal V14 (All versions), TIA Portal V15 (All versions \u003c V15.1 Upd 4), TIA Portal V16 (All versions). Changing the contents of a configuration file could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. The security vulnerability could be exploited by an attacker with a valid account and limited access rights on the system. No user interaction is required. At the time of advisory publication no public exploitation of this security vulnerability was known.",
"id": "GHSA-62j2-rqpv-q83g",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:06:47Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:06:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-10934"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/pdf/ssa-629512.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-62JX-8VMH-4MCW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-08-25 20:58 – Updated: 2023-06-13 22:04When unpacking a tarball that contains a symlink the tar crate may create directories outside of the directory it's supposed to unpack into. The function errors when it's trying to create a file, but the folders are already created at this point.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "tar"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.36"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-38511"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-18T20:08:23Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-10T23:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "When unpacking a tarball that contains a symlink the tar crate may create directories outside of the directory it\u0027s supposed to unpack into. The function errors when it\u0027s trying to create a file, but the folders are already created at this point.",
"id": "GHSA-62jx-8vmh-4mcw",
"modified": "2023-06-13T22:04:07Z",
"published": "2021-08-25T20:58:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38511"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/issues/238"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/pull/259"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rustsec/advisory-db/main/crates/tar/RUSTSEC-2021-0080.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2021-0080.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Links in archive can create arbitrary directories"
}
GHSA-62Q4-447F-WV8H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 20:00 – Updated: 2026-05-19 20:00Summary
pymdownx.snippets has a regression of the CVE-2023-32309 / GHSA-jh85-wwv9-24hv fix. With restrict_base_path: True (the default), the current filename.startswith(base) containment check does not enforce a directory boundary. As a result, a markdown snippet directive can read files from sibling paths that share the same prefix as base_path, such as docs vs docs_internal.
The regression was introduced in PR #2039 / commit 7c13bda5b7793b172efd1abb6712e156a83fe07d, which replaced the original directory-identity check with a plain string-prefix comparison.
Details
The regression was introduced in commit 7c13bda5b7793b172efd1abb6712e156a83fe07d (2023-05-15, #2039 "Fix regression of snippets nested deeply under specified base path"), which relaxed the original os.path.samefile(base, os.path.dirname(filename)) check to a plain startswith(base).
SnippetPreprocessor.get_snippet_path() in pymdownx/snippets.py:
if self.restrict_base_path:
filename = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(base, path))
# If the absolute path is no longer under the specified base path, reject the file
if not filename.startswith(base):
continue
base is os.path.abspath(b) and has no trailing separator. str.startswith(base) is True for any filename whose string representation begins with the same characters as base, regardless of whether those characters end at a directory boundary.
Concrete example:
base = "/x/docs"path = "../docs_secret/leak.txt"(inside the markdown snippet directive)os.path.join(base, path)→"/x/docs/../docs_secret/leak.txt"os.path.abspath(...)→"/x/docs_secret/leak.txt"filename.startswith(base)→True, because"/x/docs_secret/..."begins with the literal string"/x/docs".
All releases from 10.0.1 (2023-05-15) through 10.21.2 (current) are affected.
Impact
Arbitrary file read within the host the build runs on, bounded by the prefix match. With base_path = /x/docs the attacker can read files from any sibling directory whose path begins with the literal string /x/docs followed by any non-separator character — for example /x/docs_internal/, /x/docs.bak/, /x/docs2/.
The threat model is the same as the original CVE-2023-32309: markdown content processed by the snippets preprocessor in a build pipeline (typical scenario: an MkDocs documentation site built in CI from PR contributions or otherwise less-trusted markdown) can read files outside the configured base. CI builds that publish the generated HTML expose the read file to the public; CI builds with secrets on disk leak those secrets.
Reproduction
Minimal local PoC, non-destructive:
import os, shutil, tempfile, markdown
work = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="pmx_poc_")
try:
base = os.path.join(work, "docs")
sibling = os.path.join(work, "docs_secret")
os.makedirs(base)
os.makedirs(sibling)
with open(os.path.join(sibling, "leak.txt"), "w") as f:
f.write("TOP_SECRET_FROM_SIBLING_DIR\n")
out = markdown.markdown(
'--8<-- "../docs_secret/leak.txt"\n',
extensions=["pymdownx.snippets"],
extension_configs={
"pymdownx.snippets": {
"base_path": [base],
"restrict_base_path": True,
"check_paths": True,
}
},
)
print(out) # -> <p>TOP_SECRET_FROM_SIBLING_DIR</p>
finally:
shutil.rmtree(work)
Default restrict_base_path: True is sufficient — no non-default option is required.
Suggested fix
Minimal change — require the separator after the base prefix:
- if not filename.startswith(base):
+ # Append `os.sep` so a sibling directory whose name shares a prefix
+ # (e.g. `/x/docs` vs `/x/docs_evil`) cannot satisfy the check.
+ if not filename.startswith(base + os.sep):
continue
This preserves the original intent (allow snippets nested at any depth under base_path) while restoring the directory-boundary check. It does not affect the os.path.isdir(base) branch where base is a file (that branch still uses os.path.samefile).
Alternative: os.path.commonpath([base, filename]) == base is equivalent and slightly more idiomatic, though it raises ValueError on different drives on Windows and would need a try/except. The startswith(base + os.sep) fix is the smaller diff.
Note: this fix does not change behaviour for symlinks inside base_path. The existing implementation uses os.path.abspath (not os.path.realpath), so a symlink within base_path pointing outside is still followed. That is a separate concern — symlinks require write access to base_path, a much higher bar than the current bypass — and matches the behaviour the CVE-2023 fix established.
Regression test
A regression test class TestSnippetsSiblingPrefix was added in tests/test_extensions/test_snippets.py. It uses tests/test_extensions/_snippets/nested as base_path and a new fixture directory tests/test_extensions/_snippets/nested_sibling_evil/leak.txt. It asserts that the markdown directive --8<-- "../nested_sibling_evil/leak.txt" raises SnippetMissingError.
- Without fix: test fails (
AssertionError: SnippetMissingError not raised, sibling file is silently read). - With fix: test passes.
Full suite: python -m pytest tests/ -q → 738 passed (737 baseline + 1 new regression test). No regressions.
Affected versions
>= 10.0.1, <= 10.21.2
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.21.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pymdown-extensions"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.1"
},
{
"fixed": "10.21.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46338"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T20:00:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "# Summary\n\n`pymdownx.snippets` has a regression of the CVE-2023-32309 / GHSA-jh85-wwv9-24hv fix. With `restrict_base_path: True` (the default), the current `filename.startswith(base)` containment check does not enforce a directory boundary. As a result, a markdown snippet directive can read files from sibling paths that share the same prefix as `base_path`, such as `docs` vs `docs_internal`.\n\nThe regression was introduced in PR #2039 / commit `7c13bda5b7793b172efd1abb6712e156a83fe07d`, which replaced the original directory-identity check with a plain string-prefix comparison.\n\n# Details\n\nThe regression was introduced in commit `7c13bda5b7793b172efd1abb6712e156a83fe07d` (2023-05-15, #2039 *\"Fix regression of snippets nested deeply under specified base path\"*), which relaxed the original `os.path.samefile(base, os.path.dirname(filename))` check to a plain `startswith(base)`.\n\n`SnippetPreprocessor.get_snippet_path()` in `pymdownx/snippets.py`:\n\n```python\nif self.restrict_base_path:\n filename = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(base, path))\n # If the absolute path is no longer under the specified base path, reject the file\n if not filename.startswith(base):\n continue\n```\n\n`base` is `os.path.abspath(b)` and has no trailing separator. `str.startswith(base)` is `True` for any `filename` whose string representation begins with the same characters as `base`, regardless of whether those characters end at a directory boundary.\n\nConcrete example:\n\n* `base = \"/x/docs\"`\n* `path = \"../docs_secret/leak.txt\"` (inside the markdown snippet directive)\n* `os.path.join(base, path)` \u2192 `\"/x/docs/../docs_secret/leak.txt\"`\n* `os.path.abspath(...)` \u2192 `\"/x/docs_secret/leak.txt\"`\n* `filename.startswith(base)` \u2192 `True`, because `\"/x/docs_secret/...\"` begins with the literal string `\"/x/docs\"`.\n\nAll releases from **10.0.1 (2023-05-15) through 10.21.2 (current)** are affected.\n\n# Impact\n\nArbitrary file read within the host the build runs on, bounded by the prefix match. With `base_path = /x/docs` the attacker can read files from any sibling directory whose path begins with the literal string `/x/docs` followed by any non-separator character \u2014 for example `/x/docs_internal/`, `/x/docs.bak/`, `/x/docs2/`.\n\nThe threat model is the same as the original CVE-2023-32309: markdown content processed by the snippets preprocessor in a build pipeline (typical scenario: an MkDocs documentation site built in CI from PR contributions or otherwise less-trusted markdown) can read files outside the configured base. CI builds that publish the generated HTML expose the read file to the public; CI builds with secrets on disk leak those secrets.\n\n# Reproduction\n\nMinimal local PoC, non-destructive:\n\n```python\nimport os, shutil, tempfile, markdown\n\nwork = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"pmx_poc_\")\ntry:\n base = os.path.join(work, \"docs\")\n sibling = os.path.join(work, \"docs_secret\")\n os.makedirs(base)\n os.makedirs(sibling)\n with open(os.path.join(sibling, \"leak.txt\"), \"w\") as f:\n f.write(\"TOP_SECRET_FROM_SIBLING_DIR\\n\")\n\n out = markdown.markdown(\n \u0027--8\u003c-- \"../docs_secret/leak.txt\"\\n\u0027,\n extensions=[\"pymdownx.snippets\"],\n extension_configs={\n \"pymdownx.snippets\": {\n \"base_path\": [base],\n \"restrict_base_path\": True,\n \"check_paths\": True,\n }\n },\n )\n print(out) # -\u003e \u003cp\u003eTOP_SECRET_FROM_SIBLING_DIR\u003c/p\u003e\nfinally:\n shutil.rmtree(work)\n```\n\nDefault `restrict_base_path: True` is sufficient \u2014 no non-default option is required.\n\n# Suggested fix\n\nMinimal change \u2014 require the separator after the base prefix:\n\n```diff\n- if not filename.startswith(base):\n+ # Append `os.sep` so a sibling directory whose name shares a prefix\n+ # (e.g. `/x/docs` vs `/x/docs_evil`) cannot satisfy the check.\n+ if not filename.startswith(base + os.sep):\n continue\n```\n\nThis preserves the original intent (allow snippets nested at any depth under `base_path`) while restoring the directory-boundary check. It does not affect the `os.path.isdir(base)` branch where `base` is a file (that branch still uses `os.path.samefile`).\n\nAlternative: `os.path.commonpath([base, filename]) == base` is equivalent and slightly more idiomatic, though it raises `ValueError` on different drives on Windows and would need a `try/except`. The `startswith(base + os.sep)` fix is the smaller diff.\n\nNote: this fix does not change behaviour for symlinks inside `base_path`. The existing implementation uses `os.path.abspath` (not `os.path.realpath`), so a symlink within `base_path` pointing outside is still followed. That is a separate concern \u2014 symlinks require write access to `base_path`, a much higher bar than the current bypass \u2014 and matches the behaviour the CVE-2023 fix established.\n\n# Regression test\n\nA regression test class `TestSnippetsSiblingPrefix` was added in `tests/test_extensions/test_snippets.py`. It uses `tests/test_extensions/_snippets/nested` as `base_path` and a new fixture directory `tests/test_extensions/_snippets/nested_sibling_evil/leak.txt`. It asserts that the markdown directive `--8\u003c-- \"../nested_sibling_evil/leak.txt\"` raises `SnippetMissingError`.\n\n* Without fix: test fails (`AssertionError: SnippetMissingError not raised`, sibling file is silently read).\n* With fix: test passes.\n\nFull suite: `python -m pytest tests/ -q` \u2192 **738 passed** (737 baseline + 1 new regression test). No regressions.\n\n# Affected versions\n\n`\u003e= 10.0.1, \u003c= 10.21.2`",
"id": "GHSA-62q4-447f-wv8h",
"modified": "2026-05-19T20:00:29Z",
"published": "2026-05-19T20:00:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/facelessuser/pymdown-extensions/security/advisories/GHSA-62q4-447f-wv8h"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/facelessuser/pymdown-extensions/pull/2039"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/facelessuser/pymdown-extensions"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Regression in pymdownx.snippets reintroduces sibling-prefix path traversal bypass despite restrict_base_path"
}
GHSA-62V7-879R-436C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-24 00:30 – Updated: 2023-02-03 18:30A vulnerability in the descarga_etiqueta.php component of Correos Prestashop 1.7.x allows attackers to execute a directory traversal.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-46639"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-23T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the descarga_etiqueta.php component of Correos Prestashop 1.7.x allows attackers to execute a directory traversal.",
"id": "GHSA-62v7-879r-436c",
"modified": "2023-02-03T18:30:28Z",
"published": "2023-01-24T00:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-46639"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ia-informatica.com/it/CVE-2022-46639"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-62W4-XWFM-C36P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-05 00:29 – Updated: 2024-04-03 23:57Symlink Traversal vulnerability in TP-LINK TL-WDR4300 and TL-1043ND..
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2013-4654"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-11-13T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Symlink Traversal vulnerability in TP-LINK TL-WDR4300 and TL-1043ND..",
"id": "GHSA-62w4-xwfm-c36p",
"modified": "2024-04-03T23:57:15Z",
"published": "2022-05-05T00:29:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-4654"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ise.io/casestudies/exploiting-soho-routers"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ise.io/soho_service_hacks"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ise.io/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/soho_techreport.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-62WF-24C4-8R76
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-24 00:00 – Updated: 2024-03-13 18:04Since Jenkins 2.320 and LTS 2.332.1, help icon tooltips no longer escape the feature name, effectively undoing the fix for SECURITY-1955.
This vulnerability is known to be exploitable by attackers with Job/Configure permission.
Jenkins 2.356, LTS 2.332.4 and LTS 2.346.1 addresses this vulnerability, the feature name in help icon tooltips is now escaped.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.350"
},
{
"fixed": "2.356"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.320"
},
{
"fixed": "2.332.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.346"
},
{
"fixed": "2.346.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-34170"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-12-06T00:12:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-06-23T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Since Jenkins 2.320 and LTS 2.332.1, help icon tooltips no longer escape the feature name, effectively undoing the fix for [SECURITY-1955](https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2020-08-12/#SECURITY-1955).\n\nThis vulnerability is known to be exploitable by attackers with Job/Configure permission.\n\nJenkins 2.356, LTS 2.332.4 and LTS 2.346.1 addresses this vulnerability, the feature name in help icon tooltips is now escaped.",
"id": "GHSA-62wf-24c4-8r76",
"modified": "2024-03-13T18:04:01Z",
"published": "2022-06-24T00:00:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34170"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/jenkins/commit/f71495a63f8b861e8ca3a5fcf5cc931fce55bc57"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/jenkins"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2022-06-22/#SECURITY-2781"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Cross-site Scripting vulnerability in Jenkins"
}
GHSA-6324-52PR-H4P5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-13 13:24 – Updated: 2024-01-12 16:28Impact
Backoffice users with permissions to create packages can use path traversal and thereby write outside of the expected location.
Explanation of the vulnerability
The “Package” section in Umbraco Backoffice allows a logged in user to write folders outside of the default package directory.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Umbraco.CMS"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.18.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Umbraco.CMS"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.8.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Umbraco.CMS"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "12.3.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-49089"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-12-13T13:24:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-12T19:15:07Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "#### Impact\nBackoffice users with permissions to create packages can use path traversal and thereby write outside of the expected location.\n\n#### Explanation of the vulnerability \nThe \u201cPackage\u201d section in Umbraco Backoffice allows a logged in user to write folders outside of the default package directory.",
"id": "GHSA-6324-52pr-h4p5",
"modified": "2024-01-12T16:28:06Z",
"published": "2023-12-13T13:24:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/umbraco/Umbraco-CMS/security/advisories/GHSA-6324-52pr-h4p5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-49089"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/umbraco/Umbraco-CMS"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Using the directory back payload (\u201c/../\u201d) in a package name allows placement of package in other folders."
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.