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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-67435 — linuxfabrik-lib: fetch() forwards credential headers across a cross-origin redirect</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-67435</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linuxfabrik monitoring-plugins&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;linuxfabrik-lib provides Python modules for database access, caching, shell execution, and API integrations. Prior to version 6.0.0, lib.url.fetch() followed cross-origin redirects while forwarding caller-supplied credential headers other than Authorization and Cookie, allowing a malicious redirect-capable server to receive headers such as X-Auth-Token from authenticated monitoring requests. This issue is fixed in version 6.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linuxfabrik monitoring-plugins&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;linuxfabrik-lib provides Python modules for database access, caching, shell execution, and API integrations. Prior to version 6.0.0, lib.url.fetch() followed cross-origin redirects while forwarding caller-supplied credential headers other than Authorization and Cookie, allowing a malicious redirect-capable server to receive headers such as X-Auth-Token from authenticated monitoring requests. This issue is fixed in version 6.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-67435</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-4jc5-g844-4x33 — linuxfabrik-lib: fetch() forwards credential headers across a cross-origin redirect</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-4jc5-g844-4x33</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: linuxfabrik-lib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
`lib.url.fetch()` follows HTTP redirects (`follow_redirects=True`). httpx strips only `Authorization` and `Cookie` when a redirect crosses the origin, so any other caller-supplied credential header (a session token such as Redfish&amp;#39;s `X-Auth-Token`, an API key, ...) was still sent to the redirect target. A malicious or redirect-capable server can therefore answer an authenticated request with a `3xx` to an attacker-chosen host and receive the credential (server-side request forgery + token disclosure). The pre-httpx `urllib` implementation was worse: it forwarded every header, including `Authorization`, across cross-host redirects.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Any plugin that authenticates to a host with a non-standard auth header and follows that host&amp;#39;s redirects can be coerced into sending the credential, and an authenticated request, to another host the monitoring server can reach. The concrete case is the Redfish checks (`X-Auth-Token`), but the flaw is in the shared `fetch()` and affects every consumer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches
Fixed in linuxfabrik-lib 6.0.0 (commit 6573ff9). On a cross-origin redirect (any scheme/host/port change other than a plain same-host HTTP-to-HTTPS upgrade) `fetch()` now keeps only benign transport headers and drops every other caller-supplied header, so credentials never follow a redirect to a different origin.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: linuxfabrik-lib&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
`lib.url.fetch()` follows HTTP redirects (`follow_redirects=True`). httpx strips only `Authorization` and `Cookie` when a redirect crosses the origin, so any other caller-supplied credential header (a session token such as Redfish&amp;#39;s `X-Auth-Token`, an API key, ...) was still sent to the redirect target. A malicious or redirect-capable server can therefore answer an authenticated request with a `3xx` to an attacker-chosen host and receive the credential (server-side request forgery + token disclosure). The pre-httpx `urllib` implementation was worse: it forwarded every header, including `Authorization`, across cross-host redirects.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Impact
Any plugin that authenticates to a host with a non-standard auth header and follows that host&amp;#39;s redirects can be coerced into sending the credential, and an authenticated request, to another host the monitoring server can reach. The concrete case is the Redfish checks (`X-Auth-Token`), but the flaw is in the shared `fetch()` and affects every consumer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Patches
Fixed in linuxfabrik-lib 6.0.0 (commit 6573ff9). On a cross-origin redirect (any scheme/host/port change other than a plain same-host HTTP-to-HTTPS upgrade) `fetch()` now keeps only benign transport headers and drops every other caller-supplied header, so credentials never follow a redirect to a different origin.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-4jc5-g844-4x33</guid>
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