| Name |
Application API Navigation Remapping |
|
| Likelyhood of attack |
Typical severity |
| High |
Medium |
|
| Summary |
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud. |
| Prerequisites |
Targeted software is utilizing application framework APIs |
| Solutions | |
| Related Weaknesses |
|
CWE ID
|
Description
|
| CWE-311 |
Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data |
| CWE-345 |
Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity |
| CWE-346 |
Origin Validation Error |
| CWE-471 |
Modification of Assumed-Immutable Data (MAID) |
| CWE-602 |
Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security |
|
| Related CAPECS |
|
CAPEC ID
|
Description
|
| CAPEC-94 |
This type of attack targets the communication between two components (typically client and server). The attacker places themself in the communication channel between the two components. Whenever one component attempts to communicate with the other (data flow, authentication challenges, etc.), the data first goes to the attacker, who has the opportunity to observe or alter it, and it is then passed on to the other component as if it was never observed. This interposition is transparent leaving the two compromised components unaware of the potential corruption or leakage of their communications. The potential for Man-in-the-Middle attacks yields an implicit lack of trust in communication or identify between two components. MITM attacks differ from sniffing attacks since they often modify the communications prior to delivering it to the intended recipient. These attacks also differ from interception attacks since they may forward the sender's original unmodified data, after copying it, instead of keeping it for themselves. |
|