<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 13:06:34 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-89969 — nvmet-tcp: fix out-of-bounds write when receiving an over-long PDU</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89969</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nvmet-tcp: fix out-of-bounds write when receiving an over-long PDU&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nvmet_tcp_try_recv_pdu() reads a PDU header into the fixed 128-byte
queue-&amp;gt;pdu union, then computes the remaining payload length as&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;queue-&amp;gt;left = hdr-&amp;gt;hlen - queue-&amp;gt;offset + hdgst;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and reads that many more bytes into &amp;amp;queue-&amp;gt;pdu + queue-&amp;gt;offset, without
ever bounding the result against sizeof(queue-&amp;gt;pdu).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A struct nvme_tcp_icreq_pdu is itself 128 bytes, exactly the size of the
union. Once a header digest has been negotiated (hdgst = 4), a second
ICReq passes the hlen == nvmet_tcp_pdu_size() check but yields
queue-&amp;gt;left = 128 - 8 + 4 = 124, so bytes 8..132 are written into the
128-byte buffer -- 4 bytes past its end, over queue-&amp;gt;hdr_digest and
queue-&amp;gt;data_digest. Those bytes are attacker-controlled (an ICReq
carries no digest), and the duplicate ICReq is only rejected later,
after the overflow. A remote unauthenticated host can thus corrupt
kernel memory adjacent to the receive buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject any PDU whose declared length would read past the end of
queue-&amp;gt;pdu before the second recv.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nvmet-tcp: fix out-of-bounds write when receiving an over-long PDU&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nvmet_tcp_try_recv_pdu() reads a PDU header into the fixed 128-byte
queue-&amp;gt;pdu union, then computes the remaining payload length as&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;queue-&amp;gt;left = hdr-&amp;gt;hlen - queue-&amp;gt;offset + hdgst;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and reads that many more bytes into &amp;amp;queue-&amp;gt;pdu + queue-&amp;gt;offset, without
ever bounding the result against sizeof(queue-&amp;gt;pdu).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A struct nvme_tcp_icreq_pdu is itself 128 bytes, exactly the size of the
union. Once a header digest has been negotiated (hdgst = 4), a second
ICReq passes the hlen == nvmet_tcp_pdu_size() check but yields
queue-&amp;gt;left = 128 - 8 + 4 = 124, so bytes 8..132 are written into the
128-byte buffer -- 4 bytes past its end, over queue-&amp;gt;hdr_digest and
queue-&amp;gt;data_digest. Those bytes are attacker-controlled (an ICReq
carries no digest), and the duplicate ICReq is only rejected later,
after the overflow. A remote unauthenticated host can thus corrupt
kernel memory adjacent to the receive buffer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject any PDU whose declared length would read past the end of
queue-&amp;gt;pdu before the second recv.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-89969</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
