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      <title>BREW-openclaw-cli-GHSA-cjv3-m589-v3rx — OpenClaw has Canvas route hardening for mixed-trust deployments</title>
      <link>https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-ghsa-cjv3-m589-v3rx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
This advisory tracks a defense-in-depth hardening for canvas routes. In mixed-trust or network-visible deployments, prior canvas auth/fallback behavior could broaden access beyond intended boundaries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Deployment Context
OpenClaw’s default model is trusted host + loopback-first access. Some operators intentionally expose canvas routes on LAN/tailnet. This update is aimed at those broader deployment patterns.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## What Changed
- Require explicit token or session-capability authorization for canvas routes.
- Remove shared-IP fallback paths for canvas access.
- Tighten bind/fallback behavior to fail closed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
Risk was highest in non-loopback or mixed-trust environments. In strict single-operator trusted-host setups, practical exposure is lower.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Vulnerable: `&amp;lt;= 2026.2.19-2`
- Patched: `2026.2.21` (next release target)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix Commit(s)
- `c45f3c5b004c8d63dc0e282e2176f8c9355d24f1`
- `08a7967936cfc0b2af6b27ec1f9272542648ad6c`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thanks @NucleiAv for reporting.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Homebrew: openclaw-cli&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Summary
This advisory tracks a defense-in-depth hardening for canvas routes. In mixed-trust or network-visible deployments, prior canvas auth/fallback behavior could broaden access beyond intended boundaries.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Deployment Context
OpenClaw’s default model is trusted host + loopback-first access. Some operators intentionally expose canvas routes on LAN/tailnet. This update is aimed at those broader deployment patterns.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## What Changed
- Require explicit token or session-capability authorization for canvas routes.
- Remove shared-IP fallback paths for canvas access.
- Tighten bind/fallback behavior to fail closed.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Impact
Risk was highest in non-loopback or mixed-trust environments. In strict single-operator trusted-host setups, practical exposure is lower.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: `openclaw` (npm)
- Vulnerable: `&amp;lt;= 2026.2.19-2`
- Patched: `2026.2.21` (next release target)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;## Fix Commit(s)
- `c45f3c5b004c8d63dc0e282e2176f8c9355d24f1`
- `08a7967936cfc0b2af6b27ec1f9272542648ad6c`&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Thanks @NucleiAv for reporting.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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