https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 03 Oct 2026 08:47:23 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-pnpm-ghsa-vx52-2968-3vc6 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: pnpm</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>pnpm expands `${VAR}` environment placeholders in the `httpProxy` / `httpsProxy` / `noProxy` settings read from a project&#39;s `pnpm-workspace.yaml`. Because a project manifest is repository-controlled, a malicious repository that a victim merely clones and runs `pnpm install` in can route all install traffic through an attacker proxy whose hostname or userinfo embeds — and thereby exfiltrates — an environment secret such as `NPM_TOKEN` or `GITHUB_TOKEN`.</p> <p>This bypasses a trust boundary pnpm deliberately enforces: env-placeholder expansion of request-destination settings is already suppressed for `registry`, `pnprServer`, `registries` and `namedRegistries` when they come from an untrusted project manifest, and the sibling `.npmrc` reader already classifies the proxy keys as request destinations. The manifest-side guard set simply omitted them.</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>An attacker who controls only the contents of a repository&#39;s `pnpm-workspace.yaml` — a public repo, a fork, or a supply-chain pull request — can read many values out of the victim&#39;s process environment and have them delivered to an attacker-controlled host. No pre-existing access to the victim&#39;s store, global config, lockfile, `node_modules`, or environment is required. The secret is exfiltrated during config loading, before any lifecycle script runs.</p> <p>This turns &#34;I can author a project manifest&#34; into &#34;I read the victim&#39;s environment secrets.&#34;</p> <p>## Affected versions</p> <p>Introduced in pnpm 10.7.0, which added environmen…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: pnpm</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>pnpm expands `${VAR}` environment placeholders in the `httpProxy` / `httpsProxy` / `noProxy` settings read from a project&#39;s `pnpm-workspace.yaml`. Because a project manifest is repository-controlled, a malicious repository that a victim merely clones and runs `pnpm install` in can route all install traffic through an attacker proxy whose hostname or userinfo embeds — and thereby exfiltrates — an environment secret such as `NPM_TOKEN` or `GITHUB_TOKEN`.</p> <p>This bypasses a trust boundary pnpm deliberately enforces: env-placeholder expansion of request-destination settings is already suppressed for `registry`, `pnprServer`, `registries` and `namedRegistries` when they come from an untrusted project manifest, and the sibling `.npmrc` reader already classifies the proxy keys as request destinations. The manifest-side guard set simply omitted them.</p> <p>## Impact</p> <p>An attacker who controls only the contents of a repository&#39;s `pnpm-workspace.yaml` — a public repo, a fork, or a supply-chain pull request — can read many values out of the victim&#39;s process environment and have them delivered to an attacker-controlled host. No pre-existing access to the victim&#39;s store, global config, lockfile, `node_modules`, or environment is required. The secret is exfiltrated during config loading, before any lifecycle script runs.</p> <p>This turns &#34;I can author a project manifest&#34; into &#34;I read the victim&#39;s environment secrets.&#34;</p> <p>## Affected versions</p> <p>Introduced in pnpm 10.7.0, which added environmen…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-pnpm-ghsa-vx52-2968-3vc6