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      <title>CVE-2026-100842 — MONAI through 1.6.0 _get_fake_spatial_shape eval() Sandbox Bypass via Attribute Chains</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-100842</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Project-MONAI MONAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MONAI through 1.6.0 contains an eval injection vulnerability in _get_fake_spatial_shape() in monai/bundle/scripts.py. The function validates shape expressions with a helper that walks the AST and only collects ast.Name nodes, rejecting any name other than &amp;#39;p&amp;#39; or &amp;#39;n&amp;#39;, before passing the string to eval(). Expressions built solely from constants and attribute, subscript, or call nodes (for example &amp;#34;(1).__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__()&amp;#34; or &amp;#34;int.__class__.__init__.__globals__&amp;#34;) contain no ast.Name nodes and therefore bypass the allowlist. Because the shape value originates from bundle metadata consumed by _get_real_input_data and verify_net_in_out (reachable through the bundle &amp;#39;verify_net_in_out&amp;#39; CLI flow), an attacker who can influence a bundle&amp;#39;s metadata can escape the eval sandbox via object introspection chains and achieve code execution in this non-default flow.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Project-MONAI MONAI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MONAI through 1.6.0 contains an eval injection vulnerability in _get_fake_spatial_shape() in monai/bundle/scripts.py. The function validates shape expressions with a helper that walks the AST and only collects ast.Name nodes, rejecting any name other than &amp;#39;p&amp;#39; or &amp;#39;n&amp;#39;, before passing the string to eval(). Expressions built solely from constants and attribute, subscript, or call nodes (for example &amp;#34;(1).__class__.__bases__[0].__subclasses__()&amp;#34; or &amp;#34;int.__class__.__init__.__globals__&amp;#34;) contain no ast.Name nodes and therefore bypass the allowlist. Because the shape value originates from bundle metadata consumed by _get_real_input_data and verify_net_in_out (reachable through the bundle &amp;#39;verify_net_in_out&amp;#39; CLI flow), an attacker who can influence a bundle&amp;#39;s metadata can escape the eval sandbox via object introspection chains and achieve code execution in this non-default flow.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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