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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 15:43:56 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-64440 — staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB write in HT_caps_handler()</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64440</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB write in HT_caps_handler()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HT_caps_handler() iterates pIE-&amp;gt;length bytes and writes into
HT_caps.u.HT_cap[], which is a fixed 26-byte array (sizeof struct
HT_caps_element). Because pIE-&amp;gt;length is a raw u8 from an over-the-air
802.11 AssocResponse frame and is never validated, a malicious AP can
set it up to 255, causing up to 229 bytes of out-of-bounds writes into
adjacent fields of struct mlme_ext_info.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Truncate the iteration count to the size of HT_caps.u.HT_cap using
umin() so that data from a longer-than-expected IE is silently ignored
rather than written out of bounds, preserving interoperability with APs
that pad the element. An early return on oversized IEs was considered
but rejected: it would bypass the pmlmeinfo-&amp;gt;HT_caps_enable = 1
assignment that precedes the loop, silently disabling HT mode for APs
that append extra bytes to the HT Capabilities IE.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB write in HT_caps_handler()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HT_caps_handler() iterates pIE-&amp;gt;length bytes and writes into
HT_caps.u.HT_cap[], which is a fixed 26-byte array (sizeof struct
HT_caps_element). Because pIE-&amp;gt;length is a raw u8 from an over-the-air
802.11 AssocResponse frame and is never validated, a malicious AP can
set it up to 255, causing up to 229 bytes of out-of-bounds writes into
adjacent fields of struct mlme_ext_info.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Truncate the iteration count to the size of HT_caps.u.HT_cap using
umin() so that data from a longer-than-expected IE is silently ignored
rather than written out of bounds, preserving interoperability with APs
that pad the element. An early return on oversized IEs was considered
but rejected: it would bypass the pmlmeinfo-&amp;gt;HT_caps_enable = 1
assignment that precedes the loop, silently disabling HT mode for APs
that append extra bytes to the HT Capabilities IE.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-64440</guid>
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