CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13073 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-2W9J-55XJ-GCP3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:18 – Updated: 2023-04-26 21:30This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of D-Link DAP-2020 1.01rc001 routers. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the handling of the getpage parameter provided to the webproc endpoint. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose information in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-12103.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-34860"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-10-25T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of D-Link DAP-2020 1.01rc001 routers. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability. The specific flaw exists within the handling of the getpage parameter provided to the webproc endpoint. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to disclose information in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-12103.",
"id": "GHSA-2w9j-55xj-gcp3",
"modified": "2023-04-26T21:30:36Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:18:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34860"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/announcement/publication.aspx?name=SAP10201"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-21-976"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2WCG-QVRR-VF6J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-26 13:30 – Updated: 2026-05-26 13:30A flaw has been found in dazeb markdown-downloader up to 3d4394b34b6c99d81af817623af55e3384df5a6a. Affected is the function download_markdown/list_downloaded_files/create_subdirectory of the file src/index.ts. Executing a manipulation can lead to path traversal. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used. This product does not use versioning. This is why information about affected and unaffected releases are unavailable. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-9472"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-25T17:16:46Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A flaw has been found in dazeb markdown-downloader up to 3d4394b34b6c99d81af817623af55e3384df5a6a. Affected is the function download_markdown/list_downloaded_files/create_subdirectory of the file src/index.ts. Executing a manipulation can lead to path traversal. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been published and may be used. This product does not use versioning. This is why information about affected and unaffected releases are unavailable. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.",
"id": "GHSA-2wcg-qvrr-vf6j",
"modified": "2026-05-26T13:30:48Z",
"published": "2026-05-26T13:30:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9472"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dazeb/markdown-downloader/issues/12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dazeb/markdown-downloader"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/814000"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/365453"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/365453/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-2WFH-RCWF-WH23
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-04 06:04 – Updated: 2026-04-04 06:04Summary
The plugin file upload endpoint (POST /api/plugin/upload) passes the user-supplied filename directly to createTempFolder() without sanitizing path traversal sequences. An attacker with Global Builder privileges can craft a multipart upload with a filename containing ../ to delete arbitrary directories via rmSync and write arbitrary files via tarball extraction to any filesystem path the Node.js process can access.
Severity
- Attack Vector: Network — exploitable via the plugin upload HTTP API
- Attack Complexity: Low — no special conditions; a single crafted multipart request suffices
- Privileges Required: High — requires Global Builder role (
GLOBAL_BUILDERpermission) - User Interaction: None
- Scope: Changed — the plugin upload feature is scoped to a temp directory, but the traversal escapes to the host filesystem
- Confidentiality Impact: None — the vulnerability enables deletion and writing, not reading
- Integrity Impact: High — attacker can delete arbitrary directories and write arbitrary files via tarball extraction
- Availability Impact: High — recursive deletion of application or system directories causes denial of service
Severity Rationale
Despite the real filesystem impact, severity is bounded by the requirement for Global Builder privileges (PR:H), which is the highest non-admin role in Budibase. In self-hosted deployments the Global Builder may already have server access, further reducing practical impact. In cloud/multi-tenant deployments the impact is more significant as it could affect the host infrastructure.
Affected Component
packages/server/src/api/controllers/plugin/file.ts—fileUpload()(line 15)packages/server/src/utilities/fileSystem/filesystem.ts—createTempFolder()(lines 78-91)
Description
Unsanitized filename flows into filesystem operations
In packages/server/src/api/controllers/plugin/file.ts, the uploaded file's name is used directly after stripping the .tar.gz suffix:
// packages/server/src/api/controllers/plugin/file.ts:8-19
export async function fileUpload(file: KoaFile) {
if (!file.name || !file.path) {
throw new Error("File is not valid - cannot upload.")
}
if (!file.name.endsWith(".tar.gz")) {
throw new Error("Plugin must be compressed into a gzipped tarball.")
}
const path = createTempFolder(file.name.split(".tar.gz")[0])
await extractTarball(file.path, path)
return await getPluginMetadata(path)
}
The file.name originates from the Content-Disposition header's filename field in the multipart upload, parsed by formidable (via koa-body 4.2.0). Formidable does not sanitize path traversal sequences from filenames.
The createTempFolder function in packages/server/src/utilities/fileSystem/filesystem.ts uses path.join() which resolves ../ sequences, then performs destructive filesystem operations:
// packages/server/src/utilities/fileSystem/filesystem.ts:78-91
export const createTempFolder = (item: string) => {
const path = join(budibaseTempDir(), item)
try {
// remove old tmp directories automatically - don't combine
if (fs.existsSync(path)) {
fs.rmSync(path, { recursive: true, force: true })
}
fs.mkdirSync(path)
} catch (err: any) {
throw new Error(`Path cannot be created: ${err.message}`)
}
return path
}
The budibaseTempDir() returns /tmp/.budibase (from packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/utils.ts:33). With a filename like ../../etc/target.tar.gz, path.join("/tmp/.budibase", "../../etc/target") resolves to /etc/target.
Inconsistent defenses confirm the gap
The codebase is aware of the risk in similar paths:
-
Safe path in
utils.ts: ThedownloadUnzipTarballfunction (for NPM/GitHub/URL plugin sources) generates a random name server-side:typescript // packages/server/src/api/controllers/plugin/index.ts:68 const name = "PLUGIN_" + Math.floor(100000 + Math.random() * 900000)This is safe becausenamenever contains user input. -
Safe path in
objectStore.ts: Other uses ofbudibaseTempDir()use UUID-generated names:typescript // packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:546 const outputPath = join(budibaseTempDir(), v4()) -
Sanitization exists but is not applied: The codebase has
sanitizeKey()inobjectStore.tsfor sanitizing object store paths, but no equivalent is applied tocreateTempFolder's input.
The file upload path is the only caller of createTempFolder that passes unsanitized user input.
Execution chain
- Authenticated Global Builder sends
POST /api/plugin/uploadwith a multipart file whoseContent-Dispositionfilename contains path traversal (e.g.,../../etc/target.tar.gz) - koa-body/formidable parses the upload, setting
file.nameto the raw filename from the header controller.upload→sdk.plugins.processUploaded()→fileUpload(file).endsWith(".tar.gz")check passes (the suffix is present).split(".tar.gz")[0]extracts../../etc/targetcreateTempFolder("../../etc/target")is calledpath.join("/tmp/.budibase", "../../etc/target")resolves to/etc/targetfs.rmSync("/etc/target", { recursive: true, force: true })— deletes the target directory recursivelyfs.mkdirSync("/etc/target")— creates a directory at the traversed pathextractTarball(file.path, "/etc/target")— extracts attacker-controlled tarball contents to the traversed path
Proof of Concept
# Create a minimal tarball with a test file
mkdir -p /tmp/plugin-poc && echo "pwned" > /tmp/plugin-poc/test.txt
tar czf /tmp/poc-plugin.tar.gz -C /tmp/plugin-poc .
# Upload with a traversal filename targeting /tmp/pwned (non-destructive demo)
curl -X POST 'http://localhost:10000/api/plugin/upload' \
-H 'Cookie: <global_builder_session_cookie>' \
-F "file=@/tmp/poc-plugin.tar.gz;filename=../../tmp/pwned.tar.gz"
# Result: server executes:
# rm -rf /tmp/pwned (if exists)
# mkdir /tmp/pwned
# tar xzf <upload> -C /tmp/pwned
# Verify: ls /tmp/pwned/test.txt
Impact
- Arbitrary directory deletion:
rmSyncwith{ recursive: true, force: true }deletes any directory the Node.js process can access, including application data directories - Arbitrary file write: Tarball extraction writes attacker-controlled files to any writable path, potentially overwriting application code, configuration, or system files
- Denial of service: Deleting critical directories (e.g., the application's data directory, node_modules, or system directories) crashes the application
- Potential code execution: In containerized deployments (common for Budibase) where Node.js runs as root, an attacker could overwrite startup scripts or application code to achieve remote code execution on subsequent restarts
Recommended Remediation
Option 1: Sanitize at createTempFolder (preferred — protects all callers)
import { join, resolve } from "path"
export const createTempFolder = (item: string) => {
const tempDir = budibaseTempDir()
const resolved = resolve(tempDir, item)
// Ensure the resolved path is within the temp directory
if (!resolved.startsWith(tempDir + "/") && resolved !== tempDir) {
throw new Error("Invalid path: directory traversal detected")
}
try {
if (fs.existsSync(resolved)) {
fs.rmSync(resolved, { recursive: true, force: true })
}
fs.mkdirSync(resolved)
} catch (err: any) {
throw new Error(`Path cannot be created: ${err.message}`)
}
return resolved
}
Option 2: Sanitize at the upload handler (defense-in-depth)
Strip path components from the filename before use:
import path from "path"
export async function fileUpload(file: KoaFile) {
if (!file.name || !file.path) {
throw new Error("File is not valid - cannot upload.")
}
if (!file.name.endsWith(".tar.gz")) {
throw new Error("Plugin must be compressed into a gzipped tarball.")
}
// Strip directory components from the filename
const safeName = path.basename(file.name).split(".tar.gz")[0]
const dir = createTempFolder(safeName)
await extractTarball(file.path, dir)
return await getPluginMetadata(dir)
}
Both options should ideally be applied together for defense-in-depth.
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered and reported by bugbunny.ai.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@budibase/server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.33.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35214"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-04T06:04:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-03T16:16:41Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe plugin file upload endpoint (`POST /api/plugin/upload`) passes the user-supplied filename directly to `createTempFolder()` without sanitizing path traversal sequences. An attacker with Global Builder privileges can craft a multipart upload with a filename containing `../` to delete arbitrary directories via `rmSync` and write arbitrary files via tarball extraction to any filesystem path the Node.js process can access.\n\n## Severity\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network \u2014 exploitable via the plugin upload HTTP API\n- **Attack Complexity:** Low \u2014 no special conditions; a single crafted multipart request suffices\n- **Privileges Required:** High \u2014 requires Global Builder role (`GLOBAL_BUILDER` permission)\n- **User Interaction:** None\n- **Scope:** Changed \u2014 the plugin upload feature is scoped to a temp directory, but the traversal escapes to the host filesystem\n- **Confidentiality Impact:** None \u2014 the vulnerability enables deletion and writing, not reading\n- **Integrity Impact:** High \u2014 attacker can delete arbitrary directories and write arbitrary files via tarball extraction\n- **Availability Impact:** High \u2014 recursive deletion of application or system directories causes denial of service\n\n### Severity Rationale\n\n Despite the real filesystem impact, severity is bounded by the requirement for Global Builder privileges (PR:H), which is the highest non-admin role in Budibase. In self-hosted deployments the Global Builder may already have server access, further reducing practical impact. In cloud/multi-tenant deployments the impact is more significant as it could affect the host infrastructure.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- `packages/server/src/api/controllers/plugin/file.ts` \u2014 `fileUpload()` (line 15)\n- `packages/server/src/utilities/fileSystem/filesystem.ts` \u2014 `createTempFolder()` (lines 78-91)\n\n## Description\n\n### Unsanitized filename flows into filesystem operations\n\nIn `packages/server/src/api/controllers/plugin/file.ts`, the uploaded file\u0027s name is used directly after stripping the `.tar.gz` suffix:\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/api/controllers/plugin/file.ts:8-19\nexport async function fileUpload(file: KoaFile) {\n if (!file.name || !file.path) {\n throw new Error(\"File is not valid - cannot upload.\")\n }\n if (!file.name.endsWith(\".tar.gz\")) {\n throw new Error(\"Plugin must be compressed into a gzipped tarball.\")\n }\n const path = createTempFolder(file.name.split(\".tar.gz\")[0])\n await extractTarball(file.path, path)\n\n return await getPluginMetadata(path)\n}\n```\n\nThe `file.name` originates from the `Content-Disposition` header\u0027s `filename` field in the multipart upload, parsed by formidable (via koa-body 4.2.0). Formidable does not sanitize path traversal sequences from filenames.\n\nThe `createTempFolder` function in `packages/server/src/utilities/fileSystem/filesystem.ts` uses `path.join()` which resolves `../` sequences, then performs destructive filesystem operations:\n\n```typescript\n// packages/server/src/utilities/fileSystem/filesystem.ts:78-91\nexport const createTempFolder = (item: string) =\u003e {\n const path = join(budibaseTempDir(), item)\n try {\n // remove old tmp directories automatically - don\u0027t combine\n if (fs.existsSync(path)) {\n fs.rmSync(path, { recursive: true, force: true })\n }\n fs.mkdirSync(path)\n } catch (err: any) {\n throw new Error(`Path cannot be created: ${err.message}`)\n }\n\n return path\n}\n```\n\nThe `budibaseTempDir()` returns `/tmp/.budibase` (from `packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/utils.ts:33`). With a filename like `../../etc/target.tar.gz`, `path.join(\"/tmp/.budibase\", \"../../etc/target\")` resolves to `/etc/target`.\n\n### Inconsistent defenses confirm the gap\n\nThe codebase is aware of the risk in similar paths:\n\n1. **Safe path in `utils.ts`**: The `downloadUnzipTarball` function (for NPM/GitHub/URL plugin sources) generates a random name server-side:\n ```typescript\n // packages/server/src/api/controllers/plugin/index.ts:68\n const name = \"PLUGIN_\" + Math.floor(100000 + Math.random() * 900000)\n ```\n This is safe because `name` never contains user input.\n\n2. **Safe path in `objectStore.ts`**: Other uses of `budibaseTempDir()` use UUID-generated names:\n ```typescript\n // packages/backend-core/src/objectStore/objectStore.ts:546\n const outputPath = join(budibaseTempDir(), v4())\n ```\n\n3. **Sanitization exists but is not applied**: The codebase has `sanitizeKey()` in `objectStore.ts` for sanitizing object store paths, but no equivalent is applied to `createTempFolder`\u0027s input.\n\nThe file upload path is the only caller of `createTempFolder` that passes unsanitized user input.\n\n### Execution chain\n\n1. Authenticated Global Builder sends `POST /api/plugin/upload` with a multipart file whose `Content-Disposition` filename contains path traversal (e.g., `../../etc/target.tar.gz`)\n2. koa-body/formidable parses the upload, setting `file.name` to the raw filename from the header\n3. `controller.upload` \u2192 `sdk.plugins.processUploaded()` \u2192 `fileUpload(file)`\n4. `.endsWith(\".tar.gz\")` check passes (the suffix is present)\n5. `.split(\".tar.gz\")[0]` extracts `../../etc/target`\n6. `createTempFolder(\"../../etc/target\")` is called\n7. `path.join(\"/tmp/.budibase\", \"../../etc/target\")` resolves to `/etc/target`\n8. `fs.rmSync(\"/etc/target\", { recursive: true, force: true })` \u2014 **deletes the target directory recursively**\n9. `fs.mkdirSync(\"/etc/target\")` \u2014 **creates a directory at the traversed path**\n10. `extractTarball(file.path, \"/etc/target\")` \u2014 **extracts attacker-controlled tarball contents to the traversed path**\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\n# Create a minimal tarball with a test file\nmkdir -p /tmp/plugin-poc \u0026\u0026 echo \"pwned\" \u003e /tmp/plugin-poc/test.txt\ntar czf /tmp/poc-plugin.tar.gz -C /tmp/plugin-poc .\n\n# Upload with a traversal filename targeting /tmp/pwned (non-destructive demo)\ncurl -X POST \u0027http://localhost:10000/api/plugin/upload\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Cookie: \u003cglobal_builder_session_cookie\u003e\u0027 \\\n -F \"file=@/tmp/poc-plugin.tar.gz;filename=../../tmp/pwned.tar.gz\"\n\n# Result: server executes:\n# rm -rf /tmp/pwned (if exists)\n# mkdir /tmp/pwned\n# tar xzf \u003cupload\u003e -C /tmp/pwned\n# Verify: ls /tmp/pwned/test.txt\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Arbitrary directory deletion**: `rmSync` with `{ recursive: true, force: true }` deletes any directory the Node.js process can access, including application data directories\n- **Arbitrary file write**: Tarball extraction writes attacker-controlled files to any writable path, potentially overwriting application code, configuration, or system files\n- **Denial of service**: Deleting critical directories (e.g., the application\u0027s data directory, node_modules, or system directories) crashes the application\n- **Potential code execution**: In containerized deployments (common for Budibase) where Node.js runs as root, an attacker could overwrite startup scripts or application code to achieve remote code execution on subsequent restarts\n\n## Recommended Remediation\n\n### Option 1: Sanitize at `createTempFolder` (preferred \u2014 protects all callers)\n\n```typescript\nimport { join, resolve } from \"path\"\n\nexport const createTempFolder = (item: string) =\u003e {\n const tempDir = budibaseTempDir()\n const resolved = resolve(tempDir, item)\n\n // Ensure the resolved path is within the temp directory\n if (!resolved.startsWith(tempDir + \"/\") \u0026\u0026 resolved !== tempDir) {\n throw new Error(\"Invalid path: directory traversal detected\")\n }\n\n try {\n if (fs.existsSync(resolved)) {\n fs.rmSync(resolved, { recursive: true, force: true })\n }\n fs.mkdirSync(resolved)\n } catch (err: any) {\n throw new Error(`Path cannot be created: ${err.message}`)\n }\n\n return resolved\n}\n```\n\n### Option 2: Sanitize at the upload handler (defense-in-depth)\n\nStrip path components from the filename before use:\n\n```typescript\nimport path from \"path\"\n\nexport async function fileUpload(file: KoaFile) {\n if (!file.name || !file.path) {\n throw new Error(\"File is not valid - cannot upload.\")\n }\n if (!file.name.endsWith(\".tar.gz\")) {\n throw new Error(\"Plugin must be compressed into a gzipped tarball.\")\n }\n // Strip directory components from the filename\n const safeName = path.basename(file.name).split(\".tar.gz\")[0]\n const dir = createTempFolder(safeName)\n await extractTarball(file.path, dir)\n\n return await getPluginMetadata(dir)\n}\n```\n\nBoth options should ideally be applied together for defense-in-depth.\n\n## Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).",
"id": "GHSA-2wfh-rcwf-wh23",
"modified": "2026-04-04T06:04:19Z",
"published": "2026-04-04T06:04:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-2wfh-rcwf-wh23"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35214"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/18240"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/6344d06d703660fd05995e61d581593c2349c879"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.33.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Budibase: Path traversal in plugin file upload enables arbitrary directory deletion and file write"
}
GHSA-2WG4-C3JX-83F5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-17 15:30 – Updated: 2024-07-17 15:30The SolarWinds Access Rights Manager was found to be susceptible to an Arbitrary File Deletion and Information Disclosure vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-23474"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-17T15:15:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The SolarWinds Access Rights Manager was found to be susceptible to an Arbitrary File Deletion and Information Disclosure vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-2wg4-c3jx-83f5",
"modified": "2024-07-17T15:30:51Z",
"published": "2024-07-17T15:30:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23474"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://documentation.solarwinds.com/en/success_center/arm/content/release_notes/arm_2024-3_release_notes.htm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2WGX-R6J7-J62R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 06:13 – Updated: 2025-01-21 18:31The kernel in Microsoft Windows Vista Gold, SP1, and SP2, Windows Server 2008 Gold, SP2, and R2, and Windows 7 does not properly translate a registry key's virtual path to its real path, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (reboot) via a crafted application, aka "Windows Virtual Path Parsing Vulnerability."
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-0481"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2010-04-14T16:00:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The kernel in Microsoft Windows Vista Gold, SP1, and SP2, Windows Server 2008 Gold, SP2, and R2, and Windows 7 does not properly translate a registry key\u0027s virtual path to its real path, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (reboot) via a crafted application, aka \"Windows Virtual Path Parsing Vulnerability.\"",
"id": "GHSA-2wgx-r6j7-j62r",
"modified": "2025-01-21T18:31:00Z",
"published": "2022-05-02T06:13:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-0481"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins/2010/ms10-021"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A6770"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/39373"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/39374"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id?1023850"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA10-103A.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2WJ7-GPH3-JWG6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-21 18:31 – Updated: 2024-08-21 18:31Windscribe Directory Traversal Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows local attackers to escalate privileges on affected installations of Windscribe. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the Windscribe Service. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code in the context of SYSTEM. Was ZDI-CAN-23441.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-6141"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-21T17:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Windscribe Directory Traversal Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows local attackers to escalate privileges on affected installations of Windscribe. An attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the Windscribe Service. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary code in the context of SYSTEM. Was ZDI-CAN-23441.",
"id": "GHSA-2wj7-gph3-jwg6",
"modified": "2024-08-21T18:31:28Z",
"published": "2024-08-21T18:31:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6141"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Windscribe/Desktop-App/blob/90a5cc3c1f50f6545f83969c2ace6b4ac2c91c4e/client/common/changelog.txt#L23"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-24-820"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-2WVW-246G-FFW7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:40 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:40Local file inclusion in Pyrescom Termod4 time management devices before 10.04k allows authenticated remote attackers to traverse directories and read sensitive files via the Maintenance > Logs menu and manipulating the file-path in the URL.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-23161"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-01-26T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Local file inclusion in Pyrescom Termod4 time management devices before 10.04k allows authenticated remote attackers to traverse directories and read sensitive files via the Maintenance \u003e Logs menu and manipulating the file-path in the URL.",
"id": "GHSA-2wvw-246g-ffw7",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:40:05Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:40:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-23161"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/O24-vdT/85c6aa87f40a6af40dcb03b5b1381760"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Outpost24/Pyrescom-Termod-PoC"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://outpost24.com/blog/multiple-vulnerabilities-discovered-in-Pyrescom-Termod4-smart-device"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pyres.com/en/solutions/termod-4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-2WW3-72RP-WPP4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-06 18:37 – Updated: 2026-02-20 19:15Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
An Arbitrary File Write vulnerability has been identified in Microsoft's Semantic Kernel .NET SDK, specifically within the SessionsPythonPlugin.
Developers who have built applications which include Microsoft's Semantic Kernel .NET SDK and are using the SessionsPythonPlugin
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to? The problem has been fixed in Microsoft.SemanticKernel.Plugins.Core version 1.71.0. Users should upgrade to version 1.71.0 or higher.
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
Users can create a Function Invocation Filter which checks the arguments being passed to any calls to DownloadFileAsync or UploadFileAsync and ensures the provided localFilePath is allow listed.
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more? - Sample showing safe use of the CodeInterpreterPlugin - PR to Add file upload security controls to SessionsPythonPlugin
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "semantic-kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.39.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Microsoft.SemanticKernel.Core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.71.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25592"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-06T18:37:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-06T21:16:17Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\nAn Arbitrary File Write vulnerability has been identified in Microsoft\u0027s Semantic Kernel\u202f.NET SDK, specifically within the\u202f`SessionsPythonPlugin`.\nDevelopers who have built applications which include Microsoft\u0027s Semantic Kernel\u202f.NET SDK and are using the `SessionsPythonPlugin`\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\nThe problem has been fixed in [Microsoft.SemanticKernel.Plugins.Core version 1.71.0](https://www.nuget.org/packages/Microsoft.SemanticKernel.Plugins.Core/1.71.0). Users should upgrade to version 1.71.0 or higher.\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\nUsers can create a [Function Invocation Filter](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/semantic-kernel/concepts/enterprise-readiness/filters?pivots=programming-language-csharp#function-invocation-filter) which checks the arguments being passed to any calls to `DownloadFileAsync\u202f` or `UploadFileAsync` and ensures the provided `localFilePath` is allow listed.\n\n### References\n_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_\n- [Sample showing safe use of the CodeInterpreterPlugin](https://github.com/microsoft/semantic-kernel/blob/main/dotnet/samples/Demos/CodeInterpreterPlugin/Program.cs#L61-L64)\n- [PR to Add file upload security controls to SessionsPythonPlugin](https://github.com/microsoft/semantic-kernel/pull/13478/changes#diff-88d3cacba2bfa84eef8f2aa171b34f9940338cbb784a3ffc49f5fe3af1b8943d)",
"id": "GHSA-2ww3-72rp-wpp4",
"modified": "2026-02-20T19:15:43Z",
"published": "2026-02-06T18:37:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/semantic-kernel/security/advisories/GHSA-2ww3-72rp-wpp4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25592"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/semantic-kernel/pull/13478/changes#diff-88d3cacba2bfa84eef8f2aa171b34f9940338cbb784a3ffc49f5fe3af1b8943d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/semantic-kernel"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/microsoft/semantic-kernel/blob/main/dotnet/samples/Demos/CodeInterpreterPlugin/Program.cs#L61-L64"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Semantic Kernel has Arbitrary File Write via AI Agent Function Calling in .NET SDK"
}
GHSA-2WWR-9X6F-88GP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 18:18 – Updated: 2026-07-01 18:18EasyAdminBundle ships two public Twig components — <twig:ea:Flag countryCode="..."> and <twig:ea:Icon name="..."> — that load SVG files from disk using a path built directly from a public component property, and then render the resulting markup with the Twig |raw filter.
When an application binds either of those properties to data that is influenced by an end user, the lack of validation on the property value leads to two distinct issues:
- Arbitrary
.svgfile disclosure (both components) — the property value is concatenated into a filesystem path without normalizing or constraining it, so..segments are preserved and resolved by PHP. Any file on the server whose absolute path ends in.svg(for example, user-uploaded SVG icons stored elsewhere on the host) can be read and embedded into the rendered page. - Reflected XSS in the admin UI (Flag component only) — when the requested flag file does not exist, the Flag component falls back to a hard-coded SVG string that interpolates the raw
countryCodevalue twice, and the parent template renders that string with|raw. An attacker who controlscountryCodecan therefore inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that will execute inside the authenticated admin context that rendered the component.
The first-party usage shipped by EasyAdminBundle itself is not affected: the bundle only passes ISO 3166 alpha-2 codes validated through Symfony\Component\Intl\Countries to the Flag component, and only hard-coded internal:.. names or values previously set in PHP via MenuItem::setIcon() to the Icon component. The vulnerability is reachable only in third-party templates that pass attacker-controlled data into these properties.
Impact
Path traversal is information disclosure bounded by the .svg extension; reflected XSS in Flag runs in the admin context and is therefore more sensitive but requires a vulnerable template wiring and user interaction.
Affected components
EasyCorp\Bundle\EasyAdminBundle\Twig\Component\Flag— public Twig tag<twig:ea:Flag>, propertycountryCode.EasyCorp\Bundle\EasyAdminBundle\Twig\Component\Icon— public Twig tag<twig:ea:Icon>, propertynamewhen the value starts with theinternal:prefix.
Credit
EasyAdmin would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing and The PHP Foundation) for reporting the issue and providing the fix.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "easycorp/easyadmin-bundle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.29.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "easycorp/easyadmin-bundle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T18:18:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "EasyAdminBundle ships two public Twig components \u2014 `\u003ctwig:ea:Flag countryCode=\"...\"\u003e` and `\u003ctwig:ea:Icon name=\"...\"\u003e` \u2014 that load SVG files from disk using a path built directly from a public component property, and then render the resulting markup with the Twig `|raw` filter.\n\nWhen an application binds either of those properties to data that is influenced by an end user, the lack of validation on the property value leads to two distinct issues:\n\n- Arbitrary `.svg` file disclosure (both components) \u2014 the property value is concatenated into a filesystem path without normalizing or constraining it, so `..` segments are preserved and resolved by PHP. Any file on the server whose absolute path ends in `.svg` (for example, user-uploaded SVG icons stored elsewhere on the host) can be read and embedded into the rendered page.\n- Reflected XSS in the admin UI (Flag component only) \u2014 when the requested flag file does not exist, the Flag component falls back to a hard-coded SVG string that interpolates the raw `countryCode` value twice, and the parent template renders that string with `|raw`. An attacker who controls `countryCode` can therefore inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that will execute inside the authenticated admin context that rendered the component.\n\nThe first-party usage shipped by EasyAdminBundle itself is not affected: the bundle only passes ISO 3166 alpha-2 codes validated through `Symfony\\Component\\Intl\\Countries` to the `Flag` component, and only hard-coded `internal:..` names or values previously set in PHP via `MenuItem::setIcon()` to the `Icon` component. The vulnerability is reachable only in third-party templates that pass attacker-controlled data into these properties.\n\n### Impact\n\nPath traversal is information disclosure bounded by the `.svg` extension; reflected XSS in Flag runs in the admin context and is therefore more sensitive but requires a vulnerable template wiring and user interaction.\n\n### Affected components\n\n- `EasyCorp\\Bundle\\EasyAdminBundle\\Twig\\Component\\Flag` \u2014 public Twig tag `\u003ctwig:ea:Flag\u003e`, property `countryCode`.\n- `EasyCorp\\Bundle\\EasyAdminBundle\\Twig\\Component\\Icon` \u2014 public Twig tag `\u003ctwig:ea:Icon\u003e`, property `name` when the value starts with the `internal:` prefix.\n\n### Credit\n\nEasyAdmin would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing and The PHP Foundation) for reporting the issue and providing the fix.",
"id": "GHSA-2wwr-9x6f-88gp",
"modified": "2026-07-01T18:18:46Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T18:18:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/EasyCorp/EasyAdminBundle/security/advisories/GHSA-2wwr-9x6f-88gp"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/EasyCorp/EasyAdminBundle"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "EasyAdminBundle has path traversal and reflected XSS in Flag and Icon Twig components"
}
GHSA-2WXV-3G4V-P76P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 07:08 – Updated: 2023-03-30 20:57Directory traversal vulnerability in index.php in phpSysInfo prior to 3.2.5 allows remote attackers to determine the existence of arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) sequence and a trailing null (%00) byte in the lng parameter, which will display a different error message if the file exists.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "phpsysinfo/phpsysinfo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2006-3360"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-03-30T20:57:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2006-07-06T20:05:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in index.php in phpSysInfo prior to 3.2.5 allows remote attackers to determine the existence of arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) sequence and a trailing null (%00) byte in the lng parameter, which will display a different error message if the file exists.",
"id": "GHSA-2wxv-3g4v-p76p",
"modified": "2023-03-30T20:57:08Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T07:08:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2006-3360"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/phpsysinfo/phpsysinfo/issues/107"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/phpsysinfo/phpsysinfo/issues/368#issuecomment-1380842745"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/phpsysinfo/phpsysinfo/commit/60b5bbb5d1cc17f44050e99a3e746f55a4fd4e18"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/27527"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/phpsysinfo/phpsysinfo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "phpSysInfo allows remote attackers to determine the existence of arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) sequence"
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.