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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 02 Oct 2026 12:45:12 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-100845 — MONAI before 1.6.0 Remote Code Execution via NumpyReader</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-100845</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Project-MONAI MONAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MONAI before 1.6.0 contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability in the NumpyReader class that unconditionally uses numpy.load with allow_pickle=True when loading .npy and .npz files. Attackers can craft malicious .npy files with pickle payloads that execute arbitrary code when loaded through MONAI&amp;#39;s standard data pipeline.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Project-MONAI MONAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MONAI before 1.6.0 contains an unsafe deserialization vulnerability in the NumpyReader class that unconditionally uses numpy.load with allow_pickle=True when loading .npy and .npz files. Attackers can craft malicious .npy files with pickle payloads that execute arbitrary code when loaded through MONAI&amp;#39;s standard data pipeline.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-100845</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-wg9g-w2j2-8pgr — MONAI: Unsafe deserialization in NumpyReader allows arbitrary code execution via malicious .npy files</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wg9g-w2j2-8pgr</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: monai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `NumpyReader` class in `monai/data/image_reader.py` unconditionally uses `np.load(name, allow_pickle=True)` (line 1276), enabling arbitrary code execution when loading a crafted `.npy` or `.npz` file. This affects all MONAI versions up to and including the latest commit (5b71547). The `allow_pickle` parameter is hardcoded to `True` and cannot be overridden by the user (the docstring explicitly states kwargs are accepted &amp;#34;except `allow_pickle`&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable code** ([permalink](https://github.com/Project-MONAI/MONAI/blob/5b71547/monai/data/image_reader.py#L1276)):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# monai/data/image_reader.py, line 1276, in NumpyReader.read()
img = np.load(name, allow_pickle=True, **kwargs_)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `NumpyReader` is automatically selected by MONAI&amp;#39;s `LoadImage` transform for any file with `.npy` or `.npz` extension (see `monai/transforms/io/array.py` line 68: `&amp;#34;numpyreader&amp;#34;: NumpyReader`). This means the entire standard data pipeline (LoadImage, PersistentDataset, CacheDataset, SmartCacheDataset, etc.) is vulnerable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `allow_pickle=True` parameter enables Python&amp;#39;s pickle protocol during numpy loading. Pickle is known to be unsafe for untrusted data, as it can execute arbitrary code during deserialization via the `__reduce__` method.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Compare with safe practices in the same project:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The MONAI project has already addressed similar deserialization issues in other code paths:
- `torch.load` calls now use `weights_only=True` (after GHSA-6vm5-6jv…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: monai&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `NumpyReader` class in `monai/data/image_reader.py` unconditionally uses `np.load(name, allow_pickle=True)` (line 1276), enabling arbitrary code execution when loading a crafted `.npy` or `.npz` file. This affects all MONAI versions up to and including the latest commit (5b71547). The `allow_pickle` parameter is hardcoded to `True` and cannot be overridden by the user (the docstring explicitly states kwargs are accepted &amp;#34;except `allow_pickle`&amp;#34;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Vulnerable code** ([permalink](https://github.com/Project-MONAI/MONAI/blob/5b71547/monai/data/image_reader.py#L1276)):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# monai/data/image_reader.py, line 1276, in NumpyReader.read()
img = np.load(name, allow_pickle=True, **kwargs_)
```&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `NumpyReader` is automatically selected by MONAI&amp;#39;s `LoadImage` transform for any file with `.npy` or `.npz` extension (see `monai/transforms/io/array.py` line 68: `&amp;#34;numpyreader&amp;#34;: NumpyReader`). This means the entire standard data pipeline (LoadImage, PersistentDataset, CacheDataset, SmartCacheDataset, etc.) is vulnerable.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The `allow_pickle=True` parameter enables Python&amp;#39;s pickle protocol during numpy loading. Pickle is known to be unsafe for untrusted data, as it can execute arbitrary code during deserialization via the `__reduce__` method.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;**Compare with safe practices in the same project:**&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The MONAI project has already addressed similar deserialization issues in other code paths:
- `torch.load` calls now use `weights_only=True` (after GHSA-6vm5-6jv…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-wg9g-w2j2-8pgr</guid>
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