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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 05:34:07 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-82253 — gitoxide before 0.82.0 Path Traversal via Submodule Name Validation Bypass</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-82253</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; GitoxideLabs gitoxide&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;gitoxide (Rust crates gix &amp;lt;= 0.72.0 and gix-validate &amp;lt;= 0.10.0) contains a path traversal vulnerability. The submodule name validation function in gix-validate only checks the first occurrence of &amp;#39;..&amp;#39; via name.find(b&amp;#34;..&amp;#34;), allowing crafted names such as &amp;#39;a..b/../../../.git/&amp;#39; to bypass the check; additionally this validation is never invoked in production code paths. Combined with a trust inheritance flaw in Submodule::open(), where the parent repository&amp;#39;s git_dir_trust (Trust::Full) is cloned and the ownership verification is skipped, an attacker can craft a malicious .gitmodules file so that a victim tool built on gitoxide reads arbitrary git repository configuration (including embedded credentials) with full trust, bypassing safe-directory protections. Fixed in gix 0.82.0 and gix-validate 0.11.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; GitoxideLabs gitoxide&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;gitoxide (Rust crates gix &amp;lt;= 0.72.0 and gix-validate &amp;lt;= 0.10.0) contains a path traversal vulnerability. The submodule name validation function in gix-validate only checks the first occurrence of &amp;#39;..&amp;#39; via name.find(b&amp;#34;..&amp;#34;), allowing crafted names such as &amp;#39;a..b/../../../.git/&amp;#39; to bypass the check; additionally this validation is never invoked in production code paths. Combined with a trust inheritance flaw in Submodule::open(), where the parent repository&amp;#39;s git_dir_trust (Trust::Full) is cloned and the ownership verification is skipped, an attacker can craft a malicious .gitmodules file so that a victim tool built on gitoxide reads arbitrary git repository configuration (including embedded credentials) with full trust, bypassing safe-directory protections. Fixed in gix 0.82.0 and gix-validate 0.11.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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