https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Mon, 28 Sep 2026 19:59:34 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-47708 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> SepineTam stata-mcp</p> <p>MCP-for-Stata is an MCP server for Stata to integrate Stata into an agent. Prior to version 1.17.3, the `log_file_name` parameter in the `stata_do` API and CLI is directly interpolated into a Stata command string without sanitization. The security guard (`GuardValidator`) only scans the do-file content but does not validate this parameter. An attacker can inject arbitrary Stata commands (including `shell`, `python`, `erase`, etc.) by crafting a malicious `log_file_name` containing quotes, newlines, or Stata command separators. Version 1.17.3 contains a patch for the issue.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> SepineTam stata-mcp</p> <p>MCP-for-Stata is an MCP server for Stata to integrate Stata into an agent. Prior to version 1.17.3, the `log_file_name` parameter in the `stata_do` API and CLI is directly interpolated into a Stata command string without sanitization. The security guard (`GuardValidator`) only scans the do-file content but does not validate this parameter. An attacker can inject arbitrary Stata commands (including `shell`, `python`, `erase`, etc.) by crafting a malicious `log_file_name` containing quotes, newlines, or Stata command separators. Version 1.17.3 contains a patch for the issue.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-47708 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-4p62-hqp5-g644 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: stata-mcp</p> <p>### Summary The `log_file_name` parameter in the `stata_do` API and CLI is directly interpolated into a Stata command string without sanitization. The security guard (`GuardValidator`) only scans the do-file content but does not validate this parameter. An attacker can inject arbitrary Stata commands (including `shell`, `python`, `erase`, etc.) by crafting a malicious `log_file_name` containing quotes, newlines, or Stata command separators.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>In `src/stata_mcp/stata/stata_do/do.py`, both `_execute_unix_like` and `_execute_windows` construct a Stata command string using Python f-strings:</p> <p>```python commands = f&#34;&#34;&#34; capture log close {self.generate_log_command(log_file, is_replace)} ... do &#34;{dofile_path}&#34; ... &#34;&#34;&#34; ```</p> <p>The `generate_log_command` method returns:</p> <p>```python log_cmd = f&#39;log using &#34;{log_file.as_posix()}&#34;, {replace_clause} {log_type} name({log_type}_log)&#39; ```</p> <p>Where `log_file` is constructed from user-supplied `log_name`:</p> <p>```python def generate_log_file(self, log_name: str, extension=&#39;log&#39;): return self.log_file_path / f&#34;{log_name}.{extension}&#34; ```</p> <p>The `log_name` parameter comes directly from user input (via MCP tool `stata_do` or CLI `stata-mcp tool do`) without any validation. Since the path is embedded inside double quotes in a Stata command string, an attacker can break out of the string context and inject arbitrary commands.</p> <p>Additionally, `generate_log_file` does not prevent path traversal via `log_name`, allowing arbitrary file write outside…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: stata-mcp</p> <p>### Summary The `log_file_name` parameter in the `stata_do` API and CLI is directly interpolated into a Stata command string without sanitization. The security guard (`GuardValidator`) only scans the do-file content but does not validate this parameter. An attacker can inject arbitrary Stata commands (including `shell`, `python`, `erase`, etc.) by crafting a malicious `log_file_name` containing quotes, newlines, or Stata command separators.</p> <p>### Details</p> <p>In `src/stata_mcp/stata/stata_do/do.py`, both `_execute_unix_like` and `_execute_windows` construct a Stata command string using Python f-strings:</p> <p>```python commands = f&#34;&#34;&#34; capture log close {self.generate_log_command(log_file, is_replace)} ... do &#34;{dofile_path}&#34; ... &#34;&#34;&#34; ```</p> <p>The `generate_log_command` method returns:</p> <p>```python log_cmd = f&#39;log using &#34;{log_file.as_posix()}&#34;, {replace_clause} {log_type} name({log_type}_log)&#39; ```</p> <p>Where `log_file` is constructed from user-supplied `log_name`:</p> <p>```python def generate_log_file(self, log_name: str, extension=&#39;log&#39;): return self.log_file_path / f&#34;{log_name}.{extension}&#34; ```</p> <p>The `log_name` parameter comes directly from user input (via MCP tool `stata_do` or CLI `stata-mcp tool do`) without any validation. Since the path is embedded inside double quotes in a Stata command string, an attacker can break out of the string context and inject arbitrary commands.</p> <p>Additionally, `generate_log_file` does not prevent path traversal via `log_name`, allowing arbitrary file write outside…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-4p62-hqp5-g644