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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 12:13:25 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-74673 — Input: evdev - fix information leak in evdev_pass_values()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-74673</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: evdev - fix information leak in evdev_pass_values()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In evdev_pass_values(), the input_event structure is allocated on the
kernel stack and populated field-by-field. However, it is never fully
initialized. On architectures where struct input_event contains explicit
or implicit padding (such as the 32-bit __pad field on SPARC64), these
padding bytes are left uninitialized.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When this event structure is subsequently passed to the client buffer
and later copied to userspace, the uninitialized padding bytes leak
kernel stack memory, potentially exposing sensitive information.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Similar issues exist in __evdev_queue_syn_dropped and __pass_event.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by explicitly zeroing the entire event structure with memset()
before populating its fields. This ensures all padding bytes are cleared
before the data crosses the security boundary.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Input: evdev - fix information leak in evdev_pass_values()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In evdev_pass_values(), the input_event structure is allocated on the
kernel stack and populated field-by-field. However, it is never fully
initialized. On architectures where struct input_event contains explicit
or implicit padding (such as the 32-bit __pad field on SPARC64), these
padding bytes are left uninitialized.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When this event structure is subsequently passed to the client buffer
and later copied to userspace, the uninitialized padding bytes leak
kernel stack memory, potentially exposing sensitive information.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Similar issues exist in __evdev_queue_syn_dropped and __pass_event.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by explicitly zeroing the entire event structure with memset()
before populating its fields. This ensures all padding bytes are cleared
before the data crosses the security boundary.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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