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    <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-86755 — Snipe-IT 4.2.0 through 8.6.3 Permission Bypass via OAuth</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-86755</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; grokability snipe-it&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Snipe-IT versions 4.2.0 through 8.6.3 expose Laravel Passport&amp;#39;s auto-registered personal-access-token routes (GET, POST, DELETE /oauth/personal-access-tokens*) with only &amp;#39;web&amp;#39; and &amp;#39;auth:web&amp;#39; middleware, without the self.api permission gate that Snipe-IT enforces on its own token endpoints (/account/api and /api/v1/account/personal-access-tokens). Any user with a valid web session and the corresponding CSRF token can POST to /oauth/personal-access-tokens and mint a long-lived bearer token for their own account, even when an administrator has denied the self.api permission. The issued token is still subject to existing per-endpoint authorization policies, so this is not a privilege escalation; it defeats the administrative control intended to block API/scripted access at the user&amp;#39;s own permission level. Fixed in 8.7.0 (commit 3f74b8c), which registers overriding routes wrapped in the can:self.api middleware.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; grokability snipe-it&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Snipe-IT versions 4.2.0 through 8.6.3 expose Laravel Passport&amp;#39;s auto-registered personal-access-token routes (GET, POST, DELETE /oauth/personal-access-tokens*) with only &amp;#39;web&amp;#39; and &amp;#39;auth:web&amp;#39; middleware, without the self.api permission gate that Snipe-IT enforces on its own token endpoints (/account/api and /api/v1/account/personal-access-tokens). Any user with a valid web session and the corresponding CSRF token can POST to /oauth/personal-access-tokens and mint a long-lived bearer token for their own account, even when an administrator has denied the self.api permission. The issued token is still subject to existing per-endpoint authorization policies, so this is not a privilege escalation; it defeats the administrative control intended to block API/scripted access at the user&amp;#39;s own permission level. Fixed in 8.7.0 (commit 3f74b8c), which registers overriding routes wrapped in the can:self.api middleware.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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