Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-22

Allowed-with-Review

Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.

13199 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-2298-WC49-VM4H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 12:30 – Updated: 2026-07-02 12:30
VLAI
Details

The Ninja Forms - File Uploads plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read via the attach_files() function in versions up to, and including, 3.3.29. This is due to the get_files_for_attachment() function accepting a raw attacker-controlled 'files' array when the process() method returns early due to a client-supplied saveProgress flag, bypassing all upload validation, path normalization, and database record creation steps, and allowing an attacker-supplied file_path value to reach wp_mail() as an email attachment with only a file_exists() check. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files on the affected site's server.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-13369"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-02T10:16:28Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Ninja Forms - File Uploads plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read via the attach_files() function in versions up to, and including, 3.3.29. This is due to the get_files_for_attachment() function accepting a raw attacker-controlled \u0027files\u0027 array when the process() method returns early due to a client-supplied saveProgress flag, bypassing all upload validation, path normalization, and database record creation steps, and allowing an attacker-supplied file_path value to reach wp_mail() as an email attachment with only a file_exists() check. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files on the affected site\u0027s server.",
  "id": "GHSA-2298-wc49-vm4h",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T12:30:59Z",
  "published": "2026-07-02T12:30:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13369"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ninja-forms-uploads/trunk/includes/fields/upload.php#L71"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ninja-forms-uploads/trunk/includes/integrations/ninjaforms/attachments.php#L107"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/ninja-forms-uploads/trunk/includes/integrations/ninjaforms/attachments.php#L196"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/87d4dd4a-b1e2-4d08-aef1-77e58aa7531d?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-22CJ-M4WF-FV2C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 13:52 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:23
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI Dynamic Context history and terminal tools read files outside configured storage via path traversal
Details

PraisonAI Dynamic Context history and terminal tools read files outside configured storage via path traversal

Summary

PraisonAI's Dynamic Context module provides filesystem-backed history and terminal-log storage. The SDK reference describes the module as providing:

  • artifact storage for tool outputs, history, and terminal logs;
  • history persistence with search; and
  • terminal session logging.

The module also exports agent-callable tool factories:

  • create_history_tools() returns history_search, history_tail, and history_get.
  • create_terminal_tools() returns terminal_tail, terminal_grep, and terminal_commands.

Those tools accept run_id and agent_id arguments from the tool caller. The underlying stores join those values into filesystem paths without rejecting absolute paths or .. traversal:

history_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / "history"
return history_dir / f"{agent_id}.jsonl"

terminal_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / "terminal"
return terminal_dir / f"{agent_id}.log"

Because run_id can be an absolute path and agent_id can contain traversal, a lower-trust prompt/user that can call these tools can read .jsonl and .log files outside the configured Dynamic Context base directory.

Affected Product

  • Repository: MervinPraison/PraisonAI
  • Ecosystem: pip
  • Package: praisonai
  • Component: Dynamic Context history and terminal tools
  • Current source paths:
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/context/history_store.py
  • src/praisonai/praisonai/context/terminal_logger.py
  • Latest PyPI version validated: 4.6.58
  • Current origin/main validated: 1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e
  • Current origin/main tag validated: v4.6.58

Suggested affected range:

pip:praisonai >= 3.8.1, <= 4.6.58

Representative local sweep:

  • 3.8.1: vulnerable
  • 4.0.0: vulnerable
  • 4.5.113: vulnerable
  • 4.6.33: vulnerable
  • 4.6.34: vulnerable
  • 4.6.40: vulnerable
  • 4.6.50: vulnerable
  • 4.6.58: vulnerable

Root Cause

HistoryStore._get_history_path() and TerminalLogger._get_log_path() treat logical identifiers as path segments, but never validate that the resolved path stays under base_dir.

History path construction:

def _get_history_path(self, run_id: str, agent_id: str) -> Path:
    history_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / "history"
    history_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    return history_dir / f"{agent_id}.jsonl"

Terminal path construction:

def _get_log_path(self, run_id: str, agent_id: str) -> Path:
    terminal_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / "terminal"
    terminal_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    return terminal_dir / f"{agent_id}.log"

The agent tools pass caller-controlled run_id and agent_id directly into these helpers:

def history_tail(agent_id: str = "default", run_id: str = "default", count: int = 10) -> str:
    messages = history_store.get_last_messages(agent_id=agent_id, run_id=run_id, count=count)

def terminal_tail(agent_id: str = "default", run_id: str = "default", lines: int = 50) -> str:
    return term_logger.tail_session(agent_id=agent_id, run_id=run_id, lines=lines)

There is no check equivalent to:

resolved = candidate.resolve()
base = self.base_dir.resolve()
resolved.relative_to(base)

There is also no identifier allowlist preventing /, \, or .. in run_id or agent_id.

Local PoV

Run against the latest PyPI package:

uv run --with 'praisonai==4.6.58' \
  python poc/pov_prai_cand_027_history_terminal_tools_path_traversal.py --json

The PoV:

  1. Creates a temporary Dynamic Context base directory.
  2. Creates a separate outside directory containing secret.jsonl and secret.log.
  3. Creates legitimate in-base history and terminal log controls.
  4. Calls history_tail() and history_get() with run_id=<outside-dir> and agent_id=../secret.
  5. Calls terminal_tail() and terminal_grep() with the same traversal.
  6. Confirms the traversal paths resolve to files outside the configured base.

Observed output summary from evidence/pov-pypi-4.6.58.json:

{
  "package": "praisonai",
  "package_version": "4.6.58",
  "controls": {
    "valid_history_read_works": true,
    "valid_terminal_read_works": true,
    "outside_history_file_outside_base_dir": true,
    "outside_terminal_file_outside_base_dir": true,
    "traversal_history_path_resolves_to_outside_file": true,
    "traversal_terminal_path_resolves_to_outside_file": true
  },
  "outside_history_tail": "Last 1 messages:\\n\\n[system]: PRAI-CAND-027-HISTORY-SECRET",
  "outside_terminal_tail": "PRAI-CAND-027-TERMINAL-SECRET\\nsecond line\\n",
  "outside_terminal_grep": "Found 1 matches:\\n\\n--- Line 1 ---\\n> PRAI-CAND-027-TERMINAL-SECRET\\n  second line",
  "vulnerable": true
}

The PoV is local-only. It does not start a server, contact a third-party target, or use real credentials.

Why This Is Not Intended Behavior

This report does not claim that history and terminal helpers should be unable to read legitimate history or terminal logs. The issue is narrower: logical run_id and agent_id values can escape the configured Dynamic Context base directory.

The controls show the intended boundary:

  • legitimate in-base history remains readable;
  • legitimate in-base terminal logs remain readable;
  • the outside .jsonl and .log files are not under the configured base_dir; and
  • the tools still disclose those outside files through traversal identifiers.

The official context reference describes history persistence and terminal logging as filesystem-backed Dynamic Context features. The context security documentation also treats absolute paths, path traversal, and sensitive files as privacy/security risks. Reading files outside the configured context store conflicts with that documented boundary.

Impact

If a PraisonAI application exposes these Dynamic Context tools to untrusted or lower-trust prompts, the lower-trust caller can read files outside the configured context storage when the target file can be reached with the tool-imposed suffix:

  • history_* tools can disclose reachable .jsonl files;
  • terminal_* tools can disclose reachable .log files; and
  • cross-run or cross-agent context/history/logs can be disclosed if their path is known or guessable.

This can expose conversation history, prompts, terminal output, command logs, tokens, API keys, cloud credentials, operational data, or other secrets stored in JSONL/log files readable by the PraisonAI process.

The impact is confidentiality-only in the tested surface. Integrity and availability are not claimed for this report.

Severity

Suggested severity: High.

Rationale:

  • AV: applies when an application exposes an agent with these tools over a network chat/API surface.
  • AC: the traversal needs only chosen run_id and agent_id values.
  • PR: an unauthenticated or public-facing agent endpoint can be exploited without an account. Deployments that require authenticated chat/API access may score this as PR:L.
  • UI: the attacker directly supplies the prompt/tool argument to the exposed agent surface.
  • C: conversation history and terminal logs can contain secrets and private operational data.
  • I:N/A: this report demonstrates read-only disclosure.

Remediation

Treat run_id and agent_id as logical identifiers, not path components.

Recommended fixes:

  1. Reject absolute paths, path separators, and traversal components in run_id and agent_id.
  2. Build candidate paths, call .resolve(), and reject any path that is not under self.base_dir.resolve().
  3. Apply the same containment helper to history append/read/search/clear/export and terminal log/read/search/clear/export paths.
  4. Prefer opaque server-generated run and agent IDs in tool schemas.
  5. Add regression tests for absolute run_id, ../ in run_id, and ../ in agent_id for history and terminal tool factories.

Minimal containment shape:

def _safe_child(self, *parts: str) -> Path:
    candidate = self.base_dir.joinpath(*parts).resolve()
    base = self.base_dir.resolve()
    try:
        candidate.relative_to(base)
    except ValueError as exc:
        raise PermissionError("Context path is outside configured base_dir") from exc
    return candidate

Pair this with an identifier allowlist, because run_id and agent_id should not need filesystem syntax.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.58"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.8.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.59"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-56833"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:52:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# PraisonAI Dynamic Context history and terminal tools read files outside configured storage via path traversal\n\n## Summary\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s Dynamic Context module provides filesystem-backed history and\nterminal-log storage. The SDK reference describes the module as providing:\n\n- artifact storage for tool outputs, history, and terminal logs;\n- history persistence with search; and\n- terminal session logging.\n\nThe module also exports agent-callable tool factories:\n\n- `create_history_tools()` returns `history_search`, `history_tail`, and\n  `history_get`.\n- `create_terminal_tools()` returns `terminal_tail`, `terminal_grep`, and\n  `terminal_commands`.\n\nThose tools accept `run_id` and `agent_id` arguments from the tool caller. The\nunderlying stores join those values into filesystem paths without rejecting\nabsolute paths or `..` traversal:\n\n```python\nhistory_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / \"history\"\nreturn history_dir / f\"{agent_id}.jsonl\"\n```\n\n```python\nterminal_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / \"terminal\"\nreturn terminal_dir / f\"{agent_id}.log\"\n```\n\nBecause `run_id` can be an absolute path and `agent_id` can contain traversal,\na lower-trust prompt/user that can call these tools can read `.jsonl` and\n`.log` files outside the configured Dynamic Context base directory.\n\n## Affected Product\n\n- Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n- Ecosystem: `pip`\n- Package: `praisonai`\n- Component: Dynamic Context history and terminal tools\n- Current source paths:\n  - `src/praisonai/praisonai/context/history_store.py`\n  - `src/praisonai/praisonai/context/terminal_logger.py`\n- Latest PyPI version validated: `4.6.58`\n- Current `origin/main` validated:\n  `1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e`\n- Current `origin/main` tag validated: `v4.6.58`\n\nSuggested affected range:\n\n```text\npip:praisonai \u003e= 3.8.1, \u003c= 4.6.58\n```\n\nRepresentative local sweep:\n\n- `3.8.1`: vulnerable\n- `4.0.0`: vulnerable\n- `4.5.113`: vulnerable\n- `4.6.33`: vulnerable\n- `4.6.34`: vulnerable\n- `4.6.40`: vulnerable\n- `4.6.50`: vulnerable\n- `4.6.58`: vulnerable\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`HistoryStore._get_history_path()` and `TerminalLogger._get_log_path()` treat\nlogical identifiers as path segments, but never validate that the resolved path\nstays under `base_dir`.\n\nHistory path construction:\n\n```python\ndef _get_history_path(self, run_id: str, agent_id: str) -\u003e Path:\n    history_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / \"history\"\n    history_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n    return history_dir / f\"{agent_id}.jsonl\"\n```\n\nTerminal path construction:\n\n```python\ndef _get_log_path(self, run_id: str, agent_id: str) -\u003e Path:\n    terminal_dir = self.base_dir / run_id / \"terminal\"\n    terminal_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n    return terminal_dir / f\"{agent_id}.log\"\n```\n\nThe agent tools pass caller-controlled `run_id` and `agent_id` directly into\nthese helpers:\n\n```python\ndef history_tail(agent_id: str = \"default\", run_id: str = \"default\", count: int = 10) -\u003e str:\n    messages = history_store.get_last_messages(agent_id=agent_id, run_id=run_id, count=count)\n```\n\n```python\ndef terminal_tail(agent_id: str = \"default\", run_id: str = \"default\", lines: int = 50) -\u003e str:\n    return term_logger.tail_session(agent_id=agent_id, run_id=run_id, lines=lines)\n```\n\nThere is no check equivalent to:\n\n```python\nresolved = candidate.resolve()\nbase = self.base_dir.resolve()\nresolved.relative_to(base)\n```\n\nThere is also no identifier allowlist preventing `/`, `\\`, or `..` in\n`run_id` or `agent_id`.\n\n## Local PoV\n\nRun against the latest PyPI package:\n\n```bash\nuv run --with \u0027praisonai==4.6.58\u0027 \\\n  python poc/pov_prai_cand_027_history_terminal_tools_path_traversal.py --json\n```\n\nThe PoV:\n\n1. Creates a temporary Dynamic Context base directory.\n2. Creates a separate outside directory containing `secret.jsonl` and\n   `secret.log`.\n3. Creates legitimate in-base history and terminal log controls.\n4. Calls `history_tail()` and `history_get()` with\n   `run_id=\u003coutside-dir\u003e` and `agent_id=../secret`.\n5. Calls `terminal_tail()` and `terminal_grep()` with the same traversal.\n6. Confirms the traversal paths resolve to files outside the configured base.\n\nObserved output summary from `evidence/pov-pypi-4.6.58.json`:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"package\": \"praisonai\",\n  \"package_version\": \"4.6.58\",\n  \"controls\": {\n    \"valid_history_read_works\": true,\n    \"valid_terminal_read_works\": true,\n    \"outside_history_file_outside_base_dir\": true,\n    \"outside_terminal_file_outside_base_dir\": true,\n    \"traversal_history_path_resolves_to_outside_file\": true,\n    \"traversal_terminal_path_resolves_to_outside_file\": true\n  },\n  \"outside_history_tail\": \"Last 1 messages:\\\\n\\\\n[system]: PRAI-CAND-027-HISTORY-SECRET\",\n  \"outside_terminal_tail\": \"PRAI-CAND-027-TERMINAL-SECRET\\\\nsecond line\\\\n\",\n  \"outside_terminal_grep\": \"Found 1 matches:\\\\n\\\\n--- Line 1 ---\\\\n\u003e PRAI-CAND-027-TERMINAL-SECRET\\\\n  second line\",\n  \"vulnerable\": true\n}\n```\n\nThe PoV is local-only. It does not start a server, contact a third-party\ntarget, or use real credentials.\n\n## Why This Is Not Intended Behavior\n\nThis report does not claim that history and terminal helpers should be unable\nto read legitimate history or terminal logs. The issue is narrower: logical\n`run_id` and `agent_id` values can escape the configured Dynamic Context base\ndirectory.\n\nThe controls show the intended boundary:\n\n- legitimate in-base history remains readable;\n- legitimate in-base terminal logs remain readable;\n- the outside `.jsonl` and `.log` files are not under the configured\n  `base_dir`; and\n- the tools still disclose those outside files through traversal identifiers.\n\nThe official context reference describes history persistence and terminal\nlogging as filesystem-backed Dynamic Context features. The context security\ndocumentation also treats absolute paths, path traversal, and sensitive files\nas privacy/security risks. Reading files outside the configured context store\nconflicts with that documented boundary.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf a PraisonAI application exposes these Dynamic Context tools to untrusted or\nlower-trust prompts, the lower-trust caller can read files outside the\nconfigured context storage when the target file can be reached with the\ntool-imposed suffix:\n\n- `history_*` tools can disclose reachable `.jsonl` files;\n- `terminal_*` tools can disclose reachable `.log` files; and\n- cross-run or cross-agent context/history/logs can be disclosed if their path\n  is known or guessable.\n\nThis can expose conversation history, prompts, terminal output, command logs,\ntokens, API keys, cloud credentials, operational data, or other secrets stored\nin JSONL/log files readable by the PraisonAI process.\n\nThe impact is confidentiality-only in the tested surface. Integrity and\navailability are not claimed for this report.\n\n## Severity\n\nSuggested severity: High.\n\nRationale:\n\n- `AV`: applies when an application exposes an agent with these tools over a\n  network chat/API surface.\n- `AC`: the traversal needs only chosen `run_id` and `agent_id` values.\n- `PR`: an unauthenticated or public-facing agent endpoint can be exploited\n  without an account. Deployments that require authenticated chat/API access\n  may score this as `PR:L`.\n- `UI`: the attacker directly supplies the prompt/tool argument to the\n  exposed agent surface.\n- `C`: conversation history and terminal logs can contain secrets and private\n  operational data.\n- `I:N/A`: this report demonstrates read-only disclosure.\n\n## Remediation\n\nTreat `run_id` and `agent_id` as logical identifiers, not path components.\n\nRecommended fixes:\n\n1. Reject absolute paths, path separators, and traversal components in\n   `run_id` and `agent_id`.\n2. Build candidate paths, call `.resolve()`, and reject any path that is not\n   under `self.base_dir.resolve()`.\n3. Apply the same containment helper to history append/read/search/clear/export\n   and terminal log/read/search/clear/export paths.\n4. Prefer opaque server-generated run and agent IDs in tool schemas.\n5. Add regression tests for absolute `run_id`, `../` in `run_id`, and `../` in\n   `agent_id` for history and terminal tool factories.\n\nMinimal containment shape:\n\n```python\ndef _safe_child(self, *parts: str) -\u003e Path:\n    candidate = self.base_dir.joinpath(*parts).resolve()\n    base = self.base_dir.resolve()\n    try:\n        candidate.relative_to(base)\n    except ValueError as exc:\n        raise PermissionError(\"Context path is outside configured base_dir\") from exc\n    return candidate\n```\n\nPair this with an identifier allowlist, because `run_id` and `agent_id` should\nnot need filesystem syntax.",
  "id": "GHSA-22cj-m4wf-fv2c",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T21:23:20Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T13:52:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-22cj-m4wf-fv2c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI Dynamic Context history and terminal tools read files outside configured storage via path traversal"
}

GHSA-22CP-6JM2-7PJH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-02 06:14 – Updated: 2025-04-11 03:31
VLAI
Details

Directory traversal vulnerability in the SSL Service in EMC HomeBase Server 6.2.x before 6.2.3 and 6.3.x before 6.3.2 allows remote attackers to overwrite arbitrary files with any content, and consequently execute arbitrary code, via a .. (dot dot) in an unspecified parameter.

Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2010-0620"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2010-02-25T00:30:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in the SSL Service in EMC HomeBase Server 6.2.x before 6.2.3 and 6.3.x before 6.3.2 allows remote attackers to overwrite arbitrary files with any content, and consequently execute arbitrary code, via a .. (dot dot) in an unspecified parameter.",
  "id": "GHSA-22cp-6jm2-7pjh",
  "modified": "2025-04-11T03:31:47Z",
  "published": "2022-05-02T06:14:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-0620"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/8230"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/509723/100/0/threaded"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/38380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2010/0458"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-10-020"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-22F4-HRHX-4J5V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 15:32 – Updated: 2026-06-25 15:32
VLAI
Details

Dell Wyse Management Suite, versions prior to WMS 5.5 HF1, contain an Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Remote Code Execution.

Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49506"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T14:16:42Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Dell Wyse Management Suite, versions prior to WMS 5.5 HF1, contain an Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027) vulnerability. A high privileged attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Remote Code Execution.",
  "id": "GHSA-22f4-hrhx-4j5v",
  "modified": "2026-06-25T15:32:00Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T15:32:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49506"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-in/000465356/dsa-2026-225?msockid=3021cac2195069ed3194ddad186a68f9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-22F5-36Q8-782W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-07 00:30 – Updated: 2025-11-07 00:30
VLAI
Details

Due to insufficient sanitization, an attacker can upload a specially crafted configuration file to traverse directories and achieve remote code execution with system-level permissions.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-59171"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-06T23:15:37Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Due to insufficient sanitization, an attacker can upload a specially \ncrafted configuration file to traverse directories and achieve remote \ncode execution with system-level permissions.",
  "id": "GHSA-22f5-36q8-782w",
  "modified": "2025-11-07T00:30:31Z",
  "published": "2025-11-07T00:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59171"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2025/icsa-25-310-01.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.advantech.com/emt/contact"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-25-310-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-22FJ-XVPX-PQM9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-29 15:30 – Updated: 2023-12-29 15:30
VLAI
Details

Mattermost version 2.10.0 and earlier fails to sanitize deeplink paths, which allows an attacker to perform CSRF attacks against the server.

Severity
7.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-7114"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-74"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-12-29T13:15:12Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Mattermost version 2.10.0 and earlier fails to sanitize deeplink paths, which allows an attacker to perform CSRF attacks against the server.\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-22fj-xvpx-pqm9",
  "modified": "2023-12-29T15:30:36Z",
  "published": "2023-12-29T15:30:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-7114"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-22FP-CVVV-7FF5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-09 06:30 – Updated: 2026-04-09 06:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was determined in Tenda i12 1.0.0.11(3862). The impacted element is an unknown function of the component HTTP Handler. Executing a manipulation can lead to path traversal. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized.

Severity
7.3 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-5849"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-09T06:16:23Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was determined in Tenda i12 1.0.0.11(3862). The impacted element is an unknown function of the component HTTP Handler. Executing a manipulation can lead to path traversal. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been publicly disclosed and may be utilized.",
  "id": "GHSA-22fp-cvvv-7ff5",
  "modified": "2026-04-09T06:30:28Z",
  "published": "2026-04-09T06:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5849"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Litengzheng/vuldb_new/blob/main/i12/vul_110/README.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/791217"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/356375"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/356375/cti"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.tenda.com.cn"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-22GF-2Q7P-998G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-09 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-10 21:31
VLAI
Details

An unauthenticated directory traversal vulnerability in cgi-bin/upload.cgi in SNMP Web Pro 1.1 allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files. The CGI concatenates the user-supplied params directly onto the base path (/var/www/files/userScript/) using memcpy + strcat without validation or canonicalization, enabling ../ sequences to escape the intended directory. The download branch also echoes the unsanitized params into Content-Disposition, introducing header-injection risk.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-65287"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-09T16:18:17Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An unauthenticated directory traversal vulnerability in cgi-bin/upload.cgi in SNMP Web Pro 1.1 allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files. The CGI concatenates the user-supplied params directly onto the base path (/var/www/files/userScript/) using memcpy + strcat without validation or canonicalization, enabling ../ sequences to escape the intended directory. The download branch also echoes the unsanitized params into Content-Disposition, introducing header-injection risk.",
  "id": "GHSA-22gf-2q7p-998g",
  "modified": "2025-12-10T21:31:30Z",
  "published": "2025-12-09T18:30:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-65287"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://damiri.fr/en/cve/CVE-2025-65287"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-22HC-2X3V-3PHW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:28 – Updated: 2025-04-12 12:48
VLAI
Details

Directory traversal vulnerability in download_audio.php in the SE HTML5 Album Audio Player (se-html5-album-audio-player) plugin 1.1.0 and earlier for WordPress allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the file parameter.

Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2015-4414"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2015-06-17T18:59:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in download_audio.php in the SE HTML5 Album Audio Player (se-html5-album-audio-player) plugin 1.1.0 and earlier for WordPress allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the file parameter.",
  "id": "GHSA-22hc-2x3v-3phw",
  "modified": "2025-04-12T12:48:58Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T03:28:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-4414"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpvulndb.com/vulnerabilities/8032"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/37274"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/132266/WordPress-SE-HTML5-Album-Audio-Player-1.1.0-Directory-Traversal.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/75093"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.vapid.dhs.org/advisory.php?v=124"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-22J7-69M5-2PQH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:35 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:31
VLAI
Details

SAP CRM, 7.01, 7.02,7.30, 7.31, 7.33, 7.54, allows an attacker to exploit insufficient validation of path information provided by users, thus characters representing "traverse to parent directory" are passed through to the file APIs.

Severity
6.6 (Medium)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-2380"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-03-01T17:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "SAP CRM, 7.01, 7.02,7.30, 7.31, 7.33, 7.54, allows an attacker to exploit insufficient validation of path information provided by users, thus characters representing \"traverse to parent directory\" are passed through to the file APIs.",
  "id": "GHSA-22j7-69m5-2pqh",
  "modified": "2025-10-22T00:31:29Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T03:35:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-2380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blogs.sap.com/2018/02/13/sap-security-patch-day-february-2018"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/erpscanteam/CVE-2018-2380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/2547431"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2018-2380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44292"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/103001"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
  • Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-20.1
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
  • Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
  • realpath() in C
  • getCanonicalPath() in Java
  • GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
  • realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
  • realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].

Mitigation MIT-29
Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

Mitigation MIT-17
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Mitigation MIT-21.1
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

  • When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
  • For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

  • Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
  • OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
  • This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
  • Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

  • Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
  • This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
Implementation
  • Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
  • If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
  • Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
  • In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Operation Implementation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CAPEC-126: Path Traversal

An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.

CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.

CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.

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