https://vulnerability.circl.lu/sightings/feed 2026-10-12T03:00:17.613016+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup info@circl.lu python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent sightings. https://vulnerability.circl.lu/sighting/48ac9925-fa4f-41f8-8314-09b9c78f0d44/export 2026-10-12T03:00:17.640289+00:00 Automation user https://cvepremium.circl.lu/user/automation {"uuid": "48ac9925-fa4f-41f8-8314-09b9c78f0d44", "vulnerability_lookup_origin": "1a89b78e-f703-45f3-bb86-59eb712668bd", "author": "9f56dd64-161d-43a6-b9c3-555944290a09", "vulnerability": "CVE-2026-19739", "type": "seen", "source": "https://infosec.exchange/users/cve/statuses/117423449756291021", "content": "CVE-2026-19739 Bluetooth LE controller leaks a retained RX node when an unexpected LL Control PDU arrives during a Connection Update The Bluetooth Link Layer control procedure code in subsys/bluetooth/controller/ll_sw/ull_llcp_conn_upd.c retains the received RX node while a Connection Update / Connection Parameter procedure waits for its instant, so the node can later carry the host notification (llcp_rx_node_retain(), which marks it NODE_RX_TYPE_RETAIN and thereby suppresses the normal recycling in ull.c). The default: arm of llcp_rp_cu_rx() and llcp_lp_cu_rx() \u2014 the \"invalid PDU, terminate the connection\" path \u2014 completed the procedure without releasing that retained node. llcp_rr_check_done() then dequeued and freed the procedure context with ctx->node_ref.rx still pointing at the retained node, dropping the last reference to it.\nA peer device in radio range can reach this without pairing, bonding, or encryption. Against a peripheral, the peer sends a well-formed LL_CONNECTION_UPDATE_IND with an instant a few connection events in the future (the node is retained and the procedure enters RP_CU_STATE_WAIT_INSTANT), then, before the instant is reached, sends any other LL Control PDU such as LL_LENGTH_REQ. ull_cp_rx() routes that PDU into the active remote Connection Update procedure, which takes the invalid-PDU path. The central role is reachable symmetrically after accepting an LL_CONNECTION_PARAM_REQ, and the local-procedure variant is reachable with LL_REJECT_IND.\nWith CONFIG_BT_CTLR_ASSERT_DEBUG enabled (its default), the resulting state violates the invariant asserted in llcp_rr_check_done(), so the two-PDU sequence produces an immediate fatal error in the controller. With those asserts disabled, each occurrence permanently loses one node from the controller's small fixed RX pool (sized from CONFIG_BT_CTLR_RX_BUFFERS, which defaults to 1); repeating the sequence across reconnections exhausts the pool, after which the link-layer receive path operates on a NULL node. The impact is an unauthenticated, remotely triggerable denial of service persisting until reboot; there is no memory-disclosure or memory-corruption consequence, since the leaked node simply becomes unreachable.\nhttps://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-19739https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/7b600129faaba8bb26dd5cb3e8f17ed1cb41ea7fhttps://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-84v8-vgp5-4vc9#zephyrproject #zephyr#CVE_2026_19739#bot", "creation_timestamp": "2026-10-11T17:27:31.439843Z"} 2026-10-11T17:27:31.439843+00:00