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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 16:41:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-89852 — scsi: qla2xxx: Zero mailbox struct in qla2x00_get_firmware_state()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89852</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;scsi: qla2xxx: Zero mailbox struct in qla2x00_get_firmware_state()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The mbx_cmd_t is allocated on the stack but left uninitialized.
qla2x00_mailbox_command() has several early-return paths (PCI permanent
failure, device failed, EEH busy, ISP abort pending, mailbox access
timeout, purge mbox) that return without writing the input mailbox
registers back into mcp-&amp;gt;mb[]. qla2x00_get_firmware_state() then
unconditionally copies mcp-&amp;gt;mb[1..6] (and mb[12]) into the caller&amp;#39;s
states[] array regardless of the return value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On such a failure the copied values are uninitialized kernel stack
memory, which is then exposed to userspace via the fw_state and
mpi_fw_state sysfs handlers. Zero the mailbox struct so a failed query
yields deterministic zeroed state instead of leaking stack contents.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;scsi: qla2xxx: Zero mailbox struct in qla2x00_get_firmware_state()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The mbx_cmd_t is allocated on the stack but left uninitialized.
qla2x00_mailbox_command() has several early-return paths (PCI permanent
failure, device failed, EEH busy, ISP abort pending, mailbox access
timeout, purge mbox) that return without writing the input mailbox
registers back into mcp-&amp;gt;mb[]. qla2x00_get_firmware_state() then
unconditionally copies mcp-&amp;gt;mb[1..6] (and mb[12]) into the caller&amp;#39;s
states[] array regardless of the return value.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On such a failure the copied values are uninitialized kernel stack
memory, which is then exposed to userspace via the fw_state and
mpi_fw_state sysfs handlers. Zero the mailbox struct so a failed query
yields deterministic zeroed state instead of leaking stack contents.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89852</guid>
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