https://vulnerability.circl.lu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 09 Oct 2026 03:14:28 +0000 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-47418 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison praisonai-platform</p> <p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The project CRUD endpoints (`GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}` and `GET .../{project_id}/stats`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then resolve `project_id` through `ProjectService.get(project_id)` / `update(project_id, ...)` / `delete(project_id)` / `get_stats(project_id)`. None of these calls thread `workspace_id` through to constrain the lookup. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read, modify, delete, or read stats for projects that belong to a different workspace `W2`. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> MervinPraison praisonai-platform</p> <p>PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an Insecure Direct Object Reference. The project CRUD endpoints (`GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}` and `GET .../{project_id}/stats`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then resolve `project_id` through `ProjectService.get(project_id)` / `update(project_id, ...)` / `delete(project_id)` / `get_stats(project_id)`. None of these calls thread `workspace_id` through to constrain the lookup. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read, modify, delete, or read stats for projects that belong to a different workspace `W2`. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/cve-2026-47418 https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2932 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Insecure Direct Object Reference. The project CRUD endpoints (`GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}` and `GET .../{project_id}/stats`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then resolve `project_id` through `ProjectService.get(project_id)` / `update(project_id, ...)` / `delete(project_id)` / `get_stats(project_id)`. None of these calls thread `workspace_id` through to constrain the lookup. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read, modify, delete, or read stats for projects that belong to a different workspace `W2`. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py`, lines 47-108; route handlers at `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/projects.py`, lines 51-108. **Root cause:** identical to the agent and issue IDORs in this codebase. The route accepts `workspace_id` from URL, uses it solely for the membership gate, then calls `ProjectService.get(project_id)` which is `session.get(Project, project_id)` — a primary-key-only lookup with no `workspace_id` predicate. `update` and `delete` call `self.get(project_id)` first, inheriting the gap. `get_stats` likewise has no workspace check.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py`, lines 47-108.</p> <p>```python class ProjectService: ...</p> <p>async def get(self, project_id: str) -&gt; Optional[Project]: &#34;&#34;&#34;Get project by ID.&#34;&#34;&#34;…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: praisonai-platform</p> <p>## Summary</p> <p>**Type:** Insecure Direct Object Reference. The project CRUD endpoints (`GET / PATCH / DELETE /workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id}` and `GET .../{project_id}/stats`) gate access on `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` only, then resolve `project_id` through `ProjectService.get(project_id)` / `update(project_id, ...)` / `delete(project_id)` / `get_stats(project_id)`. None of these calls thread `workspace_id` through to constrain the lookup. A user who is a member of any workspace `W1` can read, modify, delete, or read stats for projects that belong to a different workspace `W2`. **File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py`, lines 47-108; route handlers at `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/projects.py`, lines 51-108. **Root cause:** identical to the agent and issue IDORs in this codebase. The route accepts `workspace_id` from URL, uses it solely for the membership gate, then calls `ProjectService.get(project_id)` which is `session.get(Project, project_id)` — a primary-key-only lookup with no `workspace_id` predicate. `update` and `delete` call `self.get(project_id)` first, inheriting the gap. `get_stats` likewise has no workspace check.</p> <p>## Affected Code</p> <p>**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py`, lines 47-108.</p> <p>```python class ProjectService: ...</p> <p>async def get(self, project_id: str) -&gt; Optional[Project]: &#34;&#34;&#34;Get project by ID.&#34;&#34;&#34;…</p> https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/pysec-2026-2932