MAL-2026-17464
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (e9db4ea82be2cd2e2d4d7eb40236b22a9ccd0e0414cad836b98ca63468c4071e)
The package presents itself as a text-to-speech inference harness but contains no TTS code. On calling the exported Harness.run, the module chmods +x and spawns a bundled ~8MB native binary at bin/voxcpm-core with a JSON config whose fields match a stratum mining pool (url/user/pass/keepalive/tls under a dict key, cpu.threads, cpu.mem-locked, cache-budget). The miner's pool-list key is assembled by string concatenation ("po"+"ols") rather than written as a literal, an evasion of static scanners that search for the literal key. A ~40MB cloudflared binary is also bundled and invoked as cloudflared access tcp --hostname <edge> --url 127.0.0.1:<port>, so the native core connects to loopback while traffic is tunneled through a Cloudflare-Access-protected hostname chosen by the caller — concealing the mining pool destination from network egress monitoring. The harness emits fabricated step/loss/tok-s progress lines generated from a seeded random.Random to maintain the training cover story. The combined effect is that installers who follow the README donate CPU cycles to the author's mining pool while the destination is obscured behind a tunneling binary.
Source: kam193 (5050cd1cac91a217e828de6f54792051b810c43bf9ee5d53e913479fb059715c)
The package imitates real activity and instead deploys a coin miner.
Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.
Campaign: 2026-10-voxeval
Reasons (based on the campaign):
- cryptominer
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "voxcpmui3/harness.py",
"sha256": "8de5e6a431808b369e2704a04efc5a3ece123b9f26d4081d05ae06680670dbbc",
"tlsh": "5f0264f1d9151e329297ca264a56b983670aac53a74e18747cfcc3182f54774c2f0fea"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "voxcpmui3-0.1.0-py3-none-any.whl",
"hashes": {
"blake2b_256": "99fad1221b7be64f5ee0845d4640bdc5f81120c240ce5eed963ad69944390368",
"md5": "e91c525b51340df3f66191d49f5c63d4",
"sha256": "9aa135579c7ab19d9145fe0798e325142bcf385a774b063f5336dbc0aaaec9ea"
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "voxcpmui3"
},
"versions": [
"0.1.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"inspector-research@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://github.com/kam193",
"https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/"
],
"name": "Kamil Ma\u0144kowski (kam193)",
"type": "REPORTER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "pypi/2026-10-voxeval/voxcpmui3",
"import_time": "2026-10-03T11:41:36.654008232Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-03T10:46:57.146227Z",
"sha256": "5050cd1cac91a217e828de6f54792051b810c43bf9ee5d53e913479fb059715c",
"source": "kam193",
"versions": [
"0.1.0"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-020926",
"import_time": "2026-10-04T23:40:42.690139883Z",
"modified_time": "2026-10-04T23:20:50Z",
"sha256": "e9db4ea82be2cd2e2d4d7eb40236b22a9ccd0e0414cad836b98ca63468c4071e",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.1.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (e9db4ea82be2cd2e2d4d7eb40236b22a9ccd0e0414cad836b98ca63468c4071e)\nThe package presents itself as a text-to-speech inference harness but contains no TTS code. On calling the exported Harness.run, the module chmods +x and spawns a bundled ~8MB native binary at bin/voxcpm-core with a JSON config whose fields match a stratum mining pool (url/user/pass/keepalive/tls under a dict key, cpu.threads, cpu.mem-locked, cache-budget). The miner\u0027s pool-list key is assembled by string concatenation (\"po\"+\"ols\") rather than written as a literal, an evasion of static scanners that search for the literal key. A ~40MB cloudflared binary is also bundled and invoked as `cloudflared access tcp --hostname \u003cedge\u003e --url 127.0.0.1:\u003cport\u003e`, so the native core connects to loopback while traffic is tunneled through a Cloudflare-Access-protected hostname chosen by the caller \u2014 concealing the mining pool destination from network egress monitoring. The harness emits fabricated step/loss/tok-s progress lines generated from a seeded random.Random to maintain the training cover story. The combined effect is that installers who follow the README donate CPU cycles to the author\u0027s mining pool while the destination is obscured behind a tunneling binary.\n\n## Source: kam193 (5050cd1cac91a217e828de6f54792051b810c43bf9ee5d53e913479fb059715c)\nThe package imitates real activity and instead deploys a coin miner.\n\n\n---\n\nCategory: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.\n\n\nCampaign: 2026-10-voxeval\n\n\nReasons (based on the campaign):\n\n\n - cryptominer\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-17464",
"modified": "2026-10-04T23:42:41.653502604Z",
"published": "2026-10-03T10:46:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bad-packages.kam193.eu/pypi/package/voxcpmui3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/voxcpmui3/0.1.0/"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in voxcpmui3 (PyPI)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
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