{"vulnerability": "CVE-2026-44815", "sightings": [{"uuid": "6ceebb48-bee2-4702-b614-cccb1ba35b3b", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2026-44815", "type": "seen", "source": "https://infosec.exchange/users/vuldb/statuses/116721522517457455", "content": "A new vulnerability with increased severity was disclosed for Microsoft Windows (CVE-2026-44815) https://vuldb.com/vuln/369652", "creation_timestamp": "2026-06-09T18:20:20.067280Z"}, {"uuid": "3902614b-f523-43af-996d-b392eb4c0725", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2026-44815", "type": "seen", "source": "https://advisories.ncsc.nl/advisory?id=NCSC-2026-0181", "content": "Microsoft heeft een groot aantal kwetsbaarheden verholpen in Windows. Een kwaadwillende kan de kwetsbaarheden misbruiken om aanvallen uit te voeren die kunnen leiden tot diverse categorie\u00ebn schade, zoals omschreven in onderstaande tabellen.\n\nTussen deze kwetsbaarheden zitten een zestal zeer ernstige, welke door Microsoft zijn ingeschaald met een CVSS score van 9 en hoger.\nDeze kwetsbaarheden bevinden zich in diverse componenten van Windows die bereikbaar en benaderbaar zijn vanaf netwerkverbindingen, zoals http.sys, DHCP, de Kernel en TCP/IP. Door de externe bereikbaarheid en de mogelijkheden tot uitvoer van willekeurige code, is het risico op grootschalig misbruik op korte termijn aanwezig. Op dit moment wordt (nog) geen actief misbruik waargenomen en is (nog) geen publieke Proof-of-Concept (PoC) of exploit bekend, maar het NCSC verwacht deze wel op korte termijn en adviseert daarom deze updates met spoed in te zetten.\n\n```\nWindows TCP/IP: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-42904 | 9.60 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-42915 | 5.70 | Denial-of-Service                   | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows BitLocker: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45655 | 5.30 | Omzeilen van beveiligingsmaatregel  | \n| CVE-2026-45658 | 7.80 | Omzeilen van beveiligingsmaatregel  | \n| CVE-2026-50507 | 6.80 | Omzeilen van beveiligingsmaatregel  | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Mark of the Web (MOTW): \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45595 | 5.40 | Omzeilen van beveiligingsmaatregel  | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Win32K - GRFX: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-44803 | 7.80 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n| CVE-2026-44812 | 7.80 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Push Notifications: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-42969 | 5.50 | Toegang tot gevoelige gegevens      | \n| CVE-2026-42971 | 5.50 | Toegang tot gevoelige gegevens      | \n| CVE-2026-42970 | 5.50 | Toegang tot gevoelige gegevens      | \n| CVE-2026-42973 | 5.50 | Toegang tot gevoelige gegevens      | \n| CVE-2026-42978 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-42977 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-42979 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-42991 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nMicrosoft Windows DNS: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-41108 | 7.00 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Bluetooth Port Driver: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45640 | 7.00 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-34335 | 7.00 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-45601 | 7.00 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-45598 | 7.00 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-45596 | 7.00 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-45638 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-45603 | 7.00 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-42911 | 7.00 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nFunction Discovery Service (fdwsd.dll): \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-42836 | 7.00 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Kernel: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2025-10263 | 9.30 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-45657 | 9.80 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n| CVE-2026-48583 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-45653 | 7.00 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-42984 | 7.00 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Secure Boot: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45588 | 7.90 | Omzeilen van beveiligingsmaatregel  | \n| CVE-2026-48568 | 7.90 | Omzeilen van beveiligingsmaatregel  | \n| CVE-2026-48570 | 7.90 | Omzeilen van beveiligingsmaatregel  | \n| CVE-2026-48573 | 7.90 | Omzeilen van beveiligingsmaatregel  | \n| CVE-2026-48575 | 7.90 | Omzeilen van beveiligingsmaatregel  | \n| CVE-2026-48576 | 7.90 | Omzeilen van beveiligingsmaatregel  | \n| CVE-2026-48578 | 7.90 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-45654 | 7.90 | Omzeilen van beveiligingsmaatregel  | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nRemote Desktop Client: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-47289 | 8.80 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n| CVE-2026-47653 | 8.80 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n| CVE-2026-47654 | 7.50 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n| CVE-2026-48563 | 7.50 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n| CVE-2026-42909 | 7.50 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n| CVE-2026-42913 | 7.50 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n| CVE-2026-42992 | 7.50 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n| CVE-2026-44799 | 7.50 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n| CVE-2026-44801 | 7.50 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n| CVE-2026-42985 | 8.80 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n| CVE-2026-42993 | 7.50 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nMicrosoft UxTheme Library (uxtheme.dll): \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45606 | 5.50 | Denial-of-Service                   | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Kernel-Mode Drivers: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45600 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows DHCP Client: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45608 | 6.80 | Toegang tot gevoelige gegevens      | \n| CVE-2026-44815 | 9.80 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nUniversal Plug and Play (upnp.dll): \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45599 | 8.10 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n| CVE-2026-45635 | 8.10 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Bluetooth Service: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45605 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows UEFI: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45656 | 7.80 | Omzeilen van beveiligingsmaatregel  | \n| CVE-2026-8863  | 7.80 | Omzeilen van beveiligingsmaatregel  | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Hotpatch Monitoring Service: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-42910 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nMicrosoft Azure Attestation service and Device Health Attestation Service: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-33828 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-45642 | 3.90 | Voordoen als andere gebruiker       | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows RDP: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45639 | 7.50 | Toegang tot gevoelige gegevens      | \n| CVE-2026-42908 | 7.50 | Toegang tot gevoelige gegevens      | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWinlogon: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-42989 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Collaborative Translation Framework: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45586 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Kerberos: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-47288 | 7.10 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n| CVE-2026-42903 | 6.50 | Denial-of-Service                   | \n| CVE-2026-42914 | 5.30 | Denial-of-Service                   | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Cryptographic Services: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-44810 | 8.40 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows NTFS: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45636 | 7.80 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Universal Disk Format File System Driver (UDFS): \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-40409 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-40404 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nMicrosoft Graphics Component: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-42986 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Hyper-V: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45607 | 8.40 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n| CVE-2026-47652 | 8.20 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows NT OS Kernel: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-42980 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-42916 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Common Log File System Driver: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-44809 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Projected File System Filter Driver: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-42828 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-42837 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nUI Automation Manager (uiamanager.dll): \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45597 | 7.00 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows HTTP.sys: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-47291 | 9.80 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nMicrosoft Kinect: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-41092 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows SDK: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45593 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Media: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-48574 | 7.80 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Performance Monitor: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-42981 | 8.10 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n| CVE-2026-42974 | 8.10 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Application Identity (AppID) Subsystem: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45594 | 5.50 | Toegang tot gevoelige gegevens      | \n| CVE-2026-45604 | 5.50 | Toegang tot gevoelige gegevens      | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Administrator Protection: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-42829 | 7.80 | Omzeilen van beveiligingsmaatregel  | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nRole: Windows Hyper-V: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45641 | 8.40 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n| CVE-2026-42972 | 5.50 | Toegang tot gevoelige gegevens      | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Narrator Braille: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-48565 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows DHCP Server: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45634 | 5.50 | Toegang tot gevoelige gegevens      | \n| CVE-2026-45602 | 9.10 | Manipulatie van gegevens            | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Internet (wininet.dll): \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45592 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Deployment Services: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-42987 | 8.10 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nHTTP/2: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-49160 | 7.50 | Denial-of-Service                   | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Telephony Service: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-42912 | 7.00 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-42968 | 5.50 | Toegang tot gevoelige gegevens      | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Network Controller (NC) Host Agent: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-44805 | 5.50 | Denial-of-Service                   | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows DWM Core Library: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-48566 | 5.50 | Toegang tot gevoelige gegevens      | \n| CVE-2026-45637 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-42905 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-44811 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-44808 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-44807 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-42983 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-44802 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-44814 | 5.50 | Toegang tot gevoelige gegevens      | \n| CVE-2026-44813 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n| CVE-2026-44804 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Boot Manager: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-47656 | 7.90 | Omzeilen van beveiligingsmaatregel  | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Program Compatibility Assistant Service: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45487 | 7.80 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Storage: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-47648 | 7.00 | Verkrijgen van verhoogde rechten    | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nWindows Shell: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-42906 | 5.50 | Toegang tot gevoelige gegevens      | \n| CVE-2026-42907 | 6.50 | Toegang tot gevoelige gegevens      | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n\nActive Directory Domain Services: \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-ID         | CVSS | Impact                              |\n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n| CVE-2026-45648 | 8.80 | Uitvoeren van willekeurige code     | \n|----------------|------|-------------------------------------|\n```", "creation_timestamp": "2026-06-09T15:44:28.000000Z"}, {"uuid": "474708bd-b247-42ba-9167-e5c363f37bd6", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2026-44815", "type": "seen", "source": "https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2026/6/9/the-june-2026-security-update-review", "content": "I\u2019ve made it through Pwn2Own Berlin, had a little vacation, and now I\u2019m back for Patch Tuesday. Microsoft and Adobe didn\u2019t disappoint. In fact, they have heralded my return with the largest Patch Tuesday release ever. Thanks? Take a break from your regularly scheduled activities and let\u2019s take a look at the latest security patches from Adobe and Microsoft. If you\u2019d rather watch the full video recap covering the entire release, you can check out the Patch Report webcast on our YouTube channel. It should be posted within a couple of hours after the release.\nAdobe Patches for June 2026\nFor May, June released 11 bulletins addressing 123 unique CVEs in Adobe Acrobat Reader, ColdFusion, Experience Manager, Experience Manager Forms, InDesign, InCopy, Substance 3D Sampler, Content Credentials SDK, Dreamweaver, Format Plugins, and Adobe Campaign Classic.\nHere\u2019s this month\u2019s overview table:\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n  \n  \n\n\n\n\n  \n    \n\n\n\n<colgroup>\n  <col />\n  <col />\n  <col />\n  <col />\n  <col />\n  <col />\n  <col />\n</colgroup>\n\n<tfoot>\n  \n</tfoot>\n\n\n  \n    Bulletin ID\n    Product\n    CVE Count\n    Highest Severity\n    Highest CVSS\n    Exploited\n    Deployment Priority\n  \n\n\n  \n    APSB26-66\n    Adobe Campaign Classic\n    2\n    Critical\n    10.0\n    No\n    1\n  \n  \n    APSB26-64\n    Adobe ColdFusion\n    7\n    Critical\n    9.6\n    No\n    1\n  \n  \n    APSB26-63\n    Adobe Acrobat Reader\n    20\n    Critical\n    7.8\n    No\n    2\n  \n  \n    APSB26-57\n    Adobe Experience Manager Forms\n    3\n    Critical\n    9.3\n    No\n    2\n  \n  \n    APSB26-62\n    Adobe Dreamweaver\n    5\n    Critical\n    8.6\n    No\n    3\n  \n  \n    APSB26-65\n    Adobe Format Plugins\n    2\n    Critical\n    7.8\n    No\n    3\n  \n  \n    APSB26-59\n    Adobe InCopy\n    3\n    Critical\n    7.8\n    No\n    3\n  \n  \n    APSB26-58\n    Adobe InDesign\n    12\n    Critical\n    7.8\n    No\n    3\n  \n  \n    APSB26-60\n    Adobe Substance 3D Sampler\n    4\n    Critical\n    7.8\n    No\n    3\n  \n  \n    APSB26-61\n    Content Credentials SDK\n    8\n    Critical\n    7.5\n    No\n    3\n  \n  \n    APSB26-56\n    Adobe Experience Manager\n    57\n    Important\n    5.4\n    No\n    3\n  \n\n    TOTAL\n    11 bulletins\n    123\n    \n    \n    \n    \n  \n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n\n  \nObviously, the update for Campaign Classic should be on the top of your deployment list if you\u2019re a user. A CVSS 10 is rare; two in the same bulletin is pretty much a unicorn. Adobe says there are no active attacks, but I would expect heavy research into creating one. The update for Coldfusion is also a Priority 1, but again, no known attacks is the wild. I suspect the Reader patch will also receive a lot of attention as malicious PDFs are common in ransomware attacks. The update for Experience Manager may be large, but it\u2019s mostly just cross-site scripting (XSS) bugs.\nMicrosoft Patches for June 2026\nThis month, Microsoft released a new record 208 CVEs Windows and Windows components, Office and Office Components, Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based), Azure, .NET and Visual Studio, Github Copilot, Defender, Exchange Server, Hyper-V, Secure Boot, and BitLocker. At least, that\u2019s my count. Microsoft\u2019s tools seem to be having some issues, as they initially included a CVE from 2020 in this release. Regardless, the count is over 200, and I counted several times.\nOne of these bugs came through the ZDI program, but bugs submitted during Pwn2Own Berlin remain unpatched. If you include the Chromium and other third-party bugs, the total CVE count for June comes to a staggering 571 CVEs. 38 of these cases are rated Critical while the rest are rated Important in severity.\nI\u2019ve been counting CVEs on Patch Tuesday since 2017, and this is by far the largest monthly release in that time. The previous record was 177 set last year. It is extraordinary that Microsoft can produce so many patches in a single month, but it does raise concerns. How many of these cases were found using AI tools? How many patches were generated using AI to assist in coding or testing? What quality issues may exist in these patches? And likely most importantly, is this the new normal? The last two months were also large releases. Should sysadmins adjust their processes for prioritization and patch deployment based on this new volume of updates? Unfortunately, Microsoft is not providing those answers right now. Hopefully that changes in the future. BTW \u2013 just a note \u2013 the current number of CVEs shipped by Microsoft this year exceeds the total number of CVEs shipped in all of 2018.\nOne of the bugs patched by Microsoft this month is listed as under active exploitation and three others are listed as publicly known at the time of release. Let\u2019s take a closer look at some of the more interesting updates for this month, starting with the bug being exploited in the wild.\n-   CVE-2026-41091 - Microsoft Defender Elevation of Privilege VulnerabilitySince Microsoft doesn\u2019t provide info on how widespread exploitation is, we must read some tea leaves. For this patch, several different people were acknowledged, which indicates multiple parties say this is in the wild, meaning exploitation is likely significant. The good news is that most people won\u2019t need to take action as Defender updates itself. However, if you don\u2019t have this configured or are in an isolated environment, you\u2019ll need to update to the latest version.\n-    CVE-2026-45657 - Windows Kernel Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityThis CVSS 9.8 bug allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to execute code at SYSTEM level without user interaction. Yup \u2013 this is wormable. The problem lies in the way the kernel handles TCP/IP. This was listed as \u201cExploitation Less Likely\u201d by Microsoft, but rest assured that every researcher and bug shop on the planet is reversing this patch right now trying to create an exploit. Test and deploy this patch quickly.\n-    CVE-2026-47291 - HTTP.sys Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityOur second CVSS 9.8 bug of the month, this also allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to execute code on affected systems without user interaction. However, there is a caveat. Systems using the default MaxRequestBytes registry value used by the Windows HTTP stack are not affected by this bug. You can edit your registry settings if you need protection while you test and deploy the patch. The bulletin includes instructions and even a PowerShell script for doing this action. Microsoft lists this as \u201cExploitation more likely\u201d, so I would definitely check your registry settings.\n-    CVE-2026-44815 - DHCP Client Service Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityHere\u2019s another CVSS 9.8 that has an odd incongruity. Although the CVSS says no permissions are required for exploitation, the write-up states it must be an \u201cauthenticated\u201d user. I would err on the side of caution here and believe the CVSS. If that\u2019s correct, then we have another bug where a remote, unauthenticated attacker could execute code on affected systems without user interaction. And since the DHCP client is on every OS, it\u2019s a juicy target. This is another one to test and deploy with haste.\n-    CVE-2026-45585/CVE-2026-50507 - Windows BitLocker Security Feature Bypass VulnerabilityIf you\u2019ve followed the ongoing saga of Nightmare Eclipse vs. MSRC, the bugs should look familiar. One is definitely a fix for \u201cYellowKey\u201d, while the other appears to be a fix for \u201cGreenPlasma\u201d. The researcher has promised a \u201cbone shattering\u201d drop on June 14, so let\u2019s hope Microsoft is able to reach some understanding with the researcher before more 0-days are released. Also, there is a script provided by Microsoft as a mitigation, but the better strategy is to test and deploy the updates.\n Here\u2019s the full list of CVEs released by Microsoft for June 2026:\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n  \n  \n\n\n\n\n  \n    \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n <col width=\"144\" />\n <col width=\"256\" />\n <col span=\"6\" width=\"104\" />\n \n\n  CVE\n  Title\n  Severity\n  CVSS\n  Public\n  Exploited\n  XI\n  Type\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-41091</span>\n  Microsoft Defender\n  Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  Yes\n  Yes\n  0\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-49160</span>\n  HTTP.sys Denial of\n  Service Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.5\n  Yes\n  No\n  1\n  DoS\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-50507</span>\n  Windows BitLocker\n  Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  6.8\n  Yes\n  No\n  1\n  SFB\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45586</span>\n  Windows Collaborative\n  Translation Framework (CTFMON) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  Yes\n  No\n  1\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2025-10263 *</span>\n  ARM: CVE-2025-10263\n  Completion of affected memory accesses might not be guaranteed by completion\n  of a TLBI [kernel]\n  Critical\n  9.3\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-48567</span>\n  Azure HorizonDB<span>  </span>Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  10\n  No\n  No\n  N/A\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-32193</span>\n  Azure Kubernetes\n  Service (AKS) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  8.8\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47644</span>\n  Copilot Chat\n  (Microsoft Edge) Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  6.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44815</span>\n  DHCP Client Service\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  9.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47291</span>\n  HTTP.sys Remote Code\n  Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  9.8\n  No\n  No\n  1\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42824</span>\n  M365 Copilot\n  Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  6.5\n  No\n  No\n  N/A\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45476</span>\n  Microsoft Azure\n  Network Adapter Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  8.2\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44810</span>\n  Microsoft\n  Cryptographic Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  8.4\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-48579</span>\n  Microsoft Exchange\n  Online Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  9.1\n  No\n  No\n  N/A\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47655</span>\n  Microsoft Graph\n  Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  6.5\n  No\n  No\n  N/A\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45497</span>\n  Microsoft M365 Copilot\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  7.7\n  No\n  No\n  N/A\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45460</span>\n  Microsoft Office\n  Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  4.7\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45472</span>\n  Microsoft Office\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  8.4\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45474</span>\n  Microsoft Office\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  8.4\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45461</span>\n  Microsoft Office\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  8.4\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45463</span>\n  Microsoft Office\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  8.4\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45456</span>\n  Microsoft Outlook and\n  Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  8.4\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45458</span>\n  Microsoft Outlook and\n  Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  8.4\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47635</span>\n  Microsoft Outlook and\n  Word Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  8.4\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-26142</span>\n  Nuance PowerScribe\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  9.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47289</span>\n  Remote Desktop Client\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  8.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47654</span>\n  Remote Desktop Client\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  7.5\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-48563</span>\n  Remote Desktop Client\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  7.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42992</span>\n  Remote Desktop Client\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  7.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44799</span>\n  Remote Desktop Client\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  7.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44801</span>\n  Remote Desktop Client\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  7.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42985</span>\n  Remote Desktop Client\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  8.8\n  No\n  No\n  1\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45648</span>\n  Windows Active\n  Directory Domain Services Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  8.8\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42987</span>\n  Windows Deployment\n  Services (WDS) Remote Code Execution\n  Critical\n  8.1\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-33828</span>\n  Windows Device Health\n  Attestation (DHA) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44803</span>\n  Windows Graphics\n  Component Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  1\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44812</span>\n  Windows Graphics\n  Component Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  1\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45607</span>\n  Windows Hyper-V Remote\n  Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  8.4\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45641</span>\n  Windows Hyper-V Remote\n  Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  8.4\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47652</span>\n  Windows Hyper-V Remote\n  Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  8.2\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47288</span>\n  Windows Kerberos Key\n  Distribution Center (KDC) Remote Code Execution\n  Critical\n  7.1\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45657</span>\n  Windows Kernel Remote\n  Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  9.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-48574</span>\n  Windows Media Remote\n  Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Critical\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45490</span>\n  .NET SDK Elevation of\n  Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45491</span>\n  .NET Tampering\n  Vulnerability\n  Important\n  6.2\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  Tampering\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45591</span>\n  ASP.NET Core Denial of\n  Service Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  DoS\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47643</span>\n  Azure Stack Edge\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  9.8\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-41098</span>\n  Azure Stack Edge\n  Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  8.4\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45642</span>\n  Microsoft Azure\n  Attestation service and Device Health Attestation Service Spoofing\n  Vulnerability\n  Important\n  3.9\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45650</span>\n  Microsoft Bing Search\n  Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  4.3\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45637</span>\n  Microsoft DWM Core\n  Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45647</span>\n  Microsoft Defender for\n  Endpoint for Mac Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-40371</span>\n  Microsoft Dynamics 365\n  (on-premises) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  8.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44822</span>\n  Microsoft Excel\n  Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  8.2\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45455</span>\n  Microsoft Excel\n  Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  3.3\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45469</span>\n  Microsoft Excel Remote\n  Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44817</span>\n  Microsoft Excel Remote\n  Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44818</span>\n  Microsoft Excel Remote\n  Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44820</span>\n  Microsoft Excel Remote\n  Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44823</span>\n  Microsoft Excel Remote\n  Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45459</span>\n  Microsoft Excel\n  Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  3.3\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  SFB\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45504</span>\n  Microsoft Exchange\n  Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  8.8\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45502</span>\n  Microsoft Exchange\n  Server Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45503</span>\n  Microsoft Exchange\n  Server Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  8.1\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45583</span>\n  Microsoft Exchange\n  Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45500</span>\n  Microsoft Exchange\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  6.1\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45501</span>\n  Microsoft Exchange\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  6.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47631</span>\n  Microsoft Exchange\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  8.1\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42986</span>\n  Microsoft Graphics\n  Component Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  1\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-41092</span>\n  Microsoft Kinect\n  Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45644</span>\n  Microsoft Live Share\n  Canvas SDK Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47293</span>\n  Microsoft Office\n  Click-To-Run Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45485</span>\n  Microsoft Office\n  Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  3.3\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44821</span>\n  Microsoft Office\n  Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45483</span>\n  Microsoft Office\n  Project Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  4.6\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45475</span>\n  Microsoft Office\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44819</span>\n  Microsoft Office\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44824</span>\n  Microsoft Office\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45645</span>\n  Microsoft Office\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-49161</span>\n  Microsoft PC Manager\n  Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  SFB\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42902</span>\n  Microsoft PowerToys\n  Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45484</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  8.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45454</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  6.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47298</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45467</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  4.6\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45468</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  4.6\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45479</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  4.6\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45453</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.4\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47636</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.4\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47637</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  4.6\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47638</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  4.6\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47639</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.4\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47641</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  4.6\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-33113</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.4\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45462</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  4.6\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45464</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.4\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45465</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.4\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47634</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.3\n  No\n  No\n  1\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47640</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  4.6\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45481</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.3\n  No\n  No\n  1\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-48560</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.4\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-48562</span>\n  Microsoft SharePoint\n  Server Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  4.6\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42835</span>\n  Microsoft Teams for\n  Android Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  8.1\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45606</span>\n  Microsoft UxTheme\n  Library (uxtheme.dll) Denial of Service Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  DoS\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45482</span>\n  Microsoft Visual\n  Studio Code CoPilot Chat Extension Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  8.4\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  SFB\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45466</span>\n  Microsoft Word\n  Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  3.3\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45471</span>\n  Microsoft Word Remote\n  Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45486</span>\n  Microsoft Word Remote\n  Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45643</span>\n  Microsoft Word Remote\n  Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45457</span>\n  Microsoft Word Remote\n  Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42980</span>\n  NT OS Kernel Elevation\n  of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  1\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42916</span>\n  NT OS Kernel Elevation\n  of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45649</span>\n  Office for Android\n  Spoofing Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.1\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47653</span>\n  Remote Desktop Client\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  8.8\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42909</span>\n  Remote Desktop Client\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.5\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42913</span>\n  Remote Desktop Client\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.5\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42993</span>\n  Remote Desktop Client\n  Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45588</span>\n  Secure Boot Security\n  Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.9\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  SFB\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-48568</span>\n  Secure Boot Security\n  Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.9\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  SFB\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-48570</span>\n  Secure Boot Security\n  Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.9\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  SFB\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-48573</span>\n  Secure Boot Security\n  Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.9\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  SFB\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-48575</span>\n  Secure Boot Security\n  Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.9\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  SFB\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-48576</span>\n  Secure Boot Security\n  Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.9\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  SFB\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-48578</span>\n  Secure Boot Security\n  Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.9\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  SFB\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45654</span>\n  Secure Boot Security\n  Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.9\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  SFB\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45656</span>\n  UEFI Secure Boot\n  Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  SFB\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-8863</span>\n  UEFI Secure Boot\n  Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  SFB\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-40376</span>\n  Visual Studio Code\n  Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47281</span>\n  Visual Studio Code\n  Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  9.6\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47284</span>\n  Visual Studio Code\n  Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  6.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47292</span>\n  Visual Studio Code\n  MSSQL Extension Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-48569</span>\n  Visual Studio Code\n  Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.1\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  SFB\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47287</span>\n  Visual Studio Code\n  Tampering Vulnerability\n  Important\n  6.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Tampering\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42829</span>\n  Windows Administrator\n  Protection Secure Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  \n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-34335</span>\n  Windows Ancillary\n  Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45601</span>\n  Windows Ancillary\n  Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45598</span>\n  Windows Ancillary\n  Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45596</span>\n  Windows Ancillary\n  Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45638</span>\n  Windows Ancillary\n  Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45603</span>\n  Windows Ancillary\n  Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42911</span>\n  Windows Ancillary\n  Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45594</span>\n  Windows Application\n  Identity (AppID) Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45655</span>\n  Windows BitLocker\n  Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.3\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  SFB\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45658</span>\n  Windows BitLocker\n  Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  1\n  SFB\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45640</span>\n  Windows Bluetooth Port\n  Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45605</span>\n  Windows Bluetooth\n  Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47656</span>\n  Windows Boot Manager\n  Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.9\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  SFB\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44809</span>\n  Windows Common Log\n  File System Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45634</span>\n  Windows DHCP Client\n  Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.5\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45608</span>\n  Windows DHCP Client\n  Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  6.8\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-41108</span>\n  Windows DNS Client\n  Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42905</span>\n  Windows DWM Core\n  Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  1\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44811</span>\n  Windows DWM Core\n  Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44808</span>\n  Windows DWM Core\n  Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44807</span>\n  Windows DWM Core\n  Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42983</span>\n  Windows DWM Core\n  Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44802</span>\n  Windows DWM Core\n  Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44813</span>\n  Windows DWM Core\n  Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44804</span>\n  Windows DWM Core\n  Library Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-48566</span>\n  Windows DWM Core\n  Library Information Disclosure<span> \n  </span>Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44814</span>\n  Windows DWM Core\n  Library Information Disclosure<span> \n  </span>Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45602</span>\n  Windows Dynamic Host\n  Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Tampering Vulnerability\n  Important\n  9.1\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Tampering\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42836</span>\n  Windows Function\n  Discovery Service (fdwsd.dll) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42910</span>\n  Windows Hotpatch\n  Monitoring Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42972</span>\n  Windows Hyper-V\n  Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45592</span>\n  Windows Internet\n  (wininet.dll) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42903</span>\n  Windows Kerberos\n  Denial of Service Vulnerability\n  Important\n  6.5\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  DoS\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42914</span>\n  Windows Kerberos\n  Denial of Service Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.3\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  DoS\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-48583</span>\n  Windows Kernel\n  Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45653</span>\n  Windows Kernel\n  Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42984</span>\n  Windows Kernel\n  Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45600</span>\n  Windows Kernel-Mode\n  Driver Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45604</span>\n  Windows Managed\n  Installer Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45595</span>\n  Windows Mark of the\n  Web Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.4\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  SFB\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45636</span>\n  Windows NTFS Remote\n  Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-50508</span>\n  Windows NTLM Spoofing\n  Vulnerability\n  Important\n  6.5\n  No\n  No\n  1\n  Spoofing\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-48565</span>\n  Windows Narrator\n  Braille Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-44805</span>\n  Windows Network\n  Controller (NC) Host Agent Denial of Service Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.5\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  DoS\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42981</span>\n  Windows Performance\n  Monitor Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  8.1\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42974</span>\n  Windows Performance\n  Monitor Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  8.1\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45487</span>\n  Windows Program\n  Compatibility Assistant Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42828</span>\n  Windows Projected File\n  System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42837</span>\n  Windows Projected File\n  System Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42969</span>\n  Windows Push\n  Notification Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.5\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42971</span>\n  Windows Push\n  Notification Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42970</span>\n  Windows Push\n  Notification Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42973</span>\n  Windows Push\n  Notification Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42978</span>\n  Windows Push\n  Notifications Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42977</span>\n  Windows Push\n  Notifications Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42979</span>\n  Windows Push\n  Notifications Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42991</span>\n  Windows Push\n  Notifications Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45639</span>\n  Windows Remote Desktop\n  Protocol (RDP) Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42908</span>\n  Windows Remote Desktop\n  Protocol (RDP) Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45593</span>\n  Windows SDK Elevation\n  of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42906</span>\n  Windows Shell\n  Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42907</span>\n  Windows Shell\n  Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  6.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-47648</span>\n  Windows Storage\n  Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42915</span>\n  Windows TCP/IP Denial\n  of Service Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.7\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  DoS\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42904</span>\n  Windows TCP/IP\n  Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  9.6\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42968</span>\n  Windows Telephony\n  Server Information Disclosure Vulnerability\n  Important\n  5.5\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  Info\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42912</span>\n  Windows Telephony\n  Service Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45597</span>\n  Windows UI Automation\n  Manager (uiamanager.dll) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7\n  No\n  No\n  3\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45599</span>\n  Windows UPnP Device\n  Host Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  8.1\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-45635</span>\n  Windows UPnP Device\n  Host Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n  Important\n  8.1\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  RCE\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-40409</span>\n  Windows Universal Disk\n  Format File System Driver (UDFS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-40404</span>\n  Windows Universal Disk\n  Format File System Driver (UDFS) Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  2\n  EoP\n \n \n  <span>CVE-2026-42989</span>\n  Winlogon\n  Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability\n  Important\n  7.8\n  No\n  No\n  1\n  EoP\n \n \n \n  \n  \n  \n  \n  \n  \n  \n  \n \n \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n  \n\n\n\n\n  \n* Indicates this CVE had been released by a third party and is now being included in Microsoft releases.\n\u2020 Indicates further administrative actions are required to fully address the vulnerability.\n \nLooking at the other Critical-rated bugs in this release, the scariest-looking one is actually nothing to concern yourself with at all. The CVSS 10 bug in Azure HorizonDB has already been addressed by Microsoft and is just being documented now. That\u2019s also the case for five others. Of course, there wouldn\u2019t be a release without Office bugs that have the Preview Pane as an attack vector. There are multiple in June. There\u2019s a handful of bugs in the Remote Desktop Client, but these rely on connecting to a malicious RDP server. There are three patches for Hyper-V that allow for guest-to-host code execution. The bug in Active Directory requires authentication, but any authenticated user can hit it. For the Windows Directory Service vulnerability, it needs to be listening for TFTP. You have blocked that everywhere, right? The bug in Azure Network Adapter is somewhat unique as you need to update your Linux kernel to be protected. The bug in Azure Kubernetes allows an attacker to break out of a container and gain control of the AKS worker node. Finally, the bug in the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) seems unlikely, but if exploited, it could allow authenticated attackers to get code execution on affected systems.\nMoving on to the other code execution bugs, there are the ubiquitous open-an-own bugs in Office components like Excel and Word. The code injection bug in Exchange Server looks troubling, but it requires a machine-in-the-middle (MiTM), so exploitation is unlikely. The bugs in SharePoint require authentication, but you should note that the patch applies to both SharePoint Server 2016 and SharePoint Enterprise Server 2016. The two bugs in UPnP are interesting. Both can lead to code execution by causing an error during the handling of specially crafted data, which could lead to a Use After Free (UAF) bug. The bugs in RDP Client all require connecting to a malicious RDP server, but it\u2019s not clear why some are rated Critical and some are rated Important. The NTFS vulnerability requires a user to mount a virtual hard drive on an affected system. The last RCE bug this month is in Azure Stack Edge and requires the attacker to send a specially crafted file upload request that includes a manipulated file name or path, leading to code execution.\nThere are more than 60 Elevation of Privilege (EoP) bugs in this month\u2019s release, and as usual, most simply lead to local attackers executing their code at SYSTEM-level privileges or administrative privileges, so there\u2019s not much to add without further technical details about the bugs themselves. A notable exception is in Exchange Server, where a user on Outlook Web Access (OWA) could gain access to other mailboxes. The bug in Visual Studio Code could allow attackers to gain permissions associated with the MCP Server\u2019s managed identity. The bugs in Windows SDK and Windows UI Automation Manager could let attacker go from low integrity up to medium integrity code execution. The bug in Bluetooth just allows \u201celevated\u201d privileges without really describing what elevated might be. \nMoving on to the more than 20 security feature bypass (SFB) bugs in the June release, there are a total of 10 that impact Secure Boot. All carry scope change (S:C) in the CVSS, meaning successful exploitation affects security boundaries beyond the vulnerable component itself \u2014 specifically the ability to load untrusted code at boot, bypass Virtual Secure Mode, and undermine boot integrity guarantees. CVE-2026-45654 explicitly calls out VSM exposure. The bulk of these are credited to Alon Leviev (STORM), which is notable given his prior BootKitty/BlackLotus-adjacent research. The bugs in the Windows Boot Manager have a similar impact as the Secure Boot bugs. The UEFI Secure Boot vulnerabilities go a layer deeper. They require either local admin or physical access but could allow for the running of untrusted code even before the OS loads. Rootkits anyone? The four bugs in BitLocker all require physical access but could yield encrypted data if exploited. The bug in Windows Administration Protection allows attackers to bypass the feature that prevents standard-user apps from performing admin-level actions. The bug in Visual Studio Copilot Chat could be the most interesting non-boot bug here as it allows authentication impersonation. Mark of the Web (MotW) and Excel vulns could bypass user warnings. Lastly, the bug in PC Manager bypasses expected user controls. \nTurning our attention to the mass of spoofing bugs in the release, we instantly see 18 impacting SharePoint Server. Fortunately, these are simply cross-site scripting (XSS) bugs. It\u2019s the Exchange bugs we should really watch for. One is an XSS that an attacker can exploit by convincing an Exchange administrator to open a malicious link or message, which then runs code in the admin's web session. That's a meaningful privilege escalation path. Another is listed as an SSRF-based attack, but no other details are available. The last is a lower-impact XSS with limited confidentiality/integrity loss. The bug in Bing Search (remember Bing?) is a classic search result spoofing. The bug in Azure Stack Edge is interesting as it could allow access to resources outside the vulnerable component's security boundary. The bug in Office for Android requires user interaction. The Office Project Server bug is an authenticated XSS with low impact. The final spoofing bug is in Azure Attestation but has already been addressed. You should still verify you are protected by following the instructions in the write-up from Microsoft.\nThere are 30 different information disclosure bugs in this release, and fortunately, the vast majority of these simply result in info leaks consisting of unspecified memory contents or memory addresses. The two bugs in Visual Studio require user interaction and could \u201cdisclose information over a network.\u201d How obtuse. The bug in GitHub Copilot and Visual Studio Code could disclose discloses a sign-in access token for a user's work account. That's a meaningful credential exposure, not just random memory. That leaves the two bugs in Exchange Server. One could allow an authenticated user to gain information about which network services that the Exchange server can reach. The other sounds much like the spoofing bug in OWA as it allows attackers to see information in mailboxes they should not have access to.\nI\u2019ve never been a fan of the \u201ctampering\u201d category, as it could mean so many different things. For example, the bug in .NET simply says it could allow an unauthorized attacker to perform tampering locally. Similarly, the bug in Visual Studio says the same, expect here the tampering occurs over a network. Microsoft doesn\u2019t even bother with a CWE for the tampering bug in the DHCP Server, so your guess is as good as mine.\nThere are seven DoS bugs in the June release, and as usual, Microsoft provides little to no actionable information about the vulnerabilities. The most interesting is the bug in HTTP.sys, which is listed as publicly known. This is an uncontrolled resource consumption, rated \"Exploitation More Likely,\" and publicly disclosed. Since, HTTP.sys sits at the core of IIS and Windows web services, a network-accessible DoS here can take down any Windows server running HTTP-based services. Based on the Acknowledgement, it looks like this bug may have been found using AI. There are no real details for the other bugs, but based simply on the impact, I would focus on the Kerberos and TCP/IP bugs if you had to prioritize.\nNo new advisories are being released this month.\nLooking Ahead\nThe next Patch Tuesday will be on July 14 and will be the last one before Black Hat/DEFCON. It\u2019s usually a big release, so strap in and hang on. I\u2019ll be back then to give you my full thoughts. Until then, stay safe, happy patching, and may all your reboots be smooth and clean!\n ", "creation_timestamp": "2026-06-09T16:12:18.000000Z"}, {"uuid": "839a22d5-a95c-474e-86de-89f01c089ef4", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "86ecb4e1-bb32-44d5-9f39-8a4673af8385", "vulnerability": "CVE-2026-44815", "type": "seen", "source": "https://www.ncsc.nl/alerts/microsoft-verhelpt-6-ernstige-kwetsbaarheden-in-windows", "content": "", "creation_timestamp": "2026-06-10T00:41:53.000000Z"}, {"uuid": "329fb110-f60c-43b8-a582-59000a0d42f3", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "86ecb4e1-bb32-44d5-9f39-8a4673af8385", "vulnerability": "CVE-2026-44815", "type": "seen", "source": "https://www.cert.se/2026/06/patchtisdag-juni-2026-samlad-information-om-manadens-sakerhetsuppdateringar.html", "content": "", "creation_timestamp": "2026-06-10T05:00:00.000000Z"}, {"uuid": "50341ad8-5ba1-4b66-ab2b-09f768156fb9", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2026-44815", "type": "seen", "source": "https://infosec.exchange/users/vuldb/statuses/116730656627785692", "content": "It is possible to see elevated activities targeting Microsoft Windows (CVE-2026-44815) https://vuldb.com/vuln/369652/cti", "creation_timestamp": "2026-06-11T09:01:07.075471Z"}, {"uuid": "c75d0f95-a89c-491d-bdd6-1a96df94da09", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2026-44815", "type": "seen", "source": "https://bsky.app/profile/cyberhub.blog/post/3mnzwcjlnm22i", "content": "\ud83d\udccc CVE-2026-44815 - Stack-based buffer overflow in Windows DHCP Client allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. https://www.cyberhub.blog/cves/CVE-2026-44815", "creation_timestamp": "2026-06-11T19:07:10.704409Z"}, {"uuid": "0a72e116-7874-47ee-ad25-b4cfb0ce5641", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2026-44815", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/kasperskyb2b/2210", "content": "\ud83d\udc40 \u0420\u0435\u043a\u043e\u0440\u0434\u043d\u044b\u0439 Patch Tuesday, 3 \u0437\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0435\u044f, \u0434\u043e\u043b\u0433\u043e\u0436\u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0444\u0438\u043a\u0441\u044b\n\nMicrosoft \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0438\u043b\u0441\u044f \u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435\u043c, \u0437\u0430\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0432\u0430\u044e\u0449\u0438\u043c 200 (!) \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0439 \u0432 \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0443\u043a\u0442\u0430\u0445. \u042d\u0442\u043e \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0442\u0435\u0445, \u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043d\u0435 \u0445\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0438\u043b\u043e \u0432 \u043d\u0430\u0447\u0430\u043b\u0435 \u0438\u044e\u043d\u044f 360 (!!) \u0437\u0430\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u044b\u0440 \u0432 Edge/Chromium. \u0412\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441, \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0439 \u043d\u0430\u0441 \u043e\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u2014 \u044d\u0442\u043e \u0442\u0435\u043f\u0435\u0440\u044c \u0442\u0430\u043a \u0431\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0442 \u043a\u0430\u0436\u0434\u044b\u0439 \u043c\u0435\u0441\u044f\u0446, \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0433\u043e\u0440\u0448\u043e\u0447\u0435\u043a \u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438 Mythos/MDASH/XBOW \u0432\u0441\u0451 \u0436\u0435 \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0435\u0442 \u0432\u0430\u0440\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0441 \u0442\u0430\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u043a\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c\u044e?\n\n\u0412\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0447\u0435\u043c, \u0418\u0422-\u0430\u0434\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0430\u043c \u043d\u0435 \u0434\u043e \u0444\u0438\u043b\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0444\u0438\u0438. \u041d\u0443\u0436\u043d\u043e \u0441\u0440\u043e\u0447\u043d\u043e \u0437\u0430\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0446\u0435\u043b\u0443\u044e \u043f\u0430\u0447\u043a\u0443 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0439, \u0432\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0430\u044f \u0442\u0440\u0438, \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0433\u043b\u0430\u0448\u0451\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0434\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f. \u0412\u0441\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0432 \u0440\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0437\u0435 32 \u043a\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438, \u0438\u0437 \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0445 28 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u043e\u0434\u044f\u0442 \u043a RCE. \u0412\u0441\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0432 \u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438 65 \u0434\u0435\u0444\u0435\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u043e\u0434\u044f\u0442 \u043a \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439, 54 \u2014 \u043a \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430, 27 \u2014 \u0441\u043f\u0443\u0444\u0438\u043d\u0433\u0443, 26 \u2014 \u0443\u0442\u0435\u0447\u043a\u0435 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438, 18 \u2014 \u043e\u0431\u0445\u043e\u0434\u0443 \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0439 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0438 7 \u2014 DoS.\n\n\u0421\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438 \u0442\u0440\u0451\u0445 \u0437\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0435\u0432 \u0441\u0430\u043c\u044b\u0439 \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u043d\u0430\u0441 \u2014 CVE-2026-50507, \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u0432\u0448\u0438\u0439 \u0441\u043a\u0440\u043e\u043c\u043d\u044b\u0439 CVSS 6.8. \u042d\u0442\u043e \u0444\u0438\u043a\u0441 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u043e\u0431\u0445\u043e\u0434\u0430 BitLocker \u043f\u043e\u0434 \u043d\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435\u043c YellowKey, \u043e \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043c \u043c\u044b \u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043b\u0438 \u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u0435. \u0418\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u043d\u043e, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u0432 \u043c\u0430\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u0434 \u044d\u0442\u043e\u0442 \u0434\u0435\u0444\u0435\u043a\u0442 \u0437\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043b\u0438 CVE-2026-45585, \u043f\u043e\u044d\u0442\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0451\u0442\u0441\u044f \u0442\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043a\u043e \u0433\u0430\u0434\u0430\u0442\u044c, \u0437\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043c \u0432 \u0420\u0435\u0434\u043c\u043e\u043d\u0434\u0435 \u0440\u0435\u0448\u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0437\u0430\u0434\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c CVE. Microsoft \u0431\u043b\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0438\u0442 \u0437\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043d\u0435\u043a\u043e\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0430\u043d\u043e\u043d\u0438\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f. \u0412\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u043e, \u044d\u0442\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0451\u043d \u043e\u0431\u0445\u043e\u0434 \u043c\u0430\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043f\u0430\u0442\u0447\u0430, \u043e\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043d\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043b\u044e \u043d\u0430\u0437\u0430\u0434. \n\n\u0414\u0440\u0443\u0433\u043e\u0439 \u0434\u0435\u0444\u0435\u043a\u0442 \u0438\u0437 \u0442\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0436\u0435 \u0438\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430, GreenPlasma, \u0442\u043e\u0436\u0435 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0451\u043d \u0438 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u043b \u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440 CVE-2026-45586. \u042d\u0442\u043e \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 CTFMON.\n\n\u041f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0438\u043c \u0437\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0435\u043c \u0432 \u0438\u044e\u043d\u0435 \u0441\u0442\u0430\u043b\u0430 CVE-2026-49160, \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0438\u0437 \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f HTTP/2 Bomb, \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u043e\u0434\u044f\u0449\u0430\u044f \u043a \u043e\u0442\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0443 \u0432 \u043e\u0431\u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0438\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0438 HTTP.sys. \u041a \u043f\u0430\u0442\u0447\u0443 \u0432 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0430\u0440\u043e\u043a \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043b\u0430\u0433\u0430\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u0431\u044e\u043b\u043b\u0435\u0442\u0435\u043d\u044c, \u043e\u0431\u044a\u044f\u0441\u043d\u044f\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0439 \u043a\u0430\u043a \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c\u0441\u044f \u043d\u043e\u0432\u044b\u043c\u0438 \u043d\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u043a\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u043f\u043e \u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e \u0447\u0438\u0441\u043b\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u0433\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0432\u043a\u043e\u0432 HTTP/2  \u0438 HTTP/3.\n\n\u0421\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438 200 \u0431\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0432 \u043d\u0430\u0448\u043b\u043e\u0441\u044c \u043c\u0435\u0441\u0442\u043e \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0442\u0440\u0451\u0445 \u0432\u0435\u0441\u044c\u043c\u0430 \u043d\u0435\u043f\u0440\u0438\u044f\u0442\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u00ab\u0447\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0437\u043d\u044b\u0445\u00bb \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0439, \u043a\u0430\u0436\u0434\u0430\u044f \u0438\u0437 \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442 \u043a \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0445\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0441\u0435\u0442\u0435\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0449\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437 \u0430\u0443\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438. \u041a\u0430\u0436\u0434\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u0432 CVSS 9.8.\n\u0421\u0430\u043c\u0430\u044f \u0441\u043b\u043e\u0436\u043d\u0430\u044f \u2014 CVE-2026-47291 \u0432 HTTP.sys, \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043a\u0443 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u043a\u0430\u043a \u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u044f\u0442\u043d\u0430\u044f, \u0430 \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0434 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435\u043c \u043f\u0430\u0442\u0447\u0430 \u043d\u0443\u0436\u043d\u043e \u0441\u043a\u043e\u0440\u0440\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0432 \u0440\u0435\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435 \u043f\u0430\u0440\u0430\u043c\u0435\u0442\u0440 MaxRequestBytes \u0443 \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0438\u0441\u0430 HTTP. \n\u0414\u043b\u044f \u0434\u0432\u0443\u0445 \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0438\u0445 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u043a\u0430\u043a \u043c\u0435\u043d\u0435\u0435 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u044f\u0442\u043d\u0430\u044f, \u043d\u043e \u044d\u0442\u043e \u0443\u0436 \u043a\u0430\u043a \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0437\u0451\u0442. CVE-2026-44815 \u0437\u0430\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0433\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0435\u0442 \u043a\u043b\u0438\u0435\u043d\u0442 DHCP, \u0430 CVE-2026-45657 \u2014 \u0441\u0430\u043c\u043e \u044f\u0434\u0440\u043e Windows.\n\n#\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 #\u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 #Microsoft @\u041f2\u0422", "creation_timestamp": "2026-07-12T08:00:06.398386Z"}, {"uuid": "7613224f-56d4-472d-9e6e-90236ddf204c", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2026-44815", "type": "seen", "source": "https://t.me/kasperskyb2b/2210", "content": "\ud83d\udc40 \u0420\u0435\u043a\u043e\u0440\u0434\u043d\u044b\u0439 Patch Tuesday, 3 \u0437\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0435\u044f, \u0434\u043e\u043b\u0433\u043e\u0436\u0434\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0444\u0438\u043a\u0441\u044b\n\nMicrosoft \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0440\u0430\u0437\u0438\u043b\u0441\u044f \u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435\u043c, \u0437\u0430\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0432\u0430\u044e\u0449\u0438\u043c 200 (!) \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0439 \u0432 \u0441\u0432\u043e\u0438\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0443\u043a\u0442\u0430\u0445. \u042d\u0442\u043e \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0442\u0435\u0445, \u043a\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043d\u0435 \u0445\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0438\u043b\u043e \u0432 \u043d\u0430\u0447\u0430\u043b\u0435 \u0438\u044e\u043d\u044f 360 (!!) \u0437\u0430\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u044b\u0445 \u0434\u044b\u0440 \u0432 Edge/Chromium. \u0412\u043e\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0441, \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0439 \u043d\u0430\u0441 \u043e\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u2014 \u044d\u0442\u043e \u0442\u0435\u043f\u0435\u0440\u044c \u0442\u0430\u043a \u0431\u0443\u0434\u0435\u0442 \u043a\u0430\u0436\u0434\u044b\u0439 \u043c\u0435\u0441\u044f\u0446, \u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0433\u043e\u0440\u0448\u043e\u0447\u0435\u043a \u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0438 Mythos/MDASH/XBOW \u0432\u0441\u0451 \u0436\u0435 \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043d\u0435\u0442 \u0432\u0430\u0440\u0438\u0442\u044c \u0441 \u0442\u0430\u043a\u043e\u0439 \u0441\u043a\u043e\u0440\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c\u044e?\n\n\u0412\u043f\u0440\u043e\u0447\u0435\u043c, \u0418\u0422-\u0430\u0434\u043c\u0438\u043d\u0430\u043c \u043d\u0435 \u0434\u043e \u0444\u0438\u043b\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0444\u0438\u0438. \u041d\u0443\u0436\u043d\u043e \u0441\u0440\u043e\u0447\u043d\u043e \u0437\u0430\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0446\u0435\u043b\u0443\u044e \u043f\u0430\u0447\u043a\u0443 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043e\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0439, \u0432\u043a\u043b\u044e\u0447\u0430\u044f \u0442\u0440\u0438, \u0440\u0430\u0437\u0433\u043b\u0430\u0448\u0451\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0434\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f. \u0412\u0441\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0432 \u0440\u0435\u043b\u0438\u0437\u0435 32 \u043a\u0440\u0438\u0442\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043a\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438, \u0438\u0437 \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0445 28 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u043e\u0434\u044f\u0442 \u043a RCE. \u0412\u0441\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0432 \u043e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438 65 \u0434\u0435\u0444\u0435\u043a\u0442\u043e\u0432 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u043e\u0434\u044f\u0442 \u043a \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439, 54 \u2014 \u043a \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430, 27 \u2014 \u0441\u043f\u0443\u0444\u0438\u043d\u0433\u0443, 26 \u2014 \u0443\u0442\u0435\u0447\u043a\u0435 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438, 18 \u2014 \u043e\u0431\u0445\u043e\u0434\u0443 \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0439 \u0431\u0435\u0437\u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0438 7 \u2014 DoS.\n\n\u0421\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438 \u0442\u0440\u0451\u0445 \u0437\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0435\u0432 \u0441\u0430\u043c\u044b\u0439 \u0438\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u043d\u0430\u0441 \u2014 CVE-2026-50507, \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u0432\u0448\u0438\u0439 \u0441\u043a\u0440\u043e\u043c\u043d\u044b\u0439 CVSS 6.8. \u042d\u0442\u043e \u0444\u0438\u043a\u0441 \u0434\u043b\u044f \u043e\u0431\u0445\u043e\u0434\u0430 BitLocker \u043f\u043e\u0434 \u043d\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435\u043c YellowKey, \u043e \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u043e\u043c \u043c\u044b \u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043b\u0438 \u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u0435. \u0418\u043d\u0442\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0441\u043d\u043e, \u0447\u0442\u043e \u0432 \u043c\u0430\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u0434 \u044d\u0442\u043e\u0442 \u0434\u0435\u0444\u0435\u043a\u0442 \u0437\u0430\u0432\u0435\u043b\u0438 CVE-2026-45585, \u043f\u043e\u044d\u0442\u043e\u043c\u0443 \u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0451\u0442\u0441\u044f \u0442\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043a\u043e \u0433\u0430\u0434\u0430\u0442\u044c, \u0437\u0430\u0447\u0435\u043c \u0432 \u0420\u0435\u0434\u043c\u043e\u043d\u0434\u0435 \u0440\u0435\u0448\u0438\u043b\u0438 \u0437\u0430\u0434\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c CVE. Microsoft \u0431\u043b\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0438\u0442 \u0437\u0430 \u043e\u0431\u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043d\u0435\u043a\u043e\u0435\u0433\u043e \u0430\u043d\u043e\u043d\u0438\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f. \u0412\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u043e, \u044d\u0442\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0451\u043d \u043e\u0431\u0445\u043e\u0434 \u043c\u0430\u0439\u0441\u043a\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043f\u0430\u0442\u0447\u0430, \u043e\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u043d\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043b\u044e \u043d\u0430\u0437\u0430\u0434. \n\n\u0414\u0440\u0443\u0433\u043e\u0439 \u0434\u0435\u0444\u0435\u043a\u0442 \u0438\u0437 \u0442\u043e\u0433\u043e \u0436\u0435 \u0438\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430, GreenPlasma, \u0442\u043e\u0436\u0435 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0451\u043d \u0438 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u043b \u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440 CVE-2026-45586. \u042d\u0442\u043e \u043f\u043e\u0432\u044b\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0438\u043b\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0439 \u0447\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 CTFMON.\n\n\u041f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043d\u0438\u043c \u0437\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0434\u0435\u0435\u043c \u0432 \u0438\u044e\u043d\u0435 \u0441\u0442\u0430\u043b\u0430 CVE-2026-49160, \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0438\u0437 \u0438\u0441\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u044f HTTP/2 Bomb, \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u043e\u0434\u044f\u0449\u0430\u044f \u043a \u043e\u0442\u043a\u0430\u0437\u0443 \u0432 \u043e\u0431\u0441\u043b\u0443\u0436\u0438\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0438 HTTP.sys. \u041a \u043f\u0430\u0442\u0447\u0443 \u0432 \u043f\u043e\u0434\u0430\u0440\u043e\u043a \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043b\u0430\u0433\u0430\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044f \u0431\u044e\u043b\u043b\u0435\u0442\u0435\u043d\u044c, \u043e\u0431\u044a\u044f\u0441\u043d\u044f\u044e\u0449\u0438\u0439 \u043a\u0430\u043a \u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c\u0441\u044f \u043d\u043e\u0432\u044b\u043c\u0438 \u043d\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0440\u043e\u0439\u043a\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u043f\u043e \u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e \u0447\u0438\u0441\u043b\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u0433\u043e\u043b\u043e\u0432\u043a\u043e\u0432 HTTP/2  \u0438 HTTP/3.\n\n\u0421\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438 200 \u0431\u0430\u0433\u043e\u0432 \u043d\u0430\u0448\u043b\u043e\u0441\u044c \u043c\u0435\u0441\u0442\u043e \u0434\u043b\u044f \u0442\u0440\u0451\u0445 \u0432\u0435\u0441\u044c\u043c\u0430 \u043d\u0435\u043f\u0440\u0438\u044f\u0442\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u00ab\u0447\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0435\u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0437\u043d\u044b\u0445\u00bb \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0435\u0439, \u043a\u0430\u0436\u0434\u0430\u044f \u0438\u0437 \u043a\u043e\u0442\u043e\u0440\u044b\u0445 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442 \u043a \u0438\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043a\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u043d\u0430 \u0445\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435 \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0441\u0435\u0442\u0435\u0432\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0440\u0430\u0449\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f \u0431\u0435\u0437 \u0430\u0443\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438. \u041a\u0430\u0436\u0434\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u0432 CVSS 9.8.\n\u0421\u0430\u043c\u0430\u044f \u0441\u043b\u043e\u0436\u043d\u0430\u044f \u2014 CVE-2026-47291 \u0432 HTTP.sys, \u043f\u043e\u0441\u043a\u043e\u043b\u044c\u043a\u0443 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u043a\u0430\u043a \u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u044f\u0442\u043d\u0430\u044f, \u0430 \u043f\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0434 \u043f\u0440\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435\u043c \u043f\u0430\u0442\u0447\u0430 \u043d\u0443\u0436\u043d\u043e \u0441\u043a\u043e\u0440\u0440\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u0442\u044c \u0432 \u0440\u0435\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0435 \u043f\u0430\u0440\u0430\u043c\u0435\u0442\u0440 MaxRequestBytes \u0443 \u0441\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0438\u0441\u0430 HTTP. \n\u0414\u043b\u044f \u0434\u0432\u0443\u0445 \u0434\u0440\u0443\u0433\u0438\u0445 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u043a\u0430\u043a \u043c\u0435\u043d\u0435\u0435 \u0432\u0435\u0440\u043e\u044f\u0442\u043d\u0430\u044f, \u043d\u043e \u044d\u0442\u043e \u0443\u0436 \u043a\u0430\u043a \u043f\u043e\u0432\u0435\u0437\u0451\u0442. CVE-2026-44815 \u0437\u0430\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0433\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0435\u0442 \u043a\u043b\u0438\u0435\u043d\u0442 DHCP, \u0430 CVE-2026-45657 \u2014 \u0441\u0430\u043c\u043e \u044f\u0434\u0440\u043e Windows.\n\n#\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 #\u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 #Microsoft @\u041f2\u0422", "creation_timestamp": "2026-07-13T00:00:48.838289Z"}, {"uuid": "48d5f7a6-f164-4bcd-a758-6383d57c1fe0", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2026-44815", "type": "seen", "source": "https://gist.github.com/clearbluejar/29f9919b8658580fa5b9b5c42d054b99", "content": "# CVE-2026-44815 Windows DHCP Client\n\n# TOC\n\n* [Visual Chart Diff](#visual-chart-diff)\n* [Metadata](#metadata)\n\t* [Ghidra Diff Engine](#ghidra-diff-engine)\n\t\t* [Command Line](#command-line)\n\t* [Binary Metadata Diff](#binary-metadata-diff)\n\t* [Program Options](#program-options)\n\t* [Diff Stats](#diff-stats)\n\t* [Strings](#strings)\n* [Deleted](#deleted)\n* [Added](#added)\n\t* [Feature_2263349562__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline](#feature_2263349562__private_isenableddeviceusagenoinline)\n\t* [Feature_3211771192__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline](#feature_3211771192__private_isenableddeviceusagenoinline)\n\t* [Feature_341032248__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline](#feature_341032248__private_isenableddeviceusagenoinline)\n\t* [Feature_849856826__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline](#feature_849856826__private_isenableddeviceusagenoinline)\n* [Modified](#modified)\n\t* [RenewIpAddressLeaseEx](#renewipaddressleaseex)\n\t* [LeaseIpAddressEx](#leaseipaddressex)\n\t* [GetOriginalSubnetMask](#getoriginalsubnetmask)\n\t* [DhcpTraceVelocityData](#dhcptracevelocitydata)\n\t* [DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData](#dhcpinitializeglobalvelocitydata)\n* [Modified (No Code Changes)](#modified-no-code-changes)\n\t* [WS2_32.DLL::Ordinal_14](#ws2_32dllordinal_14)\n\t* [WPP_SF_L](#wpp_sf_l)\n\t* [WPP_SF_DJ](#wpp_sf_dj)\n\t* [wil_details_IsEnabledFallback](#wil_details_isenabledfallback)\n\n# Visual Chart Diff\n\n\n\n```mermaid\n\nflowchart LR\n\nRenewIpAddressLeaseEx-7-old<--Match 82%-->RenewIpAddressLeaseEx-7-new\nLeaseIpAddressEx-8-old<--Match 91%-->LeaseIpAddressEx-8-new\nGetOriginalSubnetMask-2-old<--Match 48%-->GetOriginalSubnetMask-2-new\nDhcpTraceVelocityData-0-old<--Match 88%-->DhcpTraceVelocityData-0-new\nDhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData-0-old<--Match 89%-->DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData-0-new\n\nsubgraph dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655\n    RenewIpAddressLeaseEx-7-new\nLeaseIpAddressEx-8-new\nGetOriginalSubnetMask-2-new\nDhcpTraceVelocityData-0-new\nDhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData-0-new\n    subgraph Added\ndirection LR\nFeature_2263349562__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n    Feature_3211771192__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n    Feature_341032248__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n    Feature_849856826__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\nend\nend\n\nsubgraph dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521\n    RenewIpAddressLeaseEx-7-old\nLeaseIpAddressEx-8-old\nGetOriginalSubnetMask-2-old\nDhcpTraceVelocityData-0-old\nDhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData-0-old\n    \nend\n\n```\n\n\n```mermaid\npie showData\n    title Function Matches - 99.8555%\n\"unmatched_funcs_len\" : 4\n\"matched_funcs_len\" : 2764\n```\n\n\n\n```mermaid\npie showData\n    title Matched Function Similarity - 99.6382%\n\"matched_funcs_with_code_changes_len\" : 5\n\"matched_funcs_with_non_code_changes_len\" : 5\n\"matched_funcs_no_changes_len\" : 2754\n```\n\n# Metadata\n\n## Ghidra Diff Engine\n\n### Command Line\n\n#### Captured Command Line\n\n\n```\nghidriff --project-location /tmp/ws2-dhcp-backup/ghidra-projects --project-name ws2_dhcp_backup --symbols-path /tmp/ws2-dhcp-backup/symbols --gzfs-path gzfs --log-level INFO --file-log-level INFO --log-path ghidriff.log --min-func-len 10 --gdt ['/tmp/ws2-dhcp-backup/windows_vs12_64.gdt'] --bsim --max-ram-percent 60.0 --max-section-funcs 200 --md-title CVE-2026-44815 Windows DHCP Client dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521 dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655\n```\n\n\n#### Verbose Args\n\n\n\n\n```\n--old ['/tmp/ws2-dhcp-backup/dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521'] --new [['/tmp/ws2-dhcp-backup/dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655']] --engine VersionTrackingDiff --output-path /tmp/ws2-dhcp-backup/ghidriff-output --summary False --project-location /tmp/ws2-dhcp-backup/ghidra-projects --project-name ws2_dhcp_backup --symbols-path /tmp/ws2-dhcp-backup/symbols --gzfs-path gzfs --base-address None --program-options None --threaded False --force-analysis False --force-diff False --no-symbols False --log-level INFO --file-log-level INFO --log-path ghidriff.log --va False --min-func-len 10 --use-calling-counts False --gdt ['/tmp/ws2-dhcp-backup/windows_vs12_64.gdt'] --bsim True --bsim-full False --max-ram-percent 60.0 --print-flags False --jvm-args None --side-by-side False --max-section-funcs 200 --md-title CVE-2026-44815 Windows DHCP Client\n```\n\n\n\n\n#### Download Original PEs\n\n\n```\nwget https://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols/dhcpcore.dll/6121CEE175000/dhcpcore.dll -O dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521\nwget https://msdl.microsoft.com/download/symbols/dhcpcore.dll/652F0FA475000/dhcpcore.dll -O dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655\n```\n\n\n## Binary Metadata Diff\n\n\n```diff\n--- dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521 Meta\n+++ dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655 Meta\n@@ -1,44 +1,44 @@\n-Program Name: dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521\n+Program Name: dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655\n Language ID: x86:LE:64:default (4.7)\n Compiler ID: windows\n Processor: x86\n Endian: Little\n Address Size: 64\n Minimum Address: 180000000\n Maximum Address: ff0000184f\n-# of Bytes: 481888\n+# of Bytes: 481952\n # of Memory Blocks: 11\n-# of Instructions: 76851\n-# of Defined Data: 5073\n-# of Functions: 1382\n-# of Symbols: 14126\n+# of Instructions: 76995\n+# of Defined Data: 5104\n+# of Functions: 1386\n+# of Symbols: 14163\n # of Data Types: 549\n # of Data Type Categories: 43\n Analyzed: true\n Compiler: visualstudio:unknown\n Created With Ghidra Version: 12.1.2\n Date Created: Fri Aug 07 15:35:50 UTC 2026\n Executable Format: Portable Executable (PE)\n-Executable Location: /tmp/ws2-dhcp-backup/dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521\n-Executable MD5: b30007e4e6b140cb9bb13b26cba312c0\n-Executable SHA256: c0fc36971302683b7da6ba62a555a0bb7f1e28db4dfbe45424c11a69fa6abd99\n-FSRL: file:///tmp/ws2-dhcp-backup/dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521?MD5=b30007e4e6b140cb9bb13b26cba312c0\n+Executable Location: /tmp/ws2-dhcp-backup/dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655\n+Executable MD5: 0b371e98b37819f9949439f0d4d6d712\n+Executable SHA256: d600b0f01f3c9a5877c2171af011f0f63216606acf4ae367827f7f2c3c6655e4\n+FSRL: file:///tmp/ws2-dhcp-backup/dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655?MD5=0b371e98b37819f9949439f0d4d6d712\n PDB Age: 1\n PDB File: dhcpcore.pdb\n-PDB GUID: 4aaedddc-450a-1e66-eebb-0a9635c43f2e\n+PDB GUID: f930f91f-bbb8-1f1b-a7a6-d1821f8f9ed9\n PDB Loaded: true\n PDB Version: RSDS\n PE Property[CompanyName]: Microsoft Corporation\n PE Property[FileDescription]: DHCP Client Service\n-PE Property[FileVersion]: 10.0.26100.8521 (WinBuild.160101.0800)\n+PE Property[FileVersion]: 10.0.26100.8655 (WinBuild.160101.0800)\n PE Property[InternalName]: dhcpcore.dll\n PE Property[LegalCopyright]: \u00a9 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.\n PE Property[OriginalFilename]: dhcpcore.dll\n PE Property[ProductName]: Microsoft\u00ae Windows\u00ae Operating System\n-PE Property[ProductVersion]: 10.0.26100.8521\n+PE Property[ProductVersion]: 10.0.26100.8655\n PE Property[Translation]: 4b00409\n Preferred Root Namespace Category: \n RTTI Found: false\n Relocatable: true\n SectionAlignment: 4096\n Should Ask To Analyze: false\n\n```\n\n\n## Program Options\n\n\n\n\nGhidra dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521 Decompiler Options\n\n\n|Decompiler Option|Value|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|Prototype Evaluation|__fastcall|\n\n\n\n\n\n\nGhidra dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521 Specification extensions Options\n\n\n|Specification extensions Option|Value|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|FormatVersion|0|\n|VersionCounter|0|\n\n\n\n\n\n\nGhidra dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521 Analyzers Options\n\n\n|Analyzers Option|Value|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|ASCII Strings|true|\n|ASCII Strings.Create Strings Containing Existing Strings|true|\n|ASCII Strings.Create Strings Containing References|true|\n|ASCII Strings.Force Model Reload|false|\n|ASCII Strings.Minimum String Length|LEN_5|\n|ASCII Strings.Model File|StringModel.sng|\n|ASCII Strings.Require Null Termination for String|true|\n|ASCII Strings.Search Only in Accessible Memory Blocks|true|\n|ASCII Strings.String Start Alignment|ALIGN_1|\n|ASCII Strings.String end alignment|4|\n|Aggressive Instruction Finder|false|\n|Aggressive Instruction Finder.Create Analysis Bookmarks|true|\n|Apply Data Archives|true|\n|Apply Data Archives.Archive Chooser|[Auto-Detect]|\n|Apply Data Archives.Create Analysis Bookmarks|true|\n|Apply Data Archives.GDT User File Archive Path|None|\n|Apply Data Archives.User Project Archive Path|None|\n|Call Convention ID|true|\n|Call Convention ID.Analysis Decompiler Timeout (sec)|60|\n|Call-Fixup Installer|true|\n|Condense Filler Bytes|false|\n|Condense Filler Bytes.Filler Value|Auto|\n|Condense Filler Bytes.Minimum number of sequential bytes|1|\n|Create Address Tables|true|\n|Create Address Tables.Allow Offcut References|false|\n|Create Address Tables.Auto Label Table|false|\n|Create Address Tables.Create Analysis Bookmarks|true|\n|Create Address Tables.Maxmimum Pointer Distance|16777215|\n|Create Address Tables.Minimum Pointer Address|4132|\n|Create Address Tables.Minimum Table Size|2|\n|Create Address Tables.Pointer Alignment|1|\n|Create Address Tables.Relocation Table Guide|true|\n|Create Address Tables.Table Alignment|4|\n|Data Reference|true|\n|Data Reference.Address Table Alignment|1|\n|Data Reference.Address Table Minimum Size|2|\n|Data Reference.Align End of Strings|false|\n|Data Reference.Ascii String References|true|\n|Data Reference.Create Address Tables|true|\n|Data Reference.Minimum String Length|5|\n|Data Reference.References to Pointers|true|\n|Data Reference.Relocation Table Guide|true|\n|Data Reference.Respect Execute Flag|true|\n|Data Reference.Subroutine References|true|\n|Data Reference.Switch Table References|false|\n|Data Reference.Unicode String References|true|\n|Decompiler Parameter ID|true|\n|Decompiler Parameter ID.Analysis Clear Level|ANALYSIS|\n|Decompiler Parameter ID.Analysis Decompiler Timeout (sec)|60|\n|Decompiler Parameter ID.Commit Data Types|true|\n|Decompiler Parameter ID.Commit Void Return Values|false|\n|Decompiler Parameter ID.Prototype Evaluation|__fastcall|\n|Decompiler Switch Analysis|true|\n|Decompiler Switch Analysis.Analysis Decompiler Timeout (sec)|60|\n|Demangler Microsoft|true|\n|Demangler Microsoft.msdApplyOptions|{\n\tinterpretation: FUNCTION_IF_EXISTS,\n\tapplyCallingConvention: true,\n\tapplySignature: true,\n\tdemangleOnlyKnownPatterns: true,\n\tdoDisassembly: true\n}|\n|Demangler Microsoft.msdOutputOptions|ghidra.app.util.demangler.microsoft.options.MsdOutputOption@9e5b|\n|Disassemble Entry Points|true|\n|Disassemble Entry Points.Respect Execute Flag|true|\n|Embedded Media|true|\n|Embedded Media.Create Analysis Bookmarks|true|\n|External Entry References|true|\n|Function ID|true|\n|Function ID.Always Apply FID Labels|false|\n|Function ID.Create Analysis Bookmarks|true|\n|Function ID.Instruction Count Threshold|14.6|\n|Function ID.Multiple Match Threshold|30.0|\n|Function Start Search|true|\n|Function Start Search.Bookmark Functions|false|\n|Function Start Search.Search Data Blocks|false|\n|Non-Returning Functions - Discovered|true|\n|Non-Returning Functions - Discovered.Create Analysis Bookmarks|true|\n|Non-Returning Functions - Discovered.Function Non-return Threshold|3|\n|Non-Returning Functions - Discovered.Repair Flow Damage|true|\n|Non-Returning Functions - Known|true|\n|Non-Returning Functions - Known.Create Analysis Bookmarks|true|\n|PDB MSDIA|false|\n|PDB MSDIA.Search untrusted symbol servers|false|\n|PDB Universal|true|\n|PDB Universal.Import Source Line Info|true|\n|PDB Universal.Search untrusted symbol servers|false|\n|Reference|true|\n|Reference.Address Table Alignment|1|\n|Reference.Address Table Minimum Size|2|\n|Reference.Align End of Strings|false|\n|Reference.Ascii String References|true|\n|Reference.Create Address Tables|true|\n|Reference.Minimum String Length|5|\n|Reference.References to Pointers|true|\n|Reference.Relocation Table Guide|true|\n|Reference.Respect Execute Flag|true|\n|Reference.Subroutine References|true|\n|Reference.Switch Table References|false|\n|Reference.Unicode String References|true|\n|Scalar Operand References|true|\n|Scalar Operand References.Relocation Table Guide|true|\n|Shared Return Calls|true|\n|Shared Return Calls.Allow Conditional Jumps|false|\n|Shared Return Calls.Assume Contiguous Functions Only|true|\n|Stack|true|\n|Stack.Create Local Variables|true|\n|Stack.Create Param Variables|false|\n|Stack.Max Threads|2|\n|Subroutine References|true|\n|Subroutine References.Create Thunks Early|true|\n|Variadic Function Signature Override|false|\n|Variadic Function Signature Override.Create Analysis Bookmarks|false|\n|Windows x86 PE Exception Handling|true|\n|Windows x86 PE RTTI Analyzer|true|\n|Windows x86 Thread Environment Block (TEB) Analyzer|true|\n|Windows x86 Thread Environment Block (TEB) Analyzer.Starting Address of the TEB||\n|Windows x86 Thread Environment Block (TEB) Analyzer.Windows OS Version|Windows 7|\n|WindowsPE x86 Propagate External Parameters|false|\n|WindowsResourceReference|true|\n|WindowsResourceReference.Create Analysis Bookmarks|true|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer|true|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer.Create Data from pointer|false|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer.Function parameter/return Pointer analysis|true|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer.Max Threads|2|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer.Min absolute reference|4|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer.Require pointer param data type|false|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer.Speculative reference max|256|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer.Speculative reference min|1024|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer.Stored Value Pointer analysis|true|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer.Trust values read from writable memory|true|\n\n\n\n\n\n\nGhidra dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655 Decompiler Options\n\n\n|Decompiler Option|Value|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|Prototype Evaluation|__fastcall|\n\n\n\n\n\n\nGhidra dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655 Specification extensions Options\n\n\n|Specification extensions Option|Value|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|FormatVersion|0|\n|VersionCounter|0|\n\n\n\n\n\n\nGhidra dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655 Analyzers Options\n\n\n|Analyzers Option|Value|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|ASCII Strings|true|\n|ASCII Strings.Create Strings Containing Existing Strings|true|\n|ASCII Strings.Create Strings Containing References|true|\n|ASCII Strings.Force Model Reload|false|\n|ASCII Strings.Minimum String Length|LEN_5|\n|ASCII Strings.Model File|StringModel.sng|\n|ASCII Strings.Require Null Termination for String|true|\n|ASCII Strings.Search Only in Accessible Memory Blocks|true|\n|ASCII Strings.String Start Alignment|ALIGN_1|\n|ASCII Strings.String end alignment|4|\n|Aggressive Instruction Finder|false|\n|Aggressive Instruction Finder.Create Analysis Bookmarks|true|\n|Apply Data Archives|true|\n|Apply Data Archives.Archive Chooser|[Auto-Detect]|\n|Apply Data Archives.Create Analysis Bookmarks|true|\n|Apply Data Archives.GDT User File Archive Path|None|\n|Apply Data Archives.User Project Archive Path|None|\n|Call Convention ID|true|\n|Call Convention ID.Analysis Decompiler Timeout (sec)|60|\n|Call-Fixup Installer|true|\n|Condense Filler Bytes|false|\n|Condense Filler Bytes.Filler Value|Auto|\n|Condense Filler Bytes.Minimum number of sequential bytes|1|\n|Create Address Tables|true|\n|Create Address Tables.Allow Offcut References|false|\n|Create Address Tables.Auto Label Table|false|\n|Create Address Tables.Create Analysis Bookmarks|true|\n|Create Address Tables.Maxmimum Pointer Distance|16777215|\n|Create Address Tables.Minimum Pointer Address|4132|\n|Create Address Tables.Minimum Table Size|2|\n|Create Address Tables.Pointer Alignment|1|\n|Create Address Tables.Relocation Table Guide|true|\n|Create Address Tables.Table Alignment|4|\n|Data Reference|true|\n|Data Reference.Address Table Alignment|1|\n|Data Reference.Address Table Minimum Size|2|\n|Data Reference.Align End of Strings|false|\n|Data Reference.Ascii String References|true|\n|Data Reference.Create Address Tables|true|\n|Data Reference.Minimum String Length|5|\n|Data Reference.References to Pointers|true|\n|Data Reference.Relocation Table Guide|true|\n|Data Reference.Respect Execute Flag|true|\n|Data Reference.Subroutine References|true|\n|Data Reference.Switch Table References|false|\n|Data Reference.Unicode String References|true|\n|Decompiler Parameter ID|true|\n|Decompiler Parameter ID.Analysis Clear Level|ANALYSIS|\n|Decompiler Parameter ID.Analysis Decompiler Timeout (sec)|60|\n|Decompiler Parameter ID.Commit Data Types|true|\n|Decompiler Parameter ID.Commit Void Return Values|false|\n|Decompiler Parameter ID.Prototype Evaluation|__fastcall|\n|Decompiler Switch Analysis|true|\n|Decompiler Switch Analysis.Analysis Decompiler Timeout (sec)|60|\n|Demangler Microsoft|true|\n|Demangler Microsoft.msdApplyOptions|{\n\tinterpretation: FUNCTION_IF_EXISTS,\n\tapplyCallingConvention: true,\n\tapplySignature: true,\n\tdemangleOnlyKnownPatterns: true,\n\tdoDisassembly: true\n}|\n|Demangler Microsoft.msdOutputOptions|ghidra.app.util.demangler.microsoft.options.MsdOutputOption@9e5b|\n|Disassemble Entry Points|true|\n|Disassemble Entry Points.Respect Execute Flag|true|\n|Embedded Media|true|\n|Embedded Media.Create Analysis Bookmarks|true|\n|External Entry References|true|\n|Function ID|true|\n|Function ID.Always Apply FID Labels|false|\n|Function ID.Create Analysis Bookmarks|true|\n|Function ID.Instruction Count Threshold|14.6|\n|Function ID.Multiple Match Threshold|30.0|\n|Function Start Search|true|\n|Function Start Search.Bookmark Functions|false|\n|Function Start Search.Search Data Blocks|false|\n|Non-Returning Functions - Discovered|true|\n|Non-Returning Functions - Discovered.Create Analysis Bookmarks|true|\n|Non-Returning Functions - Discovered.Function Non-return Threshold|3|\n|Non-Returning Functions - Discovered.Repair Flow Damage|true|\n|Non-Returning Functions - Known|true|\n|Non-Returning Functions - Known.Create Analysis Bookmarks|true|\n|PDB MSDIA|false|\n|PDB MSDIA.Search untrusted symbol servers|false|\n|PDB Universal|true|\n|PDB Universal.Import Source Line Info|true|\n|PDB Universal.Search untrusted symbol servers|false|\n|Reference|true|\n|Reference.Address Table Alignment|1|\n|Reference.Address Table Minimum Size|2|\n|Reference.Align End of Strings|false|\n|Reference.Ascii String References|true|\n|Reference.Create Address Tables|true|\n|Reference.Minimum String Length|5|\n|Reference.References to Pointers|true|\n|Reference.Relocation Table Guide|true|\n|Reference.Respect Execute Flag|true|\n|Reference.Subroutine References|true|\n|Reference.Switch Table References|false|\n|Reference.Unicode String References|true|\n|Scalar Operand References|true|\n|Scalar Operand References.Relocation Table Guide|true|\n|Shared Return Calls|true|\n|Shared Return Calls.Allow Conditional Jumps|false|\n|Shared Return Calls.Assume Contiguous Functions Only|true|\n|Stack|true|\n|Stack.Create Local Variables|true|\n|Stack.Create Param Variables|false|\n|Stack.Max Threads|2|\n|Subroutine References|true|\n|Subroutine References.Create Thunks Early|true|\n|Variadic Function Signature Override|false|\n|Variadic Function Signature Override.Create Analysis Bookmarks|false|\n|Windows x86 PE Exception Handling|true|\n|Windows x86 PE RTTI Analyzer|true|\n|Windows x86 Thread Environment Block (TEB) Analyzer|true|\n|Windows x86 Thread Environment Block (TEB) Analyzer.Starting Address of the TEB||\n|Windows x86 Thread Environment Block (TEB) Analyzer.Windows OS Version|Windows 7|\n|WindowsPE x86 Propagate External Parameters|false|\n|WindowsResourceReference|true|\n|WindowsResourceReference.Create Analysis Bookmarks|true|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer|true|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer.Create Data from pointer|false|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer.Function parameter/return Pointer analysis|true|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer.Max Threads|2|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer.Min absolute reference|4|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer.Require pointer param data type|false|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer.Speculative reference max|256|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer.Speculative reference min|1024|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer.Stored Value Pointer analysis|true|\n|x86 Constant Reference Analyzer.Trust values read from writable memory|true|\n\n\n\n## Diff Stats\n\n\n\n|Stat|Value|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|added_funcs_len|4|\n|deleted_funcs_len|0|\n|modified_funcs_len|10|\n|added_symbols_len|21|\n|deleted_symbols_len|2|\n|diff_time|3.8734896183013916|\n|deleted_strings_len|0|\n|added_strings_len|0|\n|match_types|Counter({'SymbolsHash': 1379, 'ExternalsName': 255, 'ExactBytesFunctionHasher': 2})|\n|items_to_process|37|\n|diff_types|Counter({'address': 7, 'refcount': 5, 'code': 5, 'length': 5, 'sig': 2, 'calling': 1, 'called': 1})|\n|unmatched_funcs_len|4|\n|total_funcs_len|2768|\n|matched_funcs_len|2764|\n|matched_funcs_with_code_changes_len|5|\n|matched_funcs_with_non_code_changes_len|5|\n|matched_funcs_no_changes_len|2754|\n|match_func_similarity_percent|99.6382%|\n|func_match_overall_percent|99.8555%|\n|first_matches|Counter({'SymbolsHash': 1379, 'ExactBytesFunctionHasher': 2})|\n\n\n\n```mermaid\npie showData\n    title All Matches\n\"SymbolsHash\" : 1379\n\"ExternalsName\" : 255\n\"ExactBytesFunctionHasher\" : 2\n```\n\n\n\n```mermaid\npie showData\n    title First Matches\n\"SymbolsHash\" : 1379\n\"ExactBytesFunctionHasher\" : 2\n```\n\n\n\n```mermaid\npie showData\n    title Diff Stats\n\"added_funcs_len\" : 4\n\"deleted_funcs_len\" : 0\n\"modified_funcs_len\" : 10\n```\n\n\n\n```mermaid\npie showData\n    title Symbols\n\"added_symbols_len\" : 21\n\"deleted_symbols_len\" : 2\n```\n\n## Strings\n\n\n*No string differences found*\n\n# Deleted\n\n# Added\n\n## Feature_2263349562__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n\n### Function Meta\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|name|Feature_2263349562__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline|\n|fullname|Feature_2263349562__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline|\n|refcount|1|\n|length|51|\n|called|wil_details_IsEnabledFallback|\n|calling|DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData|\n|paramcount|0|\n|address|180047f38|\n|sig|uint __fastcall Feature_2263349562__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline(void)|\n|sym_type|Function|\n|sym_source|IMPORTED|\n|external|False|\n\n\n```diff\n--- Feature_2263349562__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n+++ Feature_2263349562__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@\n+\n+uint Feature_2263349562__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline(void)\n+\n+{\n+  uint uVar1;\n+  ulonglong local_res8;\n+  \n+  local_res8 = (ulonglong)Feature_2263349562__private_featureState;\n+  if ((Feature_2263349562__private_featureState & 0x10) != 0) {\n+    return Feature_2263349562__private_featureState & 1;\n+  }\n+  uVar1 = wil_details_IsEnabledFallback(local_res8,3,&Feature_2263349562__private_descriptor);\n+  return uVar1;\n+}\n+\n\n```\n\n\n## Feature_3211771192__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n\n### Function Meta\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|name|Feature_3211771192__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline|\n|fullname|Feature_3211771192__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline|\n|refcount|1|\n|length|51|\n|called|wil_details_IsEnabledFallback|\n|calling|DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData|\n|paramcount|0|\n|address|180047f7c|\n|sig|uint __fastcall Feature_3211771192__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline(void)|\n|sym_type|Function|\n|sym_source|IMPORTED|\n|external|False|\n\n\n```diff\n--- Feature_3211771192__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n+++ Feature_3211771192__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@\n+\n+uint Feature_3211771192__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline(void)\n+\n+{\n+  uint uVar1;\n+  ulonglong local_res8;\n+  \n+  local_res8 = (ulonglong)Feature_3211771192__private_featureState;\n+  if ((Feature_3211771192__private_featureState & 0x10) != 0) {\n+    return Feature_3211771192__private_featureState & 1;\n+  }\n+  uVar1 = wil_details_IsEnabledFallback(local_res8,3,&Feature_3211771192__private_descriptor);\n+  return uVar1;\n+}\n+\n\n```\n\n\n## Feature_341032248__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n\n### Function Meta\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|name|Feature_341032248__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline|\n|fullname|Feature_341032248__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline|\n|refcount|1|\n|length|51|\n|called|wil_details_IsEnabledFallback|\n|calling|DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData|\n|paramcount|0|\n|address|180047fc0|\n|sig|uint __fastcall Feature_341032248__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline(void)|\n|sym_type|Function|\n|sym_source|IMPORTED|\n|external|False|\n\n\n```diff\n--- Feature_341032248__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n+++ Feature_341032248__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@\n+\n+uint Feature_341032248__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline(void)\n+\n+{\n+  uint uVar1;\n+  ulonglong local_res8;\n+  \n+  local_res8 = (ulonglong)Feature_341032248__private_featureState;\n+  if ((Feature_341032248__private_featureState & 0x10) != 0) {\n+    return Feature_341032248__private_featureState & 1;\n+  }\n+  uVar1 = wil_details_IsEnabledFallback(local_res8,3,&Feature_341032248__private_descriptor);\n+  return uVar1;\n+}\n+\n\n```\n\n\n## Feature_849856826__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n\n### Function Meta\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|name|Feature_849856826__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline|\n|fullname|Feature_849856826__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline|\n|refcount|1|\n|length|51|\n|called|wil_details_IsEnabledFallback|\n|calling|DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData|\n|paramcount|0|\n|address|18004819c|\n|sig|uint __fastcall Feature_849856826__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline(void)|\n|sym_type|Function|\n|sym_source|IMPORTED|\n|external|False|\n\n\n```diff\n--- Feature_849856826__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n+++ Feature_849856826__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@\n+\n+uint Feature_849856826__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline(void)\n+\n+{\n+  uint uVar1;\n+  ulonglong local_res8;\n+  \n+  local_res8 = (ulonglong)Feature_849856826__private_featureState;\n+  if ((Feature_849856826__private_featureState & 0x10) != 0) {\n+    return Feature_849856826__private_featureState & 1;\n+  }\n+  uVar1 = wil_details_IsEnabledFallback(local_res8,3,&Feature_849856826__private_descriptor);\n+  return uVar1;\n+}\n+\n\n```\n\n\n# Modified\n\n\n*Modified functions contain code changes*\n## RenewIpAddressLeaseEx\n\n### Match Info\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521 - dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|diff_type|code,length,sig,address|\n|ratio|0.95|\n|i_ratio|0.84|\n|m_ratio|1.0|\n|b_ratio|0.82|\n|match_types|SymbolsHash|\n\n### Function Meta Diff\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: | :---: |\n|name|RenewIpAddressLeaseEx|RenewIpAddressLeaseEx|\n|fullname|RenewIpAddressLeaseEx|RenewIpAddressLeaseEx|\n|refcount|3|3|\n|`length`|3143|3179|\n|called|\nExpand for full list:API-MS-WIN-CORE-SYSINFO-L1-1-0.DLL::GetTickCount64API-MS-WIN-CRT-TIME-L1-1-0.DLL::_time64CreateDhcpContextCreateDhcpContextForNewLeaseDhcpCleanParsedOptionsDhcpCommonInitDhcpDestroyContextExDhcpMakeClientIdGetHardwareAddressForIpAddressGetSeedInitializeDhcpSocketRenewLeaseWPP_SF_WPP_SF_DWPP_SF_LWS2_32.DLL::Ordinal_11WS2_32.DLL::Ordinal_14WS2_32.DLL::Ordinal_8__security_check_cookiememcpymemset|\nExpand for full list:API-MS-WIN-CORE-SYSINFO-L1-1-0.DLL::GetTickCount64API-MS-WIN-CRT-TIME-L1-1-0.DLL::_time64CreateDhcpContextCreateDhcpContextForNewLeaseDhcpCleanParsedOptionsDhcpCommonInitDhcpDestroyContextExDhcpMakeClientIdGetHardwareAddressForIpAddressGetSeedInitializeDhcpSocketRenewLeaseWPP_SF_WPP_SF_DWPP_SF_LWS2_32.DLL::Ordinal_11WS2_32.DLL::Ordinal_14WS2_32.DLL::Ordinal_8__security_check_cookiememcpymemset|\n|calling|RpcSrvRenewIpAddressLeaseExRpcSrvRenewIpAddressLeaseEx_New|RpcSrvRenewIpAddressLeaseExRpcSrvRenewIpAddressLeaseEx_New|\n|paramcount|7|7|\n|`address`|1800404dc|1800405c8|\n|`sig`|ulonglong __fastcall RenewIpAddressLeaseEx(uint param_1, longlong param_2, uint * param_3, undefined8 param_4, undefined8 * param_5, undefined8 * param_6, int param_7)|ulonglong __fastcall RenewIpAddressLeaseEx(uint param_1, longlong param_2, uint * param_3, undefined8 param_4, undefined8 * param_5, undefined8 * param_6, uint param_7)|\n|sym_type|Function|Function|\n|sym_source|IMPORTED|IMPORTED|\n|external|False|False|\n\n### RenewIpAddressLeaseEx Diff\n\n\n```diff\n--- RenewIpAddressLeaseEx\n+++ RenewIpAddressLeaseEx\n@@ -1,611 +1,621 @@\n \n /* WARNING: Function: __security_check_cookie replaced with injection: security_check_cookie */\n \n ulonglong RenewIpAddressLeaseEx\n                     (uint param_1,longlong param_2,uint *param_3,undefined8 param_4,\n-                    undefined8 *param_5,undefined8 *param_6,int param_7)\n+                    undefined8 *param_5,undefined8 *param_6,uint param_7)\n \n {\n   int iVar1;\n   code *pcVar2;\n   undefined1 auVar3 [16];\n   undefined1 auVar4 [16];\n   undefined1 auVar5 [16];\n   undefined1 auVar6 [16];\n   undefined1 auVar7 [16];\n   undefined1 auVar8 [16];\n   undefined1 auVar9 [16];\n   undefined1 auVar10 [16];\n   undefined1 auVar11 [16];\n   undefined1 auVar12 [16];\n   undefined1 auVar13 [16];\n   undefined1 auVar14 [16];\n   undefined1 auVar15 [16];\n   undefined8 uVar16;\n   undefined8 uVar17;\n   undefined8 uVar18;\n   undefined8 uVar19;\n   undefined4 uVar20;\n   uint uVar21;\n   uint uVar22;\n   DWORD DVar23;\n   ulonglong uVar24;\n   __time64_t _Var25;\n   longlong ******pppppplVar26;\n   longlong *******ppppppplVar27;\n   ULONGLONG UVar28;\n   undefined8 *puVar29;\n   undefined8 *puVar30;\n   uint *puVar31;\n   uint *puVar32;\n   longlong ******pppppplVar33;\n   ushort uVar34;\n   longlong lVar35;\n   size_t _Size;\n   ulonglong uVar36;\n   int iVar37;\n   longlong *******ppppppplVar38;\n   int iVar39;\n   undefined1 auStackY_4d8 [32];\n   uint local_494;\n   longlong *******local_490;\n   uint local_488;\n   undefined4 local_484;\n   DWORD local_480 [2];\n   longlong *******local_478;\n   longlong *******ppppppplStack_470;\n   undefined8 local_468;\n   undefined8 local_460;\n   undefined8 local_458;\n   undefined8 local_450;\n   undefined4 *local_448;\n   undefined4 local_440;\n   undefined8 local_43c;\n   undefined4 local_434;\n   undefined8 *local_428;\n   undefined1 local_418 [24];\n   uint local_400;\n   uint local_3fc;\n   uint local_3f8;\n   undefined8 local_348 [34];\n   uint local_238 [68];\n   undefined4 local_128;\n   undefined2 local_124;\n   undefined1 local_122;\n   undefined1 local_118 [208];\n   ulonglong local_48;\n   \n   local_48 = __security_cookie ^ (ulonglong)auStackY_4d8;\n   local_428 = param_5;\n   local_490 = (longlong *******)0x0;\n   local_480[0] = 0;\n   local_488 = param_1;\n   memset(local_418,0,200);\n   local_448 = &local_128;\n   local_128 = 0x10f2c2e;\n   local_124 = 0x603;\n   local_43c = 0;\n   local_434 = 0;\n   local_122 = 0x2f;\n   local_484 = 0;\n   local_478 = (longlong *******)0x0;\n   ppppppplStack_470 = (longlong *******)0x0;\n   local_468 = 0x37;\n   local_460 = 0;\n   local_458 = 0;\n   local_450 = 0;\n   local_440 = 7;\n   if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-    WPP_SF_D(0x404,0x1c,0x18005ade8,param_1);\n+    WPP_SF_D(0x404,0x1d,0x18005ade8,param_1);\n+  }\n+  if ((g_fVelocityDhcpv4ClassIdLenOverflowFix != 0) && (0xff < param_7)) {\n+    if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) == 0) {\n+      return 0x57;\n+    }\n+    uVar34 = 0x1e;\n+LAB_1:\n+    WPP_SF_(0x404,uVar34,0x18005ade8);\n+    return 0x57;\n   }\n   if (param_2 == 0) {\n-    if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-      WPP_SF_(0x404,0x1d,0x18005ade8);\n-    }\n-    return 0x57;\n+    if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) == 0) {\n+      return 0x57;\n+    }\n+    uVar34 = 0x1f;\n+    goto LAB_1;\n   }\n   uVar24 = DhcpCommonInit();\n   uVar36 = uVar24 & 0xffffffff;\n   if ((int)uVar24 != 0) {\n     if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) == 0) {\n       return uVar36;\n     }\n-    uVar34 = 0x1e;\n-    goto LAB_1;\n+    uVar34 = 0x20;\n+    goto LAB_2;\n   }\n   if ((param_1 == 0) || (param_1 == 0x7f000001)) {\n-LAB_2:\n+LAB_3:\n     local_494 = *param_3;\n     _Size = (size_t)local_494;\n     if (200 < local_494) {\n       if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-        WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x1f,0x18005ade8,local_494);\n+        WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x21,0x18005ade8,local_494);\n       }\n       return 0xd;\n     }\n     memcpy(local_118,(void *)((longlong)param_3 + 5),_Size);\n   }\n   else {\n     local_494 = 200;\n     GetHardwareAddressForIpAddress((ulonglong)param_1,local_118,&local_494);\n     _Size = (size_t)local_494;\n-    if (local_494 == 0) goto LAB_2;\n+    if (local_494 == 0) goto LAB_3;\n   }\n   uVar21 = (uint)_Size;\n   if (g_fUseIpv6OnlyPreferred == 0) {\n     uVar22 = CreateDhcpContext(&local_490,uVar21);\n     ppppppplVar38 = local_490;\n     if (uVar22 != 0) {\n       if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-        WPP_SF_D(0x404,0x21,0x18005ade8,uVar22);\n+        WPP_SF_D(0x404,0x23,0x18005ade8,uVar22);\n       }\n       return (ulonglong)uVar22;\n     }\n     *(undefined1 *)((longlong)local_490 + 0x54) = 1;\n     *(uint *)(local_490 + 0xc) = uVar21;\n     memcpy(local_490[0xb],local_118,_Size);\n     *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 2) = 1;\n     *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 0x69) = 0;\n     uVar20 = Ordinal_8(*(undefined4 *)(param_2 + 0x10));\n     *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 0xf) = uVar20;\n     uVar20 = Ordinal_8(*(undefined4 *)(param_2 + 0x14));\n     *(undefined4 *)((longlong)ppppppplVar38 + 0x7c) = uVar20;\n     _Var25 = _time64((__time64_t *)0x0);\n     if (*(uint *)(param_2 + 0x28) < (uint)_Var25) {\n       if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-        WPP_SF_(0x404,0x22,0x18005ade8);\n+        WPP_SF_(0x404,0x24,0x18005ade8);\n       }\n       *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 0x10) = 0xffffffff;\n     }\n     else {\n       uVar20 = Ordinal_8(*(undefined4 *)(param_2 + 0x18));\n       *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 0x10) = uVar20;\n     }\n     *(undefined4 *)((longlong)ppppppplVar38 + 0x84) = *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 0xf);\n     *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 0x37) = *(undefined4 *)(param_2 + 0x1c);\n     uVar21 = *(uint *)(param_2 + 0x20);\n     if (uVar21 == 0xffffffff) {\n       pppppplVar33 = (longlong ******)0xffffffff;\n     }\n     else {\n       _Var25 = _time64((__time64_t *)0x0);\n       UVar28 = GetTickCount64();\n       auVar7._8_8_ = 0;\n       auVar7._0_8_ = UVar28;\n       lVar35 = SUB168(ZEXT816(0x624dd2f1a9fbe77) * auVar7,8);\n       pppppplVar26 = (longlong ******)\n                      (((lVar35 + (UVar28 - lVar35 >> 1) >> 9) - _Var25) + (ulonglong)uVar21);\n       pppppplVar33 = (longlong ******)0x0;\n       if (-1 < (longlong)pppppplVar26) {\n         pppppplVar33 = pppppplVar26;\n       }\n     }\n     ppppppplVar38[0x38] = pppppplVar33;\n     uVar21 = *(uint *)(param_2 + 0x24);\n     if (uVar21 == 0xffffffff) {\n       pppppplVar33 = (longlong ******)0xffffffff;\n     }\n     else {\n       _Var25 = _time64((__time64_t *)0x0);\n       UVar28 = GetTickCount64();\n       auVar8._8_8_ = 0;\n       auVar8._0_8_ = UVar28;\n       lVar35 = SUB168(ZEXT816(0x624dd2f1a9fbe77) * auVar8,8);\n       pppppplVar26 = (longlong ******)\n                      (((lVar35 + (UVar28 - lVar35 >> 1) >> 9) - _Var25) + (ulonglong)uVar21);\n       pppppplVar33 = (longlong ******)0x0;\n       if (-1 < (longlong)pppppplVar26) {\n         pppppplVar33 = pppppplVar26;\n       }\n     }\n     ppppppplVar38[0x39] = pppppplVar33;\n     uVar21 = *(uint *)(param_2 + 0x28);\n     if (uVar21 == 0xffffffff) {\n       pppppplVar33 = (longlong ******)0xffffffff;\n     }\n     else {\n       _Var25 = _time64((__time64_t *)0x0);\n       UVar28 = GetTickCount64();\n       auVar9._8_8_ = 0;\n       auVar9._0_8_ = UVar28;\n       lVar35 = SUB168(ZEXT816(0x624dd2f1a9fbe77) * auVar9,8);\n       pppppplVar26 = (longlong ******)\n                      (((lVar35 + (UVar28 - lVar35 >> 1) >> 9) - _Var25) + (ulonglong)uVar21);\n       pppppplVar33 = (longlong ******)0x0;\n       if (-1 < (longlong)pppppplVar26) {\n         pppppplVar33 = pppppplVar26;\n       }\n     }\n     ppppppplVar38[0x3a] = pppppplVar33;\n     uVar21 = *(uint *)(param_2 + 0x2c);\n     if (uVar21 == 0xffffffff) {\n       pppppplVar33 = (longlong ******)0xffffffff;\n     }\n     else {\n       _Var25 = _time64((__time64_t *)0x0);\n       UVar28 = GetTickCount64();\n       auVar10._8_8_ = 0;\n       auVar10._0_8_ = UVar28;\n       lVar35 = SUB168(ZEXT816(0x624dd2f1a9fbe77) * auVar10,8);\n       pppppplVar26 = (longlong ******)\n                      (((lVar35 + (UVar28 - lVar35 >> 1) >> 9) - _Var25) + (ulonglong)uVar21);\n       pppppplVar33 = (longlong ******)0x0;\n       if (-1 < (longlong)pppppplVar26) {\n         pppppplVar33 = pppppplVar26;\n       }\n     }\n     ppppppplVar38[0x3b] = pppppplVar33;\n     *(undefined4 *)((longlong)ppppppplVar38 + 0x34c) = 1;\n     *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 0x6a) = 1;\n     *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 0x61) = 0;\n     *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 0x62) = 0;\n     *(undefined4 *)((longlong)ppppppplVar38 + 0x314) = 0;\n     *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 99) = 1;\n     *(undefined4 *)((longlong)ppppppplVar38 + 0x31c) = 0;\n     *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 100) = 0;\n     *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 0x62) = 1;\n     *(undefined4 *)((longlong)ppppppplVar38 + 0x314) = 1;\n     *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 0x66) = 1;\n     *(undefined4 *)((longlong)ppppppplVar38 + 0x234) = 1;\n     *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 0x34) = 0;\n     uVar20 = Ordinal_11(\"169.254.0.0\");\n     *(undefined4 *)((longlong)ppppppplVar38 + 0x1a4) = uVar20;\n     uVar20 = Ordinal_11(\"255.255.0.0\");\n     *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 0x35) = uVar20;\n     DVar23 = GetSeed();\n     *(DWORD *)((longlong)ppppppplVar38 + 0x1ac) = DVar23;\n     ppppppplVar27 = ppppppplVar38 + 0x57;\n     ppppppplVar38[0x58] = (longlong ******)ppppppplVar27;\n     *ppppppplVar27 = (longlong ******)ppppppplVar27;\n     local_478 = ppppppplVar38 + 0x55;\n     ppppppplVar38[0x56] = (longlong ******)&local_478;\n     *local_478 = (longlong ******)&local_478;\n     ppppppplVar27 = ppppppplVar38 + 0x59;\n     ppppppplVar38[0x5a] = (longlong ******)ppppppplVar27;\n     *ppppppplVar27 = (longlong ******)ppppppplVar27;\n     if (param_7 == 0) {\n       ppppppplVar38[0x5c] = (longlong ******)0x0;\n     }\n     else {\n       ppppppplVar38[0x5c] = (longlong ******)((longlong)param_6 + 4);\n     }\n     uVar21 = *param_3;\n-    *(int *)(ppppppplVar38 + 0x5d) = param_7;\n+    *(uint *)(ppppppplVar38 + 0x5d) = param_7;\n     ppppppplStack_470 = local_478;\n     uVar21 = DhcpMakeClientId(1,uVar21,(void *)((longlong)param_3 + 5),ppppppplVar38 + 0x36);\n     uVar36 = (ulonglong)uVar21;\n     if (uVar21 == 0) {\n       ppppppplVar38[7] = (longlong ******)0x0;\n       ppppppplVar38[9] = (longlong ******)0xffffffffffffffff;\n       ppppppplVar38[8] = (longlong ******)0xffffffffffffffff;\n-      goto LAB_3;\n-    }\n-LAB_4:\n+      goto LAB_4;\n+    }\n+LAB_5:\n     if ((DAT_0 & 2) != 0) {\n-      WPP_SF_D(0x401,0x25,0x18005ade8,(int)uVar36);\n+      WPP_SF_D(0x401,0x27,0x18005ade8,(int)uVar36);\n     }\n   }\n   else {\n     uVar20 = Ordinal_8(*(undefined4 *)(param_2 + 0x10));\n     lVar35 = 2;\n     puVar29 = local_348;\n     do {\n       uVar16 = param_6[1];\n       uVar17 = param_6[2];\n       uVar18 = param_6[3];\n       *puVar29 = *param_6;\n       puVar29[1] = uVar16;\n       uVar16 = param_6[4];\n       uVar19 = param_6[5];\n       puVar29[2] = uVar17;\n       puVar29[3] = uVar18;\n       uVar17 = param_6[6];\n       uVar18 = param_6[7];\n       puVar29[4] = uVar16;\n       puVar29[5] = uVar19;\n       uVar16 = param_6[8];\n       uVar19 = param_6[9];\n       puVar29[6] = uVar17;\n       puVar29[7] = uVar18;\n       uVar17 = param_6[10];\n       uVar18 = param_6[0xb];\n       puVar29[8] = uVar16;\n       puVar29[9] = uVar19;\n       uVar16 = param_6[0xc];\n       uVar19 = param_6[0xd];\n       puVar29[10] = uVar17;\n       puVar29[0xb] = uVar18;\n       uVar17 = param_6[0xe];\n       uVar18 = param_6[0xf];\n       param_6 = param_6 + 0x10;\n       puVar29[0xc] = uVar16;\n       puVar29[0xd] = uVar19;\n       puVar30 = puVar29 + 0x10;\n       puVar29[0xe] = uVar17;\n       puVar29[0xf] = uVar18;\n       lVar35 = lVar35 + -1;\n       puVar29 = puVar30;\n     } while (lVar35 != 0);\n     *(undefined4 *)puVar30 = *(undefined4 *)param_6;\n     lVar35 = 2;\n     puVar31 = local_238;\n     do {\n       uVar16 = *(undefined8 *)(param_3 + 2);\n       uVar17 = *(undefined8 *)(param_3 + 4);\n       uVar18 = *(undefined8 *)(param_3 + 6);\n       *(undefined8 *)puVar31 = *(undefined8 *)param_3;\n       *(undefined8 *)(puVar31 + 2) = uVar16;\n       uVar16 = *(undefined8 *)(param_3 + 8);\n       uVar19 = *(undefined8 *)(param_3 + 10);\n       *(undefined8 *)(puVar31 + 4) = uVar17;\n       *(undefined8 *)(puVar31 + 6) = uVar18;\n       uVar17 = *(undefined8 *)(param_3 + 0xc);\n       uVar18 = *(undefined8 *)(param_3 + 0xe);\n       *(undefined8 *)(puVar31 + 8) = uVar16;\n       *(undefined8 *)(puVar31 + 10) = uVar19;\n       uVar16 = *(undefined8 *)(param_3 + 0x10);\n       uVar19 = *(undefined8 *)(param_3 + 0x12);\n       *(undefined8 *)(puVar31 + 0xc) = uVar17;\n       *(undefined8 *)(puVar31 + 0xe) = uVar18;\n       uVar17 = *(undefined8 *)(param_3 + 0x14);\n       uVar18 = *(undefined8 *)(param_3 + 0x16);\n       *(undefined8 *)(puVar31 + 0x10) = uVar16;\n       *(undefined8 *)(puVar31 + 0x12) = uVar19;\n       uVar16 = *(undefined8 *)(param_3 + 0x18);\n       uVar19 = *(undefined8 *)(param_3 + 0x1a);\n       *(undefined8 *)(puVar31 + 0x14) = uVar17;\n       *(undefined8 *)(puVar31 + 0x16) = uVar18;\n       uVar17 = *(undefined8 *)(param_3 + 0x1c);\n       uVar18 = *(undefined8 *)(param_3 + 0x1e);\n       param_3 = param_3 + 0x20;\n       *(undefined8 *)(puVar31 + 0x18) = uVar16;\n       *(undefined8 *)(puVar31 + 0x1a) = uVar19;\n       puVar32 = puVar31 + 0x20;\n       *(undefined8 *)(puVar31 + 0x1c) = uVar17;\n       *(undefined8 *)(puVar31 + 0x1e) = uVar18;\n       lVar35 = lVar35 + -1;\n       puVar31 = puVar32;\n     } while (lVar35 != 0);\n     *puVar32 = *param_3;\n     uVar21 = CreateDhcpContextForNewLease\n                        ((longlong *)&local_490,0,local_238,uVar20,(longlong)local_348,param_7,\n                         local_118,uVar21);\n     ppppppplVar38 = local_490;\n     uVar36 = (ulonglong)uVar21;\n-    if (uVar21 != 0) goto LAB_4;\n+    if (uVar21 != 0) goto LAB_5;\n     *(undefined4 *)(local_490 + 0xf) = uVar20;\n     uVar20 = Ordinal_8();\n     *(undefined4 *)((longlong)ppppppplVar38 + 0x7c) = uVar20;\n     _Var25 = _time64((__time64_t *)0x0);\n     if (*(uint *)(param_2 + 0x28) < (uint)_Var25) {\n       if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-        WPP_SF_(0x404,0x20,0x18005ade8);\n+        WPP_SF_(0x404,0x22,0x18005ade8);\n       }\n       *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 0x10) = 0xffffffff;\n     }\n     else {\n       uVar20 = Ordinal_8();\n       *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 0x10) = uVar20;\n     }\n     *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 0x37) = *(undefined4 *)(param_2 + 0x1c);\n     uVar21 = *(uint *)(param_2 + 0x20);\n     if (uVar21 == 0xffffffff) {\n       pppppplVar33 = (longlong ******)0xffffffff;\n     }\n     else {\n       _Var25 = _time64((__time64_t *)0x0);\n       UVar28 = GetTickCount64();\n       auVar3._8_8_ = 0;\n       auVar3._0_8_ = UVar28;\n       lVar35 = SUB168(ZEXT816(0x624dd2f1a9fbe77) * auVar3,8);\n       pppppplVar26 = (longlong ******)\n                      (((lVar35 + (UVar28 - lVar35 >> 1) >> 9) - _Var25) + (ulonglong)uVar21);\n       pppppplVar33 = (longlong ******)0x0;\n       if (-1 < (longlong)pppppplVar26) {\n         pppppplVar33 = pppppplVar26;\n       }\n     }\n     ppppppplVar38[0x38] = pppppplVar33;\n     uVar21 = *(uint *)(param_2 + 0x24);\n     if (uVar21 == 0xffffffff) {\n       pppppplVar33 = (longlong ******)0xffffffff;\n     }\n     else {\n       _Var25 = _time64((__time64_t *)0x0);\n       UVar28 = GetTickCount64();\n       auVar4._8_8_ = 0;\n       auVar4._0_8_ = UVar28;\n       lVar35 = SUB168(ZEXT816(0x624dd2f1a9fbe77) * auVar4,8);\n       pppppplVar26 = (longlong ******)\n                      (((lVar35 + (UVar28 - lVar35 >> 1) >> 9) - _Var25) + (ulonglong)uVar21);\n       pppppplVar33 = (longlong ******)0x0;\n       if (-1 < (longlong)pppppplVar26) {\n         pppppplVar33 = pppppplVar26;\n       }\n     }\n     ppppppplVar38[0x39] = pppppplVar33;\n     uVar21 = *(uint *)(param_2 + 0x28);\n     if (uVar21 == 0xffffffff) {\n       pppppplVar33 = (longlong ******)0xffffffff;\n     }\n     else {\n       _Var25 = _time64((__time64_t *)0x0);\n       UVar28 = GetTickCount64();\n       auVar5._8_8_ = 0;\n       auVar5._0_8_ = UVar28;\n       lVar35 = SUB168(ZEXT816(0x624dd2f1a9fbe77) * auVar5,8);\n       pppppplVar26 = (longlong ******)\n                      (((lVar35 + (UVar28 - lVar35 >> 1) >> 9) - _Var25) + (ulonglong)uVar21);\n       pppppplVar33 = (longlong ******)0x0;\n       if (-1 < (longlong)pppppplVar26) {\n         pppppplVar33 = pppppplVar26;\n       }\n     }\n     ppppppplVar38[0x3a] = pppppplVar33;\n     uVar21 = *(uint *)(param_2 + 0x2c);\n     if (uVar21 == 0xffffffff) {\n       pppppplVar33 = (longlong ******)0xffffffff;\n     }\n     else {\n       _Var25 = _time64((__time64_t *)0x0);\n       UVar28 = GetTickCount64();\n       auVar6._8_8_ = 0;\n       auVar6._0_8_ = UVar28;\n       lVar35 = SUB168(ZEXT816(0x624dd2f1a9fbe77) * auVar6,8);\n       pppppplVar26 = (longlong ******)\n                      (((lVar35 + (UVar28 - lVar35 >> 1) >> 9) - _Var25) + (ulonglong)uVar21);\n       pppppplVar33 = (longlong ******)0x0;\n       if (-1 < (longlong)pppppplVar26) {\n         pppppplVar33 = pppppplVar26;\n       }\n     }\n     ppppppplVar38[0x3b] = pppppplVar33;\n     ppppppplVar27 = ppppppplVar38 + 0x55;\n     *(undefined4 *)((longlong)ppppppplVar38 + 0x314) = 1;\n     *(undefined4 *)((longlong)ppppppplVar38 + 0x234) = 1;\n     ppppppplVar38 = (longlong *******)*ppppppplVar27;\n-    if ((longlong *******)ppppppplVar38[1] != ppppppplVar27) goto LAB_5;\n+    if ((longlong *******)ppppppplVar38[1] != ppppppplVar27) goto LAB_6;\n     ppppppplVar38[1] = (longlong ******)&local_478;\n     *ppppppplVar27 = (longlong ******)&local_478;\n     local_478 = ppppppplVar38;\n     ppppppplStack_470 = ppppppplVar27;\n-LAB_3:\n+LAB_4:\n     iVar37 = -1;\n     uVar20 = Ordinal_8(local_488);\n     ppppppplVar38 = local_490;\n     uVar21 = InitializeDhcpSocket((longlong *)(local_490 + 9),uVar20);\n     uVar36 = (ulonglong)uVar21;\n-    if (uVar21 != 0) goto LAB_4;\n+    if (uVar21 != 0) goto LAB_5;\n     ppppppplVar27 = RenewLease(ppppppplVar38,local_480,0,(longlong *******)0x1,&local_484,local_418)\n     ;\n     uVar36 = (ulonglong)ppppppplVar27 & 0xffffffff;\n     if (DhcpGlobalIsShuttingDown == 0) {\n-      if ((int)ppppppplVar27 != 0) goto LAB_4;\n+      if ((int)ppppppplVar27 != 0) goto LAB_5;\n       uVar20 = Ordinal_14(*(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar38 + 0x10));\n       *(undefined4 *)(param_2 + 0x18) = uVar20;\n       uVar24 = 0xe10;\n       if (local_400 != 0) {\n         uVar24 = (ulonglong)local_400;\n       }\n       uVar21 = (uint)uVar24;\n       *(uint *)(param_2 + 0x1c) = uVar21;\n       UVar28 = GetTickCount64();\n       auVar11._8_8_ = 0;\n       auVar11._0_8_ = UVar28;\n       lVar35 = SUB168(ZEXT816(0x624dd2f1a9fbe77) * auVar11,8);\n       uVar22 = (uint)((UVar28 - lVar35 >> 1) + lVar35 >> 9);\n       *(uint *)(param_2 + 0x20) = uVar22;\n       if ((local_3f8 == 0) || (uVar21 < local_3f8)) {\n         local_3f8 = uVar21 * 7 >> 3;\n       }\n       if (((local_3fc == 0) || (local_3f8 < local_3fc)) &&\n          (local_3fc = (uint)(uVar24 >> 1), local_3f8 <= local_3fc)) {\n         local_3fc = local_3f8 - 1;\n       }\n       *(uint *)(param_2 + 0x24) = uVar22 + local_3fc;\n       if (uVar22 + local_3fc < uVar22) {\n         *(undefined4 *)(param_2 + 0x24) = 0xffffffff;\n       }\n       *(uint *)(param_2 + 0x28) = uVar22 + local_3f8;\n       if (uVar22 + local_3f8 < uVar22) {\n         *(undefined4 *)(param_2 + 0x28) = 0xffffffff;\n       }\n       *(uint *)(param_2 + 0x2c) = uVar22 + uVar21;\n       if (uVar22 + uVar21 < uVar22) {\n         *(undefined4 *)(param_2 + 0x2c) = 0xffffffff;\n       }\n       if (uVar22 == 0xffffffff) {\n         iVar39 = -1;\n       }\n       else {\n         _Var25 = _time64((__time64_t *)0x0);\n         UVar28 = GetTickCount64();\n         auVar12._8_8_ = 0;\n         auVar12._0_8_ = UVar28;\n         lVar35 = SUB168(ZEXT816(0x624dd2f1a9fbe77) * auVar12,8);\n         iVar39 = (uVar22 - (int)((UVar28 - lVar35 >> 1) + lVar35 >> 9)) + (int)_Var25;\n       }\n       iVar1 = *(int *)(param_2 + 0x24);\n       *(int *)(param_2 + 0x20) = iVar39;\n       if (iVar1 == -1) {\n         iVar39 = -1;\n       }\n       else {\n         _Var25 = _time64((__time64_t *)0x0);\n         UVar28 = GetTickCount64();\n         auVar13._8_8_ = 0;\n         auVar13._0_8_ = UVar28;\n         lVar35 = SUB168(ZEXT816(0x624dd2f1a9fbe77) * auVar13,8);\n         iVar39 = (iVar1 - (int)((UVar28 - lVar35 >> 1) + lVar35 >> 9)) + (int)_Var25;\n       }\n       *(int *)(param_2 + 0x24) = iVar39;\n       iVar39 = *(int *)(param_2 + 0x28);\n       if (iVar39 == -1) {\n         iVar39 = -1;\n       }\n       else {\n         _Var25 = _time64((__time64_t *)0x0);\n         UVar28 = GetTickCount64();\n         auVar14._8_8_ = 0;\n         auVar14._0_8_ = UVar28;\n         lVar35 = SUB168(ZEXT816(0x624dd2f1a9fbe77) * auVar14,8);\n         iVar39 = (iVar39 - (int)((UVar28 - lVar35 >> 1) + lVar35 >> 9)) + (int)_Var25;\n       }\n       *(int *)(param_2 + 0x28) = iVar39;\n       iVar39 = *(int *)(param_2 + 0x2c);\n       if (iVar39 != -1) {\n         _Var25 = _time64((__time64_t *)0x0);\n         UVar28 = GetTickCount64();\n         auVar15._8_8_ = 0;\n         auVar15._0_8_ = UVar28;\n         lVar35 = SUB168(ZEXT816(0x624dd2f1a9fbe77) * auVar15,8);\n         iVar37 = (int)_Var25 + (iVar39 - (int)((UVar28 - lVar35 >> 1) + lVar35 >> 9));\n       }\n       uVar36 = 0;\n       *(int *)(param_2 + 0x2c) = iVar37;\n     }\n     else {\n       uVar36 = 0x41;\n       if ((DAT_0 & 2) != 0) {\n-        WPP_SF_D(0x401,0x23,0x18005ade8,0x41);\n-        goto LAB_4;\n+        WPP_SF_D(0x401,0x25,0x18005ade8,0x41);\n+        goto LAB_5;\n       }\n     }\n   }\n   if (local_428 != (undefined8 *)0x0) {\n     *local_428 = 0;\n   }\n   DhcpCleanParsedOptions(local_418);\n   if (ppppppplVar38 != (longlong *******)0x0) {\n     ppppppplVar27 = ppppppplVar38 + 0x55;\n     pppppplVar33 = *ppppppplVar27;\n     if (((longlong *******)pppppplVar33[1] != ppppppplVar27) ||\n        (pppppplVar26 = (longlong ******)*pppppplVar33,\n        (longlong ******)pppppplVar26[1] != pppppplVar33)) {\n-LAB_5:\n+LAB_6:\n       pcVar2 = (code *)swi(0x29);\n       (*pcVar2)(3);\n       pcVar2 = (code *)swi(3);\n       uVar24 = (*pcVar2)();\n       return uVar24;\n     }\n     *ppppppplVar27 = pppppplVar26;\n     pppppplVar26[1] = (longlong *****)ppppppplVar27;\n     LOCK();\n     ppppppplVar38 = ppppppplVar38 + 2;\n     iVar37 = *(int *)ppppppplVar38;\n     *(int *)ppppppplVar38 = *(int *)ppppppplVar38 + -1;\n     UNLOCK();\n     if (iVar37 == 1) {\n       DhcpDestroyContextEx((longlong)local_490);\n     }\n   }\n   if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) == 0) {\n     return uVar36;\n   }\n-  uVar34 = 0x24;\n-LAB_1:\n+  uVar34 = 0x26;\n+LAB_2:\n   WPP_SF_D(0x404,uVar34,0x18005ade8,(int)uVar36);\n   return uVar36;\n }\n \n\n```\n\n\n## LeaseIpAddressEx\n\n### Match Info\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521 - dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|diff_type|code,length,sig,address|\n|ratio|0.15|\n|i_ratio|0.52|\n|m_ratio|0.97|\n|b_ratio|0.91|\n|match_types|SymbolsHash|\n\n### Function Meta Diff\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: | :---: |\n|name|LeaseIpAddressEx|LeaseIpAddressEx|\n|fullname|LeaseIpAddressEx|LeaseIpAddressEx|\n|refcount|3|3|\n|`length`|1296|1386|\n|called|\nExpand for full list:API-MS-WIN-CORE-HEAP-OBSOLETE-L1-1-0.DLL::LocalFreeCheckForAddressConflictCreateDhcpContextForNewLeaseCreateInfoForNewLeaseDetermineHardwareAddressForNewLeaseDhcpCleanParsedOptionsDhcpCommonInitDhcpDestroyContextExDhcpPerformIPAutoconfigurationGrandHashingInitializeDhcpSocketObtainInitialParametersSendDhcpDeclineWPP_SF_WPP_SF_DWPP_SF_DJWPP_SF_dDJWPP_SF_lDWS2_32.DLL::Ordinal_14__security_check_cookiememset|\nExpand for full list:API-MS-WIN-CORE-HEAP-OBSOLETE-L1-1-0.DLL::LocalFreeCheckForAddressConflictCreateDhcpContextForNewLeaseCreateInfoForNewLeaseDetermineHardwareAddressForNewLeaseDhcpCleanParsedOptionsDhcpCommonInitDhcpDestroyContextExDhcpPerformIPAutoconfigurationGrandHashingInitializeDhcpSocketObtainInitialParametersSendDhcpDeclineWPP_SF_WPP_SF_DWPP_SF_DJWPP_SF_dDJWPP_SF_lDWS2_32.DLL::Ordinal_14__security_check_cookiememset|\n|calling|RpcSrvLeaseIpAddressExRpcSrvLeaseIpAddressEx_New|RpcSrvLeaseIpAddressExRpcSrvLeaseIpAddressEx_New|\n|paramcount|8|8|\n|`address`|18003fac4|18003fb54|\n|`sig`|ulonglong __fastcall LeaseIpAddressEx(uint param_1, uint * param_2, undefined4 param_3, undefined8 param_4, undefined8 * param_5, undefined8 * param_6, undefined8 * param_7, int param_8)|int __fastcall LeaseIpAddressEx(uint param_1, uint * param_2, undefined4 param_3, undefined8 param_4, undefined8 * param_5, undefined8 * param_6, undefined8 * param_7, uint param_8)|\n|sym_type|Function|Function|\n|sym_source|IMPORTED|IMPORTED|\n|external|False|False|\n\n### LeaseIpAddressEx Diff\n\n\n```diff\n--- LeaseIpAddressEx\n+++ LeaseIpAddressEx\n@@ -1,286 +1,289 @@\n \n /* WARNING: Function: __security_check_cookie replaced with injection: security_check_cookie */\n \n-ulonglong LeaseIpAddressEx(uint param_1,uint *param_2,undefined4 param_3,undefined8 param_4,\n-                          undefined8 *param_5,undefined8 *param_6,undefined8 *param_7,int param_8)\n+int LeaseIpAddressEx(uint param_1,uint *param_2,undefined4 param_3,undefined8 param_4,\n+                    undefined8 *param_5,undefined8 *param_6,undefined8 *param_7,uint param_8)\n \n {\n   undefined8 uVar1;\n   undefined8 uVar2;\n   undefined8 uVar3;\n-  undefined8 uVar4;\n-  uint uVar5;\n-  undefined4 uVar6;\n-  int iVar7;\n-  longlong *******ppppppplVar8;\n-  ulonglong uVar9;\n-  uint *puVar10;\n-  uint *puVar11;\n+  uint uVar4;\n+  undefined4 uVar5;\n+  int iVar6;\n+  longlong *******ppppppplVar7;\n+  undefined8 uVar8;\n+  uint *puVar9;\n+  longlong lVar10;\n+  ulonglong uVar11;\n   uint *puVar12;\n-  undefined8 *puVar13;\n+  uint *puVar13;\n   undefined8 *puVar14;\n-  longlong lVar15;\n-  longlong *******ppppppplVar16;\n-  ulonglong uVar17;\n+  undefined8 *puVar15;\n+  ushort uVar16;\n+  longlong lVar17;\n+  int iVar18;\n   undefined1 auStackY_4b8 [32];\n   longlong *******local_478;\n   uint local_470;\n   uint local_46c;\n-  HLOCAL local_468;\n-  int local_460 [2];\n-  undefined8 *local_458;\n+  uint local_468 [2];\n+  HLOCAL local_460;\n+  undefined4 local_458;\n+  int local_454;\n+  undefined8 *local_450;\n   undefined1 local_448 [208];\n   uint local_378 [68];\n   undefined8 local_268 [34];\n   uint local_158 [68];\n   undefined8 local_48;\n   ulonglong local_40;\n   \n   local_40 = __security_cookie ^ (ulonglong)auStackY_4b8;\n-  local_458 = param_5;\n-  ppppppplVar8 = (longlong *******)0x0;\n-  local_46c = 0;\n+  local_450 = param_5;\n+  ppppppplVar7 = (longlong *******)0x0;\n+  local_468[0] = 0;\n   local_478 = (longlong *******)0x0;\n   local_470 = 0;\n   local_48 = 0;\n-  local_460[0] = 0;\n-  local_468 = (HLOCAL)0x0;\n+  local_454 = 0;\n+  local_46c = 0;\n+  local_460 = (HLOCAL)0x0;\n+  local_458 = param_3;\n   memset(local_448,0,200);\n   if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n     WPP_SF_lD(0x404,0x14,0x18005ade8,param_1);\n   }\n-  *local_458 = 0;\n-  if (param_6 != (undefined8 *)0x0) {\n-    *param_6 = 0;\n-  }\n-  uVar9 = DhcpCommonInit();\n-  uVar17 = uVar9 & 0xffffffff;\n-  ppppppplVar16 = ppppppplVar8;\n-  if ((int)uVar9 == 0) {\n-    lVar15 = 2;\n-    puVar10 = param_2;\n-    puVar11 = local_378;\n+  if ((g_fVelocityDhcpv4LeaseIpAddressOverflow == 0) || (param_8 < 0x100)) {\n+    *local_450 = 0;\n+    if (param_6 != (undefined8 *)0x0) {\n+      *param_6 = 0;\n+    }\n+    uVar8 = DhcpCommonInit();\n+    iVar18 = (int)uVar8;\n+    ppppppplVar7 = (longlong *******)0x0;\n+    if (iVar18 != 0) goto LAB_1;\n+    lVar10 = 2;\n+    puVar9 = param_2;\n+    puVar12 = local_378;\n+    lVar17 = lVar10;\n     do {\n-      uVar1 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 2);\n-      uVar2 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 4);\n-      uVar3 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 6);\n-      *(undefined8 *)puVar11 = *(undefined8 *)puVar10;\n-      *(undefined8 *)(puVar11 + 2) = uVar1;\n-      uVar1 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 8);\n-      uVar4 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 10);\n-      *(undefined8 *)(puVar11 + 4) = uVar2;\n-      *(undefined8 *)(puVar11 + 6) = uVar3;\n-      uVar2 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0xc);\n-      uVar3 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0xe);\n-      *(undefined8 *)(puVar11 + 8) = uVar1;\n-      *(undefined8 *)(puVar11 + 10) = uVar4;\n-      uVar1 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0x10);\n-      uVar4 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0x12);\n-      *(undefined8 *)(puVar11 + 0xc) = uVar2;\n-      *(undefined8 *)(puVar11 + 0xe) = uVar3;\n-      uVar2 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0x14);\n-      uVar3 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0x16);\n-      *(undefined8 *)(puVar11 + 0x10) = uVar1;\n-      *(undefined8 *)(puVar11 + 0x12) = uVar4;\n-      uVar1 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0x18);\n-      uVar4 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0x1a);\n-      *(undefined8 *)(puVar11 + 0x14) = uVar2;\n-      *(undefined8 *)(puVar11 + 0x16) = uVar3;\n-      uVar2 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0x1c);\n-      uVar3 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0x1e);\n-      puVar10 = puVar10 + 0x20;\n-      *(undefined8 *)(puVar11 + 0x18) = uVar1;\n-      *(undefined8 *)(puVar11 + 0x1a) = uVar4;\n-      puVar12 = puVar11 + 0x20;\n-      *(undefined8 *)(puVar11 + 0x1c) = uVar2;\n-      *(undefined8 *)(puVar11 + 0x1e) = uVar3;\n-      lVar15 = lVar15 + -1;\n-      puVar11 = puVar12;\n-    } while (lVar15 != 0);\n-    *puVar12 = *puVar10;\n-    uVar5 = DetermineHardwareAddressForNewLease(&local_48,0,&local_470,param_1,local_378);\n-    uVar17 = (ulonglong)uVar5;\n-    ppppppplVar16 = (longlong *******)0x0;\n-    if (uVar5 == 0) {\n-      lVar15 = 2;\n-      puVar13 = local_268;\n-      do {\n-        uVar1 = param_7[1];\n-        uVar2 = param_7[2];\n-        uVar3 = param_7[3];\n-        *puVar13 = *param_7;\n-        puVar13[1] = uVar1;\n-        uVar1 = param_7[4];\n-        uVar4 = param_7[5];\n-        puVar13[2] = uVar2;\n-        puVar13[3] = uVar3;\n-        uVar2 = param_7[6];\n-        uVar3 = param_7[7];\n-        puVar13[4] = uVar1;\n-        puVar13[5] = uVar4;\n-        uVar1 = param_7[8];\n-        uVar4 = param_7[9];\n-        puVar13[6] = uVar2;\n-        puVar13[7] = uVar3;\n-        uVar2 = param_7[10];\n-        uVar3 = param_7[0xb];\n-        puVar13[8] = uVar1;\n-        puVar13[9] = uVar4;\n-        uVar1 = param_7[0xc];\n-        uVar4 = param_7[0xd];\n-        puVar13[10] = uVar2;\n-        puVar13[0xb] = uVar3;\n-        uVar2 = param_7[0xe];\n-        uVar3 = param_7[0xf];\n-        param_7 = param_7 + 0x10;\n-        puVar13[0xc] = uVar1;\n-        puVar13[0xd] = uVar4;\n-        puVar14 = puVar13 + 0x10;\n-        puVar13[0xe] = uVar2;\n-        puVar13[0xf] = uVar3;\n-        lVar15 = lVar15 + -1;\n-        puVar13 = puVar14;\n-      } while (lVar15 != 0);\n-      *(undefined4 *)puVar14 = *(undefined4 *)param_7;\n-      lVar15 = 2;\n-      puVar10 = local_158;\n-      do {\n-        uVar1 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 2);\n-        uVar2 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 4);\n-        uVar3 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 6);\n-        *(undefined8 *)puVar10 = *(undefined8 *)param_2;\n-        *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 2) = uVar1;\n-        uVar1 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 8);\n-        uVar4 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 10);\n-        *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 4) = uVar2;\n-        *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 6) = uVar3;\n-        uVar2 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0xc);\n-        uVar3 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0xe);\n-        *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 8) = uVar1;\n-        *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 10) = uVar4;\n-        uVar1 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0x10);\n-        uVar4 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0x12);\n-        *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0xc) = uVar2;\n-        *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0xe) = uVar3;\n-        uVar2 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0x14);\n-        uVar3 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0x16);\n-        *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0x10) = uVar1;\n-        *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0x12) = uVar4;\n-        uVar1 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0x18);\n-        uVar4 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0x1a);\n-        *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0x14) = uVar2;\n-        *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0x16) = uVar3;\n-        uVar2 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0x1c);\n-        uVar3 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0x1e);\n-        param_2 = param_2 + 0x20;\n-        *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0x18) = uVar1;\n-        *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0x1a) = uVar4;\n-        puVar11 = puVar10 + 0x20;\n-        *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0x1c) = uVar2;\n-        *(undefined8 *)(puVar10 + 0x1e) = uVar3;\n-        lVar15 = lVar15 + -1;\n-        puVar10 = puVar11;\n-      } while (lVar15 != 0);\n-      *puVar11 = *param_2;\n-      uVar5 = CreateDhcpContextForNewLease\n-                        ((longlong *)&local_478,0x80,local_158,param_3,(longlong)local_268,param_8,\n-                         &local_48,local_470);\n-      ppppppplVar16 = local_478;\n-      uVar17 = (ulonglong)uVar5;\n-      if (uVar5 == 0) {\n-        if (param_1 == 0x7f000001) {\n-          uVar5 = GrandHashing((byte *)local_478[0xb],*(uint *)(local_478 + 0xc),\n-                               (uint *)((longlong)local_478 + 0x1ac),*(uint *)(local_478 + 0x35),\n-                               *(uint *)((longlong)local_478 + 0x1a4));\n-          *(uint *)(ppppppplVar16 + 0xf) = uVar5;\n-          *(undefined4 *)((longlong)ppppppplVar16 + 0x7c) = *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar16 + 0x35);\n-          *(undefined4 *)((longlong)ppppppplVar16 + 0x31c) = 1;\n-        }\n-        else {\n-          uVar6 = Ordinal_14(param_1);\n-          ppppppplVar16 = local_478;\n-          uVar5 = InitializeDhcpSocket((longlong *)(local_478 + 9),uVar6);\n-          uVar17 = (ulonglong)uVar5;\n-          if (uVar5 != 0) goto LAB_1;\n-          while ((uint)ppppppplVar8 < 3) {\n-            uVar5 = (uint)ppppppplVar8 + 1;\n-            ppppppplVar8 = (longlong *******)(ulonglong)uVar5;\n+      uVar8 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 2);\n+      uVar1 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 4);\n+      uVar2 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 6);\n+      *(undefined8 *)puVar12 = *(undefined8 *)puVar9;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar12 + 2) = uVar8;\n+      uVar8 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 8);\n+      uVar3 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 10);\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar12 + 4) = uVar1;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar12 + 6) = uVar2;\n+      uVar1 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0xc);\n+      uVar2 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0xe);\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar12 + 8) = uVar8;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar12 + 10) = uVar3;\n+      uVar8 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0x10);\n+      uVar3 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0x12);\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar12 + 0xc) = uVar1;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar12 + 0xe) = uVar2;\n+      uVar1 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0x14);\n+      uVar2 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0x16);\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar12 + 0x10) = uVar8;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar12 + 0x12) = uVar3;\n+      uVar8 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0x18);\n+      uVar3 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0x1a);\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar12 + 0x14) = uVar1;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar12 + 0x16) = uVar2;\n+      uVar1 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0x1c);\n+      uVar2 = *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0x1e);\n+      puVar9 = puVar9 + 0x20;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar12 + 0x18) = uVar8;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar12 + 0x1a) = uVar3;\n+      puVar13 = puVar12 + 0x20;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar12 + 0x1c) = uVar1;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar12 + 0x1e) = uVar2;\n+      lVar17 = lVar17 + -1;\n+      puVar12 = puVar13;\n+    } while (lVar17 != 0);\n+    *puVar13 = *puVar9;\n+    iVar18 = DetermineHardwareAddressForNewLease(&local_48,0,&local_470,param_1,local_378);\n+    if (iVar18 != 0) goto LAB_1;\n+    lVar17 = lVar10;\n+    puVar14 = local_268;\n+    do {\n+      uVar8 = param_7[1];\n+      uVar1 = param_7[2];\n+      uVar2 = param_7[3];\n+      *puVar14 = *param_7;\n+      puVar14[1] = uVar8;\n+      uVar8 = param_7[4];\n+      uVar3 = param_7[5];\n+      puVar14[2] = uVar1;\n+      puVar14[3] = uVar2;\n+      uVar1 = param_7[6];\n+      uVar2 = param_7[7];\n+      puVar14[4] = uVar8;\n+      puVar14[5] = uVar3;\n+      uVar8 = param_7[8];\n+      uVar3 = param_7[9];\n+      puVar14[6] = uVar1;\n+      puVar14[7] = uVar2;\n+      uVar1 = param_7[10];\n+      uVar2 = param_7[0xb];\n+      puVar14[8] = uVar8;\n+      puVar14[9] = uVar3;\n+      uVar8 = param_7[0xc];\n+      uVar3 = param_7[0xd];\n+      puVar14[10] = uVar1;\n+      puVar14[0xb] = uVar2;\n+      uVar1 = param_7[0xe];\n+      uVar2 = param_7[0xf];\n+      param_7 = param_7 + 0x10;\n+      puVar14[0xc] = uVar8;\n+      puVar14[0xd] = uVar3;\n+      puVar15 = puVar14 + 0x10;\n+      puVar14[0xe] = uVar1;\n+      puVar14[0xf] = uVar2;\n+      lVar17 = lVar17 + -1;\n+      puVar14 = puVar15;\n+    } while (lVar17 != 0);\n+    *(undefined4 *)puVar15 = *(undefined4 *)param_7;\n+    puVar9 = local_158;\n+    do {\n+      uVar8 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 2);\n+      uVar1 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 4);\n+      uVar2 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 6);\n+      *(undefined8 *)puVar9 = *(undefined8 *)param_2;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 2) = uVar8;\n+      uVar8 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 8);\n+      uVar3 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 10);\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 4) = uVar1;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 6) = uVar2;\n+      uVar1 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0xc);\n+      uVar2 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0xe);\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 8) = uVar8;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 10) = uVar3;\n+      uVar8 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0x10);\n+      uVar3 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0x12);\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0xc) = uVar1;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0xe) = uVar2;\n+      uVar1 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0x14);\n+      uVar2 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0x16);\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0x10) = uVar8;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0x12) = uVar3;\n+      uVar8 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0x18);\n+      uVar3 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0x1a);\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0x14) = uVar1;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0x16) = uVar2;\n+      uVar1 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0x1c);\n+      uVar2 = *(undefined8 *)(param_2 + 0x1e);\n+      param_2 = param_2 + 0x20;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0x18) = uVar8;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0x1a) = uVar3;\n+      puVar12 = puVar9 + 0x20;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0x1c) = uVar1;\n+      *(undefined8 *)(puVar9 + 0x1e) = uVar2;\n+      lVar10 = lVar10 + -1;\n+      puVar9 = puVar12;\n+    } while (lVar10 != 0);\n+    *puVar12 = *param_2;\n+    iVar18 = CreateDhcpContextForNewLease\n+                       ((longlong *)&local_478,0x80,local_158,local_458,(longlong)local_268,param_8,\n+                        &local_48,local_470);\n+    ppppppplVar7 = local_478;\n+    if (iVar18 != 0) goto LAB_1;\n+    if (param_1 == 0x7f000001) {\n+      uVar4 = GrandHashing((byte *)local_478[0xb],*(uint *)(local_478 + 0xc),\n+                           (uint *)((longlong)local_478 + 0x1ac),*(uint *)(local_478 + 0x35),\n+                           *(uint *)((longlong)local_478 + 0x1a4));\n+      *(uint *)(ppppppplVar7 + 0xf) = uVar4;\n+      *(undefined4 *)((longlong)ppppppplVar7 + 0x7c) = *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar7 + 0x35);\n+      *(undefined4 *)((longlong)ppppppplVar7 + 0x31c) = 1;\n+    }\n+    else {\n+      uVar5 = Ordinal_14(param_1);\n+      ppppppplVar7 = local_478;\n+      iVar18 = InitializeDhcpSocket((longlong *)(local_478 + 9),uVar5);\n+      if (iVar18 != 0) goto LAB_1;\n+      while (local_46c < 3) {\n+        local_46c = local_46c + 1;\n+        if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n+          WPP_SF_dDJ(0x404,0x16,0x18005ade8,local_46c);\n+        }\n+        uVar11 = ObtainInitialParameters(ppppppplVar7,local_468,&local_454,local_448);\n+        iVar18 = (int)uVar11;\n+        if (iVar18 == 0) {\n+          iVar6 = CheckForAddressConflict\n+                            (*(int *)(ppppppplVar7 + 0xf),ppppppplVar7[0xb],\n+                             *(uint *)(ppppppplVar7 + 0xc),1);\n+          iVar18 = 0;\n+          if (iVar6 == 0x1004) {\n+            iVar18 = 0x1004;\n+          }\n+          if (iVar18 == 0) {\n             if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-              WPP_SF_dDJ(0x404,0x15,0x18005ade8,uVar5);\n+              WPP_SF_DJ(0x404,0x18,0x18005ade8,*(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar7 + 0xf));\n             }\n-            uVar9 = ObtainInitialParameters(ppppppplVar16,&local_46c,local_460,local_448);\n-            uVar17 = uVar9 & 0xffffffff;\n-            if ((int)uVar9 == 0) {\n-              iVar7 = CheckForAddressConflict\n-                                (*(int *)(ppppppplVar16 + 0xf),ppppppplVar16[0xb],\n-                                 *(uint *)(ppppppplVar16 + 0xc),1);\n-              uVar17 = 0;\n-              if (iVar7 == 0x1004) {\n-                uVar17 = 0x1004;\n-              }\n-              if ((int)uVar17 == 0) {\n-                if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                  WPP_SF_DJ(0x404,0x17,0x18005ade8,*(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar16 + 0xf));\n-                }\n-                goto LAB_2;\n-              }\n-              if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                WPP_SF_(0x404,0x18,0x18005ade8);\n-              }\n-              SendDhcpDecline(ppppppplVar16,local_46c,*(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar16 + 0x10),\n-                              *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar16 + 0xf));\n-              *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar16 + 0xf) = 0;\n-              *(undefined4 *)((longlong)ppppppplVar16 + 0x84) = 0;\n-            }\n-            else if ((DAT_0 & 2) != 0) {\n-              WPP_SF_D(0x401,0x16,0x18005ade8,(int)uVar9);\n-            }\n+            goto LAB_2;\n           }\n-          if ((int)uVar17 == 0x79) {\n-            if ((DAT_0 & 2) != 0) {\n-              WPP_SF_D(0x401,0x19,0x18005ade8,0x79);\n-            }\n-            uVar5 = DhcpPerformIPAutoconfiguration((longlong)ppppppplVar16);\n-            uVar17 = (ulonglong)uVar5;\n-            if (uVar5 != 0) {\n-              if ((DAT_0 & 2) != 0) {\n-                WPP_SF_D(0x401,0x1a,0x18005ade8,uVar5);\n-              }\n-              goto LAB_1;\n-            }\n+          if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n+            WPP_SF_(0x404,0x19,0x18005ade8);\n           }\n-          else if ((int)uVar17 != 0) goto LAB_1;\n-        }\n+          SendDhcpDecline(ppppppplVar7,local_468[0],*(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar7 + 0x10),\n+                          *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar7 + 0xf));\n+          *(undefined4 *)(ppppppplVar7 + 0xf) = 0;\n+          *(undefined4 *)((longlong)ppppppplVar7 + 0x84) = 0;\n+        }\n+        else if ((DAT_0 & 2) != 0) {\n+          WPP_SF_D(0x401,0x17,0x18005ade8,iVar18);\n+        }\n+      }\n+      if (iVar18 == 0x79) {\n+        if ((DAT_0 & 2) != 0) {\n+          WPP_SF_D(0x401,0x1a,0x18005ade8,0x79);\n+        }\n+        iVar18 = DhcpPerformIPAutoconfiguration((longlong)ppppppplVar7);\n+        if (iVar18 != 0) {\n+          if ((DAT_0 & 2) == 0) goto LAB_180040051;\n+          uVar16 = 0x1b;\n+          goto LAB_3;\n+        }\n+      }\n+      else if (iVar18 != 0) goto LAB_1;\n+    }\n LAB_2:\n-        uVar5 = CreateInfoForNewLease((longlong)ppppppplVar16,&local_468);\n-        puVar13 = local_458;\n-        uVar17 = (ulonglong)uVar5;\n-        if (uVar5 == 0) {\n-          *local_458 = local_468;\n-          local_468 = (HLOCAL)0x0;\n-        }\n-        if (local_468 != (HLOCAL)0x0) {\n-          LocalFree(local_468);\n-          *puVar13 = 0;\n-        }\n-      }\n-    }\n+    iVar18 = CreateInfoForNewLease((longlong)ppppppplVar7,&local_460);\n+    puVar14 = local_450;\n+    if (iVar18 == 0) {\n+      *local_450 = local_460;\n+      local_460 = (HLOCAL)0x0;\n+    }\n+    if (local_460 != (HLOCAL)0x0) {\n+      LocalFree(local_460);\n+      *puVar14 = 0;\n+    }\n+  }\n+  else {\n+    iVar18 = 0x57;\n+    if ((DAT_0 & 2) == 0) goto LAB_180040051;\n+    uVar16 = 0x15;\n+LAB_3:\n+    WPP_SF_D(0x401,uVar16,0x18005ade8,iVar18);\n   }\n LAB_1:\n   DhcpCleanParsedOptions(local_448);\n-  if (ppppppplVar16 != (longlong *******)0x0) {\n+  if (ppppppplVar7 != (longlong *******)0x0) {\n     LOCK();\n-    ppppppplVar16 = ppppppplVar16 + 2;\n-    iVar7 = *(int *)ppppppplVar16;\n-    *(int *)ppppppplVar16 = *(int *)ppppppplVar16 + -1;\n+    ppppppplVar7 = ppppppplVar7 + 2;\n+    iVar6 = *(int *)ppppppplVar7;\n+    *(int *)ppppppplVar7 = *(int *)ppppppplVar7 + -1;\n     UNLOCK();\n-    if (iVar7 == 1) {\n+    if (iVar6 == 1) {\n       DhcpDestroyContextEx((longlong)local_478);\n     }\n   }\n   if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-    WPP_SF_D(0x404,0x1b,0x18005ade8,(int)uVar17);\n-  }\n-  return uVar17;\n+    WPP_SF_D(0x404,0x1c,0x18005ade8,iVar18);\n+  }\n+  return iVar18;\n }\n \n\n```\n\n\n## GetOriginalSubnetMask\n\n### Match Info\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521 - dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|diff_type|code,length,address|\n|ratio|0.24|\n|i_ratio|0.37|\n|m_ratio|0.83|\n|b_ratio|0.48|\n|match_types|SymbolsHash|\n\n### Function Meta Diff\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: | :---: |\n|name|GetOriginalSubnetMask|GetOriginalSubnetMask|\n|fullname|GetOriginalSubnetMask|GetOriginalSubnetMask|\n|refcount|3|3|\n|`length`|245|367|\n|called|API-MS-WIN-CORE-SYNCH-L1-1-0.DLL::AcquireSRWLockSharedAPI-MS-WIN-CORE-SYNCH-L1-1-0.DLL::ReleaseSRWLockSharedWPP_SF_DJWPP_SF_qWS2_32.DLL::Ordinal_14memcpy|API-MS-WIN-CORE-SYNCH-L1-1-0.DLL::AcquireSRWLockSharedAPI-MS-WIN-CORE-SYNCH-L1-1-0.DLL::ReleaseSRWLockSharedWPP_SF_DJWPP_SF_qWS2_32.DLL::Ordinal_14memcpy|\n|calling|RpcSrvGetOriginalSubnetMaskRpcSrvGetOriginalSubnetMask_New|RpcSrvGetOriginalSubnetMaskRpcSrvGetOriginalSubnetMask_New|\n|paramcount|2|2|\n|`address`|18000ff44|18001a100|\n|sig|undefined4 __fastcall GetOriginalSubnetMask(longlong param_1, undefined4 * param_2)|undefined4 __fastcall GetOriginalSubnetMask(longlong param_1, undefined4 * param_2)|\n|sym_type|Function|Function|\n|sym_source|IMPORTED|IMPORTED|\n|external|False|False|\n\n### GetOriginalSubnetMask Diff\n\n\n```diff\n--- GetOriginalSubnetMask\n+++ GetOriginalSubnetMask\n@@ -1,38 +1,51 @@\n \n undefined4 GetOriginalSubnetMask(longlong param_1,undefined4 *param_2)\n \n {\n-  undefined8 *puVar1;\n-  undefined4 uVar2;\n-  undefined8 *puVar3;\n-  undefined4 uVar4;\n+  uint uVar1;\n+  undefined8 *puVar2;\n+  undefined4 uVar3;\n+  undefined8 *puVar4;\n+  ushort uVar5;\n   \n-  uVar4 = 0;\n   if (param_2 == (undefined4 *)0x0) {\n-    uVar4 = 0x57;\n+    return 0x57;\n+  }\n+  *param_2 = 0;\n+  AcquireSRWLockShared((PSRWLOCK)(param_1 + 0x2a0));\n+  puVar2 = *(undefined8 **)(param_1 + 0x2b8);\n+  do {\n+    puVar4 = puVar2;\n+    if (puVar4 == (undefined8 *)(param_1 + 0x2b8)) {\n+      if ((DAT_0 & 2) != 0) {\n+        WPP_SF_q(0x401,0x3a,0x180057630,*(undefined8 *)(param_1 + 0x18));\n+      }\n+      goto LAB_1;\n+    }\n+    puVar2 = (undefined8 *)*puVar4;\n+  } while (*(int *)(puVar4 + 2) != 0xdd);\n+  uVar1 = *(uint *)(puVar4 + 7);\n+  if (g_fVelocityDhcpGetOriginalSubnetMaskFix == 0) {\n+    memcpy(param_2,(void *)puVar4[6],(ulonglong)uVar1);\n+    uVar3 = Ordinal_14(*param_2);\n+    if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) == 0) goto LAB_18001a181;\n+    uVar5 = 0x3d;\n   }\n   else {\n-    *param_2 = 0;\n-    AcquireSRWLockShared((PSRWLOCK)(param_1 + 0x2a0));\n-    puVar1 = *(undefined8 **)(param_1 + 0x2b8);\n-    do {\n-      puVar3 = puVar1;\n-      if (puVar3 == (undefined8 *)(param_1 + 0x2b8)) {\n-        if ((DAT_0 & 2) != 0) {\n-          WPP_SF_q(0x401,0x3a,0x180057630,*(undefined8 *)(param_1 + 0x18));\n-        }\n-        goto LAB_1;\n+    if (uVar1 != 4) {\n+      if ((DAT_0 & 2) != 0) {\n+        WPP_SF_DJ(0x401,0x3c,0x180057630,uVar1);\n       }\n-      puVar1 = (undefined8 *)*puVar3;\n-    } while (*(int *)(puVar3 + 2) != 0xdd);\n-    memcpy(param_2,(void *)puVar3[6],(ulonglong)*(uint *)(puVar3 + 7));\n-    uVar2 = Ordinal_14(*param_2);\n-    if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-      WPP_SF_DJ(0x404,0x3d,0x180057630,uVar2);\n+      goto LAB_1;\n     }\n+    memcpy(param_2,(void *)puVar4[6],4);\n+    uVar3 = Ordinal_14(*param_2);\n+    if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) == 0) goto LAB_18001a181;\n+    uVar5 = 0x3b;\n+  }\n+  WPP_SF_DJ(0x404,uVar5,0x180057630,uVar3);\n LAB_1:\n-    ReleaseSRWLockShared((PSRWLOCK)(param_1 + 0x2a0));\n-  }\n-  return uVar4;\n+  ReleaseSRWLockShared((PSRWLOCK)(param_1 + 0x2a0));\n+  return 0;\n }\n \n\n```\n\n\n## DhcpTraceVelocityData\n\n### Match Info\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521 - dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|diff_type|code,length,address|\n|ratio|0.07|\n|i_ratio|0.74|\n|m_ratio|0.95|\n|b_ratio|0.88|\n|match_types|SymbolsHash|\n\n### Function Meta Diff\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: | :---: |\n|name|DhcpTraceVelocityData|DhcpTraceVelocityData|\n|fullname|DhcpTraceVelocityData|DhcpTraceVelocityData|\n|refcount|2|2|\n|`length`|1051|1153|\n|called|WPP_SF_L|WPP_SF_L|\n|calling|DhcpFastWppCallback|DhcpFastWppCallback|\n|paramcount|0|0|\n|`address`|18004795c|180047ab0|\n|sig|undefined __fastcall DhcpTraceVelocityData(void)|undefined __fastcall DhcpTraceVelocityData(void)|\n|sym_type|Function|Function|\n|sym_source|IMPORTED|IMPORTED|\n|external|False|False|\n\n### DhcpTraceVelocityData Diff\n\n\n```diff\n--- DhcpTraceVelocityData\n+++ DhcpTraceVelocityData\n@@ -1,113 +1,77 @@\n \n void DhcpTraceVelocityData(void)\n \n {\n-  if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-    WPP_SF_L(0x404,10,0x18005b008,g_fUseIpv6OnlyPreferred);\n-    if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-      WPP_SF_L(0x404,0xb,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityIpv6OnlyPreferredEnabledDefault);\n-      if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-        WPP_SF_L(0x404,0xc,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpv4InformNegativeCacheFix);\n-        if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-          WPP_SF_L(0x404,0xd,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpInformModifiedLeaseTimesFix);\n-          if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-            WPP_SF_L(0x404,0xe,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityApistubStyleUpdate);\n-            if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-              WPP_SF_L(0x404,0xf,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpClassedClasslessRoutesFix);\n-              if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x10,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpv6ParserFreeCleanup);\n-                if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                  WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x11,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpv6MultiRecordOptionSupport);\n-                  if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                    WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x12,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityResetUnderRenewalStatus);\n-                    if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                      WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x13,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityAddUserClassTracing);\n-                      if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                        WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x14,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpFixEtwEventErrors);\n-                        if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                          WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x15,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpnsiv6StyleUpdate);\n-                          if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                            WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x16,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityRegFillParamsLoopFix);\n-                            if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                              WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x17,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityRemoveFTimersEnabled);\n-                              if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                                WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x18,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpIPxlatPolicyMgr);\n-                                if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                                  WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x19,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpOption108RenewFix);\n-                                  if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                                    WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x1a,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityFixDuidHardwareType);\n-                                    if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                                      WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x1b,0x18005b008,\n-                                               g_fVelocityDhcpv6ContextBitfieldUpdate);\n-                                      if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                                        WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x1c,0x18005b008,\n-                                                 g_fVelocityUpdateErrorDumpLimit);\n-                                        if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                                          WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x1d,0x18005b008,\n-                                                   g_fVelocityDhcpSocketRaceConditionFix);\n-                                          if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                                            WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x1e,0x18005b008,\n-                                                     g_fVelocityStaticRouteCleanup);\n-                                            if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                                              WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x1f,0x18005b008,\n-                                                       g_fVelocityDhcpCaptivePortalSupport);\n-                                              if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                                                WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x20,0x18005b008,\n-                                                         g_fVelocityDhcpRenewThreadRaceConditionFix)\n-                                                ;\n-                                                if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                                                  WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x21,0x18005b008,\n-                                                           g_fVelocityDhcpv6StaleOptionRemoval);\n-                                                  if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                                                    WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x22,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDnr);\n-                                                    if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                                                      WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x23,0x18005b008,\n-                                                                                                                              \n-                                                  g_fVelocityConnectedStandbyHandlingCleanup);\n-                                                  if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                                                    WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x24,0x18005b008,\n-                                                                                                                          \n-                                                  g_fVelocityRpcMsftVendorSpecificOptionsFix);\n-                                                  if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                                                    WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x25,0x18005b008,\n-                                                             g_fVelocityDhcpv6AiBugFinderHighFixes);\n-                                                    if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                                                      WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x27,0x18005b008,\n-                                                               g_fVelocityDhcpRpcAuthnSvcUpdate);\n-                                                      if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) {\n-                                                        WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x28,0x18005b008,\n-                                                                 g_fVelocityAiBugFinderLockLeakFixes\n-                                                                );\n-                                                      }\n-                                                    }\n-                                                  }\n-                                                  }\n-                                                  }\n-                                                  }\n-                                                }\n-                                              }\n-                                            }\n-                                          }\n-                                        }\n-                                      }\n-                                    }\n-                                  }\n-                                }\n-                              }\n-                            }\n-                          }\n-                        }\n-                      }\n-                    }\n-                  }\n-                }\n-              }\n-            }\n-          }\n-        }\n-      }\n+  if (((((((((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) &&\n+           (WPP_SF_L(0x404,10,0x18005b008,g_fUseIpv6OnlyPreferred), (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0)) &&\n+          (WPP_SF_L(0x404,0xb,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityIpv6OnlyPreferredEnabledDefault),\n+          (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0)) &&\n+         (((WPP_SF_L(0x404,0xc,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpv4InformNegativeCacheFix),\n+           (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0 &&\n+           (WPP_SF_L(0x404,0xd,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpInformModifiedLeaseTimesFix),\n+           (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0)) &&\n+          ((WPP_SF_L(0x404,0xe,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityApistubStyleUpdate),\n+           (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0 &&\n+           ((WPP_SF_L(0x404,0xf,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpClassedClasslessRoutesFix),\n+            (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0 &&\n+            (WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x10,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpv6ParserFreeCleanup),\n+            (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0)))))))) &&\n+        (WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x11,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpv6MultiRecordOptionSupport),\n+        (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0)) &&\n+       ((((WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x12,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityResetUnderRenewalStatus),\n+          (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0 &&\n+          (WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x13,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityAddUserClassTracing),\n+          (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0)) &&\n+         (WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x14,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpFixEtwEventErrors),\n+         (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0)) &&\n+        (((WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x15,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpnsiv6StyleUpdate),\n+          (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0 &&\n+          (WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x16,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityRegFillParamsLoopFix),\n+          (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0)) &&\n+         ((WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x17,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityRemoveFTimersEnabled),\n+          (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0 &&\n+          ((WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x18,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpIPxlatPolicyMgr),\n+           (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0 &&\n+           (WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x19,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpOption108RenewFix),\n+           (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0)))))))))) &&\n+      ((WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x1a,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityFixDuidHardwareType), (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0\n+       && (((((WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x1b,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpv6ContextBitfieldUpdate),\n+              (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0 &&\n+              (WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x1c,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityUpdateErrorDumpLimit),\n+              (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0)) &&\n+             (WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x1d,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpSocketRaceConditionFix),\n+             (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0)) &&\n+            ((WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x1e,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityStaticRouteCleanup),\n+             (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0 &&\n+             (WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x1f,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpCaptivePortalSupport),\n+             (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0)))) &&\n+           ((WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x20,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpRenewThreadRaceConditionFix),\n+            (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0 &&\n+            ((WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x21,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpv6StaleOptionRemoval),\n+             (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0 &&\n+             (WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x22,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDnr), (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0))))))))))\n+     && ((WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x23,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityConnectedStandbyHandlingCleanup),\n+         (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0 &&\n+         (WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x24,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityRpcMsftVendorSpecificOptionsFix),\n+         (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0)))) {\n+    WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x25,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpv6AiBugFinderHighFixes);\n+  }\n+  if ((g_fVelocityDhcpv4ClassIdLenOverflowFix != 0) && ((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0)) {\n+    WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x26,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpv4ClassIdLenOverflowFix);\n+  }\n+  if (g_fVelocityDhcpv4LeaseIpAddressOverflow != 0) {\n+    if ((DAT_0 & 0x10) == 0) {\n+      return;\n     }\n+    WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x27,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpv4LeaseIpAddressOverflow);\n+  }\n+  if ((((DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0) &&\n+      (WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x28,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpGetOriginalSubnetMaskFix),\n+      (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0)) &&\n+     (WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x29,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityDhcpRpcAuthnSvcUpdate), (DAT_0 & 0x10) != 0\n+     )) {\n+    WPP_SF_L(0x404,0x2a,0x18005b008,g_fVelocityAiBugFinderLockLeakFixes);\n   }\n   return;\n }\n \n\n```\n\n\n## DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData\n\n### Match Info\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521 - dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|diff_type|code,length,address,called|\n|ratio|0.89|\n|i_ratio|0.58|\n|m_ratio|0.89|\n|b_ratio|0.89|\n|match_types|SymbolsHash|\n\n### Function Meta Diff\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: | :---: |\n|name|DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData|DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData|\n|fullname|DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData|DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData|\n|refcount|2|2|\n|`length`|324|390|\n|`called`|\nExpand for full list:Feature_58976313__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_59101910__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_60512953__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_61186233__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_61277108__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_61561226__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_CLAT_DHCP_Option108__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_CLAT_Preview2_Dhcp108Default__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_CLAT_Preview2_DhcpIPxlatPolicyMgr__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_CLAT_Preview2_DhcpOption108RenewFix__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_Servicing_Dhcpv4InformNegativeCacheResetTimersOnWakeFix__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline|\nExpand for full list:Feature_2263349562__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_3211771192__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_341032248__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_58976313__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_59101910__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_60512953__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_61186233__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_61277108__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_61561226__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_849856826__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_CLAT_DHCP_Option108__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_CLAT_Preview2_Dhcp108Default__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_CLAT_Preview2_DhcpIPxlatPolicyMgr__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_CLAT_Preview2_DhcpOption108RenewFix__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_Servicing_Dhcpv4InformNegativeCacheResetTimersOnWakeFix__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline|\n|calling|DhcpInitGlobalData|DhcpInitGlobalData|\n|paramcount|0|0|\n|`address`|180047810|180047920|\n|sig|undefined __fastcall DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData(void)|undefined __fastcall DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData(void)|\n|sym_type|Function|Function|\n|sym_source|IMPORTED|IMPORTED|\n|external|False|False|\n\n### DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData Called Diff\n\n\n```diff\n--- DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData called\n+++ DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData called\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+Feature_2263349562__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n+Feature_3211771192__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n+Feature_341032248__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n@@ -6,0 +10 @@\n+Feature_849856826__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n```\n\n\n### DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData Diff\n\n\n```diff\n--- DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData\n+++ DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData\n@@ -1,51 +1,58 @@\n \n void DhcpInitializeGlobalVelocityData(void)\n \n {\n   uint uVar1;\n   \n   uVar1 = Feature_CLAT_DHCP_Option108__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();\n   g_fUseIpv6OnlyPreferred = (uint)(uVar1 != 0);\n   uVar1 = Feature_CLAT_Preview2_Dhcp108Default__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();\n   g_fVelocityIpv6OnlyPreferredEnabledDefault = (uint)(uVar1 != 0);\n   uVar1 = Feature_Servicing_Dhcpv4InformNegativeCacheResetTimersOnWakeFix__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n                     ();\n   g_fVelocityDhcpv4InformNegativeCacheFix = (uint)(uVar1 != 0);\n   uVar1 = Feature_58976313__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();\n   g_fVelocityDhcpv6MultiRecordOptionSupport = (uint)(uVar1 != 0);\n   uVar1 = Feature_CLAT_Preview2_DhcpIPxlatPolicyMgr__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();\n   g_fVelocityDhcpIPxlatPolicyMgr = (uint)(uVar1 != 0);\n   uVar1 = Feature_CLAT_Preview2_DhcpOption108RenewFix__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();\n   g_fVelocityDhcpOption108RenewFix = (uint)(uVar1 != 0);\n   uVar1 = Feature_61277108__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();\n-  g_fVelocityDhcpv6StaleOptionRemoval = 0;\n+  g_fVelocityDhcpCaptivePortalSupport = (uint)(uVar1 != 0);\n+  uVar1 = Feature_2263349562__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();\n   g_fVelocityDnr = 0;\n-  g_fVelocityDhcpCaptivePortalSupport = (uint)(uVar1 != 0);\n+  g_fVelocityDhcpv6StaleOptionRemoval = (uint)(uVar1 != 0);\n+  uVar1 = Feature_341032248__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();\n+  g_fVelocityDhcpv4ClassIdLenOverflowFix = (uint)(uVar1 != 0);\n+  uVar1 = Feature_3211771192__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();\n+  g_fVelocityDhcpv4LeaseIpAddressOverflow = (uint)(uVar1 != 0);\n+  uVar1 = Feature_849856826__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();\n+  g_fVelocityDhcpGetOriginalSubnetMaskFix = (uint)(uVar1 != 0);\n   uVar1 = Feature_59101910__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();\n   g_fVelocityDhcpFixEtwEventErrors = (uint)(uVar1 != 0);\n   g_fVelocityApistubStyleUpdate = g_fVelocityDhcpFixEtwEventErrors;\n   g_fVelocityResetUnderRenewalStatus = g_fVelocityDhcpFixEtwEventErrors;\n   g_fVelocityDhcpClassedClasslessRoutesFix = g_fVelocityDhcpFixEtwEventErrors;\n   g_fVelocityAddUserClassTracing = g_fVelocityDhcpFixEtwEventErrors;\n   g_fVelocityDhcpv6ParserFreeCleanup = g_fVelocityDhcpFixEtwEventErrors;\n   uVar1 = Feature_60512953__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();\n   g_fVelocityRemoveFTimersEnabled = (uint)(uVar1 != 0);\n   g_fVelocityDhcpSocketRaceConditionFix = g_fVelocityRemoveFTimersEnabled;\n   g_fVelocityUpdateErrorDumpLimit = g_fVelocityRemoveFTimersEnabled;\n   g_fVelocityDhcpv6ContextBitfieldUpdate = g_fVelocityRemoveFTimersEnabled;\n   g_fVelocityFixDuidHardwareType = g_fVelocityRemoveFTimersEnabled;\n   g_fVelocityRegFillParamsLoopFix = g_fVelocityRemoveFTimersEnabled;\n   g_fVelocityDhcpnsiv6StyleUpdate = g_fVelocityRemoveFTimersEnabled;\n   uVar1 = Feature_61186233__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();\n   g_fVelocityDhcpInformModifiedLeaseTimesFix = (uint)(uVar1 != 0);\n   g_fVelocityStaticRouteCleanup = g_fVelocityDhcpInformModifiedLeaseTimesFix;\n   g_fVelocityDhcpRenewThreadRaceConditionFix = g_fVelocityDhcpInformModifiedLeaseTimesFix;\n   uVar1 = Feature_61561226__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline();\n   g_fVelocityConnectedStandbyHandlingCleanup = (uint)(uVar1 != 0);\n   g_fVelocityRpcMsftVendorSpecificOptionsFix = g_fVelocityConnectedStandbyHandlingCleanup;\n   g_fVelocityDhcpv6AiBugFinderHighFixes = g_fVelocityConnectedStandbyHandlingCleanup;\n   g_fVelocityDhcpRpcAuthnSvcUpdate = g_fVelocityConnectedStandbyHandlingCleanup;\n   g_fVelocityAiBugFinderLockLeakFixes = g_fVelocityConnectedStandbyHandlingCleanup;\n   return;\n }\n \n\n```\n\n\n# Modified (No Code Changes)\n\n\n*Slightly modified functions have no code changes, rather differnces in:*\n- refcount\n- length\n- called\n- calling\n- name\n- fullname\n\n## WS2_32.DLL::Ordinal_14\n\n### Match Info\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521 - dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|diff_type|refcount|\n|ratio|1.0|\n|i_ratio|1.0|\n|m_ratio|1.0|\n|b_ratio|1.0|\n|match_types|SymbolsHash,ExternalsName|\n\n### Function Meta Diff\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: | :---: |\n|name|Ordinal_14|Ordinal_14|\n|fullname|WS2_32.DLL::Ordinal_14|WS2_32.DLL::Ordinal_14|\n|`refcount`|45|46|\n|length|0|0|\n|called|||\n|calling|\nExpand for full list:AppendMadcapAddressListApplyOptionsToDhcpContextCheckMessageCreateInfoForNewLeaseDhcpCleanupStackDhcpEnumClassesDhcpFindDwordOptionDhcpGetPrefixLengthDhcpParseOptionListDhcpRegSaveOptionAtLocationDhcpUninitializeInterfaceDispatchPktExpandMadcapAddressListGetOriginalSubnetMaskGetSpecifiedDhcpMessageExLeaseIpAddressExObtainMScopeListProcessRecvFromSocketRenewIpAddressLeaseExRenewMadcapAddressSendDhcpMessageStoreMScopeListTryReceive|\nExpand for full list:AppendMadcapAddressListApplyOptionsToDhcpContextCheckMessageCreateInfoForNewLeaseDhcpCleanupStackDhcpEnumClassesDhcpFindDwordOptionDhcpGetPrefixLengthDhcpParseOptionListDhcpRegSaveOptionAtLocationDhcpUninitializeInterfaceDispatchPktExpandMadcapAddressListGetOriginalSubnetMaskGetSpecifiedDhcpMessageExLeaseIpAddressExObtainMScopeListProcessRecvFromSocketRenewIpAddressLeaseExRenewMadcapAddressSendDhcpMessageStoreMScopeListTryReceive|\n|paramcount|0|0|\n|address|EXTERNAL:000000da|EXTERNAL:000000da|\n|sig|undefined Ordinal_14(void)|undefined Ordinal_14(void)|\n|sym_type|Function|Function|\n|sym_source|IMPORTED|IMPORTED|\n|external|True|True|\n\n## WPP_SF_L\n\n### Match Info\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521 - dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|diff_type|refcount|\n|ratio|1.0|\n|i_ratio|0.91|\n|m_ratio|1.0|\n|b_ratio|1.0|\n|match_types|SymbolsHash|\n\n### Function Meta Diff\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: | :---: |\n|name|WPP_SF_L|WPP_SF_L|\n|fullname|WPP_SF_L|WPP_SF_L|\n|`refcount`|176|179|\n|length|44|44|\n|called|FastWppTraceMessage|FastWppTraceMessage|\n|calling|\nExpand for full list:AnyGatewaysReachableAppendWideOptionApplyStaticRoutesAsyncSelectCRpcWatchDog::StartCalculateTimeToSleepCheckIfPdcActivationDisabledCheckIfSystemSupportsAOACCheckMessageCreateRenewTimerDeleteRenewTimerDhcpAddClassDhcpAddIncomingOptionExDhcpAddMissingOptionsDhcpAppendHostNameOptionDhcpAppendOptionDhcpAppendSendOptionsDhcpApplyRoutingDhcpAssembleOptionsForParsingDhcpBuildParsedOptionsDhcpCacheScavangerDhcpClientDumpMessageDhcpComputeRetrySleepIntervalDhcpDelClassDhcpDynDnsRegisterAdapterDhcpEnumIPv4AddressDhcpEnumRoutesDhcpFindOptionDhcpFirewallCleanupDhcpFirewallInitDhcpFreeAllClassesDhcpInitGlobalDataDhcpInitStateDhcpIsIpv6OnlyPreferredDhcpMakeContextDhcpParseOptionListDhcpParseVendorOptionDhcpReadSavedConfigurationsDhcpRegClearOptDefsExDhcpRegSaveOptionAtLocationDhcpSetThreadCompartmentIdDhcpStandbyCheckAndSignalFailureDhcpStandbyGetFailureCountDhcpStandbyGetNetworkBlockedDhcpStandbyResetStatusDhcpStartRPCServerDhcpTraceVelocityDataDhcpUnicastAddressChangeCallbackDhcpUpdateContextStateAfterInitRenewDhcpV4ActivateNetworkDhcpV4ActivateNetwork_NewDhcpV4DeactivateNetworkDispatchPktEnumerateObjectsInternalEnumerateScopesExpandRegLocationFromValueGenMadcapClientUIDGetRegistryClassIdNameGetSpecifiedDhcpMessageExMadcapAddIncomingOptionObtainMScopeListOnTimeoutCallbackOpenDhcpSocketPdcDeactivateNetworkPdcInitializePdcUnInitializeProcessDhcpRequestForeverProcessRecvFromSocketProcessSingleContextReadClientIDReleaseAddressRenewAddressRenewIpAddressLeaseExRenewLeaseReplaceConfigRequestAddressRpcSrvEnableDhcpAdvancedRpcSrvIsMeteredDetectedRpcSrvQueryLeaseInfo_NewRpcSrvRegisterConnectionStateNotificationRpcSrvRegisterConnectionStateNotification_NewSendDummyDiscoverForDiagnosticsSendInformAndGetRepliesSetExpiryTimeForNonReceivedOptionsStoreMScopeListSystemInitializeTriggerAddressAcquisitionOnModernStandbyExitTryReceiveTrySetRenewalFunctionUpdateFirewall|\nExpand for full list:AnyGatewaysReachableAppendWideOptionApplyStaticRoutesAsyncSelectCRpcWatchDog::StartCalculateTimeToSleepCheckIfPdcActivationDisabledCheckIfSystemSupportsAOACCheckMessageCreateRenewTimerDeleteRenewTimerDhcpAddClassDhcpAddIncomingOptionExDhcpAddMissingOptionsDhcpAppendHostNameOptionDhcpAppendOptionDhcpAppendSendOptionsDhcpApplyRoutingDhcpAssembleOptionsForParsingDhcpBuildParsedOptionsDhcpCacheScavangerDhcpClientDumpMessageDhcpComputeRetrySleepIntervalDhcpDelClassDhcpDynDnsRegisterAdapterDhcpEnumIPv4AddressDhcpEnumRoutesDhcpFindOptionDhcpFirewallCleanupDhcpFirewallInitDhcpFreeAllClassesDhcpInitGlobalDataDhcpInitStateDhcpIsIpv6OnlyPreferredDhcpMakeContextDhcpParseOptionListDhcpParseVendorOptionDhcpReadSavedConfigurationsDhcpRegClearOptDefsExDhcpRegSaveOptionAtLocationDhcpSetThreadCompartmentIdDhcpStandbyCheckAndSignalFailureDhcpStandbyGetFailureCountDhcpStandbyGetNetworkBlockedDhcpStandbyResetStatusDhcpStartRPCServerDhcpTraceVelocityDataDhcpUnicastAddressChangeCallbackDhcpUpdateContextStateAfterInitRenewDhcpV4ActivateNetworkDhcpV4ActivateNetwork_NewDhcpV4DeactivateNetworkDispatchPktEnumerateObjectsInternalEnumerateScopesExpandRegLocationFromValueGenMadcapClientUIDGetRegistryClassIdNameGetSpecifiedDhcpMessageExMadcapAddIncomingOptionObtainMScopeListOnTimeoutCallbackOpenDhcpSocketPdcDeactivateNetworkPdcInitializePdcUnInitializeProcessDhcpRequestForeverProcessRecvFromSocketProcessSingleContextReadClientIDReleaseAddressRenewAddressRenewIpAddressLeaseExRenewLeaseReplaceConfigRequestAddressRpcSrvEnableDhcpAdvancedRpcSrvIsMeteredDetectedRpcSrvQueryLeaseInfo_NewRpcSrvRegisterConnectionStateNotificationRpcSrvRegisterConnectionStateNotification_NewSendDummyDiscoverForDiagnosticsSendInformAndGetRepliesSetExpiryTimeForNonReceivedOptionsStoreMScopeListSystemInitializeTriggerAddressAcquisitionOnModernStandbyExitTryReceiveTrySetRenewalFunctionUpdateFirewall|\n|paramcount|4|4|\n|address|180050adc|180050adc|\n|sig|undefined __fastcall WPP_SF_L(undefined2 param_1, ushort param_2, ULONGLONG param_3, undefined4 param_4)|undefined __fastcall WPP_SF_L(undefined2 param_1, ushort param_2, ULONGLONG param_3, undefined4 param_4)|\n|sym_type|Function|Function|\n|sym_source|IMPORTED|IMPORTED|\n|external|False|False|\n\n## WPP_SF_DJ\n\n### Match Info\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521 - dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|diff_type|refcount|\n|ratio|1.0|\n|i_ratio|0.93|\n|m_ratio|1.0|\n|b_ratio|1.0|\n|match_types|SymbolsHash|\n\n### Function Meta Diff\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: | :---: |\n|name|WPP_SF_DJ|WPP_SF_DJ|\n|fullname|WPP_SF_DJ|WPP_SF_DJ|\n|`refcount`|74|75|\n|length|60|60|\n|called|FastWppTraceMessage|FastWppTraceMessage|\n|calling|\nExpand for full list:CheckMessageDhcpAddIPv4AddressDhcpAddIPv4RouteDhcpClearAllStackParametersDhcpCreateThreadAndRenewDhcpDelIPv4AddressDhcpDelIPv4RouteDhcpDeleteGatewaysAndStaticRoutesDhcpDeleteIpRouteDhcpDoInformDhcpEnumRoutesDhcpGetInterfaceFromIPv4AddressDhcpGetStackGatewaysDhcpInitRebootStateDhcpInitStateDhcpNotifyDNSDhcpNotifyRouterDiscoveryOptionDhcpRenewStateDhcpRequestingStateDhcpSetInterfaceDeferringLeaseDhcpSetIpRouteDhcpUpdateIPv4AddressLifetimeDhcpUpdateIPv4RouteLifetimeDhcpV4DeactivateNetworkDisableDhcpDoDNSRegistrationEnableFallbackGetCurrentMessageSizeGetDADStateFromIpStackGetOriginalSubnetMaskGetSpecifiedDhcpMessageGetSpecifiedMadcapMessageLeaseIpAddressExMadcapDoInformObtainMadcapAddressReObtainInitialParametersReRenewParametersByBroadcastForApiCallReleaseIpAddressReleaseMadcapAddressRenewLeaseRenewMadcapAddressScheduleDhcpRenewalSendDhcpMessageSendMadcapMessageStaticRefreshParamsExWaitForOfferForDiagnostics|\nExpand for full list:CheckMessageDhcpAddIPv4AddressDhcpAddIPv4RouteDhcpClearAllStackParametersDhcpCreateThreadAndRenewDhcpDelIPv4AddressDhcpDelIPv4RouteDhcpDeleteGatewaysAndStaticRoutesDhcpDeleteIpRouteDhcpDoInformDhcpEnumRoutesDhcpGetInterfaceFromIPv4AddressDhcpGetStackGatewaysDhcpInitRebootStateDhcpInitStateDhcpNotifyDNSDhcpNotifyRouterDiscoveryOptionDhcpRenewStateDhcpRequestingStateDhcpSetInterfaceDeferringLeaseDhcpSetIpRouteDhcpUpdateIPv4AddressLifetimeDhcpUpdateIPv4RouteLifetimeDhcpV4DeactivateNetworkDisableDhcpDoDNSRegistrationEnableFallbackGetCurrentMessageSizeGetDADStateFromIpStackGetOriginalSubnetMaskGetSpecifiedDhcpMessageGetSpecifiedMadcapMessageLeaseIpAddressExMadcapDoInformObtainMadcapAddressReObtainInitialParametersReRenewParametersByBroadcastForApiCallReleaseIpAddressReleaseMadcapAddressRenewLeaseRenewMadcapAddressScheduleDhcpRenewalSendDhcpMessageSendMadcapMessageStaticRefreshParamsExWaitForOfferForDiagnostics|\n|paramcount|4|4|\n|address|18004c268|18004c268|\n|sig|undefined __fastcall WPP_SF_DJ(undefined2 param_1, ushort param_2, ULONGLONG param_3, undefined4 param_4)|undefined __fastcall WPP_SF_DJ(undefined2 param_1, ushort param_2, ULONGLONG param_3, undefined4 param_4)|\n|sym_type|Function|Function|\n|sym_source|IMPORTED|IMPORTED|\n|external|False|False|\n\n## wil_details_IsEnabledFallback\n\n### Match Info\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521 - dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: |\n|diff_type|refcount,address,calling|\n|ratio|1.0|\n|i_ratio|0.83|\n|m_ratio|1.0|\n|b_ratio|1.0|\n|match_types|SymbolsHash|\n\n### Function Meta Diff\n\n\n\n|Key|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8521|dhcpcore.dll.x64.10.0.26100.8655|\n| :---: | :---: | :---: |\n|name|wil_details_IsEnabledFallback|wil_details_IsEnabledFallback|\n|fullname|wil_details_IsEnabledFallback|wil_details_IsEnabledFallback|\n|`refcount`|13|17|\n|length|140|140|\n|called|wil_details_FeatureReporting_ReportUsageToServicewil_details_FeatureStateCache_ReevaluateCachedFeatureEnabledStatewil_details_FeatureStateCache_TryEnableDeviceUsageFastPath|wil_details_FeatureReporting_ReportUsageToServicewil_details_FeatureStateCache_ReevaluateCachedFeatureEnabledStatewil_details_FeatureStateCache_TryEnableDeviceUsageFastPath|\n|`calling`|\nExpand for full list:Feature_58976313__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_59101910__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_60512953__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_61186233__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_61277108__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_61561226__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_CLAT_DHCP_Option108__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_CLAT_Preview2_Dhcp108Default__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_CLAT_Preview2_DhcpIPxlatPolicyMgr__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_CLAT_Preview2_DhcpOption108RenewFix__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_ModernWpp__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_Servicing_Dhcpv4InformNegativeCacheResetTimersOnWakeFix__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline|\nExpand for full list:Feature_2263349562__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_3211771192__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_341032248__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_58976313__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_59101910__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_60512953__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_61186233__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_61277108__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_61561226__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_849856826__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_CLAT_DHCP_Option108__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_CLAT_Preview2_Dhcp108Default__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_CLAT_Preview2_DhcpIPxlatPolicyMgr__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_CLAT_Preview2_DhcpOption108RenewFix__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_ModernWpp__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInlineFeature_Servicing_Dhcpv4InformNegativeCacheResetTimersOnWakeFix__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline|\n|paramcount|3|3|\n|`address`|180028598|180028628|\n|sig|uint __fastcall wil_details_IsEnabledFallback(ulonglong param_1, int param_2, undefined8 * param_3)|uint __fastcall wil_details_IsEnabledFallback(ulonglong param_1, int param_2, undefined8 * param_3)|\n|sym_type|Function|Function|\n|sym_source|IMPORTED|IMPORTED|\n|external|False|False|\n\n### wil_details_IsEnabledFallback Calling Diff\n\n\n```diff\n--- wil_details_IsEnabledFallback calling\n+++ wil_details_IsEnabledFallback calling\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+Feature_2263349562__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n+Feature_3211771192__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n+Feature_341032248__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n@@ -6,0 +10 @@\n+Feature_849856826__private_IsEnabledDeviceUsageNoInline\n```\n\n\n\n\nGenerated with `ghidriff` version: 1.0.0 on 2026-08-07T15:36:44", "creation_timestamp": "2026-08-07T17:20:48.733322Z"}, {"uuid": "46d2ba03-1067-4c4f-a1c5-31cde18b1161", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2026-44815", "type": "seen", "source": "https://bsky.app/profile/lasenal.bsky.social/post/3mqnl3dfljs2b", "content": "Windows parcha una ejecuci\u00f3n remota en su cliente DHCP.\n\nCVE-2026-44815 (CVSS 9.8): un servidor DHCP malicioso env\u00eda una respuesta manipulada y ejecuta c\u00f3digo sin credenciales ni interacci\u00f3n. Ya hay parche.\n\nLeer en Microsoft \u2192\n\n#LaSe\u00f1alNews #Ciberseguridad #CyberSecurity #Microsoft", "creation_timestamp": "2026-07-15T01:29:53.410962Z"}]}