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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 17:55:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-90307 — RDMA/srp: fix heap information leak on a truncated SRP_CRED_REQ</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90307</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/srp: fix heap information leak on a truncated SRP_CRED_REQ&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;srp_recv_done() passes wc-&amp;gt;byte_len to srp_process_rsp(). It passes
nothing to srp_process_cred_req() and srp_process_aer_req(), which read
fixed-size fields from the receive buffer without checking that those
fields were received.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The buffer size is max_ti_iu_len, which comes from the login response
and is not validated. A target that advertises 8 and then sends an
8-byte SRP_CRED_REQ makes the initiator read req-&amp;gt;tag from beyond the
end of the buffer. req-&amp;gt;tag is copied into the SRP_CRED_RSP and sent
back, so those bytes reach the target. SRP_AER_REQ behaves the same way
and also reads req-&amp;gt;lun.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The leak is 8 bytes per response. max_ti_iu_len also decides which slab
cache the buffer comes from. With 8 the buffer is a kmalloc-8 object and
the read is entirely outside it:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in srp_recv_done+0x172b/0x1aa0
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff888104714da8 by task kworker/u8:3/50
   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
  The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
   allocated 8-byte region [ffff888104714da0, ffff888104714da8)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Without KASAN the returned bytes are whatever is next in the slab. One
run returned &amp;#34;.strtab&amp;#34;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rsp-&amp;gt;data[3] in srp_process_rsp() has the same problem: only
resp_data_len is checked before it is read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Drop a request that is shorter than the structure being parsed, and
check byt…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RDMA/srp: fix heap information leak on a truncated SRP_CRED_REQ&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;srp_recv_done() passes wc-&amp;gt;byte_len to srp_process_rsp(). It passes
nothing to srp_process_cred_req() and srp_process_aer_req(), which read
fixed-size fields from the receive buffer without checking that those
fields were received.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The buffer size is max_ti_iu_len, which comes from the login response
and is not validated. A target that advertises 8 and then sends an
8-byte SRP_CRED_REQ makes the initiator read req-&amp;gt;tag from beyond the
end of the buffer. req-&amp;gt;tag is copied into the SRP_CRED_RSP and sent
back, so those bytes reach the target. SRP_AER_REQ behaves the same way
and also reads req-&amp;gt;lun.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The leak is 8 bytes per response. max_ti_iu_len also decides which slab
cache the buffer comes from. With 8 the buffer is a kmalloc-8 object and
the read is entirely outside it:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in srp_recv_done+0x172b/0x1aa0
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff888104714da8 by task kworker/u8:3/50
   which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
  The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
   allocated 8-byte region [ffff888104714da0, ffff888104714da8)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Without KASAN the returned bytes are whatever is next in the slab. One
run returned &amp;#34;.strtab&amp;#34;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;rsp-&amp;gt;data[3] in srp_process_rsp() has the same problem: only
resp_data_len is checked before it is read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Drop a request that is shorter than the structure being parsed, and
check byt…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90307</guid>
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