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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>CVE-2025-53002 — LLaMA-Factory Remote Code Execution (RCE) Vulnerability</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-53002</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; hiyouga LLaMA-Factory&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LLaMA-Factory is a tuning library for large language models. A remote code execution vulnerability was discovered in LLaMA-Factory versions up to and including 0.9.3 during the LLaMA-Factory training process. This vulnerability arises because the `vhead_file` is loaded without proper safeguards, allowing malicious attackers to execute arbitrary malicious code on the host system simply by passing a malicious `Checkpoint path` parameter through the `WebUI` interface. The attack is stealthy, as the victim remains unaware of the exploitation. The root cause is that the `vhead_file` argument is loaded without the secure parameter `weights_only=True`. Version 0.9.4 contains a fix for the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; hiyouga LLaMA-Factory&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LLaMA-Factory is a tuning library for large language models. A remote code execution vulnerability was discovered in LLaMA-Factory versions up to and including 0.9.3 during the LLaMA-Factory training process. This vulnerability arises because the `vhead_file` is loaded without proper safeguards, allowing malicious attackers to execute arbitrary malicious code on the host system simply by passing a malicious `Checkpoint path` parameter through the `WebUI` interface. The attack is stealthy, as the victim remains unaware of the exploitation. The root cause is that the `vhead_file` argument is loaded without the secure parameter `weights_only=True`. Version 0.9.4 contains a fix for the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2025-53002</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>GHSA-xj56-p8mm-qmxj — LLaMA-Factory allows Code Injection through improper vhead_file safeguards</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/ghsa-xj56-p8mm-qmxj</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: llamafactory&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A critical remote code execution vulnerability was discovered during the Llama Factory training process. This vulnerability arises because the `vhead_file` is loaded without proper safeguards, allowing malicious attackers to execute arbitrary malicious code on the host system simply by passing a malicious `Checkpoint path` parameter through the `WebUI` interface. The attack is stealthy, as the victim remains unaware of the exploitation. The root cause is that the `vhead_file` argument is loaded without the secure parameter `weights_only=True`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note: In torch versions &amp;lt;2.6, the default setting is `weights_only=False`, and Llama Factory&amp;#39;s `setup.py` only requires `torch&amp;gt;=2.0.0`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Version&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Llama Factory versions &amp;lt;=0.9.3 are affected by this vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. In LLaMA Factory&amp;#39;s WebUI, when a user sets the `Checkpoint path`, it modifies the `adapter_name_or_path` parameter passed to the training process.
code in src/llamafactory/webui/runner.py
&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;1040&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;image-1&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c8bc79e4-ce7d-43c9-b0fd-e37c235e6585&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. The `adapter_name_or_path` passed to the training process is then used in `src/llamafactory/model/model_utils/valuehead.py` to fetch the corresponding `value_head.bin` file from Hugging Face. This file is subsequently loaded via `torch.load()` without the security parameter `weights_only=True` being set, resulting in remote code execution.
code in src/llamafactory/model/model_u…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; PyPI: llamafactory&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Summary
A critical remote code execution vulnerability was discovered during the Llama Factory training process. This vulnerability arises because the `vhead_file` is loaded without proper safeguards, allowing malicious attackers to execute arbitrary malicious code on the host system simply by passing a malicious `Checkpoint path` parameter through the `WebUI` interface. The attack is stealthy, as the victim remains unaware of the exploitation. The root cause is that the `vhead_file` argument is loaded without the secure parameter `weights_only=True`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note: In torch versions &amp;lt;2.6, the default setting is `weights_only=False`, and Llama Factory&amp;#39;s `setup.py` only requires `torch&amp;gt;=2.0.0`.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Affected Version&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Llama Factory versions &amp;lt;=0.9.3 are affected by this vulnerability.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;### Details&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. In LLaMA Factory&amp;#39;s WebUI, when a user sets the `Checkpoint path`, it modifies the `adapter_name_or_path` parameter passed to the training process.
code in src/llamafactory/webui/runner.py
&amp;lt;img width=&amp;#34;1040&amp;#34; alt=&amp;#34;image-1&amp;#34; src=&amp;#34;https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c8bc79e4-ce7d-43c9-b0fd-e37c235e6585&amp;#34; /&amp;gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. The `adapter_name_or_path` passed to the training process is then used in `src/llamafactory/model/model_utils/valuehead.py` to fetch the corresponding `value_head.bin` file from Hugging Face. This file is subsequently loaded via `torch.load()` without the security parameter `weights_only=True` being set, resulting in remote code execution.
code in src/llamafactory/model/model_u…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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