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      <title>CVE-2026-55512 — nebula-mesh: Unauthenticated OIDC login endpoint allocates unbounded in-memory state entries without rate limiting</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-55512</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; forgekeep nebula-mesh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. From version 0.2.0 to before version 0.5.0, when OIDC is enabled, GET /ui/oidc/login is reachable without authentication and is registered outside the Web UI rate-limited auth routes. Every request creates a fresh random OIDC state value and stores it in an in-memory map for 10m. Expired states are swept lazily, but there is no rate limit or maximum live-state cap on the allocation path. An unauthenticated remote client can therefore grow OIDC.states for the full state TTL, bounded by request throughput rather than by configured auth rate limits. This issue has been patched in version 0.5.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; forgekeep nebula-mesh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. From version 0.2.0 to before version 0.5.0, when OIDC is enabled, GET /ui/oidc/login is reachable without authentication and is registered outside the Web UI rate-limited auth routes. Every request creates a fresh random OIDC state value and stores it in an in-memory map for 10m. Expired states are swept lazily, but there is no rate limit or maximum live-state cap on the allocation path. An unauthenticated remote client can therefore grow OIDC.states for the full state TTL, bounded by request throughput rather than by configured auth rate limits. This issue has been patched in version 0.5.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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