CWE-209
AllowedGeneration of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product generates an error message that includes sensitive information about its environment, users, or associated data.
902 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-HJWH-XVFW-QRWJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-19 19:32 – Updated: 2026-08-19 19:32Summary
mcp-searxng version 1.11.0 exposes SearXNG Basic Authentication credentials embedded in the SEARXNG_URL environment variable.
When the server starts in STDIO mode and an MCP client connects, the complete SEARXNG_URL, including its username and password, is sent to the client through an MCP notifications/message logging notification.
Additionally, when URL validation fails, the complete credential-bearing URL is included in the configuration error. This error is logged through MCP and returned to the client as a JSON-RPC error response.
For example, a value such as:
http://username:password@searxng.example.com
is exposed without redaction.
A connected MCP client or anyone with access to captured server logs may recover the SearXNG credentials and use them to access the configured SearXNG instance.
The issue was confirmed in:
mcp-searxng 1.11.0
Suggested severity: Medium
Details
mcp-searxng supports SearXNG Basic Authentication by embedding credentials in the URL userinfo component:
https://username:password@searxng.example.com
The project contains a redaction function named redactSearxngInstanceUrl(), but it is not used in several logging and error-handling paths.
Startup console disclosure
In src/index.ts:373-378, the server retrieves the raw SearXNG URLs and writes them directly to stderr:
const searxngInstances = getSearxngInstances();
if (searxngInstances.length > 0) {
console.error(`🌐 SearXNG URLs: ${searxngInstances.join("; ")}`);
}
getSearxngInstances() returns the unmodified environment-variable values.
Relevant code in src/searxng-instances.ts:25-38:
export function parseSearxngUrls(
raw: string | undefined = process.env.SEARXNG_URL
): string[] {
if (raw === undefined) {
return [];
}
return raw
.split(";")
.map((entry) => entry.trim())
.filter((entry) => entry !== "");
}
export function getSearxngInstances(): string[] {
return parseSearxngUrls();
}
MCP logging notification disclosure
After the MCP client connects, src/index.ts:388-393 sends the complete URL through the MCP logging interface:
const searxngInstances = getSearxngInstances();
logMessage(
mcpServer,
"info",
`SearXNG URLs: ${
searxngInstances.length > 0
? searxngInstances.join("; ")
: "not configured"
}`
);
logMessage() passes this value to sendLoggingMessage() in src/logging.ts:15-25:
mcpServer.sendLoggingMessage({
level,
data: notificationData
});
As a result, the connected MCP client receives a message containing the username and password:
{
"method": "notifications/message",
"params": {
"level": "info",
"data": {
"message": "SearXNG URLs: http://username:password@searxng.example.com"
}
},
"jsonrpc": "2.0"
}
Configuration error disclosure
The URL validation function includes the complete unredacted value in error messages.
Relevant code in src/searxng-instances.ts:44-52:
export function validateSearxngInstanceUrl(
value: string
): string | null {
try {
const url = new URL(value);
if (!["http:", "https:"].includes(url.protocol)) {
return `SEARXNG_URL invalid protocol for "${value}": ${url.protocol}`;
}
} catch {
return `SEARXNG_URL invalid format: ${value}`;
}
return null;
}
The validation error is aggregated by validateEnvironment() in src/error-handler.ts:175-203:
const validationError =
validateSearxngInstanceUrl(searxngUrl);
if (validationError) {
issues.push(validationError);
}
The complete error is then thrown from src/search.ts:689-693:
const validationError = validateEnvironment();
if (validationError) {
logMessage(mcpServer, "error", "Configuration invalid");
throw new MCPSearXNGError(validationError);
}
The tool handler in src/index.ts:254-260 sends the error message and stack trace through MCP logging, then rethrows it:
logMessage(
mcpServer,
"error",
`Tool execution error: ${
error instanceof Error
? error.message
: String(error)
}`,
{
tool: name,
args: args,
error:
error instanceof Error
? error.stack
: String(error)
}
);
throw error;
Rethrowing the error causes the same unredacted credential-bearing URL to be returned in the JSON-RPC error response.
Existing redaction function is not used
The project already contains a suitable redaction function in src/searxng-instances.ts:57-69:
export function redactSearxngInstanceUrl(
raw: string
): string {
try {
const url = new URL(raw);
if (!url.username && !url.password) {
return raw;
}
url.username = "";
url.password = "";
return url.toString();
} catch {
return raw.replace(
/^([a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.-]*:\/\/)[^/]*@/,
"$1"
);
}
}
However, this function is not applied before startup logging, MCP logging, or configuration error construction.
The MCP manifest also marks SEARXNG_URL as non-secret in .mcp/server.json:20-25:
{
"name": "SEARXNG_URL",
"description": "URL of your SearXNG instance",
"isRequired": true,
"isSecret": false,
"format": "string"
}
Because credentials may be embedded in this variable, it should be classified as a secret.
PoC
The following proof of concept uses fake credentials. A real SearXNG server is not required.
Requirements
Node.js 20 or newer
npm
mcp-searxng 1.11.0 source code
Build the application
unzip mcp-searxng-main.zip
cd mcp-searxng-main
npm ci
npm run build
Test 1: Credential disclosure through MCP logging
Create an MCP initialization request:
cat > /tmp/mcp-init.jsonl <<'EOF'
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"credential-leak-poc","version":"1.0.0"}}}
EOF
Start the server with fake credentials embedded in a valid HTTP URL:
SEARXNG_URL='http://MCP_POC_USER_7391:MCP_POC_PASS_7391@127.0.0.1:9' \
timeout 8s node dist/cli.js \
< /tmp/mcp-init.jsonl \
2>&1 | tee credential-log-leak.txt
Search the output for the credentials:
grep -nE \
'MCP_POC_USER_7391|MCP_POC_PASS_7391' \
credential-log-leak.txt
Observed result
The complete credential-bearing URL is exposed:
SearXNG URLs: http://MCP_POC_USER_7391:MCP_POC_PASS_7391@127.0.0.1:9
It is also delivered to the MCP client:
{
"method": "notifications/message",
"params": {
"level": "info",
"data": {
"message": "SearXNG URLs: http://MCP_POC_USER_7391:MCP_POC_PASS_7391@127.0.0.1:9"
}
},
"jsonrpc": "2.0"
}
This confirms that a connected MCP client can recover the configured username and password without accessing the host environment.
Test 2: Credential disclosure through JSON-RPC errors
Create initialization and tool-call requests:
cat > /tmp/mcp-error-poc.jsonl <<'EOF'
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"credential-error-poc","version":"1.0.0"}}}
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"searxng_web_search","arguments":{"query":"credential leak test"}}}
EOF
Start the server with a credential-bearing URL that uses an unsupported protocol:
SEARXNG_URL='ftp://MCP_POC_USER_7391:MCP_POC_PASS_7391@example.invalid' \
timeout 8s node dist/cli.js \
< /tmp/mcp-error-poc.jsonl \
2>&1 | tee credential-error-leak.txt
Search the response:
grep -nE \
'MCP_POC_USER_7391|MCP_POC_PASS_7391' \
credential-error-leak.txt
Observed result
The complete URL is exposed in the MCP logging notification:
Tool execution error: Configuration Issues: SEARXNG_URL invalid protocol for "ftp://MCP_POC_USER_7391:MCP_POC_PASS_7391@example.invalid": ftp:
It is also returned directly in the JSON-RPC error:
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 2,
"error": {
"code": -32603,
"message": "Configuration Issues: SEARXNG_URL invalid protocol for \"ftp://MCP_POC_USER_7391:MCP_POC_PASS_7391@example.invalid\": ftp:"
}
}
The raw username and password are therefore exposed through both logging and protocol responses.
Impact
This is a sensitive credential disclosure vulnerability.
The following parties may obtain the credentials:
- A connected MCP client receiving logging notifications.
- A client capable of invoking a tool and receiving JSON-RPC errors.
- A user or process with access to captured stderr output.
- A centralized logging or monitoring system collecting application logs.
- Other users with access to shared log files or container logs.
The exposed credentials may allow an attacker to authenticate directly to the configured SearXNG instance.
Depending on the SearXNG deployment and the permissions associated with the account, this may allow:
- Unauthorized use of a private SearXNG service.
- Access to functionality restricted through Basic Authentication.
- Consumption of private server resources.
- Exposure of information available only to authenticated users.
- Further account compromise where the credentials have been reused.
The default STDIO transport limits the exposure to the connected parent MCP client and local logging environment. However, MCP clients should not receive upstream service credentials, and the project security documentation explicitly treats credentials embedded in SEARXNG_URL as secrets that must be redacted.
Suggested mitigation
Apply redactSearxngInstanceUrl() before including any SearXNG URL in console or MCP logging:
const redactedInstances = getSearxngInstances()
.map(redactSearxngInstanceUrl);
logMessage(
mcpServer,
"info",
`SearXNG URLs: ${
redactedInstances.length > 0
? redactedInstances.join("; ")
: "not configured"
}`
);
Do not include raw configuration values in validation errors. A generic error can be returned instead:
return `SEARXNG_URL entry has an unsupported protocol: ${url.protocol}`;
For malformed URLs:
return "SEARXNG_URL contains an invalid URL";
The following additional changes are recommended:
- Redact URLs before writing them to stderr.
- Redact secrets before sending MCP logging notifications.
- Avoid including raw environment-variable values in exceptions.
- Avoid returning detailed stack traces containing secrets to MCP clients.
- Mark
SEARXNG_URLas secret in.mcp/server.json:
"isSecret": true
-
Add regression tests that assert usernames and passwords never appear in:
-
stderr output
- MCP logging notifications
- JSON-RPC error responses
- stack traces
- configuration resources
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "mcp-searxng"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.12.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209",
"CWE-532"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-19T19:32:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nmcp-searxng version 1.11.0 exposes SearXNG Basic Authentication credentials embedded in the `SEARXNG_URL` environment variable.\n\nWhen the server starts in STDIO mode and an MCP client connects, the complete `SEARXNG_URL`, including its username and password, is sent to the client through an MCP `notifications/message` logging notification.\n\nAdditionally, when URL validation fails, the complete credential-bearing URL is included in the configuration error. This error is logged through MCP and returned to the client as a JSON-RPC error response.\n\nFor example, a value such as:\n\n```text\nhttp://username:password@searxng.example.com\n```\n\nis exposed without redaction.\n\nA connected MCP client or anyone with access to captured server logs may recover the SearXNG credentials and use them to access the configured SearXNG instance.\n\nThe issue was confirmed in:\n\n```text\nmcp-searxng 1.11.0\n```\n\nSuggested severity: **Medium**\n\n### Details\n\nmcp-searxng supports SearXNG Basic Authentication by embedding credentials in the URL userinfo component:\n\n```text\nhttps://username:password@searxng.example.com\n```\n\nThe project contains a redaction function named `redactSearxngInstanceUrl()`, but it is not used in several logging and error-handling paths.\n\n#### Startup console disclosure\n\nIn `src/index.ts:373-378`, the server retrieves the raw SearXNG URLs and writes them directly to stderr:\n\n```typescript\nconst searxngInstances = getSearxngInstances();\n\nif (searxngInstances.length \u003e 0) {\n console.error(`\ud83c\udf10 SearXNG URLs: ${searxngInstances.join(\"; \")}`);\n}\n```\n\n`getSearxngInstances()` returns the unmodified environment-variable values.\n\nRelevant code in `src/searxng-instances.ts:25-38`:\n\n```typescript\nexport function parseSearxngUrls(\n raw: string | undefined = process.env.SEARXNG_URL\n): string[] {\n if (raw === undefined) {\n return [];\n }\n\n return raw\n .split(\";\")\n .map((entry) =\u003e entry.trim())\n .filter((entry) =\u003e entry !== \"\");\n}\n\nexport function getSearxngInstances(): string[] {\n return parseSearxngUrls();\n}\n```\n\n#### MCP logging notification disclosure\n\nAfter the MCP client connects, `src/index.ts:388-393` sends the complete URL through the MCP logging interface:\n\n```typescript\nconst searxngInstances = getSearxngInstances();\n\nlogMessage(\n mcpServer,\n \"info\",\n `SearXNG URLs: ${\n searxngInstances.length \u003e 0\n ? searxngInstances.join(\"; \")\n : \"not configured\"\n }`\n);\n```\n\n`logMessage()` passes this value to `sendLoggingMessage()` in `src/logging.ts:15-25`:\n\n```typescript\nmcpServer.sendLoggingMessage({\n level,\n data: notificationData\n});\n```\n\nAs a result, the connected MCP client receives a message containing the username and password:\n\n```json\n{\n \"method\": \"notifications/message\",\n \"params\": {\n \"level\": \"info\",\n \"data\": {\n \"message\": \"SearXNG URLs: http://username:password@searxng.example.com\"\n }\n },\n \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\"\n}\n```\n\n#### Configuration error disclosure\n\nThe URL validation function includes the complete unredacted value in error messages.\n\nRelevant code in `src/searxng-instances.ts:44-52`:\n\n```typescript\nexport function validateSearxngInstanceUrl(\n value: string\n): string | null {\n try {\n const url = new URL(value);\n\n if (![\"http:\", \"https:\"].includes(url.protocol)) {\n return `SEARXNG_URL invalid protocol for \"${value}\": ${url.protocol}`;\n }\n } catch {\n return `SEARXNG_URL invalid format: ${value}`;\n }\n\n return null;\n}\n```\n\nThe validation error is aggregated by `validateEnvironment()` in `src/error-handler.ts:175-203`:\n\n```typescript\nconst validationError =\n validateSearxngInstanceUrl(searxngUrl);\n\nif (validationError) {\n issues.push(validationError);\n}\n```\n\nThe complete error is then thrown from `src/search.ts:689-693`:\n\n```typescript\nconst validationError = validateEnvironment();\n\nif (validationError) {\n logMessage(mcpServer, \"error\", \"Configuration invalid\");\n throw new MCPSearXNGError(validationError);\n}\n```\n\nThe tool handler in `src/index.ts:254-260` sends the error message and stack trace through MCP logging, then rethrows it:\n\n```typescript\nlogMessage(\n mcpServer,\n \"error\",\n `Tool execution error: ${\n error instanceof Error\n ? error.message\n : String(error)\n }`,\n {\n tool: name,\n args: args,\n error:\n error instanceof Error\n ? error.stack\n : String(error)\n }\n);\n\nthrow error;\n```\n\nRethrowing the error causes the same unredacted credential-bearing URL to be returned in the JSON-RPC error response.\n\n#### Existing redaction function is not used\n\nThe project already contains a suitable redaction function in `src/searxng-instances.ts:57-69`:\n\n```typescript\nexport function redactSearxngInstanceUrl(\n raw: string\n): string {\n try {\n const url = new URL(raw);\n\n if (!url.username \u0026\u0026 !url.password) {\n return raw;\n }\n\n url.username = \"\";\n url.password = \"\";\n return url.toString();\n } catch {\n return raw.replace(\n /^([a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.-]*:\\/\\/)[^/]*@/,\n \"$1\"\n );\n }\n}\n```\n\nHowever, this function is not applied before startup logging, MCP logging, or configuration error construction.\n\nThe MCP manifest also marks `SEARXNG_URL` as non-secret in `.mcp/server.json:20-25`:\n\n```json\n{\n \"name\": \"SEARXNG_URL\",\n \"description\": \"URL of your SearXNG instance\",\n \"isRequired\": true,\n \"isSecret\": false,\n \"format\": \"string\"\n}\n```\n\nBecause credentials may be embedded in this variable, it should be classified as a secret.\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following proof of concept uses fake credentials. A real SearXNG server is not required.\n\n#### Requirements\n\n```text\nNode.js 20 or newer\nnpm\nmcp-searxng 1.11.0 source code\n```\n\n#### Build the application\n\n```bash\nunzip mcp-searxng-main.zip\ncd mcp-searxng-main\n\nnpm ci\nnpm run build\n```\n\n#### Test 1: Credential disclosure through MCP logging\n\nCreate an MCP initialization request:\n\n```bash\ncat \u003e /tmp/mcp-init.jsonl \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\n{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"initialize\",\"params\":{\"protocolVersion\":\"2024-11-05\",\"capabilities\":{},\"clientInfo\":{\"name\":\"credential-leak-poc\",\"version\":\"1.0.0\"}}}\nEOF\n```\n\nStart the server with fake credentials embedded in a valid HTTP URL:\n\n```bash\nSEARXNG_URL=\u0027http://MCP_POC_USER_7391:MCP_POC_PASS_7391@127.0.0.1:9\u0027 \\\ntimeout 8s node dist/cli.js \\\n\u003c /tmp/mcp-init.jsonl \\\n2\u003e\u00261 | tee credential-log-leak.txt\n```\n\nSearch the output for the credentials:\n\n```bash\ngrep -nE \\\n\u0027MCP_POC_USER_7391|MCP_POC_PASS_7391\u0027 \\\ncredential-log-leak.txt\n```\n\n#### Observed result\n\nThe complete credential-bearing URL is exposed:\n\n```text\nSearXNG URLs: http://MCP_POC_USER_7391:MCP_POC_PASS_7391@127.0.0.1:9\n```\n\nIt is also delivered to the MCP client:\n\n```json\n{\n \"method\": \"notifications/message\",\n \"params\": {\n \"level\": \"info\",\n \"data\": {\n \"message\": \"SearXNG URLs: http://MCP_POC_USER_7391:MCP_POC_PASS_7391@127.0.0.1:9\"\n }\n },\n \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\"\n}\n```\n\nThis confirms that a connected MCP client can recover the configured username and password without accessing the host environment.\n\n#### Test 2: Credential disclosure through JSON-RPC errors\n\nCreate initialization and tool-call requests:\n\n```bash\ncat \u003e /tmp/mcp-error-poc.jsonl \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\n{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"initialize\",\"params\":{\"protocolVersion\":\"2024-11-05\",\"capabilities\":{},\"clientInfo\":{\"name\":\"credential-error-poc\",\"version\":\"1.0.0\"}}}\n{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":2,\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"searxng_web_search\",\"arguments\":{\"query\":\"credential leak test\"}}}\nEOF\n```\n\nStart the server with a credential-bearing URL that uses an unsupported protocol:\n\n```bash\nSEARXNG_URL=\u0027ftp://MCP_POC_USER_7391:MCP_POC_PASS_7391@example.invalid\u0027 \\\ntimeout 8s node dist/cli.js \\\n\u003c /tmp/mcp-error-poc.jsonl \\\n2\u003e\u00261 | tee credential-error-leak.txt\n```\n\nSearch the response:\n\n```bash\ngrep -nE \\\n\u0027MCP_POC_USER_7391|MCP_POC_PASS_7391\u0027 \\\ncredential-error-leak.txt\n```\n\n#### Observed result\n\nThe complete URL is exposed in the MCP logging notification:\n\n```text\nTool execution error: Configuration Issues: SEARXNG_URL invalid protocol for \"ftp://MCP_POC_USER_7391:MCP_POC_PASS_7391@example.invalid\": ftp:\n```\n\nIt is also returned directly in the JSON-RPC error:\n\n```json\n{\n \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n \"id\": 2,\n \"error\": {\n \"code\": -32603,\n \"message\": \"Configuration Issues: SEARXNG_URL invalid protocol for \\\"ftp://MCP_POC_USER_7391:MCP_POC_PASS_7391@example.invalid\\\": ftp:\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe raw username and password are therefore exposed through both logging and protocol responses.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a sensitive credential disclosure vulnerability.\n\nThe following parties may obtain the credentials:\n\n1. A connected MCP client receiving logging notifications.\n2. A client capable of invoking a tool and receiving JSON-RPC errors.\n3. A user or process with access to captured stderr output.\n4. A centralized logging or monitoring system collecting application logs.\n5. Other users with access to shared log files or container logs.\n\nThe exposed credentials may allow an attacker to authenticate directly to the configured SearXNG instance.\n\nDepending on the SearXNG deployment and the permissions associated with the account, this may allow:\n\n1. Unauthorized use of a private SearXNG service.\n2. Access to functionality restricted through Basic Authentication.\n3. Consumption of private server resources.\n4. Exposure of information available only to authenticated users.\n5. Further account compromise where the credentials have been reused.\n\nThe default STDIO transport limits the exposure to the connected parent MCP client and local logging environment. However, MCP clients should not receive upstream service credentials, and the project security documentation explicitly treats credentials embedded in `SEARXNG_URL` as secrets that must be redacted.\n\n### Suggested mitigation\n\nApply `redactSearxngInstanceUrl()` before including any SearXNG URL in console or MCP logging:\n\n```typescript\nconst redactedInstances = getSearxngInstances()\n .map(redactSearxngInstanceUrl);\n\nlogMessage(\n mcpServer,\n \"info\",\n `SearXNG URLs: ${\n redactedInstances.length \u003e 0\n ? redactedInstances.join(\"; \")\n : \"not configured\"\n }`\n);\n```\n\nDo not include raw configuration values in validation errors. A generic error can be returned instead:\n\n```typescript\nreturn `SEARXNG_URL entry has an unsupported protocol: ${url.protocol}`;\n```\n\nFor malformed URLs:\n\n```typescript\nreturn \"SEARXNG_URL contains an invalid URL\";\n```\n\nThe following additional changes are recommended:\n\n1. Redact URLs before writing them to stderr.\n2. Redact secrets before sending MCP logging notifications.\n3. Avoid including raw environment-variable values in exceptions.\n4. Avoid returning detailed stack traces containing secrets to MCP clients.\n5. Mark `SEARXNG_URL` as secret in `.mcp/server.json`:\n\n```json\n\"isSecret\": true\n```\n\n6. Add regression tests that assert usernames and passwords never appear in:\n\n * stderr output\n * MCP logging notifications\n * JSON-RPC error responses\n * stack traces\n * configuration resources",
"id": "GHSA-hjwh-xvfw-qrwj",
"modified": "2026-08-19T19:32:46Z",
"published": "2026-08-19T19:32:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ihor-sokoliuk/mcp-searxng/security/advisories/GHSA-hjwh-xvfw-qrwj"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ihor-sokoliuk/mcp-searxng"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ihor-sokoliuk/mcp-searxng/releases/tag/v1.12.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SearXNG Basic Authentication Credentials Exposed Through MCP Logs and JSON-RPC Error Responses"
}
GHSA-HM37-9XH2-Q499
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-06 19:24 – Updated: 2024-10-07 21:17Impact
If a field of a key is shorter than it is declared to be, the parser raises an error with a message containing the raw field value. An attacker able to modify the declared length of a key's sensitive field can thus expose the raw value of that field.
Patches
Upgrade to version 0.0.6, which no longer includes the raw field value in the error message.
Workarounds
N/A
References
N/A
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in openssh_key_parser
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "openssh-key-parser"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-31124"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-07-06T19:24:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-06T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nIf a field of a key is shorter than it is declared to be, the parser raises an error with a message containing the raw field value. An attacker able to modify the declared length of a key\u0027s sensitive field can thus expose the raw value of that field.\n\n### Patches\nUpgrade to version 0.0.6, which no longer includes the raw field value in the error message.\n\n### Workarounds\nN/A\n\n### References\nN/A\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [openssh_key_parser](https://github.com/scottcwang/openssh_key_parser)\n",
"id": "GHSA-hm37-9xh2-q499",
"modified": "2024-10-07T21:17:17Z",
"published": "2022-07-06T19:24:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/scottcwang/openssh_key_parser/security/advisories/GHSA-hm37-9xh2-q499"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31124"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/scottcwang/openssh_key_parser/pull/5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/scottcwang/openssh_key_parser/commit/26e0a471e9fdb23e635bc3014cf4cbd2323a08d3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/scottcwang/openssh_key_parser/commit/274447f91b4037b7050ae634879b657554523b39"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/scottcwang/openssh_key_parser/commit/d5b53b4b7e76c5b666fc657019dbf864fb04076c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/openssh-key-parser/PYSEC-2022-233.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/scottcwang/openssh_key_parser"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Possible leak of key\u0027s raw field if declared length is incorrect"
}
GHSA-HM6H-8CG9-XCV7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:38 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:38Nextcloud Server before 9.0.52 & ownCloud Server before 9.0.4 are vulnerable to a log pollution vulnerability potentially leading to a local XSS. The download log functionality in the admin screen is delivering the log in JSON format to the end-user. The file was delivered with an attachment disposition forcing the browser to download the document. However, Firefox running on Microsoft Windows would offer the user to open the data in the browser as an HTML document. Thus any injected data in the log would be executed.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-9459"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209",
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-03-28T02:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Nextcloud Server before 9.0.52 \u0026 ownCloud Server before 9.0.4 are vulnerable to a log pollution vulnerability potentially leading to a local XSS. The download log functionality in the admin screen is delivering the log in JSON format to the end-user. The file was delivered with an attachment disposition forcing the browser to download the document. However, Firefox running on Microsoft Windows would offer the user to open the data in the browser as an HTML document. Thus any injected data in the log would be executed.",
"id": "GHSA-hm6h-8cg9-xcv7",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:38:33Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:38:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-9459"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nextcloud/server/commit/94975af6db1551c2d23136c2ea22866a5b416070"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/owncloud/core/commit/044ee072a647636b1a17c89265c7233b35371335"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/owncloud/core/commit/b7fa2c5dc945b40bc6ed0a9a0e47c282ebf043e1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/owncloud/core/commit/efa35d621dc7ff975468e636a5d1c153511296dc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/146278"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nextcloud.com/security/advisory/?id=nc-sa-2016-002"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://owncloud.org/security/advisory?id=oc-sa-2016-012"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/97284"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HPFW-6CC8-9HHJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:35 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:35The aptdaemon DBus interface disclosed file existence disclosure by setting Terminal/DebconfSocket properties, aka GHSL-2020-192 and GHSL-2020-196. This affected versions prior to 1.1.1+bzr982-0ubuntu34.1, 1.1.1+bzr982-0ubuntu32.3, 1.1.1+bzr982-0ubuntu19.5, 1.1.1+bzr982-0ubuntu14.5.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-16128"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-12-09T04:15:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "The aptdaemon DBus interface disclosed file existence disclosure by setting Terminal/DebconfSocket properties, aka GHSL-2020-192 and GHSL-2020-196. This affected versions prior to 1.1.1+bzr982-0ubuntu34.1, 1.1.1+bzr982-0ubuntu32.3, 1.1.1+bzr982-0ubuntu19.5, 1.1.1+bzr982-0ubuntu14.5.",
"id": "GHSA-hpfw-6cc8-9hhj",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:35:29Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:35:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-16128"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/aptdaemon/+bug/1899513"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-4664-1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-HQF8-2R96-C772
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-27 15:31 – Updated: 2025-02-27 15:31IBM EntireX 11.1 could allow a local user to obtain sensitive information when a detailed technical error message is returned. This information could be used in further attacks against the system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-56493"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-27T15:15:39Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "IBM EntireX 11.1 could allow a local user to obtain sensitive information when a detailed technical error message is returned. This information could be used in further attacks against the system.",
"id": "GHSA-hqf8-2r96-c772",
"modified": "2025-02-27T15:31:52Z",
"published": "2025-02-27T15:31:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56493"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7184194"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HR32-MGPM-QF2F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-06-03 23:41 – Updated: 2021-06-03 23:33A flaw was found in RESTEasy client in all versions of RESTEasy up to 4.5.6.Final. It may allow client users to obtain the server's potentially sensitive information when the server got WebApplicationException from the RESTEasy client call. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.5.6.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jboss.resteasy:resteasy-client"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.7.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.5.6.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jboss.resteasy:resteasy-client-microprofile"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.7.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.13.2.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jboss.resteasy:resteasy-client"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.14.0.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.13.2.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jboss.resteasy:resteasy-client-microprofile"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.14.0.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-25633"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-06-03T23:33:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in RESTEasy client in all versions of RESTEasy up to 4.5.6.Final. It may allow client users to obtain the server\u0027s potentially sensitive information when the server got WebApplicationException from the RESTEasy client call. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality.",
"id": "GHSA-hr32-mgpm-qf2f",
"modified": "2021-06-03T23:33:32Z",
"published": "2021-06-03T23:41:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-25633"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/resteasy/Resteasy/pull/2665/commits/13c808b5967242eec1e877edbc0014a84dcd6eb0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2020-25633"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RESTEASY-2820"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Generation of Error Message Containing Sensitive Information in RESTEasy client"
}
GHSA-HRVG-RQ28-FJF5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 21:30 – Updated: 2026-03-25 21:30IBM InfoSphere Information Server 11.7.0.0 through 11.7.1.6 is affected by an information disclosure vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-1262"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T21:16:28Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM InfoSphere Information Server 11.7.0.0 through 11.7.1.6 is affected by an information disclosure vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-hrvg-rq28-fjf5",
"modified": "2026-03-25T21:30:36Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T21:30:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1262"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7266748"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HWGP-86HH-XVG8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-20 00:32 – Updated: 2023-12-20 00:32IBM UrbanCode Deploy (UCD) 7.1 through 7.1.2.14, 7.2 through 7.2.3.7, and 7.3 through 7.3.2.2 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information when a detailed technical error message is returned in the browser. This information could be used in further attacks against the system. IBM X-Force ID: 265510.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-42013"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-20T00:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM UrbanCode Deploy (UCD) 7.1 through 7.1.2.14, 7.2 through 7.2.3.7, and 7.3 through 7.3.2.2 could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information when a detailed technical error message is returned in the browser. This information could be used in further attacks against the system. IBM X-Force ID: 265510.",
"id": "GHSA-hwgp-86hh-xvg8",
"modified": "2023-12-20T00:32:45Z",
"published": "2023-12-20T00:32:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-42013"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/265510"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7096547"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HWRM-C4CX-RF4J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 21:36 – Updated: 2026-09-04 21:36Summary
When the vLLM API receives a malformed request (e.g., invalid JSON or missing required fields), FastAPI raises a Pydantic RequestValidationError. The validation_exception_handler in vllm/entrypoints/openai/server_utils.py converts this exception to a string via str(exc), which includes the internal file path and line number of the handler function. The existing sanitize_message() function in vllm/entrypoints/utils.py strips memory addresses (e.g., 0x7f...) but does not strip File "...", line X patterns. The result is a user-facing HTTP response that leaks internal system information.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can extract the following with a single malformed request:
- OS username running the vLLM process (e.g.,
ubuntu) - Home directory path (e.g.,
/home/ubuntu/) - Virtual environment path (e.g.,
vllm-env/) - Python version (e.g.,
3.12) - Internal package structure and line numbers (e.g.,
vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/api_router.py) - Handler function names per endpoint, enabling precise version fingerprinting
This information aids attackers in constructing targeted exploits: environment paths narrow the attack surface, and handler function names + line numbers enable exact version identification even when the /version endpoint is disabled.
All POST endpoints that accept JSON bodies are affected, including /v1/chat/completions, /v1/completions, /tokenize, and /detokenize.
Workarounds
Deploying vLLM behind a reverse proxy that rewrites error response bodies to strip file paths would mitigate this, though it is fragile.
Remediation Recommendation
Two possible fixes (either suffices):
Option A — Fix validation_exception_handler: Construct the error message from exc.errors() (the structured Pydantic error list) rather than str(exc). This avoids the traceback-style string entirely.
Option B — Fix sanitize_message: Add a regex to strip File "...", line \d+ patterns, similar to how memory addresses are already stripped:
import re
msg = re.sub(r'File ".*?", line \d+, in \w+', '[internal]', msg)
Option A is preferred as it addresses the root cause rather than filtering symptoms.
Environment Tested
- vLLM 0.20.1 (pip install, latest stable as of May 2026)
- Python 3.12
- Ubuntu 22.04
- Model: Qwen/Qwen2-0.5B (text-only; bug is model-independent)
This was fixed here: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/e87521626f
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "vllm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.26.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-73555"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-04T21:36:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-13T15:20:17Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen the vLLM API receives a malformed request (e.g., invalid JSON or missing required fields), FastAPI raises a Pydantic `RequestValidationError`. The `validation_exception_handler` in `vllm/entrypoints/openai/server_utils.py` converts this exception to a string via `str(exc)`, which includes the internal file path and line number of the handler function. The existing `sanitize_message()` function in `vllm/entrypoints/utils.py` strips memory addresses (e.g., `0x7f...`) but does not strip `File \"...\", line X` patterns. The result is a user-facing HTTP response that leaks internal system information.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can extract the following with a single malformed request:\n\n- **OS username** running the vLLM process (e.g., `ubuntu`)\n- **Home directory path** (e.g., `/home/ubuntu/`)\n- **Virtual environment path** (e.g., `vllm-env/`)\n- **Python version** (e.g., `3.12`)\n- **Internal package structure and line numbers** (e.g., `vllm/entrypoints/openai/chat_completion/api_router.py`)\n- **Handler function names per endpoint**, enabling precise version fingerprinting\n\nThis information aids attackers in constructing targeted exploits: environment paths narrow the attack surface, and handler function names + line numbers enable exact version identification even when the `/version` endpoint is disabled.\n\nAll POST endpoints that accept JSON bodies are affected, including `/v1/chat/completions`, `/v1/completions`, `/tokenize`, and `/detokenize`.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nDeploying vLLM behind a reverse proxy that rewrites error response bodies to strip file paths would mitigate this, though it is fragile.\n\n## Remediation Recommendation\n\nTwo possible fixes (either suffices):\n\n**Option A \u2014 Fix `validation_exception_handler`:** Construct the error message from `exc.errors()` (the structured Pydantic error list) rather than `str(exc)`. This avoids the traceback-style string entirely.\n\n**Option B \u2014 Fix `sanitize_message`:** Add a regex to strip `File \"...\", line \\d+` patterns, similar to how memory addresses are already stripped:\n\n```python\nimport re\nmsg = re.sub(r\u0027File \".*?\", line \\d+, in \\w+\u0027, \u0027[internal]\u0027, msg)\n```\n\nOption A is preferred as it addresses the root cause rather than filtering symptoms.\n\n## Environment Tested\n\n- vLLM 0.20.1 (pip install, latest stable as of May 2026)\n- Python 3.12\n- Ubuntu 22.04\n- Model: Qwen/Qwen2-0.5B (text-only; bug is model-independent)\n\nThis was fixed here: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/e87521626f",
"id": "GHSA-hwrm-c4cx-rf4j",
"modified": "2026-09-04T21:36:33Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T21:36:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-hwrm-c4cx-rf4j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73555"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/46415"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/e87521626febe2763f997691d1599de4175f4324"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.26.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "vLLM: Unauthenticated Internal Path and Username Disclosure via Validation Error Messages"
}
GHSA-HWRR-QGGH-2777
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-11 00:30 – Updated: 2024-11-11 00:30The BGP daemon in Extreme Networks ExtremeXOS (aka EXOS) 30.7.1.1 allows an attacker (who is not on a directly connected network) to cause a denial of service (BGP session reset) because of BGP attribute error mishandling (for attribute 21 and 25). NOTE: the vendor disputes this because it is "evaluating support for RFC 7606 as a future feature" and believes that "customers that have chosen to not require or implement RFC 7606 have done so willingly and with knowledge of what is needed to defend against these types of attacks."
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-40457"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-11T00:15:13Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "The BGP daemon in Extreme Networks ExtremeXOS (aka EXOS) 30.7.1.1 allows an attacker (who is not on a directly connected network) to cause a denial of service (BGP session reset) because of BGP attribute error mishandling (for attribute 21 and 25). NOTE: the vendor disputes this because it is \"evaluating support for RFC 7606 as a future feature\" and believes that \"customers that have chosen to not require or implement RFC 7606 have done so willingly and with knowledge of what is needed to defend against these types of attacks.\"",
"id": "GHSA-hwrr-qggh-2777",
"modified": "2024-11-11T00:30:44Z",
"published": "2024-11-11T00:30:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40457"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.benjojo.co.uk/asset/JgH8G5duO1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.benjojo.co.uk/post/bgp-path-attributes-grave-error-handling"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://supportdocs.extremenetworks.com/support/documentation/extremexos-32-5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
Mitigation
Handle exceptions internally and do not display errors containing potentially sensitive information to a user.
Mitigation MIT-33
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
Use naming conventions and strong types to make it easier to spot when sensitive data is being used. When creating structures, objects, or other complex entities, separate the sensitive and non-sensitive data as much as possible.
Mitigation MIT-40
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Debugging information should not make its way into a production release.
Mitigation MIT-40
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Debugging information should not make its way into a production release.
Mitigation
Where available, configure the environment to use less verbose error messages. For example, in PHP, disable the display_errors setting during configuration, or at runtime using the error_reporting() function.
Mitigation
Create default error pages or messages that do not leak any information.
CAPEC-215: Fuzzing for application mapping
An attacker sends random, malformed, or otherwise unexpected messages to a target application and observes the application's log or error messages returned. The attacker does not initially know how a target will respond to individual messages but by attempting a large number of message variants they may find a variant that trigger's desired behavior. In this attack, the purpose of the fuzzing is to observe the application's log and error messages, although fuzzing a target can also sometimes cause the target to enter an unstable state, causing a crash.
CAPEC-463: Padding Oracle Crypto Attack
An adversary is able to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key if a target system leaks data on whether or not a padding error happened while decrypting the ciphertext. A target system that leaks this type of information becomes the padding oracle and an adversary is able to make use of that oracle to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key by issuing on average 128*b calls to the padding oracle (where b is the number of bytes in the ciphertext block). In addition to performing decryption, an adversary is also able to produce valid ciphertexts (i.e., perform encryption) by using the padding oracle, all without knowing the encryption key.
CAPEC-54: Query System for Information
An adversary, aware of an application's location (and possibly authorized to use the application), probes an application's structure and evaluates its robustness by submitting requests and examining responses. Often, this is accomplished by sending variants of expected queries in the hope that these modified queries might return information beyond what the expected set of queries would provide.
CAPEC-7: Blind SQL Injection
Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.