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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 20:53:21 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-90153 — ksmbd: bound smb_check_perm_dacl() ACE walks by DACL size</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90153</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd: bound smb_check_perm_dacl() ACE walks by DACL size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb_check_perm_dacl() validates that the DACL fits inside the NT
security descriptor, but then bounds its two ACE walks by the
remaining NTSD length (acl_size) rather than the DACL&amp;#39;s declared
size (pdacl_size).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When pdacl-&amp;gt;size is smaller than the trailing NTSD buffer, bytes
after the declared DACL boundary - still inside the stored security
descriptor - are parsed as ACEs during access checks.  A crafted
DACL can place an access-granting ACE beyond pdacl-&amp;gt;size, and the
current code accepts it during SMB2_CREATE access validation, while
parse_dacl() and smb_inherit_dacl() stop at pdacl_size.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bound both ACE walks by pdacl_size to match the DACL boundary
semantics used elsewhere in the server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Validation:
- semantic KUnit harness shows the post-boundary ACE is selected
  before the fix and rejected (EACCES) after it
- linux master (7.2-rc6), x86_64&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ksmbd: bound smb_check_perm_dacl() ACE walks by DACL size&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb_check_perm_dacl() validates that the DACL fits inside the NT
security descriptor, but then bounds its two ACE walks by the
remaining NTSD length (acl_size) rather than the DACL&amp;#39;s declared
size (pdacl_size).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When pdacl-&amp;gt;size is smaller than the trailing NTSD buffer, bytes
after the declared DACL boundary - still inside the stored security
descriptor - are parsed as ACEs during access checks.  A crafted
DACL can place an access-granting ACE beyond pdacl-&amp;gt;size, and the
current code accepts it during SMB2_CREATE access validation, while
parse_dacl() and smb_inherit_dacl() stop at pdacl_size.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Bound both ACE walks by pdacl_size to match the DACL boundary
semantics used elsewhere in the server.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Validation:
- semantic KUnit harness shows the post-boundary ACE is selected
  before the fix and rejected (EACCES) after it
- linux master (7.2-rc6), x86_64&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-90153</guid>
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