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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 04:56:02 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-13089 — OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorit…</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-13089</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RITOU OIDC::Lite&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the caller does not pin an algorithm, OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken::verify sets $self-&amp;gt;alg($self-&amp;gt;header-&amp;gt;{alg}) from the token&amp;#39;s own header and then calls decode_jwt(token, key, 1, [$self-&amp;gt;alg]), handing JSON::WebToken an accepted-algorithm allowlist taken from the untrusted token. A token with alg=none yields [&amp;#39;none&amp;#39;], so decode_jwt returns the claims with no signature check, and a token with alg=HS256 is verified with the RP&amp;#39;s RSA public key as the HMAC secret (RS to HS confusion).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ID Token is the OpenID Connect authentication assertion delivered to the Relying Party. Any caller that verifies an ID Token through the unpinned load(token)-&amp;gt;verify path, or load(token, key) with only the key pinned, accepts a forged token carrying attacker-chosen claims such as sub and is authenticated as any user. Passing an explicit algorithm so $self-&amp;gt;alg is already set bypasses the header-derived allowlist and is not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that the latest version uploaded to CPAN is 0.10. Later versions are available in the git repository.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; RITOU OIDC::Lite&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OIDC::Lite versions through 0.12.1 for Perl allow ID Token signature verification bypass via a token-controlled algorithm allowlist in verify.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the caller does not pin an algorithm, OIDC::Lite::Model::IDToken::verify sets $self-&amp;gt;alg($self-&amp;gt;header-&amp;gt;{alg}) from the token&amp;#39;s own header and then calls decode_jwt(token, key, 1, [$self-&amp;gt;alg]), handing JSON::WebToken an accepted-algorithm allowlist taken from the untrusted token. A token with alg=none yields [&amp;#39;none&amp;#39;], so decode_jwt returns the claims with no signature check, and a token with alg=HS256 is verified with the RP&amp;#39;s RSA public key as the HMAC secret (RS to HS confusion).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The ID Token is the OpenID Connect authentication assertion delivered to the Relying Party. Any caller that verifies an ID Token through the unpinned load(token)-&amp;gt;verify path, or load(token, key) with only the key pinned, accepts a forged token carrying attacker-chosen claims such as sub and is authenticated as any user. Passing an explicit algorithm so $self-&amp;gt;alg is already set bypasses the header-derived allowlist and is not affected.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that the latest version uploaded to CPAN is 0.10. Later versions are available in the git repository.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-13089</guid>
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