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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 19:14:18 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-90073 — net/sched: hhf: clamp quantum before hhf_change() to avoid overflow</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90073</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/sched: hhf: clamp quantum before hhf_change() to avoid overflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hhf_init() sets q-&amp;gt;quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) with no overflow
check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting
MTU 2147483634) makes weight * quantum overflow the signed deficit in
hhf_dequeue(), spinning forever.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp q-&amp;gt;quantum before hhf_change() so both the opt and !opt paths see
a sane quantum. Without this, bare &amp;#34;tc qdisc add ... hhf&amp;#34; succeeds with
a clamped quantum but &amp;#34;tc qdisc add ... hhf limit 1000&amp;#34; (any option
present) fails with -EINVAL because hhf_change() re-validates the
unclamped default (sch_hhf.c:559). 256 matches fq_codel&amp;#39;s floor and is
a sane minimum for a DRR quantum.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus
hard_header_len) wraps psched_mtu() into the sign bit (e.g. a dummy
device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/sched: hhf: clamp quantum before hhf_change() to avoid overflow&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hhf_init() sets q-&amp;gt;quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) with no overflow
check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting
MTU 2147483634) makes weight * quantum overflow the signed deficit in
hhf_dequeue(), spinning forever.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clamp q-&amp;gt;quantum before hhf_change() so both the opt and !opt paths see
a sane quantum. Without this, bare &amp;#34;tc qdisc add ... hhf&amp;#34; succeeds with
a clamped quantum but &amp;#34;tc qdisc add ... hhf limit 1000&amp;#34; (any option
present) fails with -EINVAL because hhf_change() re-validates the
unclamped default (sch_hhf.c:559). 256 matches fq_codel&amp;#39;s floor and is
a sane minimum for a DRR quantum.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus
hard_header_len) wraps psched_mtu() into the sign bit (e.g. a dummy
device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90073</guid>
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