CWE-150
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Escape, Meta, or Control Sequences
Abstraction: Variant · Status: Incomplete
The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could be interpreted as escape, meta, or control character sequences when they are sent to a downstream component.
134 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-WQ4H-7R42-5HRR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-27 16:36 – Updated: 2022-12-07 14:37There is a possible shell escape sequence injection vulnerability in the Lint and CommonLogger components of Rack. This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2022-30123.
Versions Affected: All. Not affected: None Fixed Versions: 2.0.9.1, 2.1.4.1, 2.2.3.1
Impact
Carefully crafted requests can cause shell escape sequences to be written to the terminal via Rack's Lint middleware and CommonLogger middleware. These escape sequences can be leveraged to possibly execute commands in the victim's terminal.
Impacted applications will have either of these middleware installed, and vulnerable apps may have something like this:
use Rack::Lint
Or
use Rack::CommonLogger
All users running an affected release should either upgrade or use one of the workarounds immediately.
Workarounds
Remove these middleware from your application
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.0.9.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "rack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.9.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.1.4.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "rack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.4.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.2.3.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "rack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.2"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-30123"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-150"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-05-27T16:36:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-05T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "There is a possible shell escape sequence injection vulnerability in the Lint\nand CommonLogger components of Rack. This vulnerability has been assigned the\nCVE identifier CVE-2022-30123.\n\nVersions Affected: All.\nNot affected: None\nFixed Versions: 2.0.9.1, 2.1.4.1, 2.2.3.1\n\n## Impact\nCarefully crafted requests can cause shell escape sequences to be written to\nthe terminal via Rack\u0027s Lint middleware and CommonLogger middleware. These\nescape sequences can be leveraged to possibly execute commands in the victim\u0027s\nterminal.\n\nImpacted applications will have either of these middleware installed, and\nvulnerable apps may have something like this:\n\n```\nuse Rack::Lint\n```\n\nOr\n\n```\nuse Rack::CommonLogger\n```\n\nAll users running an affected release should either upgrade or use one of the\nworkarounds immediately.\n\n## Workarounds\nRemove these middleware from your application\n",
"id": "GHSA-wq4h-7r42-5hrr",
"modified": "2022-12-07T14:37:27Z",
"published": "2022-05-27T16:36:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-30123"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/commit/b426cc224908ec6ed6eb8729325392b048215d88"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://discuss.rubyonrails.org/t/cve-2022-30123-possible-shell-escape-sequence-injection-vulnerability-in-rack/80728"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rack/rack"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/rack/CVE-2022-30123.yml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://groups.google.com/g/ruby-security-ann/c/LWB10kWzag8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202310-18"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20231208-0011"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2023/dsa-5530"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Possible shell escape sequence injection vulnerability in Rack"
}
GHSA-X3G7-QRWC-F6C5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-20 18:36 – Updated: 2026-08-20 18:36Summary
Ember's interactive TUI renders fields taken from the monitored Caddy server's access logs — most notably the request URI — straight to the operator's terminal without neutralising terminal escape or control sequences (CWE-150). Those log fields are populated from arbitrary, unauthenticated HTTP requests, so any remote client can embed ANSI/OSC/CSI control bytes that the operator's terminal emulator interprets when the log row is displayed. The bytes survive the whole pipeline: Caddy escapes them into its JSON access log as unicode escapes, ember's ParseLogLine decodes them back to raw 0x1b/0x07 bytes, and the row formatters concatenate them into the bubbletea View() output with no encoding before they reach os.Stdout.
Impact
An unauthenticated, remote attacker who can send HTTP requests to the Caddy server that ember monitors can inject terminal escape sequences into the operator's TUI. The trigger is a single ordinary HTTP request with control bytes in the request target. It requires no authentication; because the payload is reflected through Caddy's normal access log, it works even when ember's log listener is bound only to loopback. When the operator views the Logs tab — ember's default, zero-config mode — the terminal emulator interprets the injected sequences. Broadly-supported, demonstrated impact includes:
- Monitoring-dashboard spoofing — CSI cursor/erase/scroll sequences forge or hide log rows so the operator misjudges the monitored server's state.
- Clipboard hijacking (OSC 52) — attacker-chosen text is written into the operator's system clipboard, staging a payload the operator may later paste into a shell.
- Window-title spoofing (OSC 0/2) — to support social engineering.
The impact ceiling depends on the operator's terminal emulator and usually requires a further operator action (e.g. a paste) to fully escalate; this is not general-case RCE, though specific terminal emulators have historically escalated escape sequences further. The Certificates and Routes tabs share the same unneutralised render path as secondary sinks. The --json/--once and daemon (--expose) modes are not affected, as they do not render to an interactive terminal.
References
- https://github.com/alexandre-daubois/ember/blob/main/internal/ui/logtable.go#L18 — the unneutralised render helper (
fitCellLeft) and row formatters (the sink) - https://github.com/alexandre-daubois/ember/blob/main/internal/fetcher/lognetlistener.go — the unauthenticated TCP access-log listener (input source)
- https://github.com/alexandre-daubois/ember/blob/main/internal/fetcher/logentry.go —
ParseLogLine, where the JSON decode restores raw control bytes - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/150.html — CWE-150: Improper Neutralization of Escape, Meta, or Control Sequences
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/alexandre-daubois/ember"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54162"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-150"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-20T18:36:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nEmber\u0027s interactive TUI renders fields taken from the monitored Caddy server\u0027s access logs \u2014 most notably the request URI \u2014 straight to the operator\u0027s terminal without neutralising terminal escape or control sequences (CWE-150). Those log fields are populated from arbitrary, unauthenticated HTTP requests, so any remote client can embed ANSI/OSC/CSI control bytes that the operator\u0027s terminal emulator interprets when the log row is displayed. The bytes survive the whole pipeline: Caddy escapes them into its JSON access log as unicode escapes, ember\u0027s `ParseLogLine` decodes them back to raw `0x1b`/`0x07` bytes, and the row formatters concatenate them into the bubbletea `View()` output with no encoding before they reach `os.Stdout`.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn **unauthenticated, remote** attacker who can send HTTP requests to the Caddy server that ember monitors can inject terminal escape sequences into the operator\u0027s TUI. The trigger is a single ordinary HTTP request with control bytes in the request target. It requires no authentication; because the payload is reflected through Caddy\u0027s normal access log, it works even when ember\u0027s log listener is bound only to loopback. When the operator views the Logs tab \u2014 ember\u0027s default, zero-config mode \u2014 the terminal emulator interprets the injected sequences. Broadly-supported, demonstrated impact includes:\n\n- **Monitoring-dashboard spoofing** \u2014 CSI cursor/erase/scroll sequences forge or hide log rows so the operator misjudges the monitored server\u0027s state.\n- **Clipboard hijacking (OSC 52)** \u2014 attacker-chosen text is written into the operator\u0027s system clipboard, staging a payload the operator may later paste into a shell.\n- **Window-title spoofing (OSC 0/2)** \u2014 to support social engineering.\n\nThe impact ceiling depends on the operator\u0027s terminal emulator and usually requires a further operator action (e.g. a paste) to fully escalate; this is not general-case RCE, though specific terminal emulators have historically escalated escape sequences further. The Certificates and Routes tabs share the same unneutralised render path as secondary sinks. The `--json`/`--once` and daemon (`--expose`) modes are not affected, as they do not render to an interactive terminal.\n\n## References\n\n- https://github.com/alexandre-daubois/ember/blob/main/internal/ui/logtable.go#L18 \u2014 the unneutralised render helper (`fitCellLeft`) and row formatters (the sink)\n- https://github.com/alexandre-daubois/ember/blob/main/internal/fetcher/lognetlistener.go \u2014 the unauthenticated TCP access-log listener (input source)\n- https://github.com/alexandre-daubois/ember/blob/main/internal/fetcher/logentry.go \u2014 `ParseLogLine`, where the JSON decode restores raw control bytes\n- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/150.html \u2014 CWE-150: Improper Neutralization of Escape, Meta, or Control Sequences",
"id": "GHSA-x3g7-qrwc-f6c5",
"modified": "2026-08-20T18:36:01Z",
"published": "2026-08-20T18:36:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/alexandre-daubois/ember/security/advisories/GHSA-x3g7-qrwc-f6c5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/alexandre-daubois/ember/commit/fcb7160e58dba58d6f9b5033cc312fdedc8c9f6b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/alexandre-daubois/ember"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/alexandre-daubois/ember/releases/tag/v1.4.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Ember has unneutralized terminal escape/control sequences from Caddy logs injected into the operator\u0027s TUI"
}
GHSA-XM8C-HVJF-C5Q9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 21:32 – Updated: 2026-08-10 21:32npm-check-updates through 23.0.2, fixed in commit b554b84, contains a terminal escape sequence injection vulnerability that allows an attacker to embed arbitrary terminal control characters in a dependency's package.json homepage or repository URL fields. When a developer runs ncu with the --format homepage or --format repo option, unfiltered escape sequences are written directly to the terminal, enabling malicious output manipulation or other terminal-dependent effects.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-73035"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-150"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T21:17:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "npm-check-updates through 23.0.2, fixed in commit b554b84, contains a terminal escape sequence injection vulnerability that allows an attacker to embed arbitrary terminal control characters in a dependency\u0027s package.json homepage or repository URL fields. When a developer runs ncu with the --format homepage or --format repo option, unfiltered escape sequences are written directly to the terminal, enabling malicious output manipulation or other terminal-dependent effects.",
"id": "GHSA-xm8c-hvjf-c5q9",
"modified": "2026-08-10T21:32:09Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T21:32:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73035"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/raineorshine/npm-check-updates/issues/1988"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/raineorshine/npm-check-updates/pull/1994"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/raineorshine/npm-check-updates/commit/b554b84848fc0b08a9d2b3d3db15e351387168cf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/npm-check-updates-terminal-injection-via-unsanitized-escape-sequences"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-XWFJ-JGWM-7WP5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-29 20:33 – Updated: 2025-09-02 16:35Impact
Previous versions of tracing-subscriber were vulnerable to ANSI escape sequence injection attacks. Untrusted user input containing ANSI escape sequences could be injected into terminal output when logged, potentially allowing attackers to:
- Manipulate terminal title bars
- Clear screens or modify terminal display
- Potentially mislead users through terminal manipulation
In isolation, impact is minimal, however security issues have been found in terminal emulators that enabled an attacker to use ANSI escape sequences via logs to exploit vulnerabilities in the terminal emulator.
Patches
tracing-subscriber version 0.3.20 fixes this vulnerability by escaping ANSI control characters in when writing events to destinations that may be printed to the terminal.
Workarounds
Avoid printing logs to terminal emulators without escaping ANSI control sequences.
References
https://www.packetlabs.net/posts/weaponizing-ansi-escape-sequences/
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank zefr0x who responsibly reported the issue at security@tokio.rs.
If you believe you have found a security vulnerability in any tokio-rs project, please email us at security@tokio.rs.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "tracing-subscriber"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.20"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-58160"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-150"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-29T20:33:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-29T22:15:32Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nPrevious versions of tracing-subscriber were vulnerable to ANSI escape sequence injection attacks. Untrusted user input containing ANSI escape sequences could be injected into terminal output when logged, potentially allowing attackers to:\n\n- Manipulate terminal title bars\n- Clear screens or modify terminal display\n- Potentially mislead users through terminal manipulation\n\nIn isolation, impact is minimal, however security issues have been found in terminal emulators that enabled an attacker to use ANSI escape sequences via logs to exploit vulnerabilities in the terminal emulator.\n\n### Patches\n\n`tracing-subscriber` version 0.3.20 fixes this vulnerability by escaping ANSI control characters in when writing events to destinations that may be printed to the terminal.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nAvoid printing logs to terminal emulators without escaping ANSI control sequences.\n\n### References\n\nhttps://www.packetlabs.net/posts/weaponizing-ansi-escape-sequences/\n\n\n### Acknowledgments\n\nWe would like to thank [zefr0x](http://github.com/zefr0x) who responsibly reported the issue at `security@tokio.rs`.\n\nIf you believe you have found a security vulnerability in any tokio-rs project, please email us at `security@tokio.rs`.",
"id": "GHSA-xwfj-jgwm-7wp5",
"modified": "2025-09-02T16:35:51Z",
"published": "2025-08-29T20:33:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tokio-rs/tracing/security/advisories/GHSA-xwfj-jgwm-7wp5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58160"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/tokio-rs/tracing"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0055.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": " Tracing logging user input may result in poisoning logs with ANSI escape sequences"
}
Mitigation
Developers should anticipate that escape, meta and control characters/sequences will be injected/removed/manipulated in the input vectors of their product. Use an appropriate combination of denylists and allowlists to ensure only valid, expected and appropriate input is processed by the system.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation MIT-20
Strategy: Input Validation
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
Mitigation
When using output from an LLM, neutralize or strip escape codes before redirecting output to the terminal or other rendering engine that would process the codes. The neutralization could require that the character be printable and/or allowable whitespace, such as a carriage return or newline. Be deliberate about what to allow.
Mitigation
When using an LLM: during tokenizer training, suppress escape codes from the tokenizer's vocabulary. Depending on context, this could be accomplished by removing the codes from input to the tokenizer, or removing the map from the string to its token ID. It is generally unlikely that this removal would adversely affect the quality or correctness of what is generated, e.g. advice requests for terminal settings to change colors.
CAPEC-134: Email Injection
An adversary manipulates the headers and content of an email message by injecting data via the use of delimiter characters native to the protocol.
CAPEC-41: Using Meta-characters in E-mail Headers to Inject Malicious Payloads
This type of attack involves an attacker leveraging meta-characters in email headers to inject improper behavior into email programs. Email software has become increasingly sophisticated and feature-rich. In addition, email applications are ubiquitous and connected directly to the Web making them ideal targets to launch and propagate attacks. As the user demand for new functionality in email applications grows, they become more like browsers with complex rendering and plug in routines. As more email functionality is included and abstracted from the user, this creates opportunities for attackers. Virtually all email applications do not list email header information by default, however the email header contains valuable attacker vectors for the attacker to exploit particularly if the behavior of the email client application is known. Meta-characters are hidden from the user, but can contain scripts, enumerations, probes, and other attacks against the user's system.
CAPEC-81: Web Server Logs Tampering
Web Logs Tampering attacks involve an attacker injecting, deleting or otherwise tampering with the contents of web logs typically for the purposes of masking other malicious behavior. Additionally, writing malicious data to log files may target jobs, filters, reports, and other agents that process the logs in an asynchronous attack pattern. This pattern of attack is similar to "Log Injection-Tampering-Forging" except that in this case, the attack is targeting the logs of the web server and not the application.
CAPEC-93: Log Injection-Tampering-Forging
This attack targets the log files of the target host. The attacker injects, manipulates or forges malicious log entries in the log file, allowing them to mislead a log audit, cover traces of attack, or perform other malicious actions. The target host is not properly controlling log access. As a result tainted data is resulting in the log files leading to a failure in accountability, non-repudiation and incident forensics capability.