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      <title>CVE-2026-59227 — Open WebUI: POST /api/v1/images/edit bypasses the global image-edit switch and the per-user image-generation permission</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-59227</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.8.11 before 0.10.0, POST /api/v1/images/edit required only a verified account and did not enforce the global image-edit switch or the per-user image-generation permission, allowing a non-admin user to invoke server-side image editing with administrator-configured provider credentials. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.8.11 before 0.10.0, POST /api/v1/images/edit required only a verified account and did not enforce the global image-edit switch or the per-user image-generation permission, allowing a non-admin user to invoke server-side image editing with administrator-configured provider credentials. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-59227</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-rqj7-6wrp-6g2g — Open WebUI: POST /api/v1/images/edit bypasses the global image-edit switch and the per-user image-generation permission</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-rqj7-6wrp-6g2g</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`POST /api/v1/images/edit` performed no authorization beyond requiring a verified account. Every other image-editing surface in Open WebUI enforces the global image-edit switch and the per-user image-generation permission — the `/api/v1/images/generations` route, the built-in `edit_image` tool, and the chat image-edit middleware — but the direct edit route enforced neither. A verified non-admin user could therefore invoke server-side image editing, reaching the configured image-edit provider with the administrator&amp;#39;s credentials, even when the administrator had globally disabled image editing (`ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False`) or denied that user image-generation permission. The image-editing UI is surfaced only to administrators (Playground), so the route additionally exposed an admin-only capability to any verified user.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated, non-admin user can:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- bypass the global `ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False` administrator control;
- bypass a denied per-user/group `features.image_generation` permission;
- cause the server to send billable image-edit requests to the configured provider (OpenAI-compatible, Gemini, or ComfyUI) using administrator-configured credentials (`IMAGES_EDIT_OPENAI_API_KEY` for the OpenAI engine).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No cross-user data is exposed and the provider credentials are never returned to the caller; the impact is the control/permission bypass and the associated billable resource consumption.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`&amp;gt;= 0.8.11, &amp;lt; 0.10.0` (the `/api/v1/…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`POST /api/v1/images/edit` performed no authorization beyond requiring a verified account. Every other image-editing surface in Open WebUI enforces the global image-edit switch and the per-user image-generation permission — the `/api/v1/images/generations` route, the built-in `edit_image` tool, and the chat image-edit middleware — but the direct edit route enforced neither. A verified non-admin user could therefore invoke server-side image editing, reaching the configured image-edit provider with the administrator&amp;#39;s credentials, even when the administrator had globally disabled image editing (`ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False`) or denied that user image-generation permission. The image-editing UI is surfaced only to administrators (Playground), so the route additionally exposed an admin-only capability to any verified user.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated, non-admin user can:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- bypass the global `ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False` administrator control;
- bypass a denied per-user/group `features.image_generation` permission;
- cause the server to send billable image-edit requests to the configured provider (OpenAI-compatible, Gemini, or ComfyUI) using administrator-configured credentials (`IMAGES_EDIT_OPENAI_API_KEY` for the OpenAI engine).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;No cross-user data is exposed and the provider credentials are never returned to the caller; the impact is the control/permission bypass and the associated billable resource consumption.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Versions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;`&amp;gt;= 0.8.11, &amp;lt; 0.10.0` (the `/api/v1/…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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