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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-54014 — Open WebUI: Sibling-Prefix Path Traversal via /cache/{path} in open-webui/open-webui</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-54014</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, a path traversal vulnerability exists in open-webui&amp;#39;s cache file serving endpoint that allows any authenticated user to read files from sibling directories outside the intended cache directory, by exploiting an incomplete startswith containment check that lacks a trailing path separator. The root cause is that serve_cache_file() in open_webui/main.py validates the resolved path with file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR)) — without appending os.sep. This allows any path resolving to a sibling directory whose name begins with cache (e.g. cache_sibling, cache_backup, cached_models) to pass validation. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.6, a path traversal vulnerability exists in open-webui&amp;#39;s cache file serving endpoint that allows any authenticated user to read files from sibling directories outside the intended cache directory, by exploiting an incomplete startswith containment check that lacks a trailing path separator. The root cause is that serve_cache_file() in open_webui/main.py validates the resolved path with file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR)) — without appending os.sep. This allows any path resolving to a sibling directory whose name begins with cache (e.g. cache_sibling, cache_backup, cached_models) to pass validation. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.6.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-54014</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-j2c8-v969-8r5c — Open WebUI: Sibling-Prefix Path Traversal via /cache/{path}</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-j2c8-v969-8r5c</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A path traversal vulnerability exists in open-webui&amp;#39;s cache file serving endpoint that allows any authenticated user to read files from sibling directories outside the intended cache directory, by exploiting an incomplete `startswith` containment check that lacks a trailing path separator.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The root cause is that `serve_cache_file()` in `open_webui/main.py` validates the resolved path with `file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR))` — without appending `os.sep`. This allows any path resolving to a sibling directory whose name begins with `cache` (e.g. `cache_sibling`, `cache_backup`, `cached_models`) to pass validation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Deep traversal and absolute paths are correctly blocked. The bypass is narrow but confirmed — limited to sibling-prefix directories.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Exploitation constraints&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Constraint | Detail |
|---|---|
| Auth required | `get_verified_user` — any user with role `user` or `admin` |
| Scope | Only sibling directories starting with `cache` (e.g. `cache_backup`, `cached_models`) |
| Deep traversal | Blocked — `../../etc/passwd` correctly fails the startswith check |
| Absolute paths | Blocked — `/etc/passwd` correctly fails |
| Client normalization | httpx/browsers normalize `..` client-side — must use raw HTTP or ASGI to deliver payload |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Vulnerable function: `serve_cache_file()`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# open_webui/main.py, line 2907-2924
@app.get(&amp;#39;/cache/{path:path}&amp;#39;)
async def serve_cache_file(path: str, user=Depends(get_verif…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A path traversal vulnerability exists in open-webui&amp;#39;s cache file serving endpoint that allows any authenticated user to read files from sibling directories outside the intended cache directory, by exploiting an incomplete `startswith` containment check that lacks a trailing path separator.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The root cause is that `serve_cache_file()` in `open_webui/main.py` validates the resolved path with `file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR))` — without appending `os.sep`. This allows any path resolving to a sibling directory whose name begins with `cache` (e.g. `cache_sibling`, `cache_backup`, `cached_models`) to pass validation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Deep traversal and absolute paths are correctly blocked. The bypass is narrow but confirmed — limited to sibling-prefix directories.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Exploitation constraints&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;| Constraint | Detail |
|---|---|
| Auth required | `get_verified_user` — any user with role `user` or `admin` |
| Scope | Only sibling directories starting with `cache` (e.g. `cache_backup`, `cached_models`) |
| Deep traversal | Blocked — `../../etc/passwd` correctly fails the startswith check |
| Absolute paths | Blocked — `/etc/passwd` correctly fails |
| Client normalization | httpx/browsers normalize `..` client-side — must use raw HTTP or ASGI to deliver payload |&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Vulnerability Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Vulnerable function: `serve_cache_file()`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;```python
# open_webui/main.py, line 2907-2924
@app.get(&amp;#39;/cache/{path:path}&amp;#39;)
async def serve_cache_file(path: str, user=Depends(get_verif…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-j2c8-v969-8r5c</guid>
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